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This project challenges a series of common interpretations of Hulme‟s work: that his 
arguments are contradictory; that his career can be separated into distinct “phases”; that he 
endorsed other thinkers‟ ideas uncritically; and that he promulgated authoritarian politics. 
Chapter 1 examines the entries in Hulme‟s notebooks that relate his views on the nature of 
reality and language. Read through ideas in the works of Bergson, Nietzsche and Ribot, these 
rudimentary notes present a coherent “anti-intellectualist” philosophical position, consistent 
with claims made in his later writings. Chapter 2 focuses on “A Lecture on Modern Poetry.” 
Hulme‟s rejection of nineteenth-century verse was part of a broader campaign by poets in 
London to find new ways of expression, yet his ideas stand independently of claims made by 
Flint, Storer and Pound. Hulme‟s greatest contribution to Imagism is the emphasis he put on 
the use of images in poetry, a method that follows from the distinction he drew in the 
notebooks between “direct” and “indirect” language. Chapter 3, which examines Hulme‟s 
essays and lectures on Bergson, demonstrates that, although he embraced Bergson‟s 
philosophical method, Hulme remained critical of many of Bergson‟s theories. This discredits 
the claim that he was simply reiterating Bergson‟s ideas. Ultimately, Bergson‟s “intuition” 
enabled Hulme to develop his earlier description of “modern” poetry and to recast it as 
“classic” poetry. Chapter 4 investigates Hulme‟s political essays. Together with Storer, 
Hulme participated in a debate in the Commentator concerning the parliamentary crisis of 
1910. It was as part of an attempt to create an efficient propaganda strategy for the 
Conservative party that Hulme postulated his famous antithesis between Romanticism and 
Classicism. Hulme‟s analysis of the process of political conversion shows that in 1910-12 he 
had not abandoned elements in his thought from Bergson‟s philosophy. Moreover, far from 
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sharing the authoritarian political views of the Action Française, he can be more accurately 
described as a “moderate Conservative.” Chapter 5 demonstrates that claims Hulme made in 
his art criticism are consonant with the general reaction in 1913-14 against representational 
art. While drawing heavily on Worringer‟s anti-materialist conception of art history, he was 
using it to defend his contemporaries‟ experimentation with geometric forms, in a way 
similar to Fry and Bell. Although, like Worringer and Ludovici, Hulme campaigned for anti-
humanism and mixed aesthetics with politics, the model of art he proposed did not carry the 
authoritarian implications of those of Worringer and Ludovici. Finally, Chapter 6 explores 
Hulme‟s war writings. Hulme was not a militarist; rather, he supported Britain‟s involvement 
in the war on the grounds that war against Germany would protect the British political 
institutions. He stayed true to his Conservative principles, using ideas from Sorel and 
Proudhon to dissociate the “democratic” from the “pacifist” ideology. There is also evidence 
that, despite his explicit rejection of vitalism in “A Notebook,” Hulme continued to value 
Bergson‟s method of “intuition” right up to his death in 1917. This project, therefore, argues 
for a re-interpretation of Hulme‟s work and shows the value of scrutinising the intellectual 






Re-Examining Hulme’s Work 
 
 
The name of T. E. Hulme reverberates widely across early twentieth-century literary 
studies. It is now a commonplace that in his short but prolific career, spanning from about 
1908 until his death in 1917, Hulme exerted considerable influence on intellectual thought in 
the early modernist period; in the words of T. S. Eliot, Hulme is “the forerunner of a new 
attitude of mind” (“A Commentary” 231), a verdict which has been repeated by numerous 
other modernist figures throughout the years. In their 1927 Survey of Modernist Poetry, for 
example, Laura Riding and Robert Graves refer to Hulme as the “Aristotle of modernism,” 
while Ezra Pound, despite later protesting that Hulme‟s importance has been overstated, 
claimed in 1932 that Hulme‟s work was epoch-defining.
1
 Likewise, Edwin Muir asserts that 
Hulme set the “tone of a great deal” of twentieth-century criticism, Allen Tate wrote in 1927 
that Hulme “defined the mood, the out-look of this age,” and Richard Curle, from his position 
as a central figure in the literary and artistic circles of the early modernist period, recalled in 
1937 that Hulme “affected everyone as a man of genius.”
2
 In later years, influential modernist 
critics from Raymond Williams, Frank Kermode, William York Tindall and Wallace Martin 
through to Michael Levenson and Jewel Spears Brooker all singled out Hulme‟s writings as 
having a significant impact on intellectual thought in the pre-First World War years in 
Britain. Williams presents Hulme as “an extraordinarily stimulating critic,” arguing that 
Hulme‟s work “requires recognition and emphasis” (195), while Kermode demonstrates in 
Romantic Image that “Hulme was ... the most influential of the cénacle” of the modernist 
                                                 
1 Riding and Graves 271; Pound, Profile 21. Pound made conflicting claims as to the part played by Hulme in 
the development of Imagism, arguing in 1939 that Hulme‟s importance had been over-emphasised (“This Hulme 
Business” 15). For a summary of Pound‟s attempts to diminish Hulme‟s reputation, see Csengeri, “This Pound 
Business” 23-25 and Douglass 23-28. 
2 Muir 166; Tate 50; Curle 276-77. 
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aesthetes of the early twentieth century (120). Both Tindall and Martin credit Hulme with 
introducing Henri Bergson‟s philosophy into the literary circles of the time, arguing that 
Hulme is the intellectual “father” of Imagism, the movement of poetry usually taken as the 
“point de repère” of literary modernism.
3
 For Levenson, Hulme‟s significance lies in the way 
he developed an aesthetic of modernism by turning first to Bergson and then to Worringer 
(39-43). Similarly for Brooker, Hulme “is more than one of the founding fathers of modern 
poetry; in all the arts, he was a prophet of and an advocate of modernism” (46).  
 
Hulme‟s work has attracted significant interest in recent years, the appearance of 
numerous articles and chapters on or about Hulme in the last decade or so prompting 
Hulme‟s latest biographer to claim in 2002 that “Hulme‟s reputation is in the ascendant” 
(Ferguson xvii). Recent studies include Ronald Schuchard‟s discussion of Hulme in The Last 
Minstrels (2008), which challenges the received interpretation of Hulme as proto-Imagist, 
and Roger Kimball‟s brief interlude on Hulme in Experiments Against Reality (2000), in 
which Kimball urges critics to re-examine Hulme‟s classicism and his anti-pacifism, without, 
however, Kimball pursuing this task himself.
4
 Furthermore, Hulme‟s position within 
modernism is examined by David Trotter in Paranoid Modernism (2001), where Hulme‟s 
“will-to-abstraction” is read in terms of the broader attempt of modernists to deal with the 
contingency and friability of their time (3). There is also Louise Blakeney Williams‟ 2002 
study of Hulme as one among a group of modernists – including Yeats, Pound, Ford and 
Lawrence – who rejected progressive notions of history in favour of cyclic views of the past, 
as well as Helen Carr‟s account of the part Hulme played in the development of the Imagist 
                                                 
3 Tindall 102-03; Martin, “„The Forgotten School of 1909‟ and the Origins of Imagism” 7-38 and The New Age 
under Orage 225; The phrase “point de repère” is Eliot‟s. See “American Literature and the American 
Language” 58. Other critics who take Hulme as Imagism‟s originator include J. McCormick 116-18, Gillies 42, 
Brooker 48, Zach 228-42, and Thacker 47-49. 
4 Schuchard, The Last Minstrels 256-83; Kimball 45-60. Schuchard‟s chapter in The Last Minstrels is, in fact, a 
revision of the 1984 essay “„As Regarding Rhythm‟: Yeats and the Imagists,” published in Yeats: An Annual of 
Critical and Textual Studies 2 (1984): 209-26. 
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aesthetic in her impressive group biography of Imagism, The Verse Revolutionaries (2009).
5
 
Finally, Comentale‟s and Gasiorek‟s collection of essays, which according to its editors seeks 
to re-examine Hulme‟s brand of modernism in a way that “offers a unique glimpse into the 
wider movement‟s fundamental contradictions, its productive excesses and complicated 




Even though Hulme‟s contribution to early twentieth-century literary theory and practice 
has received considerable attention, and his reputation as a central figure in the early 
modernist period appears warranted, fundamental questions concerning the precise nature of 
his thought persist. A brief survey of secondary criticism confirms this. Following the 
publication of Speculations in 1924, the book which, edited by Herbert Read, brought 
together for the first time a selection of Hulme‟s writings, critics quickly concluded that 
Hulme‟s work, albeit interesting, is essentially contradictory; as his first biographer put it in 
1932, Hulme “was an impressionable man [who] sympathized first with one current of 
thought and then another.”
7
 The publication of Further Speculations by Samuel Hynes in 
1955, which added to the corpus of Hulme‟s work, did little to change this view of Hulme as 
a contradictory thinker. Reviewing Further Speculations, Stuart Hampshire argued that 
Hulme‟s arguments are “eccentric”; Richard Huett called his ideas a “potpourri” indicative of 
his “erratic” thinking; and Vivienne Koch, shocked by Hulme‟s “aphoristic and elliptical 
skirmishes with linguistic problems,” dismissed his work as lacking coherence.
8
 Finding 
Hulme‟s thought incoherent and contradictory is part of a well-trodden route in Hulme 
studies. To this day, critics are baffled at the little coherence of “A Lecture on Modern 
                                                 
5 L. B. Williams 3-4, 23-38 and 74-90; Carr, Verse Revolutionaries 133-64. 
6 “On the Significance of a Hulmean Modernism” 5. 
7 Roberts, T. E. Hulme 136. Cf. Roberts, “The Categories of T. E. Hulme” 375-85. For similar opinions, see 
Anon. “The Philosophic Quest” 62-63; King [J. M. Murry] 850-51; Richards 127-38; Read, A Coat of Many 
Colours 294; and Nott 82-104. 
8 Hampshire 458; Koch 154; Huett 246. Although critical of his work, Hampshire, Koch and Huett all stress that 
Hulme‟s ideas are exciting, original and ahead of their time. 
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Poetry” and the way in which Hulme‟s defence of Bergson‟s theory of duration in “Bergson‟s 
Theory of Art” is at odds with the demand for accuracy he makes in the same lecture. 
Moreover, they note how, given that Hulme‟s “classic” poetry is premised on romantic 
notions of the Imagination, the classicism prescribed in “Romanticism and Classicism” is 
ambiguous. Thus Harmer and Sherry protest that “A Lecture” is based on opposite aesthetic 
philosophies, and Sanford Schwartz maintains that Hulme‟s argument in “Bergson‟s Theory 
of Art” constitutes a misreading of Bergson‟s durée. Roberts, Kermode, A. Jones and Hansen 
have all maintained that Hulme is guilty of practising romanticism while at the same time 
rallying against it. Richards, Nott, Krieger, Bayley, Hough, Primeau and, most recently, 
Howarth, have concurred, stressing that Hulme‟s romanticism is problematic, yet also going a 
step further by claiming that the conflicts in Hulme‟s work instruct the broader contradictions 
of modernism.
9
 Similar claims are made by Comentale and Gasiorek, Trotter and Beasley, all 
of whom are attracted to the way Hulme‟s contradictory thought, as Comentale and Gasiorek 
put it, “acts as a template for the clash and play of modernism‟s idiolects ... testifies to its 





Building on the detective work of Ronald Schuchard and Michael Levenson, who first 
determined the dates of composition for Hulme‟s “A Lecture” and “Romanticism and 
Classicism” respectively, and her own meticulous editorial labour for The Collected Writings 
of T. E. Hulme (1994), Karen Csengeri has demonstrated that much of the early criticism of 
Hulme as an inconsistent thinker is due to the confusion over the chronology of his writings. 
According to Csengeri, Hulme‟s thought can accurately be divided into distinct phases; seen 
                                                 
9 See Roberts, “The Categories of T. E. Hulme” 375-85; Kermode, Romantic Image 141-63; A. Jones, The Life 
and Opinions of T. E. Hulme 46; Hansen 355-85; Richards‟ review of Speculations 469-70; Nott 238-40; 
Krieger 300-14; Bayley 49-58; Hough 9, 32-34; Primeau 1104-22; and Howarth 34-44. 
10 See Trotter 225; Beasley, “„A Definite Meaning‟: The Art Criticism of T. E. Hulme” 70. 
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in their correct chronological order, Csengeri proposes, “The turns and changes that occurred 
in his thought ... make sense ... They are the natural changes that take place in any acute, 
enquiring mind as it learns and advances” (ed., xi). Csengeri‟s argument, therefore, is that 
Hulme is not an inconsistent thinker, but rather that his thought developed through the years 
and ideas that might appear contradictory in fact belong to different stages of his career. 
Beginning from the “nominalism” of the early notebooks, Hulme‟s ideas changed in 1909 
when he became a follower of Bergson. He remained under the influence of Bergson up until 
1912, when he began to leave elements of Bergson‟s philosophy behind him. Finally, by 
1914, Csengeri claims, he embraced a rigidly anti-Bergsonian theory of aesthetics and 
advanced ideas in politics and ethics that were sharply antithetical to the teachings of 
Bergson. Levenson holds a similar view to Csengeri, arguing years earlier that Hulme‟s work 
is best understood as consisting of different phases or periods. Although Levenson agrees 
with Csengeri that Hulme ended up turning against his early beliefs, he also maintains that 
another breach occurred in Hulme‟s thought when, in his post-1914 articles on art and war, 
he substituted classicism for a more “radical” anti-humanism (83, 99). 
 
As we will see during the course of this project, another common critical assessment is 
that Hulme is an unoriginal thinker whose importance rests in the way he disseminated the 
theories of others, such as Kahn, Bergson and Worringer. Thus Read, Roberts and Hynes 
warn against treating his ideas as original, while Carritt, Martin, A. Jones, Kamerbeek and A. 
D. Robinson present him as a mediator of ideas that other thinkers express with more clarity. 
This latter view is also endorsed by less sympathetic critics such as Mason and Hansen, both 
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of whom dismiss Hulme as a propagandist who, in Hansen‟s words, “rarely credited [his] 




Finally, Hulme is also seen as someone who promulgates radically anti-democratic 
political views. Critics cite his rejection of “Progress” and his mantra that “human nature is 
limited and imperfect,” his idea that political order should be built on the notion of Original 
Sin, and his very vocal support of Britain‟s war against Germany in 1914 as evidence that he 
flirted with the politics of the extreme Right. Watson, S. Schwartz, A. Robinson, Ferrall, 
Ardis, R. Potter, L. B. Williams, Griffiths and Olsen, all, to varying degrees, postulate that 
Hulme embraced the radicalism of the proto-fascist Action Française halfway through his 
career, while Read, A. Jones and, more recently, Susser, have traced an ideological trajectory 
that connects his authoritarian politics with his defence of Britain‟s involvement in the war.
12
 
This reading of Hulme‟s politics as authoritarian forms a central part of Levenson‟s argument 
in A Genealogy of Modernism, according to which Hulme‟s “transformation” from advocate 
of Bergson to proponent of classicism and anti-humanism marks a wider shift in early 
twentieth century from “individualism” and “anarchism” to “authoritarianism” (79). 
 
Is Hulme a contradictory thinker? Can his work be plausibly separated into distinct periods 
or phases? Does he repeat other thinkers‟ ideas uncritically? And is his politics authoritarian? 
This project starts from the twin premise that it is only by addressing these questions that 
Hulme‟s exact significance in the literary and cultural history of the early twentieth century 
can be assessed and, moreover, that in order to answer these questions it is useful to study his 
                                                 
11 See Read, A Coat of Many Colours 294; Roberts, “The Categories of T. E. Hulme” 375-85 and T. E. Hulme 
12; Hynes, ed. xv and Edwardian Occasions 123-28; Carritt 273n1; A. Jones, “T. E. Hulme, Wilhelm 
Worringer, and the Urge to Abstraction” 1-7; Kamerbeek 193-212; Martin, “The Sources of the Imagist 
Aesthetic” 196-204; A. D. Robinson, “New Source for Imagism” 238-40; Mason 215-16.  
12 See Watson 81-82; S. Schwartz, “Bergson and the Politics of Vitalism” 296; Robinson 109-11; Ferrall 17-18, 
Ardis 7; Potter 67; Williams 25; Griffiths 168; Olsen 98; Read, Introduction to Speculations x; A. Jones, The 
Life and Opinions of T. E. Hulme 148. 
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work comprehensively, in chronological order, and by taking into account the intellectual 
context in which he developed his ideas. A “classic” in early twentieth-century literary 





Beginning in Chapter 1 with “Cinders” and “Notes on Language and Style,” I investigate 
the rudimentary and often extremely implicit entries included in these texts. These two sets of 
notes represent Hulme‟s earliest known writings and, as such, an examination of “Cinders” 
and “Notes” will inevitably be informative of his thought at the start of his career. Moreover, 
a detailed study of the notebooks helps determine whether or not Hulme‟s thought underwent 
dramatic changes, as many critics claim. As I argue in this chapter, while we must be 
cautious not to treat either of these texts as finished or complete, the theories of Bergson, 
Nietzsche and Ribot provide a framework from within which to understand Hulme‟s 
fragmentary notes and help answer questions arising from a study of “Cinders” and “Notes.”  
 
I proceed in Chapter 2 to examine Hulme‟s argument in “A Lecture on Modern Poetry.” 
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. On one hand, my intention is to add to our understanding 
of the part played by Hulme in the development of the early Imagist aesthetic. Given Hulme‟s 
leading position in the “School of Images” and the common interpretation of “A Lecture” as 
proto-Imagist manifesto, it is important to address the claims Hulme makes in it in light of 
contemporaneous demands made on the part of modern poetry by those most closely 
associated with early Imagism, namely Flint, Storer and Pound. This will enable us to address 
the following questions: What are we to make of Hulme‟s claim in “A Lecture” that a new 
                                                 
13 See Kermode‟s “Local and Provincial Restrictions” 68 and his use of the term in relation to “classic” works of 
literature in “Survival of the Classic” 173-79. As Kermode explains in “The Patience of Shakespeare” and The 
Genesis of Secrecy, the term is Whitehead‟s. See 158 and xi respectively. Both Jacqueline Rose and John 
Sutherland have recently reminded us of the continuing relevance of Kermode‟s notion for the study of 
literature. See Rose 10 and Sutherland 16. 
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poetry is necessitated by the “modern spirit”? In what sense does he intend modern poetry to 
be “Impressionistic”? What does he mean when he argues that modern poetry will find 
expression as “free verse”? On the other hand, I seek to assess the critical view of the lecture 
as containing incoherent ideas and the position that Hulme‟s description of modern poetry in 
“A Lecture” is inconsistent with his discussion of poetry in “Romanticism and Classicism.” 
In this way, it becomes possible to shed light on Hulme‟s position within the Imagist 
network, but also, and more importantly for the purpose of this project, to assess how 
Hulme‟s argument in “A Lecture” relates to the rest of his work. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on Hulme‟s essays and lectures on Bergson from 1909-11. Hulme‟s 
relationship to Bergson has attracted a great deal of attention from critics who generally 
conclude that the period between 1909 and 1911 marks a distinct phase in his career, during 
which Hulme became a mouthpiece for Bergson‟s philosophy. In order to assess this 
interpretation of Hulme‟s writings on Bergson, it is helpful to consider possible reasons why 
Hulme turned to Bergson in 1909 by examining Bergson‟s reception in the Britain of the 
early twentieth century. A brief examination of Bergson‟s main philosophical tenets then 
allows for a more informed understanding of the reasons that led Hulme to herald in 1909 
Bergson as the most important and exciting living philosopher. Most importantly, the aim of 
this chapter is to determine whether Hulme repeats Bergson‟s ideas with approval, or whether 
he is more critical of the French thinker‟s theses than critics usually assume. Hulme‟s 
interpretation of Bergson is central in understanding his entire work, precisely because, as it 
will become apparent in later chapters, the ideas Hulme expresses in his writings on Bergson 




In chapter 4, I explore Hulme‟s essays on politics, focusing on the five articles he 
published in the Commentator between February 1911 and May 1912. Much has been written 
about Hulme‟s rejection of romanticism in favour of classicism, with critics usually detecting 
in his political essays evidence that, under the auspices of Lasserre, in 1912 Hulme 
abandoned Bergson as it became apparent to him that the French philosopher‟s theories were 
are odds with his authoritarian political beliefs. The aim of this chapter is to question this 
common interpretation of Hulme‟s politics. In examining Hulme‟s essays on politics, it is 
helpful to take into account the context in which Hulme launched his defence of classicism. 
Seen in light of the debate that broke out in the pages of the Commentator following the 1910 
General Elections about the need of the Conservative Party to develop a more effective 
propaganda strategy, Hulme‟s extensive discussion of the nature of political conversion gains 
a timely political significance. It is also useful to consider the articles written in the 
Commentator in 1910-12 by Storer. Like Hulme, Storer derides romanticism and advocates 
classicism in a way that his claims invite comparison with ideas expressed by Hulme during 
this time. Finally, in order to examine the common interpretation of Hulme‟s politics as 
authoritarian, it is necessary that we compare his political beliefs with the social and political 
programme of Maurras and Lasserre. 
 
Chapter 5 interrogates the critical view of Hulme‟s art criticism as a turning point in his 
thought. For many critics, the essays Hulme wrote on art between 1913 and 1914 chart the 
final stage of his transformation from Bergsonian to someone who embraced objectivism in 
art; according to Levenson, they also mark the point when Hulme abandoned classicism in 
favour of a much more “reactionary” anti-humanism. In his art criticism, Hulme directs his 
attack not on romanticism and Rousseau, but on humanism and the “Renaissance” ethic. In 
this chapter, I seek to examine Hulme‟s rejection of the Renaissance vis-à-vis the art criticism 
10 
 
of Fry and Bell, two critics who, like Hulme, were rejecting in the early 1900s what they 
interpreted as the Renaissance conception of art as representation. This allows us to examine 
Hulme‟s defence of abstract art in the context of the general shift in the art of the time from 
representationalism to experimentation with abstract forms. Hulme acknowledges in his art 
criticism that his defence of abstract art draws heavily on the theories of Worringer. As such, 
I briefly examine Worringer‟s discussion in Abstraction and Empathy in an effort to 
demarcate how Hulme‟s claims compare with the ideas of Worringer. Ultimately, this will 
enable us to gain a better understanding of what Hulme means by “anti-humanism” and, more 
importantly, of the political implications of his theory of art.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 considers Hulme‟s writings during the First World War. The letters he 
wrote at the front, published by Hynes in Further Speculations under the title “Diary from the 
Trenches,” have been largely overlooked by critics, yet our understanding of Hulme‟s 
response to war cannot be complete unless we take into account Hulme‟s recorded 
experiences of life at the war front. The specific focus of this chapter is Hulme‟s argument in 
favour of the war. By analysing the claims he makes in “War Notes,” I seek to unravel the 
reasons why he supported the war so passionately. I also examine Hulme‟s heated exchange 
with Russell in the Cambridge Magazine in January-March 1916 in an effort to assess the 
claim he makes that his disagreement with pacifists of Russell‟s persuasions was due to an 
ethical difference. Turning to “A Notebook,” Hulme‟s last known piece of work, I, finally, 
explore Hulme‟s distinction between “absolute” and “relative” ethical values, looking 
specifically at how his argument in “A Notebook” may inform his “War Notes.” Most 
importantly, I consider the political implications of the ethical order he describes in “A 
Notebook.” A close study of Hulme‟s war writings ultimately allows us to assess the 
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common critical position that Hulme was an authoritarian militarist and the view that the 
argument he presents in “A Notebook” constitutes a departure from his earlier beliefs. 
  
By returning attention to the intellectual context in which Hulme was writing, and by 
undertaking a comprehensive survey of Hulme‟s work that proceeds in chronological order, 
this project, therefore, aims above all at addressing the key questions that arise from a survey 
of Hulme criticism. While the thematic focus is Hulme‟s work, however, a survey of his 
writings promises to enlighten our understanding of intellectual thought in the early 
modernist period. This is because Hulme developed his ideas at a time of significant 
philosophical, political, artistic and historical events, including the introduction of 
philosophical currents from the Continent into the intellectual circles of Britain, the 
constitutional crisis of 1910, the Post-Impressionist exhibition of December 1910, and the 
outbreak of the First World War. All these events had a resounding effect on the intellectual 
scene of the time and Hulme‟s contributions to very topical debates in journals that were at 
the forefront of events, such as the New Age and the Cambridge Magazine, are informative of 


















T. E. Hulme‟s earliest known work consists of a number of fragmentary notes published as 
“Cinders” and “Notes on Language and Style.”
14
 The rudimentary form of these notes has led 
some critics to describe them as “cryptic” and “spasmodic.”
15
 Others find them contingent 
and allegorical, concluding that they deliberately resist interpretation, while the fragmentary 
nature of the notebooks has also been cited as evidence of Hulme‟s propensity to draw 
together ideas from various different sources with little consideration for thematic unity.
16
 
The notes‟ formal peculiarities and the fact that they were never intended for publication 
explain perhaps why they have not so far been studied in detail.
17
 There are, however, plenty 
of reasons why we should not overlook them. First, it is necessary to examine them simply 
because they exist; that is, any critic who wants to claim to have a comprehensive view of 
Hulme‟s work must necessarily take them into account. Secondly, because the notebooks 
represent Hulme‟s earliest known writings, it seems plausible to hypothesise that they are 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of the chronology of both these texts and the way in which Read‟s confusing arrangement of 
“Cinders” in Speculations has influenced the notes‟ reception, see Csengeri, ed. x-xi, 7, 23, Ferguson 31, and 
Kanetake, “„Cinders‟ and „Notes on Language and Style‟: Twin Manuscripts?” 47.   
15 Richards, [Review of Speculations] 470; MacCarthy, “A Militarist” 73. 
16 Critics who argue that the notes resist interpretation included Comentale (Modernism, Cultural Production, 
and the British Avant-garde 117-18) and Hansen (377). Read, Roberts, Hynes, and Sieburth maintain that 
Hulme‟s notes are a collection of other thinkers‟ ideas. See Read, Introduction to Speculations xv; Roberts 136; 
Hynes, ed. xi, xii, xv and Edwardian Occasions 123-28; and Sieburth 59-63. In recent years, critics have 
interpreted the notebooks‟ style of composition in a more positive spirit. Carr suggests that the paratactic form 
of the notes anticipates Eliot‟s The Waste Land (“T. E. Hulme and the „Spiritual Dread of Space‟” 96); Brown 
argues that the “collagistic” arrangement of the notes is in line with modernist poetic practices, as well as the 
works of Derrida and Ong (96-97); Shapiro likens Hulme‟s “cindery” style to the postmodernist “disruption” of 
logos (74, 246-47); and Murdoch finds Hulme‟s style akin to Sartre‟s nausea (166). 




revealing of his concerns at this early stage of his career. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, despite not elaborating on their claims in detail, many critics have shown that 
“Cinders” and “Notes” contain ideas that we also find in his later writings. For Glenn 
Hughes, Tindall, Abraham Edel and Delmore Schwartz, for example, various entries in the 
notebooks anticipate some of Hulme‟s claims in his lectures on poetry, while Roberts, 
Csengeri, Rae, and Gasiorek all find that ideas expressed in “Cinders” and “Notes” are 
informative of claims Hulme makes in his essays on politics and ethics.
18
 As such, it is 
reasonable to assume that a study of the early notebooks will contribute to our understanding 
of Hulme‟s thought and that, moreover, it will help us determine any connections that might 
exist between “Cinders” and “Notes” and the rest of his work. 
  
The aim of this chapter is to return attention to Hulme‟s notebooks and study them in 
detail. Rather than resign to the fact that Hulme‟s notebooks are entirely incoherent, I start 
from the hypothesis that the notes lend themselves to interpretation; and instead of 
concentrating on tracing possible original “sources” for the ideas expressed in them, I explore 
possible ways in which, through the ideas of other thinkers, Hulme‟s remarks in the 
notebooks can be understood.
19
 Focusing specifically on the entries that relate his views on 
reality and on the nature of language, I argue that the notes present a coherent philosophical 
position that is consistent with claims made elsewhere in his writings. I begin by discussing 
the view expressed in various entries in “Cinders” that there is no unity in the world and that 
it is wrong to try and impose such unity on it. This idea can be understood from the 
perspective of Bergson‟s critique of “intellectualist” philosophical methods. Hulme openly 
                                                 
18 See Hughes 21; Tindall 103; Edel 264; Schwartz 21-22; Roberts 138-38; Csengeri, ed. xii-xiv; Rae, Practical 
Muse 68; Gasiorek 164. Similar claims have been made by Comentale, Modernism, Cultural Production, and 
the British Avant-garde 118, 131, J. McCormick 117, Thacker 45-46, and Carr 97. 
19 For many years, it has been a common practice to try and locate Hulme‟s unacknowledged “sources of 
influence.” See, for example, Martin, “The Sources of the Imagist Aesthetic” 196-204; A. D. Robinson 238-40; 
Csengeri, “T. E. Hulme‟s Borrowings from the French” 16-27; and Rae, “Hulme‟s French Sources” 69-99. 
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embraces Bergson‟s anti-intellectualist philosophy in a series of essays written between 1909 
and 1911; seeing that in “Cinders” he holds similar ideas to his writings on Bergson proves 
that his thought is much more coherent than Martin, Csengeri and Edwards suggest, all of 
whom argue that Bergson is “absent” from “Cinders.”
20
 I move on to discuss another 
recurring view in “Cinders,” namely that language is an illusion, this time through the 
perspective of Nietzsche‟s remarks about the nature of language in “On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense.” Nietzsche‟s essay provides an interesting framework from within which to 
understand several of Hulme‟s reflections on language, while the view of language advanced 
by Nietzsche is similar in many ways to Bergson‟s mistrust of conceptual language, a 
connection which suggests further continuity between the periods of “Cinders” and the 
writings on Bergson. In the final section, I examine the distinction between “direct” and 
“indirect” language that runs throughout “Notes” by turning to the theories of language of 
Nietzsche, Bergson and, especially, Ribot. Read through the psychological theories of Ribot, 
Hulme‟s notion of “direct” language is seen as a response to the problem of language 
gradually losing its effect. It is important to examine in detail the distinction between “direct” 
and “indirect” language presented in the “Notes,” for, as we will see in the following chapter, 
it forms the basis of Hulme‟s discussions of poetry in “A Lecture on Modern Poetry” and 
“Romanticism and Classicism.”  
 
2. Reality as “cinders” 
A recurring theme in “Cinders” is the idea that it is wrong to reduce the world into a 
system or ultimate laws. It is stated, for example, that the “World is indescribable”, that it is 
“impossible to include it under one large counter such as „God‟ or „Truth‟” (9), and that “The 
truth is that there are no ultimate principles” (16). Moreover, the “desire to introduce a unity 
                                                 




in the world” is described as an “old fallacy” that “persists,” while the “unity of Nature” is 
depicted as “an extremely artificial and fragile bridge, a garden net” (11; cf. 13). The idea 
behind these statements appears to be that human intellect cannot decipher the world by 
appealing to a unifying principle and must therefore give up trying to rationalise it. We thus 
read in “Cinders” that “The truth remains that the world is not any unity (11); that “Just as no 
common purpose can be aimed at for the conflicting purposes of real people, so there is no 
common purpose in the world;” and that “There is a difficulty in finding a comprehensive 
scheme of the cosmos because there is none” (9; emphasis in original). Rather than reducing 
the world of experience into artificial laws we must accept, it is suggested, that “The world is 
a plurality.” “This plurality,” according to one fragment, “consists in the nature of an ... ash-
pit of cinders” (9), a metaphoric image which recurs throughout “Cinders” (cf. 11-12, 13, 17, 
22).  
 
Hulme does not elaborate on which specific philosophers or philosophical attitudes he 
thought were committing the “old fallacy” of introducing unity in the world. In “Cinders,” we 
find one fragment referring to “Hegelians” as philosophers who “triumphantly explain the 
world as a mixture of „good‟ and „beauty‟ and „truth‟,” with Hulme protesting that these are 
simply “symbols ... picked out and believed to be realities” (8). Another fragment states that 
“absolute philosophy” is an “absurd” invention designed to “reconcile conflicting purposes ... 
by artificial gymnastics” (13). The “true purpose” of “absolute philosophy,” we read 
elsewhere, is that of “reducing everything to number,” this being the “only rational and 
logical solution from the point of view that dares to conceive relation as of more importance 
than the persons related” (12). Finally, Hulme writes in a fragment that “The absolute is to be 
described not as perfect, but if existent as essentially imperfect, chaotic, and cinder-like,” 
16 
 
adding that “Even this view is not ultimate, but merely designed to satisfy temporary human 
analogies and wants” (9).  
 
The critique of “Hegelians” and “absolute philosophy” suggests that Hulme was sceptical 
of Idealism, specifically Hegel‟s version of Idealism. “Idealism” is mentioned in name on 
two occasions in “Cinders.” In the first, it is defined as the view that “assumes that there is 
nothing but a fixed number of persons, and without them nothing” (11). This is the definition 
Hulme gives to “Hegelian” philosophy in his article on Balford Bax, published in the New 
Age for July 1909: that, as he puts it in this essay, the “Hegelian” view ignores the existence 
of “the flux of phenomena” by postulating that “only the concept is real; positive significance 
only attaches to thought or relational elements” (90; cf. 94). In the immediately preceding 
fragment in “Cinders,” it is stated that “There is an objective world ... a chaos, a cinder-heap” 
(11; cf. 16). If we take this as a tacit objection to Hegelian Idealism, then, as in the article on 
Bax, the idea would be that it is not possible to comprehend the world without paying 
attention to the experiential “chaos” which the intellect cannot grasp. Thus understood, 
Hulme could be siding against the “neo-Hegelian” view held by British Idealist philosophers 
such as F. H. Bradley, J. M. E. MacTaggart and Bernard Bosanquet, all of whom, despite 
their many differences, regard reality as a single indivisible whole, constituted of internal 
relations – in short, an all-encompassing Hegelian absolute.
21
 As MacTaggart argues in 
Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, it is possible starting with minimal presumptions about 
experiential concepts to come to conclusions about the structure of experience and that which 
it reveals – reality – by simply transcending ordinary experience (cf. 58). The second mention 
occurs in an entry entitled “Space,” which states that “The idealists analyse space into a mode 
                                                 
21 It is likely that Hulme was familiar with the works of these philosophers. He reportedly attended 
MacTaggart‟s lectures when a student at Cambridge in 1907 (Ferguson 35), acknowledged Bradley‟s 
Appearance and Reality as “one of the most important books on philosophy” in “Bax on Bergson” (118), and 
discussed Bosanquet‟s Idealist theory of the State, which features in Bosanquet‟s The Philosophical Theory of 
the State (1899), in “War Notes” (369). 
17 
 
of arranging sensations,” the problem for Hulme being that “this gives an unimaginable world 
existing all at a point” (19). This could be read as an objection to the common Idealist view 
that space is “a form of sensibility.” In “On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the 
Intelligible World,” Kant describes space as “not something objective and real, nor ... a 
substance, nor an accident, nor a relation,” but rather as “subjective and ideal”; space, Kant 
argues, “issues from the nature of the mind in accordance to a stable law as a scheme ... for 
co-ordinating everything which it senses externally” (397; emphasis in original). Kantian 
objects or bodies, therefore, do not exist in and of themselves, but depend on the mind, which 
is the source of spatial order; external bodies are mere appearances of an underlying reality 
that eludes human senses. When Hulme writes that “The idealists analyse space into a mode 
of arranging sensations,” he may well be referring to Kant‟s view of space as a condition that 
the mind imposes on our senses to allow them to be ordered in relations, so that they can be 
grasped by our intellect as representations of objects. This hypothesis, which is the basis of 
Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason, was shared by many British Idealists, among them R. B. 
Haldane.
22
 In Pathway to Reality, a book that Hulme reviewed for the New Age in 1909, 
Haldane defines space as a “mode in which the mind presents phenomena” and “as one 
among a multitude of other relations in reality”; “forms of space and time,” Haldane 
maintains, “are merely stages or aspects in the mode of self-comprehension by the mind 
within which the whole of reality falls” (64-65). In remarking in “Cinders” that the “idealist” 
conception of space “gives us an unimaginable world existing all at a point” (19), Hulme is 
objecting, as he does in his previous mention of Idealism, to what in his article on Haldane he 
describes as Idealism‟s emphasis on the “order and organisation” of experience and its 
neglect of the “flux of sensation” (93). 
 
                                                 
22 Cf. Critique of Pure Reason par. 4-5. 
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As well as making references to “idealism” and “absolute philosophy,” several entries in 
“Cinders” mention “science” and “mathematics” as systems that “impose” unity on the 
world. In one fragment, for instance, we read that “The aim of science and of all thought is to 
reduce the complex and inevitably disconnected world of grit and cinders to a few ideal 
counters,” a method which gives an account of reality that, Hulme goes on to claim in this 
entry, is not accurate, but only “flattering to our sense of power over the world” (11). “This is 
true too of mathematics,” the fragment concludes, which “is deducible from numbers, which 
are nothing but counters”; or, as he puts it differently in another entry, “Mathematics takes 
one group of counters, abstracts them and makes them absolute” (11, 17). Here, Hulme is 
rejecting what in his New Age articles he defines as “rationalism” or “intellectualism,” two 
terms used interchangeably by Hulme to refer to the positivist idea that all epistemological 
enquiries must begin with scientific analysis (cf. 106, 99-100).
23
 Turning briefly to the essays 
Hulme published in the New Age in 1909-12, sheds light on some of the undeveloped ideas 
expressed in “Cinders.”  
 
In “The New Philosophy,” his first published article from July 1909, Hulme defines 
“rationalism” or “intellectualism” as “the abuse of the power of translating the flux of 
immediate experience into a conceptual order” and as the view that “asserts that the 
apparently rough contradictory constituents of the flux are in reality of the nature of logical 
concepts” (86). For many years, Hulme argues, philosophers have tried to rationalise the 
world by appealing to science. He describes the process in the following way: “One takes a 
little part of known reality and asserts dogmatically that it alone is the true analogy by which 
                                                 
23 Bergson described “intellectualism” as the view that is only through the intellect, as opposed to intuition, that 
we could we gain sufficient knowledge of reality, a view he ultimately associated with the tendency of thinking 
of metaphysics as science. See Creative Evolution 194. A definition of intellectualism in the sense that Hulme 
and his contemporaries used it is given by William James, who states that intellectualism is the “notion that 
logic is an adequate measure of what can or cannot be” (Pluralistic Universe 225). A detailed discussion of 
Bergson‟s and James‟ critique of intellectualism follows in ch. 3. 
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the cosmos is to be described” (90). According to Hulme, the problem with this approach is 
that it “takes a bad analogy, logic and the geometric sciences ... and asserts that the flux of 
phenomena which apparently contradicts this is not real, and can really be resolved into 
logical concepts” (90). Because the intellect could never capture the “flux” of life, he 
postulates that an account of reality based on purely intellectual means is insufficient. 
Hulme‟s objection to rationalism and intellectualism in “The New Philosophy,” therefore, is 
that they fail to explain the true nature of consciousness, or to give an accurate picture of the 
world.  
 
In “The New Philosophy,” intellectualism as a philosophical method is traced back to 
Socrates and Plato, for whom, Hulme claims, “reality consisted of „essences‟ or ideas, which 
could be discovered by definition” (86; cf. 111), while in “Notes of Bergson,” a series of 
articles published in the New Age between October 1911 and February 1912, he mentions as 
examples of intellectualist philosophers Spinoza, Laplace, Huxley and Spencer (140). Hulme 
also argues in “The New Philosophy” that the idea that reality can be rationalised in terms of 
easily definable propositions lies at the heart of Kant‟s philosophy, which “slightly curtailed 
its pretensions to define reality „an sich‟, but only partly” (86), as well as in “Hegelian 
panlogism” (90); in modern times, it “survives ... in science” (86). In “Cinders,” Hulme 
directs his criticism at an equally broad spectrum of philosophers and philosophical attitudes, 
with “Hegelians,” “absolute philosophy,” “idealists,” “moralists” and “capital letterists,” 
“science” and “mathematics” all coming under attack (cf. 10-11, 17). The explanation for this 
is that, as in his New Age articles, in “Cinders” Hulme is not dismissing one specific 
philosophical school in particular, but, rather, the entire philosophical tradition that he claims 
runs from Socrates and Plato through to positivists such as Laplace; what all of these 
philosophers have in common is that they all turned to science in search for an adequate 
20 
 
philosophical method. Despite their pronounced antipathy, Hulme seems to be saying, both 
Idealism and Positivism are based on the same presupposition: that the world can be analysed 
through rational or intellectual means. The difference is that Positivism focuses on analysing 
antecedent conditions in order to deduce what he calls in “Cinders” the “unifying principles” 
of the world, whereas Idealism is predicated on the belief that the world can be understood by 
reference to a pre-arranged teleology. To use his own metaphor from “Cinders,” what all 
systems of thought – Idealist or Positivist – have in common, is that they try to “find a 
framework outside the flux, a solid bank for the river, a pier rather than a raft” (10). 
 
Hulme‟s sweeping dismissal of “idealism,” “science” and “mathematics” as “rationalist” 
or “intellectualist” philosophies in equal measure is undoubtedly problematic. Not only is his 
definition of rationalism and intellectualism so broad it runs the risk of being empty, but, 
more crucially, he fails to discriminate between the different approaches to logic of Idealists 
like Bax and Haldane and the Cambridge analytics philosophers who were using logic 
“therapeutically.”
24
 Nevertheless, his position appears to be fairly consistent, especially when 
read through Bergson‟s critique of “intellectualism,” an all-encompassing term used by 
Bergson to describe the entire philosophical tradition that precedes him. Bergson‟s “anti-
intellectualist” metaphysics is examined in more detail in Chapter 3, but it is worth pointing 
out here that, like Hulme in “Cinders,” Bergson dismisses a series of philosophical views, 
including Realism, Idealism and Mechanism, on the grounds that they are based on a 
common axiom, namely that philosophical problems can be solved through intellectual 
means, as opposed to via intuition, Bergson‟s trademark philosophical method. Hulme 
endorses Bergson‟s critique of intellectualism in the New Age articles, where he praises the 
way the French philosopher has delivered the final blow to rationalist philosophies. By 
                                                 
24 For three enlightening accounts of how the analytic philosophers took an alternative approach to their Idealist 
counterparts by using language as a guide to reality, see Hylton 171-269, Dummett 4-14, and Baker and Hacker, 
Language, Sense and Nonsense 19-39. 
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contrast to what in his article on Gaultier he describes as “critics of science” (101), Bergson‟s 
metaphysical theory, Hulme argues in “The New Philosophy,” does not impose an artificial 
unity on the world, but offers an accurate picture of the world by taking into account the 
experiential flux which the intellect could not grasp (87). Seen in this way, Bergson‟s two 
key ideas – that it is wrong to attempt to impose an artificial order on the “flux” of life and 
that the confusion of artifice with reality leads to a fallacious picture of reality – form the 
unifying theme of “Cinders.”  
 
Even though Bergson is not mentioned by name in any of the notes, the ideas repeatedly 
articulated in “Cinders” – that the true world of experience resembles a “cinder-heap,” that 
notions of unity and truth are “artificial,” and that the flux of experience cannot be 
rationalised – are the very tenets of Bergson‟s philosophy which Hulme endorses in the New 
Age articles. As in “Cinders,” for example, in “The New Philosophy” Hulme sets the 
“constructions of the logical intellect” against Bergson‟s view of reality as a “complicated, 
intertwined, inextricable flux of reality” and “a chaotic cinder heap” (86). Indeed, Bergson 
describes reality in similar terms to Hulme, comparing in Creative Evolution the movement 
of the creating élan vital to what Arthur Mitchell translates as “an action that is unmaking 
itself ... like the fiery path torn by the last rocket of a fireworks display through the black 
cinders of the spent rockets that are falling dead” (251).
25
 In “The New Philosophy,” Hulme 
also insists that Bergson‟s great lesson is that “Logic has use in real life, but it has not that of 
making us theoretically acquainted with the essential nature of reality” (87), an idea that runs 
throughout “Cinders” – we read, for instance, that “Symbols” exist “for the convenience of 
men,” that “science” and “all thought” serves only to give a false “ungritlike [sic] picture of 
                                                 
25 This point is made by Rae in Practical Muse 61.  
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reality,” and that despite the best attempts of “logic,” there can be “no unity” (8, 11, 17).
26
 
Finally, according to the argument Hulme puts forward in “The New Philosophy,” “Reality 
has a fullness of content that no conceptual description can equal” and the “„immédiatement 
donnée‟ ... is the only absolute with which philosophy can legitimately deal” (87); both these 
claims chime perfectly with the views expressed in “Cinders,” according to which the world 
is “indescribable” (9) and the only reality that exists is the “flux” of experience (cf. 10). That 
Hulme‟s representations of the world in “Cinders” and in his essays on Bergson overlap 
shows that, understood from the perspective of Hulme‟s interpretation of Bergson, “Cinders” 
presents a fairly coherent picture of reality; more importantly, it attests to the fact that 
Hulme‟s campaign against intellectualism was under way since the days of “Cinders.”  
 
3. Language as “gossamer web” 
In addition to remarks about the nature of reality as experiential “flux,” in “Cinders” there 
are also a number of entries that are specifically concerned with language – its role and its 
function in human lives. Language is described as a communicative tool, a human construct 
created solely to enable communication. It is also stated that gradually all words lose their 
meaning, a process that results in what Hulme terms the “disease of language,” whereby we 
use words whose meaning has been exhausted (cf. 8). Finally, various fragments express the 
view that language is misleading and that we must therefore be cautious not to take words as 
“realities,” as one fragment in “Cinders” explains (8). This idea is also present in “Notes,” 
where, however, as we will see later on in this chapter, the emphasis is on ways through 
which language can be made to be more “real.” Hulme‟s reflections on language in “Cinders” 
and “Notes” are best understood from the perspective of Nietzsche‟s argument in “On Truth 
and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.” As far as I know, no critic has approached the notebooks 
                                                 
26 Cf. the fragment in “Notes” that describes logic “only an analogy to counter-pushing” (35). 
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from such angle, yet Nietzsche is the most mentioned philosopher in the notebooks, while he 
is also a philosopher whom Hulme regarded as an intellectual ally, crediting him in “The 
New Philosophy” for launching the “first radical attack” against rationalism and praising him 
for paving the way for Bergson‟s “defeat of the old intellectualist philosophy” (85-86). 
 
One of the fragments that appear early on in “Cinders” states: 
 
There is a kind of gossamer web, woven between the real things, and by this means the 
animals communicate. For purposes of communication they invent a symbolic 
language. Afterwards this language, used to excess, becomes a disease, and we get the 
curious phenomena of men explaining themselves by means of the gossamer web that 
connects them. Language becomes a disease in the hands of the counter-word mongers. 
It must constantly be remembered that it is an invention for the convenience of men ... 
Symbols are picked out and believed to be realities ... words are merely counters 
representing vague groups of things, to be moved about on a board for the convenience 
of the players. (8)  
 
The syllogism here is that humans understand the world filtered through language; moreover, 
because language is “symbolic,” humans‟ understanding of reality is removed from the “real 
things” that language claims to represent. According to the evolutionary process of language 
suggested in this entry, words, initially conceived as communicative tools, end up being 
mistakenly taken to mirror reality – hence the phenomenon of the “disease of language.” We 
encounter a similar idea in “Notes,” where Hulme writes that, for purposes of 
communication, “real things are replaced by symbols” in a way similar to substitutions of 
variables with their values in algebra (23; cf. 24). It is also stated in “Notes” that it is a 
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“fallacy” to think that language is logical – for, “Phrases have meaning for no reason” (28), 
and language is a “Large clumsy instrument” that “does not naturally come with meaning” 
(29; cf. 32). As I will discuss in chapter 2, this view of language found its way in Hulme‟s 
discussion of poetry in “A Lecture on Modern Poetry,” where conventional language is 
described as a series of “figures of speech” (55), as well as in “Romanticism and Classicism,” 
where Hulme argues that “language is by its very nature a communal thing ... it expresses 
never the exact thing but a compromise” (68; cf. 70).  
 
Hulme‟s account of language in “Cinders” echoes Nietzsche‟s argument in his 1873 essay 
“On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.” This essay, which remained unpublished 
throughout Nietzsche‟s life, but which sums up nicely Nietzsche‟s early view of language, 
illuminates the following ideas expressed in “Cinders” and “Notes”: that language is invented 
for “purposes of communication”; that it gradually loses its capacity to represent – as Hulme 
puts it, “language, used to excess, becomes a disease, and we get the curious phenomena of 
men explaining themselves by means of the gossamer web that connects them”; and, finally, 
that words such as “truth” or “beauty” resemble empty tokens – or as Hulme phrases it, 
“merely counters representing vague groups of things” (8).
27
 A brief outline of the argument 
in “On Truth and Lies” highlights the proximity of Hulme‟s ideas regarding language to 
Nietzsche‟s view of language.  
 
                                                 
27 A version of this essay was made available after Nietzsche‟s death, together with other drafts and notes, in 
Nietzsches Werke (Grossoktavausgabe), during 1894-1904 (10: 189-215). A more complete version appeared in 
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 1967 (1: 873-91). For a discussion of the essay‟s textual history, 
see Breazeale, ed. lx and Kaufman 485-87. While Clark and, to a lesser degree, Nehamas hold that the ideas 
expressed in the essay contradict his later writings, Klein maintains that Nietzsche‟s analysis of language in the 
essay is in line with his more mature philosophy and that, in fact, it underlies his entire work. See Clark 105; 
Nehamas 246n6; and Klein 57-62. For other critics who share Klein‟s opinion that the argument in “On Truth 
and Lies” underpins the entire of Nietzsche‟s philosophy, see Lacoue-Labarthe 15; de Man 103-04; Schrift 124-
43; and Hillis Miller 41-54. 
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For Nietzsche, language consists of arbitrary signs designating abstract entities that do not 
correspond to reality but whose structure is entirely tropological. According to the genealogy 
presented in “On Truth and Lies,” their first contact with the physical world initiated in 
humans a nerve stimulus, which they then transferred onto an image and, ultimately, imitated 
in sound (116). Gradually, these noises were developed into a more advanced system of 
language, as “from boredom and necessity” humans wished to participate in a community. 
They thus assigned commonly agreed conceptions and meanings to words and, in this way, 
language was invented (115, 118). Unfortunately, Nietzsche argues, somewhere during this 
process we forgot that language is simply a system of metaphors and the consequence of this 
is that language became truth; as he puts it in his essay, from this moment on, “that which 
shall count as „truth‟ ... is established … a uniformly valid and binding designation is 
invented for things, and this legislation of language … establishes the first laws of truth” 
(115).  
 
The view of language as originating in a process of instantiation and forgetting is not 
unique to Nietzsche. It is shared, for instance, by Descartes, Locke and Kant, as well as by 
Lange, Hartmann, Gerber, all of whom endorse the view that an inevitable and irreversible 
separation or difference exists between the “thing in itself,” the originary subjective 
experience of the world, and its conceptualisation or abstraction.
28
 Moreover, as Nietzsche 
recognised himself, it dates at least as far back as Plato‟s distinction between eidē and ideai, 
specifically, to the way that for Plato the exchange of effect and cause is indicative of the 
                                                 
28 For an account of the dominant philosophical views of language in Nietzsche‟s time, see Klein 66-74. On the 
similarities between Nietzsche‟s view of language and those of Kant, Lange and Hartman, see Crawford 97-100. 
For Nietzsche‟s relation to Gerber, see Liebscher 247-49 and Crawford 199-219. As Bruns shows, the idea that 
there is an image behind words is a motif that runs from Plato through to William of Ockham in the fourteenth 
century (16-17, 34). According to Baker and Hacker, a similar view of language has dominated post-Cartesian 




metonymic exchange of perceptions with ideas.
29
 According to Crawford, however, more 
than any other philosopher, Nietzsche is indebted to Schopenhauer, whose influence on his 
work Nietzsche acknowledged early in his career.
30
 Turning briefly to Schopenhauer‟s view 
of language helps understand the precise nature of Nietzsche‟s argument and, therefore, 
allows us to compare Nietzsche‟s and Hulme‟s arguments in an informed manner. 
 
Schopenhauer holds that it is impossible to know the “thing in itself,” that which exists 
outside the subject: for the subject can only know his own perception and what he 
conceptualises about these perceptions as objects. Yet, Schopenhauer allows that first 
perception enables a more direct relationship with the “thing in itself” than abstraction and, 
thus, also language, which, according to Schopenhauer, is a product of abstraction. Starting 
from intuitive, complete and empirical representations, humans, Schopenhauer argues, 
perceive the world by reducing first impressions into component parts, “in order to think each 
of these parts as different qualities of, or relations between, things” (On the Fourfold Root of 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason 115-16). Language plays a detrimental part in this 
metaphoric process, as words are understood as signs used to aid the reduction of knowledge 
that is gathered through perception. We thus move successively from the “thing in itself” to 
sensation and the image it gives rise to in perception to, finally, abstraction and words, where 
the image or impression is “fixed” in a concept through language. This process creates a 
scheme whereby direct impressions gathered through perception possess a closer affinity to 
the “thing in itself” than concepts and words gathered in the process of abstraction. Hence 
perception for Schopenhauer is, as he states in World as Will and Representation, “the source 
of all knowledge” and “itself knowledge „par excellence,‟” as “it alone is the unconditionally 
                                                 
29 Cf. “Description of Ancient Rhetoric” 59, qtd. in Klein 6-7. 
30 Nietzsche describes Schopenhauer as “my first and only educator” in Human, All Too Human 209. For fuller 




true genuine knowledge [that] imparts insight proper” (2: 77; emphasis in original). By 
contrast, concepts are “phantasms” or “representations of representations” that “cling” to the 
subject; they are “abstract” and “discursive,” “attainable and intelligible” by those who 
possess “the faculty of reason.”
31
 It thus follows that language, in existing solely to help 
reduce knowledge gathered through perception, “does not … bring anything new to light” 
(On the Fourfold Root 123); worse, “since it forces the infinitely shaded, mobile, and 
modifiable idea into certain rigid, permanent forms … fixing the idea it at the same time 
fetters it” (World as Will and Representation 2: 64). 
 
Nietzsche‟s “On Truth and Lies” postulates a similar view of language to Schopenhauer. 
Originally an unconscious and instinctual process, language for Nietzsche gradually came to 
consist of only concepts that are by definition removed from the “thing in itself”: for, 
although the first metaphor is “individual and without equals,” as soon as it is translated into 
communal language it loses its uniqueness, succumbing to convention and becoming what 
Nietzsche calls “herd” language (116; 118; 115).
32
 This tripartite metaphoric process – from 
physical thing to nerve stimulus and sound to, finally, conceptual language – suggests that for 
Nietzsche language is removed both from the real thing and from the experience of the 
original “subjective stimulation” (116). The nature of this process of abstraction makes 
Nietzsche suspicious of language and forces him to doubt whether it is possible to retrieve the 
original “truth” behind words. As he writes in “On Truth and Lies,”  
 
                                                 
31 See On the Fourfold Root 120; World as Will and Representation 1: 40, 2: 77, and 1: 234. 
32 Cf. The Gay Science, where Nietzsche argues that human consciousness is created as a result of communal 
language that, as he puts it, it “takes place in words, that is, in communication symbols.” In the same aphorism 
in The Gay Science, Nietzsche describes language as a “bridge between persons,” concluding that 
“consciousness actually belongs not to man‟s existence as an individual but rather to the community- and herd-
aspects of his nature” (213). 
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The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is never a question 
of truth, never a question of adequate expression. The „thing in itself‟ (which is 
precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise 
something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the 
least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and 
for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors ... we possess 
nothing but metaphors for things – metaphors which correspond in no way to the 
original entities. In the same way that the sound appears as a sand figure, so the 
mysterious X of the thing in itself first appears as a nerve stimulus, then as an image, 
and finally as a sound. Thus the genesis of language does not proceed logically in any 
case, and all the material within and with which the man of truth, the scientist, and the 
philosopher later work and build, if not derived from never-never land, is at least not 




Here, Nietzsche argues that language is an arbitrary, communal system of “legislation” that 
consists of concepts abstracted through a metaphoric exchange (115). These concepts do not 
correspond to the “real things” which humans, forgetting that “the original perceptual 
metaphors are metaphors,” take them to be (119). A concept, rather, does not designate the 
“thing in itself”: it is “bony, foursquare, and transposable as a die … merely the residue of a 




Nietzsche‟s view of language informs the claims Hulme makes in the entry in “Cinders” 
cited above. Following Nietzsche (and Schopenhauer), Hulme posits a view of language 
according to which language, albeit a useful tool for communication, is misleading. Such a 
                                                 
33 Cf. Human, All Too Human 16. On Nietzsche‟s views on the indeterminacy of language, see Emden 74-77. 
34 Cf. Nietzsche‟s remark in “The Philosopher” that “There is no „real‟ expression and no real knowing apart 
from metaphor” (50). 
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view is consistent with remarks made in other fragments in “Cinders.” Consider, for example, 
the following: 
 
In this ash-pit of cinders, certain ordered routes have been made, thus constituting 
whatever unity there may be – a kind of manufactured chess-board laid on a cinder 
heap. Not a real chess-board impressed on the cinders, but the gossamer world of 
symbolic communication. (9) 
 
Unity is made in the world by drawing squares over it. (10) 
 
Truth is what helps a particular sect in the general flow. (10) 
 
The aim ... of all thought is to reduce the complex and inevitably disconnected world of 
grit and cinders to a few ideal counters, which we can move about. (11) 
 
The truth is that there are no ultimate principles, upon which the whole of knowledge 
can be built once and for ever as upon a rock. But there are an infinity of analogues, 
which help us along, and give us a feeling of power over the chaos when we perceive 
them. (16) 
 
The idea that lies behind all these fragments – that the existence of linguistic fictions or 
metaphors is both comprehensible and useful – invites comparison with Nietzsche‟s 
argument in “On Truth and Lies,” according to which the acts of forgetting that language is 
constituted of metaphors and of taking words as truth are necessary for communicative 
purposes, but also for humans‟ survival; as Nietzsche puts it in this essay, “only by forgetting 
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that he himself is an artistically creating subject, does man live with any repose, security and 
consistency” (119). Moreover, in the same way that Nietzsche argues that notions of “truth” 
are linguistic constructs involving the “piling up [of] an infinitely complicated dome of 
concepts upon an unstable foundation ... like one constructed of spiders‟ webs” (118), in 
“Cinders” Hulme dismisses “truth” as a verbalism that “helps a particular sect in the general 
flow” (10), liking language to a “gossamer web” that, while it enables humans to 
communicate, it also perpetrates a series of illusions (cf. 10). A further comparison between 
Nietzsche and Hulme can be drawn. In “Notes,” Hulme distinguishes between an “emotion” 
that “depends on real solid vision or sound” and that “It is physical” (24) and words that are 
only a “tally.”
35
 This binary echoes Nietzsche‟s own distinction between the original image 
that is initiated in humans during their first interaction with the physical world and language, 
which consists, as we have seen, of “bony” words (118). Hulme‟s claims in “Notes” that 
“The progress of language is the absorption of new analogies” (27) and that “Language [is] a 
cumbrous growth, a compound of old and new analogies” (29) can also be taken as 
corresponding to the history of language as a series of metaphors presented in “On Truth and 
Lies.” Finally, the idea in “Cinders” that “A man cannot stand alone but always appeals to his 
fellows” (8; cf. 14, 12) is in consonance with Nietzsche‟s claim that language was originally 
invented as a result of the basic human need to participate in a community. There is no 
difference between Nietzsche‟s argument that language was conceived by primitives and the 
view expressed in “Notes” that the “making and fixing of words” began in the “nomadic” 
stage (28). 
 
A reading of Hulme‟s reflections on language from the perspective of Nietzsche‟s essay is 
thoroughly consistent with the reading of his views on the nature of reality through Bergson‟s 
                                                 
35 See Kanetake‟s edition of “Notes” 4. The idea that words are “counters” also runs throughout “Cinders.” Cf. 
8, 11, 17. 
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anti-intellectualism which I proposed earlier in this chapter. This is because Nietzsche‟s 
views on language in “On Truth and Lies” are in line with Bergson‟s mistrust of conceptual 
language. Like Nietzsche, Bergson is suspicious of conventional language; he argues that 
language is a useful tool needed for practical purposes, adding that language is also 
misleading. Bergson‟s point, specifically, is that language cannot represent accurately the 
experiential “flux,” which Bergson equates with reality. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Bergson thus argues that as a product of the intellect, language consists of concepts: 
“abstract, general, or simple ideas” (27). These concepts, Bergson goes on to explain, “have 
the disadvantage of being in reality symbols substituted for the object they symbolize, and 
demand no effort on our part” (28). In the terminology of Time and Free Will, concepts for 
Bergson are incapable of capturing the “inner life” or the “fundamental self,” the latter which 
remains always “inexpressible,” for, “language,” Bergson writes in Time and Free Will, 
“cannot get hold of it without arresting its mobility or fit it into its common-place forms 
without making it into public property” (129). In this sense, Hulme‟s suspicion of symbolic 
language in the notebooks is concomitant with his conception of reality in terms of 
Bergsonian “cinders.” That is not to say, however, that Bergson‟s critique of conceptual 
language is identical to Nietzsche‟s view on language in “On Truth and Lies.” An obvious 
difference is that, unlike Bergson, who, as we will see in chapter 3, holds that it is possible 
through intuition to reach the “flux” of reality, in “On Truth and Lies” Nietzsche appears to 
adopt a radically sceptical position, according to which there is no hope of reaching beyond 
language and into a realm of universal and eternal truths. Unlike Bergson, that is, Nietzsche 
does not hold that there is a deeper truth, an ultimate reality that awaits us before the veil of 
appearance; as Andreas Urs Sommer notes, in “On Truth and Lies” truth is entirely 
“perspectivist [sic]” and “situational” (258). A possibility of linking Nietzsche‟s argument to 
Bergson‟s view of language, however, is granted to us by Crawford, who shows that a 
32 
 
different reading of Nietzsche‟s essay to the one proposed by Sommers is possible. 
Nietzsche, Crawford argues, is not denying the possibility of truth in “On Truth and Lies”; on 
the contrary, he can be seen to follow Hartmann and Lange in holding that, even though 
conceptual or conscious language prevents us from grasping the real world, there is still the 
possibility that an instinctual or unconscious reaction to a sensation could approach the “thing 
in itself.”
36
 Hence Nietzsche‟s remark in the essay that the intuitive being “speaks only in 
forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts … does this so that by 
shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at lead correspond creatively to 
the impression of the powerful present intuition” (122). As Crawford explains, “This passage 
characterizes the artistic, socially subversive, and transformative possibilities of language”; 
moreover, it shows how for Nietzsche “these very unconscious creative possibilities become 
an end in themselves” (xi). Thus understood, Nietzsche expresses a view, albeit less 
explicitly, similar to that of Bergson: that it is possible through an unconscious process – 
what Bergson calls “intuition” – to reach the “flux” of experience that exists beyond 
language. As we will now see, Hulme follows a similar route in “Notes,” where in an attempt 
to make language, as he puts it, more “direct” and more “real,” proposes a method of 
expressing ideas in a non-conceptual manner. 
 
4. Poetry as “visual” language 
The most recurring theme in “Notes” is the opposition Hulme sets between “prose” and 
what he describes as “poetry.” These terms are not to be taken in their literal sense: “prose,” 
for instance, includes “genteel poetry like Shelley‟s,” while Hulme uses “poetry” to refer to 
                                                 
36 Klein makes a similar point as Crawford when he argues that it is wrong to understand Nietzsche as denying 
the possibility of truth. Unlike Crawford, however, who maintains that Nietzsche can be seen as trying to break 
from conceptual language through unconscious means, Klein understands Nietzsche as making “the positive and 
more complicated assertion that meaning … is principally a product of the intra-linguistic resources of language 
itself” (70). In other words, Klein sees Nietzsche in “On Truth and Lies” as advocating an anti-correspondence 
theory of language, rather than embracing scepticism. 
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Morris‟ “firm simple prose, creating in a definite way a fairy story” (25). What does Hulme 
mean by these two terms? “Prose” is language that is used to “pass to conclusions without 
thinking” (25); it is “making a tremendous deal out of a point which can be noted down in 
one sentence” (37) and it can thus be compared to “a line of string lying on a paper” (32). As 
Hulme writes elsewhere in “Notes,” in “expositional prose we get words divorced from any 
real vision” (24); “The ideal of modern prose is to be all counters”; its “intermediate terms 
have only counter value” (25); phrases in it are simply “useful” (27; cf. 24, 31); and, as in 
algebra, in “prose” “the reader takes words as x without the meaning attached” (27). 
“Poetry,” by contrast, is language that does not employ “counters” but “images.” “Poetry” is 
thus the place where “phrases [are] made [and] tested” and where words “are all glitter and 
new coruscation” (27). “Poetry” is, therefore, “the advance guard in language (27). 
Moreover, unlike in “prose,” where words are vague and superfluous, in “poetry” “each 
sentence should be a lump, a piece of clay, a vision seen” (25); it is “always … a solid thing” 
(25, 26). According to Hulme, in “poetry” there is “No flowing on of words, but tightly 
clutched tense fingers leaving marks in the clay”; the “Style [is] short, being forced by the 
coming together of many different thoughts, and generated by their contact,” like “Fire struck 
between stones” (26; emphasis in original). “Poetry,” finally, requires “great exactness”: 
unlike prose which is “decorative,” “poetry” presents “definite things” (42, 26; cf. 36). The 
fundamental difference between “prose” and “poetry,” it turns out, is that, while “prose” uses 
“counters” and is thus indirect, poetry is direct, because it uses new images.    
 
In principle, Hulme‟s distinction between “prose” and “poetry” follows Nietzsche‟s 
evolutionary account of language in “On Truth and Lies.” The ideas that poetry is “the 
advance guard in language,” that, in other words, words are created as part of a poetic (or 
artistic) inspiration and that these words end up being used in daily language, for example, 
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can be understood through Nietzsche‟s claim in “On Truth and Lies” that the origins of 
language are to be found in the artistically creating individual, whose instinct urges him 
toward metaphor building.
37
 Likewise, Hulme‟s suggestion in “Notes” that “poetry” is more 
direct because it avoids words in favour of images, is consonant with the view in Nietzsche‟s 
essay, according to which the “first metaphor” that is created when “a nerve stimulus is 
transferred into an image” is, by definition, closer to the “thing in itself” than a word or a 
concept, both of which overlook the “individual and actual” (116-17). In a much more 
obvious and striking way, Hulme‟s idea that a language consisting of images is more direct 
than conceptual language is the very basis of the reasoning put forward by Bergson in An 
Introduction to Metaphysics. As already discussed above, Bergson holds that conceptual 
language prevents humans from seeing the “flux” of experience, what he calls “real duration” 
or “durée,” which, according to Bergson, cannot be reached through intellectual means. In An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson thus argues that real duration, although it “cannot be 
represented by images ... it is even less possible to represent it by concepts.” As Bergson 
maintains:  
 
It is true that no image can reproduce exactly the original feeling I have of the flow of 
my own conscious life ... [However,] the image has at least this advantage, that it keeps 
us in the concrete. No image can replace the intuition of duration, but many diverse 
images, borrowed from very different orders of things may, by the convergence of their 
action, direct consciousness to the precise point where there is certain intuition to be 
seized. (27-28) 
 
                                                 




Bergson‟s suggestion here is that, because visual impressions are non-rational and non-
conceptual, they can direct us to the point of intuition and, therefore, show us the way to 
duration, the immédiatement donnée. While Bergson is adamant that images alone do not lead 
us directly to duration – as he puts it in An Introduction to Metaphysics, for duration to be 
reached “consciousness must ... consent to make the effort” (28) – he is, in a sense, allowing 
that images are the nearest thing to the original moment of intuition, at the time when, 
according to Nietzsche‟s genealogy, language is first created.  
 
Better than through Bergson‟s claim in An Introduction to Metaphysics, Hulme‟s idea in 
“Notes” that poetry is more “direct” than “prose” because it deals in images and uses solid 
analogies, rather than vague, generalised words, can be read from the perspective of the work 
of Ribot. The significance of Ribot‟s work in understanding Hulme‟s claims regarding 
literary composition has been noted by a number of critics. Martin, first, identified Ribot‟s 
psychology as a “source” behind Hulme‟s use of the concept of “image,” the latter which, 
according to Martin, follows closely from Ribot‟s use of the term in his theory of psychology 
(“The Sources of the Imagist Aesthetic” 199). In the same line as Martin, Csengeri has found 
that Hulme “gathered some of his ideas on the subject of the image from the French 
philosopher and psychologist” (“T. E. Hulme‟s Borrowings from the French” 22). Finally, 
Rae has argued that Ribot‟s experimental psychology clarifies Hulme‟s notion of a language 
that consists of images, as well his aesthetic “anti-romanticism.” Ribot‟s “demystification” of 
the process of artistic creation, Rae claims, allows Hulme to reject romantic and symbolist 
conceptions of poetry that present poetry as a mystical or ideal affair, postulating in its place 
a “classicist” theory of inspiration (“Hulme‟s French Sources” 76; Practical Muse 63). 
However, the way Ribot‟s analysis of the cognitive processes of abstraction and 
generalisation in Evolution of General Ideas compares to Hulme‟s distinction in “Notes” 
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between “poetry” and “prose” has remained unexamined.
38
 In the remaining of this chapter, I 
turn my attention to Ribot‟s account of language in Evolution of General Ideas to explain 
how it informs Hulme‟s discussion of “prose” and “poetry” in “Notes.”
39
 Read through 
Ribot‟s distinction between “concrete” and “abstract” terms, Hulme‟s notion that “poetry” is 
more direct is seen as an attempt to break through conceptual language. This is an important 
point for two reasons. First, insofar as Hulme‟s ideas tie in with Ribot‟s account of language, 
the claims he makes in “Notes” present a consistent view of reality and of the role played in it 
by language. For, as we will see, Ribot‟s account of language speaks to both Nietzsche‟s 
argument in “On Truth and Lies” and to Bergson‟s idea in An Introduction to Metaphysics 
that it is only through an unconscious process that we can grasp reality. Secondly, given the 
way that Hulme‟s description of “modern” poetry, as it will become obvious in the following 
chapter, is built on the view of language he presents in his notebooks, his thought is revealed 
to be much more coherent than previously allowed. 
 
In Evolution of General Ideas, which traces the progressive development of the cognitive 
processes of abstraction and generalisation, Ribot draws a distinction between “concrete” 
words and abstract “general” terms. Put simply, Ribot‟s thesis in Evolution of General Ideas 
is that there is a direct line of progression from inferior abstraction, where attention is the 
primary condition of primitive people, to the formation of general images through a process 
                                                 
38 The only notable exception is Rae‟s brief discussion of Ribot‟s experiment in “Hulme‟s French Sources.” Rae 
suggests that Ribot‟s experiment provided Hulme with a basis on which to develop his model of art, according 
to which the purpose of poetry is that of “presenting some reality directly rather than attempting to explain it to 
the intellect with the „chiffres‟ [tokens] of highly abstract language: a reality that, transcendental or otherwise, 
forever resists explication in such terms” (81). Rae‟s emphasis, however, is not on Hulme‟s account of language 
in “Cinders” and “Notes,” but on the way that, read via Ribot‟s (and Bergson‟s) scepticism about the existence 
of a transcendental realm, Hulme‟s “classical” poetry can be interpreted in terms of “the aesthetics of 
Pragmatism” (97; cf. 88). This is a view which Rae elaborates in Practical Muse. See 12, 47-64.  
39 As well as his distinction between “prose” and “poetry,” Ribot‟s ideas, specifically in Essay on the Creative 
Imagination, enlighten Hulme‟s claims in “Notes” that poetry must use “new” and “physical” analogies, avoid 
using “vague” words, and aim to describe “solid, definite things” (cf. 24, 26, 34-36). I discuss the way in which 
Ribot helps us read these claims in the following chapter. 
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of dissociation to, finally, the substitution of these general images for words through 
complete abstraction. Ribot explains: 
 
[A]s we ascend in generalisation we rise ... into the approximate. The relatively empty 
concepts ... are the product of a discontinuous generalisation which prevents descent 
without interruption or omission into the concrete … They are names representing a 
knowledge that is incomplete, partial, inadequate or ill-organised … Having no possible 
contact with reality they float in an unreal atmosphere... (225) 
 
In other words, since gaining capacity for abstraction, humans have been able to formulate 
general concepts; these concepts, in turn, have enabled a more advanced communication than 
previously possible, but because these concepts are “empty,” they now prevent humans from 
descending into the “concrete” reality that we once experienced.  
 
To determine the function of language as an intermediary between originary impressions 
and mental images with more precision, Ribot explains in Evolution of General Ideas that he 
carried out an experiment, the aim of which was “to discover the instantaneous operations 
(conscious or unconscious)” that occur when humans think, hear or read a word (113; 
emphasis in original). Individuals were submitted to a hearing of a series of words and were 
asked to describe without reflection what came to their minds: “We said to the subject,” Ribot 
states, “„I am going to pronounce certain words; will you tell me directly, without reflexion 
[sic], whether this word calls up anything or nothing in your mind? If anything, what is 
suggested to you?‟” (114). The experiment revealed that “[a]s a rule a mixed type prevails: a 
concrete image for certain words, and typographical vision, or auditory images, for others” 
(122). “Concrete” words, such as, for example, “dog,” “animal” and “colour,” generally 
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evoked a mental image of a particular thing, a phenomenon which Ribot describes in terms of 
the “logic of images.” Early on in the book Ribot explains that this “logic of images” is 
characteristic of animals and of infants, while it also often acts as an “auxiliary for adults” 
during the process of artistic creation (27-28). In contrast, abstract or general terms such as 
“time,” “cause” or “infinity,” revealed in the minds of the participants a “typographic type 
[that] consists in seeing printed words and nothing more,” or “auditory images 
unaccompanied either by the vision of printed words or by concrete images” (119-21, 129). 
Ribot describes the kind of reasoning involved here using Leibniz‟s terms: it is “blind” and 
“symbolic,” the words in such cases evoking in individuals‟ minds only “tokens” (129).  
 
As Nietzsche, therefore, Ribot holds an account of language according to which there is an 
irreparable difference between originary sensations and concepts that “fix” these sensations 
in language in higher forms of abstraction. Nietzsche‟s genealogy of language in “On Truth 
and Lies,” as I already discussed, can be understood from the perspective of Schopenhauer‟s 
account of language. In this sense, it is significant that Ribot acknowledges Schopenhauer‟s 
idea that abstract concepts obscure reality and that it is only through intuitions that we can 
have true knowledge (La philosophie de Schopenhauer 4, 31-32, 121). Moreover, like 
Bergson, and to a certain extent Nietzsche, Ribot proposes in Evolution of General Ideas that 
it is only through unconscious means that we can eschew the limitations of language. 
Although not explicitly interested in proposing a method through which to grasp a reality that 
is obstructed from us by language, in the way that Bergson, for example, is, Ribot, as 
Nietzsche before him, hints at how it is possible to return to the originary sensation at a pre-
linguistic level through non-rational or instinctual means.
40
 He makes this clear when he 
states in the “Conclusion” of Evolution of General Ideas that language is a “substitute for the 
                                                 
40 Ribot was interested in the operation of concepts or general ideas in human reasoning. Thus, the aim of the 
experiment he carried out was specifically to investigate the “psycho-physiological condition of the existence of 
concepts [that] are practically unknown” (Evolution of General Ideas 113). 
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abstract intuition” gathered by primitive people through the faculty of “attention” (217). 
Earlier in the book, he claims, borrowing Leibniz‟s words, that his experiment demonstrated 
that words fail to produce in us a visual image of a particular thing when we have “no 
simultaneous intuition of all the characteristics or attributes of a thing” (129). This implies 
that it is not the case that some words denote nothing. Distancing himself from Taine who, as 
Ribot notes, “is usually regarded as a Nominalist” (129n1), Ribot ascertains that abstract 
words have simply lost their ability to trigger our attention: 
 
This is because each word exacts an act of attention, an effort, which corresponds to 
labor in the unconscious or sub-conscious regions. When this labor becomes useless, 
and we think, or appear to think, by signs alone all goes rapidly and easily. (130-31)  
 
It follows that the originary sensation that is lost in words during the process of abstraction 
remains “stored up” beneath general or abstract terms. This sensation is only accessible 
through what Ribot calls the “unconscious substratum, this organised and potential 
knowledge,” that, he explains, “gives not merely value, but an actual denotation to the word, 
– like harmonics superadded to the fundamental note” (132). 
 
Read through Ribot‟s report, what Hulme calls “poetry” evokes in the mind of the 
recipient a concrete, mental image of a particular thing, while “prose” is language that 
produces in the receptive mind only a “token.” There is no difference between Ribot‟s 
description of concrete and abstract terms as evoking visual images and “tokens” 
respectively, and Hulme‟s remark in “Notes” that in “prose” “counters … can be moved 
about, without the mind having to think in any involved way” or that in “poetry” “Each word 
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must be an image seen, not a counter” (25; emphasis in original).
41
 Likewise, the ideas Hulme 
expresses in “Cinders” – that in place of “vague long pretentious words” “poetry” should use 
“the hard, definite, personal and concrete word” (22; cf. 26, 31) and that there is always 
“something lost in generalisation” as “Generalisations are only means of getting about” (14) 
– echo Ribot‟s view of the process of generalisation in the passage cited above. That is, like 
Ribot, Hulme can be seen as arguing in “Notes” that “general” terms are removed from 
reality and are used only to enable communication by passing tokens from one mind to 
another. Finally, Ribot‟s “logic of images” provides a way of reading Hulme‟s claims in 
“Notes” that “literary expression is from Real to Real with all the intermediate terms keeping 
their real value” (24; emphasis in original) and that “in a sense we may say that the heavy, 
solid use of words is always nearer to reality.”
42
 Another way of understanding Ribot‟s 
distinction between “abstract” and “concrete” terms is in terms of a distinction Ribot draws in 
a later work, Essay on the Creative Imagination, between “diffluent” and “plastic” terms. The 
former, Ribot argues, ought to be understood as “semi-schematic representations of the 
rational imagination”; the latter, as “clear-cut, concrete, reality-penetrated images” (195). 
Ribot‟s account of language, therefore, clarifies Hulme‟s discussion of “prose” and of 
“poetry” in “Notes” and reveals how this distinction follows from ideas regarding language 
expressed elsewhere in his notebooks. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Understood through ideas in the works of Bergson, Nietzsche and Ribot, the three most 
recurring claims Hulme makes in “Cinders” and “Notes” – that the “flux” of experience 
cannot be rationalized, that conceptual language is deceptive, and that a non-conceptual 
                                                 
41 Cf. the fragment in “Notes” that states that “[h]abitually … the reader takes words as x without the meaning 
attached” (24). 
42 See Kanetake‟s edition of “Notes” 38. In another fragment included in Kanetake‟s edition, Hulme equates 
“my attempt to get to reality” with the use of “no long words” (34). 
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language is more real and more direct than language consisting of “counters” – present a 
coherent argument. The idea that language is an illusion designed to enable communication, 
follows from the anti-intellectualist view of the world expressed in “Cinders” – to use 
Nietzsche‟s terms, Hulme argues that the “laws of truth” are established by the “legislation of 
language” (cf. “On Truth and Lies” 115). Likewise, Hulme‟s claim in “Notes” that language 
which consists of “images” is more real than “counter” language, examined from the 
perspective of Nietzsche‟s account of language in “On Truth and Lies,” Bergson‟s suggestion 
in An Introduction to Metaphysics that images can enable intuition, and Ribot‟s evolutionary 
view of language in Evolution of General Ideas, is revealed to be entirely consistent with the 
emphasis Hulme puts in “Cinders” on the deceptive nature of language. Despite claims by 
many critics that “Cinders” and “Notes” resist interpretation or that they are a collection of 
fragmented entries with no coherence, therefore, the ideas Hulme expresses in the notebooks 
form a coherent philosophical view of the world and of language that, crucially, as it will 
become clear in subsequent chapters, underpins the rest of his writings. The next chapter 
demonstrates how Hulme developed his notion of “modern” poetry on the view of language 
he postulates in “Cinders” and in “Notes.” Acknowledging that Hulme‟s literary reflections 
follow from his “anti-intellectualist” view of language and of reality highlights the continuity 










 Chapter 2  
 
“A Lecture on Modern Poetry”: Poetry as “Visual” Language 
 
 
1. Introduction  
In early 1908, following travels in Canada and Belgium, Hulme finally settled in London 
(Ferguson 39). It was in London, in the opening years of the twentieth century, that Hulme 
delivered “A Lecture on Modern Poetry,” his first known piece of literary criticism. In this 
lecture, which was delivered to the “Poets‟ Club” most likely in November 1908, Hulme 
argues for the introduction in English poetry of a new verse form.
43
 The majority of critics 
interpret the lecture as a manifesto for Imagism, the movement of poetry formally launched 
by Pound and Flint in 1913. Thus Hynes argues that in his lecture “Hulme gives the reasons 
why, the principles behind the practices which Flint and Pound advocated,” Coffman 
maintains that “Hulme‟s argument for a new verse form reflects ... accurately the 
requirements of Imagism,” and Harmer finds in Hulme‟s “dogmatic programme for a 
modernisation of poetry ... the ingredients of Imagism … already contained.”
44
 According to 
                                                 
43 For the lecture‟s chronology, see Schuchard, Last Minstrels 258. A number of critics, including Schuchard 
himself, have claimed that Hulme repeated “A Lecture” a second time, in the spring or summer of 1914. See, for 
example, Roberts 21-22; Hynes, ed. xii-xix; A. Jones 122; P. Jones 16; Sherry 38-40, 202; Beasley, “„A Definite 
Meaning‟: The Art Criticism of T. E. Hulme” 62; and Schuchard, Last Minstrels 282. All these critics base their 
claim that Hulme redelivered the lecture in 1914 on Kate Lechmere‟s accounts, given in conversations with 
Roberts and Hynes. In claiming that “The lecture on Modern Poetry was given in the Kensington Town Hall just 
before I met Hulme about spring of 1914,” Lechmere confuses Hulme‟s “A Lecture” with the lecture on modern 
art that he gave in January 1914. Cf. Lechmere, letter to Roberts, 10-11 Feb. 1938. See also her letter to 
Roberts, 29 Mar. 1938. This becomes clear once we compare Lechmere‟s description of the lecture in question 
with accounts of the January 1914 lecture given by Lewis, Pound and the art critic P. G. Konody. Lechmere‟s 
description matches Lewis‟, Pound‟s and Konody‟s eye-witness accounts of “Modern Art and its Philosophy,” 
delivered to the Quest Society in London on 22 Jan. 1914. See Lewis, Blasting and Bombardiering 107 and 
letter to Herbert Read 29 Jan. 1948; Pound, “The New Sculpture” 67, letter to Patricia Hutchins 30 Oct. 1953 
(qtd. in Surette 132), and his letter to Roberts 14 July 1937; and Konody Observer 1 Feb. 1914: 7. 
44 Hynes, ed. xviii; Coffman 72; Harmer 30. Flint states that Hulme was a leader amongst the early Imagists, 
while Pound dates the beginning of Imagism to “the forgotten school of 1909,” seeing Hulme‟s poetry as an 
example of the poetic practice of this group. See Flint, “History of Imagism” 71 and Pound‟s prefatory note to 
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these critics, what explains “A Lecture” as proto-Imagist manifesto is the emphasis Hulme 
puts in it on vers libre as the principal form of modern poetry and on the use in this modern 
poetry of visual images, two tenets usually seen as the central principles of Imagism.
45
 Aside 
from finding “A Lecture” the first and fullest exposition of Imagist poetry, critics argue that it 
is characteristic of Hulme‟s tendency to borrow ideas from different sources, with little 
regard for coherence. As Harmer argues for example, the lecture should be understood as “a 
mosaic of arguments” assembled out of the ideas of Gustave Kahn, Jean-Marie Guyau, André 
Beaunier, Jules de Gaultier and Rémy de Gourmont; similar claims have been made by 
Taupin, Roberts, Burne, Martin, Sieburth and, most recently, Carr.
46
 Finally, and in line with 
the general view of Hulme as an inconsistent thinker, Sherry argues that Hulme combines in 
“A Lecture” “opposite aesthetic philosophies,” with Levenson adding that the “subjectivist” 





By carrying out an in-depth analysis of “A Lecture,” this chapter challenges the common 
interpretation that the argument Hulme makes in the lecture is incoherent and that the 
aesthetic principles included in it are inconsistent with his later criticism. In the first part, I 
focus on Hulme‟s claim in “A Lecture” that a distinctly “modern” spirit was evident in 
philosophy and arts in 1908 and his argument that, as he puts it, “Each age must have its own 
special form of expression, and any period that deliberately goes out of it is an age of 
insincerity” (51). Hulme‟s demand for the introduction in poetry of a new verse form is best 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hulme‟s poems in Canzoni and Ripostes 58-59. In his autobiography, Aldington also claims that Hulme played 
a central role in the development of Imagism. See 122-23. 
45 See Read, Tenth Muse 129; Harmer 30; Rodway 96; Martin, New Age under Orage 156; and Wacior 26. 
46 See Harmer 115; Taupin 84; Roberts 117; Burne 115; Martin, New Age under Orage 157-58; Sieburth 62; and 
Carr, Verse Revolutionaries 160. Although noting that “Hulme has made something new from the pieces,” Carr 
compares Hulme‟s practice in “A Lecture” with the way Eliot constructs a “patchwork” of translated quotations 
in The Waste Land (cf. 160).  
47 Sherry, Ezra Pound, Wyndham Lewis and Radical Modernism 39; Levenson 61-62 and 97. See also Louise 
Blakeney Williams, who maintains that the “optimistic” view Hulme expresses in the lecture about the “reality 
of change” is at odds with the belief professed in his later writings in cyclic history (cf. 52-54). 
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understood as part of the broader campaign by poets in the early twentieth century against 
nineteenth-century verse. Like Flint, Storer and Pound, Hulme is dissatisfied with the existing 
state of poetry and in campaigning for a new or modern verse form he is expressing the hopes 
of his contemporaries for aesthetic rejuvenation. At the same time, however, in advocating a 
new form of poetry, Hulme rejects the same philosophical views he argues against in 
“Cinders,” as well as in his essays on Bergson. His argument in “A Lecture,” therefore, can 
be understood independently of the ideas of Flint and Pound, both of whom attacked 
nineteenth-century poetry on mainly aesthetic grounds. In the second part of this chapter, I 
concentrate on Hulme‟s description of modern poetry as “impressionist” (54) and examine 
his suggestion that modern poetry would find expression in “free verse” (53). As I show, 
Hulme is using Impressionist painting in the lecture not as a model for modern poetry, but as 
an example of an art that has accommodated the modern spirit and that, therefore, sets the 
precedent for a change in modern poetry. Likewise, in claiming that modern poetry will 
express itself in free verse, Hulme is essentially arguing against the use in poetry of strict 
rules of metre, rhythm and rhyme, features which he sees as incongruous with the modern 
spirit that is “relative.” This corrects the view that “A Lecture” is a manifesto against metre, 
rhythm and rhyme, while it also explains why Hulme uses such “conventions” as rhyme and 
rhythm in his poetry. In the final part, I address Hulme‟s definition of modern poetry as 
“read” and the method he prescribes for the “new visual” poetry. In distinguishing between 
“read” and “chanted” verse, Hulme dissociates the poetry he advocates from the chanting of 
W. B. Yeats and Florence Farr, which he views as an example of “indirect” language. Read 
through ideas in the works of Bergson and Ribot, Hulme‟s “visual” poetry is revealed to be a 





2. The “modern spirit” 
In “A Lecture,” Hulme puts forward a critique of the Edwardian literary establishment. He 
begins with a jeer directed against Henry Simpson, the Scottish banker who acted as the 
President of the “Poets‟ Club” and who, as Hulme states, “told us last week that poetry was 
akin to religion” (49). He then goes on to berate the anonymous critic of the Saturday Review, 
the famous venue for writers like Anthony Trollope, George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells, 
for holding that poetry is “the means by which the soul soared into higher regions, and ... a 
means of expression by which it became merged into a higher kind of reality” (49). Hulme is 
here referring to an unsigned article in the Saturday Review from November 1908 that 
described Storer‟s poetry as “slag,” the anonymous critic claiming that Storer‟s poems are “a 
spiritual equivalent to the sucking of chocolate” (“Versicolor” 612).
48
 What the anonymous 
critic of the Saturday Review, Simpson, and William Watson, the author of Wordsworth‟s 
Grave and Lachrymae musarum who is described later on in the lecture as more of “a 
political orator than a poet” (53), have in common, is that they harboured outdated ideas 
regarding poetry, its function and its method of composition. As Hulme puts it, they all make 
“mysterious passes and mumble of the infinite and the human heart”; this was in reality a 
“bluff,” he argues, which can be compared to “the way medieval scientists spoke of God. 
When entirely ignorant of the cause of anything they said God did it” (49). Distancing 
himself from these critics, Hulme portrays himself as one among a “number of modern 
people” (50), an adjective that, as Hobsbawm has noted, has from the late nineteenth century 
onwards been used by artists in an effort to dissociate themselves from the establishment 
(226-27). It is because there is nothing modern in it that Hulme finds the poem posted outside 
the London Pavilion so disagreeable to him (cf. 55). Full of “clichés or tags of speech,” 
Hulme claims that the poem is based on “old rules” (51); moreover, it is long, verbose and 
                                                 




one among many poems written by people “with no poetic inspiration” (55).
49
 Never a shy 
polemicist, Hulme thus declares that “I have no reverence for tradition” and, rejecting all 
“references to Dante, Milton and the rest of them,” he announces that “Personally I am ... in 
favour of the complete destruction of all verse more than twenty years old” (50-51). 
 
Hulme was certainly not alone in turning against established notions of poetry and in 
demanding a distinctly modern poetry. Late in 1908, Hulme began meeting regularly with 
Storer, Flint and Pound, forming together their own little coterie, what came to be known as 
the “Tour d‟ Eiffel” group.
50
 Like Hulme, Storer, Flint and, to a lesser extent, Pound, were all 
registering at this time their dissatisfaction with the existing state of poetry. In “An Essay,” 
appended to his collection of poetry The Mirrors of Illusion, Storer argued that “at the hands 
of her priests and disciples poetry has suffered the most” (78). It was time, Storer suggested, 
for poetry to break from those “restrictions” of the past that “run counter to the current of 
life.” Poetry, Storer went on to claim, had to change and modernise itself: for “One does not 
despise one‟s ancestors for having ridden in stage coaches, but one can use a railway train 
oneself without disrespect to the dead” (81). Flint shared Storer‟s views on poetry. Reviewing 
Mirrors of Illusion, Flint praised Storer‟s rejection of old techniques and, although he did not 
find Storer‟s poems especially successful, Flint agreed with Storer that the existing poetry 
was no longer adequate. He wanted to make it clear, Flint wrote, that “Amid much that may 
be contradictory, one thing has been insisted upon in what I have written here about modern 
English poetry: the need for revaluation of all poetical values” (“Book of the Week, Recent 
                                                 
49 The idea that regular verse requires less creative effort than modern poetry is also expressed by Storer, who 
claims in “An Essay” that “a trickster, a Cinquevalli of syllables and rhymes ... will not be able to disguise this 
fact in his blank verse” (108). 
50 For a history of the „Tour Eiffel‟ group, including information about the circumstances that led Hulme to 
depart from the “Poets‟ Club” and invite Flint to the Tour d‟Eiffel restaurant, see Hughes 11, Harmer 21, 
Ferguson 53-56, and Carr 133-35. See also Flint, “Book of the Week: Recent Verse” 11 Feb. 1909: 327 and 
Hulme, “Belated Romanticism” 350. For Pound‟s reminiscences of “Hulme‟s dinners,” as he described them, 
see “Harold Monro” 8. 
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Verse” 26 Nov. 1908: 95). Pound, too, was determined to modernise poetry as it was being 
written in the London of 1908. Writing to William Carlos Williams on 21 October 1908, he 
rallied against the “materia poetica & metrica ... of Milton‟s or Miss Austin‟s [sic] day” and 
the “didactisism [sic]” of the past (8, 11). As Stock, Kenner, Tytell and, more recently, 
Moody, have shown, Pound devoted the best part of his early career in opposing the 
dominant conceptions of poetry and criticism.
51
 As a quick glance at Hulme‟s lecture, 
Storer‟s “Essay,” Flint‟s review of Storer‟s Mirrors of Illusion and Pound‟s letter to Williams 
suggests, all these poets felt in 1908 that they were, like the unnamed figure in the opening of 
Pound‟s Hugh Selwyn Mauberley, “out of key” and “out of date” with the poetry of their time 




In “A Lecture,” Hulme bases his argument about the necessity of change in poetry on two 
ideas: that poetry had reached in 1908 a state of stagnation and that only the introduction of a 
new verse could rejuvenate poetic activity; and that poetry had a duty to change in order to 
accommodate the modern spirit, which, as he argues, was distinctly different from that of the 
nineteenth century. In the first case, despite his rejection in the lecture of all poetry “more 
than twenty years old” (50-51), and in contrast to the swagger and blast of the Imagist and 
Vorticist manifestos, Hulme presents his argument for change from a fairly dispassionate 
standpoint; he is thus keen on showing that his reasoning is based on elaborate empirical and 
historical observations concerning the nature of poetry. In the second case, he takes the 
opportunity to criticise the nineteenth century on ideological and philosophical grounds. 
 
                                                 
51 See Stock 29-41; Kenner 121-44; Tytell 35-111; Moody 68-126.   
52 For a fuller discussion of the dissatisfaction felt by Hulme‟s circle with the dominant trends in the early 




“The principle on which I rely in this paper,” Hulme announces early on in the lecture, “is 
that there is an intimate connection between the verse form and the state of poetry at any 
period” (50). The introduction of a new poetic form, in other words, is a necessary 
prerequisite for the production of new and original poetry; as he puts it later on in the lecture, 
“arts like poetry ... must find a new technique each generation” (51). He thus writes that, 
unlike other literary critics, he does not think that poetic activity can be explained by external 
reasons, such as the discovery of a new Continent. Rather, empirical and historical evidence 
leads him to conclude that poetic activity flourishes when a new form of poetry is invented:  
 
All kind of reasons are given by the academic critics for the efflorescence of verse at 
any period. But the true one is very seldom given. It is the invention or introduction of a 
new verse form. To the artist the introduction of a new art form is ... like a new dress to 
a girl; he wants to see himself in it. It is a new toy ... The discovery of America had 
about as much effect on the Courtier poets at that time as the discovery of a new 
asteroid would have had on the poetic activity of Swinburne. The real reason was, I 
take it, that the first opportunity was given for the exercise of verse composition by the 




The logic described here, according to which the introduction of new verse forms and the 
composition of new and original poetry are coextensive, is an established position within 
literary history – it forms part, for example, of Kirby-Smith‟s discussion of the development 
of modern verse – that helps us understand why Hulme and his fellow poets were so eager to 
welcome a modern form of poetry in 1908.
54
 As explained in “A Lecture,” the introduction 
by Wordsworth of the “Modern lyrical impulse ... in good set terms as a new method” 
                                                 
53 Cf. Hulme‟s claim in “Romanticism and Classicism” that the “blank verse” introduced in the Elizabethan 
rimes was, as he says, “new and so it was easy to play tunes on it” (63). 
54 See Kirby-Smith 44. 
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accounts for the great amount of original poems written by the British Romantics in the 
nineteenth century. This was also the lesson to be learnt from developments in France in the 
late nineteenth century, where, as Hulme explains, Kahn‟s new technique of vers libre 
resulted in “the appearance of a band of poets perhaps unequalled at any one time in the 
history of French poetry” (52). In his essay on vers libre, published as a “Préface” in 
Premiers Poèmes in 1897, Kahn suggests that the introduction of a new form in French 
poetry can accommodate the “plus complexe” and “plus difficile” modern thought; more 
crucially for Hulme, Kahn shows that a new verse form can reinvigorate the state of French 
poetry. Reiterating Kahn‟s argument in verbatim, Hulme uses it in his lecture to show why it 
is necessary to replace old verse forms with modern ones: 
 
It must be admitted that verse forms like manners and like individuals develop and die. 
They evolve from their initial freedom to decay and finally to virtuosity. They 
disappear before the new man, burdened with the thought more complex and more 
difficult to express by the old name. After being too much used their primitive effect is 
lost. All possible tunes have been played on the instrument. What possibility is there in 




Detecting in the poetry of the early twentieth century a similar decay and lack of virtuosity as 
the one described in Kahn‟s “Préface,” Hulme concludes that only the introduction of a new 
form of poetry can take poetry out of the state of stagnation in which, in his view, it has 
fallen.  
 
                                                 
55 Cf. Kahn 23. For further discussion of Hulme‟s appropriation of the ideas of Kahn in “A Lecture,” see 
Csengeri, “T. E. Hulme‟s Borrowings from the French” 16-27. 
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At the same time, Hulme bases his argument in support of change on the idea that poetry 
has to be in line with “the spirit of our times” (53). This is another idea that can be 
understood through Kahn‟s argument in the “Préface” to Premiers Poèmes. Like Kahn, who 
advocates vers libre on the grounds that it is better suited to accommodate the “pensée plus 
complexe” [more complex thought]” of modern times (23), Hulme maintains in his lecture 
that twentieth-century English poetry has to adapt to the “trend of the modern spirit” (52). In 
his review of Tancrède de Visan‟s L‟Attitude du lyrisme contemporain, published in the New 
Age in August 1911, Hulme explains what he means by this idea, this time using Taine‟s 
terms:  
 
It starts out from this thesis. That there is in each generation ... a „temperature morale‟ 
[a moral “temperature”], which is to be found at the same epoch in all the different 
orders of mental activity, and which constitutes „l‟état général de l‟esprit de moeurs 





By “spirit,” therefore, Hulme only means the general worldview – what in later writings he 
refers to as Weltanschauung. The view in the lecture that poetry and art more broadly are 
inextricably linked with the general worldview or attitude of the time in which they are 
produced, stayed with Hulme throughout his career. It is, for example, part of Hulme‟s 
critique of the Romantic “critical attitude” in “Romanticism and Classicism,” which he 
dismisses as having “outlasted the thing from which it was formed” (65). It is also used in his 
defence of abstract art in “Modern Art and Its Philosophy” in 1914, where Hulme presents 
                                                 
56 Taine makes this claim in Philosophie de l‟art 101. 
51 
 
the geometric art of Epstein as the testimony to “the break up [sic] of the Renaissance 
humanistic attitude” (269).  
 
What was the specific nature of this “modern” or “new” spirit? That is, how did it differ 
from the spirit of previous times? Hulme argues that a dramatic change in the way humans 
perceived the world occurred in the modern era and that, as a result of this change, the 
moderns ceased to believe in absolute truth, instead acknowledging the “relative” (52-53). To 
understand the way in which Hulme uses the terms “absolute” and “relative” here, it is useful 
to consider his argument as he presents it in “A Lecture” in more detail. Hulme begins by 
drawing a distinction between the “ancients” and the “moderns,” moving on to describe the 
difference in the way the “ancients” and the “moderns” view the world:  
 
The ancients were perfectly aware of the fluidity of the world and of its impermanence; 
there was the Greek theory that the whole world was a flux. But while they recognised 
it they feared it and endeavoured to evade it, to construct things of permanence which 
would stand fast in this universal flux which frightened them ... We see it in a thousand 
different forms. Materially in the pyramids, spiritually in the dogmas of religion and in 
the hypostatised ideas of Plato. Living in a dynamic world they wished to create a static 
fixity where their souls might rest.  
This I conceive to be the explanation of many of the old ideas on poetry. They wish to 
embody in a few lines a perfection of thought ... hence the fixity of the form of poem 
and the elaborate rules of regular metre ... As the French philosopher Guyau put it, the 
great poems of ancient times resembled pyramids built for eternity where people loved 
to inscribe their history in symbolic characters. They believed they could realise an 
adjustment of idea and words that nothing could destroy.  
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Now the whole trend of the modern spirit is away from that, philosophers no longer 
believe in absolute truth. We no longer believe in perfection, either in verse or in 
thought, we frankly acknowledge the relative. We shall no longer strive to attain the 
absolutely perfect form in poetry. (52-53) 
 
The mention of Jean-Marie Guyau in the passage cited above has led some critics to the 
conclusion that Hulme‟s descriptions of the ancient and modern spirits can be explained 
through Guyau‟s work, specifically Les Problèmes de l‟ esthétique contemporaine (1884) and 
L‟ Art au point de vue sociologique (1889). In Les Problèmes de l‟ esthétique contemporaine, 
in a discussion about the future of poetry, Guyau discusses the reasons why his 
contemporaries “naturalistes,” prose writers such as Zola, turned to prose instead of poetry as 
a medium for their art. Among other things, Guyau writes: 
 
La prose, ce qu‟il y a de plus relatif et des plus mobile dans le langage, semble mieux 
convenir des nos idées modernes, si changeantes elles-même. Les grands poèmes des 
anciens âges ressemblent à ces pyramides dressées pour l‟éternité, où les vieux peuples 
aimaient à inscrire leur histoire en caractères merveilleux et symboliques: aujourd‟hui, 
les faits et les idées se succèdent si vite pour nos cerveaux fatigués que nous avons à 
peine le temps de les transcrire à la hâte, le plus simplement possible, sans symboles ni 
figures délicatement sculptées ... écrire n‟est plus graver. (176) 
Prose, that which is the most relative and the most flexible in language, seems more 
appropriate to our modern ideas, which keep changing. The great poems of the past 
resemble pyramids erected for eternity, on which the ancients loved to inscribe their 
history by producing fantastic and symbolic characters; nowadays, thoughts and ideas 
succeed one another so quickly for our tired minds that we only have time to translate 
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them in haste and as simply as possible with no symbolisms, nor delicately grafted 
characters ... writing is no longer engraving.  
 
Critics have also identified another passage, this time from Guyau‟s L‟ Art au point de vue 
sociologique, as a possible source for Hulme‟s idea that the tendency of the modern spirit is 
toward the “relative.” In L‟ Art au point de vue sociologique, a work which examines the 
social basis of art, Guyau states: 
 
L‟art moderne doit être fondé sur la notion de l‟imparfait, comme la métaphysique 
moderne sur celle du relatif. (123) 
Modern art ought to be based upon the idea of the imperfect, in the same way as 
modern metaphysics proceeds on the idea of the relative. 
 
In both cases, Guyau‟s claims chime with Hulme‟s remark in the lecture that the defining 
characteristic of the “modern” is its rejection of the absolute or the perfect and its recognition 
of the relative (53). However tempting it may be to conclude that Hulme owes his idea that 
the modern spirit is “relative” to Guyau, as Csengeri has rightly pointed out, Guyau‟s use of 
the term “relative” is demonstrably different. In Les Problèmes de l‟ esthétique 
contemporaine, Csengeri explains, Guyau was only making a point about how the 
“naturalistes” writers preferred prose to poetry because it was more flexible. In L‟ Art au 
point de vue sociologique, Guyau was specifically discussing literary realism; he was 
interested, Csengeri writes, in “the matter not the manner of literature, and in this regard he 
discussed the introduction of ugliness into realistic novels” (“T. E. Hulme‟s Borrowings from 
the French” 25; emphasis in original). For Guyau in L‟ Art au point de vue sociologique, 
therefore, relative meant “realistic,” Guyau‟s idea being that the presentation of perfect 
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characters in the literature of this kind clashes with its aim, which is to present real, flawed 
characters with whom readers could relate, leading to “faux realisme” (cf. L‟ Art au point de 
vue sociologique 76, 83). Csengeri‟s conclusion in “T. E. Hulme‟s Borrowings from the 
French” that Hulme took Guyau‟s discussion “out of its original context, and put it into his 
own,” thus seems fair (25). 
 
In distinguishing between the ancients who “believe in perfection” and the moderns who 
“frankly acknowledge the relative,” Hulme seems to be harking back to “Cinders,” where he 
presented two antithetical views of the world. On the one hand, there are those who tried to 
impose an artificial unity on the flux of experience and whom Hulme derides in “Cinders” as 
“counter” philosophers (8). On the other hand, there are those who, like Hulme, endorse a 
view of the world as “cinders.” As in “A Lecture,” in “Cinders” Hulme sides against the idea 
that there is an absolute truth, unity or beauty in the world (8-10). Instead of reducing the 
world to “theories of the world, which satisfy [us],” as one entry puts it (14), we must 
recognise, he claims in another, that “The world is a plurality” (9). Likewise, rather than 
postulate philosophical views that are “flattering to our sense of power over the world” (11), 
Hulme suggests in “Cinders” that it is more accurate to recognise that the world is 
“essentially imperfect, chaotic, and cinder-like” (9), and thus accept the view that there is 
“No average or real truth” (13). In a sense then, the modern poet in a lecture who does not 
believe in absolute truth recalls Hulme of “Cinders,” who happily acknowledges that the only 
reality is the experiential “flux.” Hulme elaborates on this view – that there is no “absolute” 
truth and that the world is imperfect – in the New Age essays of 1909-11. Turning briefly to 
these essays provides a way of understanding how he uses the terms “absolute” and “relative” 




Following a similar argument as in his lecture, in “The New Philosophy” Hulme argues 
that the tendency to seek “perfection” in philosophy begins with the ancient Greeks, 
specifically Plato, for whom, he writes, “reality consisted of „essences‟ or ideas” (86; cf. 
111). This tendency, Hulme goes on to claim, can also be seen at work in neo-Hegelian 
philosophers such as Haldane, whose philosophy is based on “order and organisation” (93); it 
can also be seen in the theories of positivist philosophers in general, who vouch to rationalise 
reality through scientific methods (101). For Hulme, two philosophers who have rejected the 
view of the world as “perfect” and who have thus moved away from the constructions of 
systems in metaphysics are Jules de Gaultier and Bergson. In his review of Gaultier, Hulme 
posits that Gaultier demonstrates that philosophy is in reality “a means of expressing certain 
attitudes to the cosmos” and that, moreover, thinking the opposite implies “humbly groping 
after the truth” (99-100). Hulme also explains that, for Gaultier, the struggle of science for 
“certitude” and for “systematic structure” is misguided, as “All philosophy is bound to be 
untrue, for it is the art of representing the cosmos in words, which is just as much a necessary 
distortion as the art of painting, which represents solidity in a plane of two dimensions” 
(103). Metaphysics should instead resemble art: it must combine “freedom and chance,” 
“bold speculation,” “light-heartedness” and “idiosyncrasy.” It must be seen, as Hulme puts it 
otherwise, as “an elaborate means for the expression of quite personal and human emotions” 
(101). 
 
As with Gaultier, Hulme praises Bergson for offering an alternative approach to 
metaphysics. Thus in Hulme‟s “Notes on the Bologna Congress” Bergson is described as a 
philosopher who does not believe that philosophy could unveil any “Truth” (cf. 105). By 
understanding the world in terms of experiential “flux” and not as a unity of laws, Hulme 
maintains in this report, Bergson provides a more accurate and more sincere view of reality. 
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Citing Bergson in support of his argument, Hulme rejects the belief that “Somewhere at a 
great distance, Truth is hidden” and that “She is always waiting to be discovered” (105). He 
reiterates this view in “Bax on Bergson,” now lauding Bergson for having shown how 
philosophers‟ quest for absolute knowledge is a dated approach to metaphysics: “What is so 
difficult for a man who has been brought up in one epoch of philosophy and lives on into the 
beginning of the next to understand,” Hulme writes in “Bax on Bergson,” “is this, that not 
only are there new answers to old questions, but in many cases the old questions cease to 
have an interest and any meaning for the next generation” (121).  
 
There is an obvious link between Hulme‟s description of the modern poet in “A Lecture” 
and his discussion of Gaultier and Bergson in the New Age articles. Just as Gaultier and 
Bergson are deemed by Hulme in the New Age to understand the world without imposing any 
“artificial” unities over it (87; 101), so Hulme presents the modern poet in “A Lecture” as 
someone who rejects all notions of “perfection” (cf. 52). My claim here, therefore, is that in 
arguing in the lecture that the moderns “acknowledge the relative” (cf. 53), Hulme is 
referring to the philosophical view expressed in “Cinders” and which in his articles for the 
New Age he attributes to the philosophical methods of Gautier and, especially Bergson.  
 
There is, finally, another aspect to Hulme‟s claim that the moderns should acknowledge 
the “relative,” which is less immediately apparent. The lecture‟s opposition to notions of 
“perfection” and to the tendency of creating God-like structures and inventing theories of 
“absolute” truth (52), in a sense anticipates his rejection of romanticism, defined in 
“Romanticism and Classicism” as the belief that “man is a god” (62). It is also in line with his 
criticism in this lecture of Ruskin, who, Hulme writes in “Romanticism and Classicism,” 
“wants to deduce his opinion like his master, Coleridge, from a fixed principle of the 
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cosmos” (62). Both the modern poet in the early lecture and his “classic” counterpart in 
“Romanticism and Classicism” recognise that it is not the job of poetry to make claims to an 
“absolute truth,” thus avoiding speaking of poetry in an idealistic manner (cf. 49, 52, 62, 66). 
This is not to say that the arguments in the two lectures are identical; as we will see in chapter 
4, in “Romanticism and Classicism” Hulme primarily aims to reject the romantic 
Weltanschauung he detects in poetry and politics, a concern which he does not have in “A 
Lecture.” Despite the change in terminology and focus, however, the poetry that Hulme 
criticises in “Romanticism and Classicism” is the same as the poetry he opposes in his early 
lecture. This is evident from the way that in both these lectures, Hulme directs his criticism 
towards the same poets. Thus in “A Lecture” he lists Tennyson, Shelley, Keats and prominent 
members of the Edwardian literary establishment, such as Simpson and Watson, as examples 
of poets guilty of chasing “perfection” and of using empty rhetoric, while in “Romanticism 
and Classicism,” even though he adds Lamartine, Hugo, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley and 
Swinburne on his list of poets whose poetry he dislikes, Hulme also includes Tennyson, 
Shelley, Keats and the critic who “takes up the thing at least a couple of notes in pitch” (cf. 
62-63). 
 
3. Impressionism and free verse 
Halfway through the lecture, Hulme describes the difference between the old and the 
modern attitudes in poetry by pointing to “analogous” developments in painting:  
 
The old poetry dealt essentially with big things, the expression of epic subjects leads 
naturally to the anatomical matter and regular verse...  
But the modern is the exact opposite of this, it no longer deals with heroic action, it has 
become finally introspective ... The opinion you often hear expressed, that perhaps a 
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new poet will arrive who will synthesise the whole modern movement into a great epic, 
shows an entire misconception of the tendency of modern verse. There is an analogous 
change in painting, where the old endeavoured to tell a story, the modern attempts to fix 
an impression. We still perceive the mystery of things, but we perceive it ... in an 
impression, for example, Whistler‟s pictures. We can‟t escape from the spirit of our 
times. What has found expression in painting as Impressionism will soon find 
expression in poetry in free verse. (53) 
 
There are two things to note here, both of which invite further scrutiny. The first relates to the 
role played by Impressionist painting in Hulme‟s formulation of modern poetry. The second 
concerns the form that modern poetry would take. In what follows, I begin by briefly 
considering Hulme‟s discussion of Impressionism in the lecture, then moving on to examine 
in detail his suggestion that modern verse would find its expression as free verse. 
 
As Carr points out, “before Roger Fry‟s first Post-Impressionist exhibition [in 1910], 
Impressionism still represented all that was most modern in art” (Verse Revolutionaries 198). 
This was certainly Storer‟s impression, who wrote in 1908 that “To argue for or against 
impressionism at this time of the day would be as foolish as to write a treatise proving the 
circulation of blood” (“An Essay” 101). Understood in its broadest definition, as the art 
practised by Monet, Renoir, Pissarro and Sisley, as well as Cézanne, Degas, Manet and 
Whistler, Impressionism challenged many nineteenth-century conceptions of art. Hulme 
values specifically Impressionism‟s choice of subject matter and its creative method. In the 
passage cited above, he presents Impressionism as art that is not interested in presenting a 
story or a narrative – this is what Hulme means when he says that Impressionism avoided 
“epic subjects” – but that is rather only interested in the momentary presentations of the 
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artist‟s inward feelings. As he puts it earlier on in the lecture, the aim of Impressionism is 
“the maximum of individual and personal expression” (53). In this sense, Impressionism 
constitutes a transformation into art of the idea that Hulme professes in his article on Gaultier, 
according to which philosophy should be “simply an elaborate means for the expression of 
quite personal and human emotions” (101). More importantly, Hulme is attracted to the way 
Impressionism avoids presenting ideas of “absolute truth,” looking instead for inspiration in 
material reality (53). This is evident from the way Hulme juxtaposes the Impressionist 
method of representing feelings induced by “the vision of a London street at midnight” or the 
“the flat spaces and wide horizons” of the Canadian prairies with the “lyrical impulse” of 
Tennyson, Shelley and Keats (53). This regard for material reality, which both Compton and 
Eitner identify as a central component of Impressionist art, can be seen in “Notes,” where 
Hulme writes in one entry that “All emotion depends on real solid vision or sound. It is 
physical” (24), stating in another that “The art of literature consists exactly in this passage 
from the Eye to the Voice” (31; emphasis in original).
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 It can also be seen in “Romanticism 
and Classicism,” where Hulme argues that a poem should always be built around “an actually 
realised visual object” (71).  
 
Hulme‟s claim in the lecture that the change in Impressionist painting is “analogous” to 
changes happening in the field of poetry, suggests that he was using Impressionism as an 
example of a broader transformation in the spirit of the times. For Hulme, Impressionism is 
part of a larger process in which artists are turning away from preoccupations with 
“perfection.” He appears to feel similarly about developments in music. As he writes in the 
lecture, a “fanciful analogy” for the method of “piling-up and juxtaposition of distinct 
images,” the technique which he goes on to inaugurate as the defining characteristic of 
                                                 
57 See Compton n.pag. and Eitner 338. 
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modern poetry, can be found in “music ... when for the melody that is one-dimensional ... was 
substituted harmony which moves in two.” As he explains, the “visual images” in modern 
poetry combine to “suggest an image which is different to both” in a way comparable to 
different notes in modern music uniting as a “visual chord” (54). One way of understanding 
Hulme‟s reference to music here is through Bergson, who on separate moments in his 
writings describes how the continuous, uninterrupted movement enacted in music can point 
us to a reality that is not available to us through conceptual language.
58
 Another way of 
reading Hulme‟s claim, however, is through developments in the field of music in the early 
twentieth century. As Botstein has demonstrated, in the opening years of the last century 
composers such as Debussy looked to Impressionism to redeem themselves from what 
Botstein describes as “absolutist aesthetics” (160). Debussy himself later wrote to a friend 
that, during this time, his aim was to “Collect impressions” rather than present in his music a 
real-life portrait or a narrative, Debussy‟s hope being that music could lead the audience to a 
reality beyond the visual or the linguistic. For that to happen, Debussy maintains in this letter, 
music ought to be taken as a “whole, a single intense facing object of vision – a single 
striking object of vision” (qtd. in Botstein 161, 164; emphasis in original). Hulme‟s 
discussion of Impressionist art in “A Lecture,” therefore, is best understood as part of his 
overall argument in the lecture, which is to convince that there was evidence in philosophy 
and in arts that the spirit of the time was changing and that poetry had to change accordingly. 
 
Hulme concludes his discussion of Impressionism by saying that, just like the “modern 
spirit” found its expression in art as Impressionism, the “modern spirit” in poetry will find its 
expression as “free verse.” For many critics, Hulme‟s demand for “free verse” is the central 
                                                 
58 Cf. Time and Free Will 100; “The Stating of Problems” 33-34; and “The Perception of Change” 149-50. 
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requirement which Hulme postulates for modern poetry.
59
 The obvious problem with 
describing Hulme‟s definition of modern poetry as “free verse” is that, as various scholars 
have showed, “free verse” is an often misused term that, unless it is defined each time it is 
used, it runs the risk of being a misnomer.
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 In neglecting to explain what they mean by “free 
verse,” critics including Taupin, Read, Rodway and Wacior fail to add to our understanding 
of Hulme‟s position regarding the form of modern poetry in “A Lecture.” To gain an insight 
into how Hulme is using the term “free verse” in his lecture, I propose we briefly explore 
what the term stood for in 1908.  
 
According to Flint‟s “History of Imagism,” the poets Hulme associated himself with 
looked for inspiration to Japanese poetic forms and the French vers libre (71). Japanese forms 
and the French vers libre were thought of as “free” forms, as both put greater emphasis on 
individual rhythm than they did on regular metre, rhythm or rhyme.
61
 Reviewing a volume of 
Japanese and Chinese poetry in 1908, Flint thus expressed his wish “that the poems in this 
book had been translated into little dropping rhythms, unrhymed” rather than into “heavy 
English rhymed quatrains,” as in that way, Flint went on to argue, it would be possible to 
experience the “soul‟s music.” This would have been preferable, Flint claimed, because “To 
the poet who can catch and render [this music] the future lies open,” concluding by calling 
for poetry of “more subtle rhythms and broken cadences” (“Book of the Week: Recent 
Verses” 212-13). In this review, Flint is essentially arguing for the introduction in English 
poetry of French vers libre. This becomes obvious once we compare the claims he makes in 
his review with an article he wrote for the Poetry Review four years later, where Flint defines 
French vers libre as poetry “free from exterior law,” praising the French vers librists, whose 
                                                 
59 See, for example, Taupin 245; Read, Tenth Muse 129; Rodway 96; and Wacior 26. 
60 See Hough 87; Pratt, Introduction to The Imagist Poem 39; Duffell 187; Malof 146; and Hartman 44. 
61 On the formal characteristics of Japanese verse forms and on its influence on the French vers libre movement, 
see Carr 189-190. On the influence of Japanese verse forms on the Imagist poets, see Gillies and Mahood 69-73; 
Copp 20-21; and Carr, “Imagism and Empire” 67-72. 
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primary concern, Flint argued, was to “follow rigorously the interior law of the poet‟s 
emotion and the idea which has given it birth” (“Contemporary French Poetry” 358). As Carr 
has demonstrated in detail, Flint‟s essay in the Poetry Review was influential to those around 
him, especially Pound, who was made aware by Flint about the importance of rhythm and 
assonance rather than rhyme (480-82). Directly influenced or not, Pound‟s principle of 
melopoeia, according to which form has “truly to bear the trace of emotion which the poem ... 
is intended to communicate” (“A Serious Artist” 244), certainly shares something with the 
verse advocated by Flint in both his 1908 and 1912 articles.  
 
Like Flint, Storer was also campaigning in 1908 for a verse form that abandoned the 
conventions of regular rhythm and rhyme, criticising in his essay in Mirrors of Illusion all 
poetry that was “coffined alive in the restrictions of rhythm or rhyme.” Unlike Flint, 
however, who advertised the French vers libre as the best-suited form for modern poetry, in 
“An Essay” Storer maintained that the modern poet had much more to learn from the work of 
the nineteenth-century English poets Sydney Dobell, Alexander Smith and Coleridge rather 
than the French vers librists. This is because, Storer claims, “nearly all the English poets have 
been vers-librists, for we never insisted on such rigidity of form as the French did” (110). The 
kind of poetry Storer favoured specifically was “separatist,” by which he meant poetry 
stripped of “all unessential and confounding branches of literary art which only serve to 
hinder and destroy it” – that is, free from metre, rhythm, narration, drama and other 
“conventions” and “artificialities” (102). Storer thus concluded: 
 
There is no absolute virtue in iambic pentameters as such … however well they may be. 
There is no immediate virtue in rhythm or rhyme even. These things are merely means 
to an end. Judged by themselves they are monstrosities of childish virtuosity and 
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needless iteration. Indeed, rhythm and rhyme are often destructive of thought, lulling 
the mind into a drowsy kind of stupor … Their use for their own sake may safely be left 
to the music-hall and ballad concert type of poetry. (107) 
 
Storer‟s idea that rhythm and rhyme are better suited to the music-hall, as we will see in the 
final part of this chapter, recalls Hulme‟s distinction in “A Lecture” between read and 
chanted verse. Here, however, we need only note how, even though Flint and Storer were 
agreed in 1908 on the fact that regular forms of poetry were unsatisfactory, and despite all of 
the “Tour Eiffel” poets being equally eager to find an alternative verse form to the “stale and 
hackneyed” metre of old, as Pound later described nineteenth-century metric verse (“A 
Retrospect” 253), in 1908 the poets of Hulme‟s “Tour Eiffel” group were not firmly settled 
on a specific form of poetry.
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 This is significant because, as we will now see, in “A Lecture” 
Hulme similarly refuses to prescribe modern poetry a specific verse form, freely 
experimenting in his poetry with traditional rhythmic and rhyme schemes. 
 
Hulme‟s first mention of either term – “free verse” or vers libre – occurs early on in the 
lecture: 
 
I came to the subject of verse from the inside rather than the outside. There were certain 
impressions which I wanted to fix. I read verse to find models but I could not find any 
that seemed exactly suitable to express that kind of impression, except perhaps in the 
                                                 
62 Pound advocated vers libre in “The Tradition” 93, “The Approach to Paris” 340, and in “How I Began” 213-
14. Like Storer and Hulme, Pound drew a distinction between the free verse form used by the Imagists and 
French vers libre. As he put it in a letter to Alice Henderson from 1913, “„Vers Libre‟ is various things. there‟s 
„Vers Libre‟. And „our vers libre‟ and „their vers libre‟ [sic]” (4). In “A Retrospect,” Pound expressed his 
dismay about how vers libre had become in the hands of some modern poets “as prolix and verbose as any of 
the flaccid varieties of prose that preceded it” (3). Pound was also an admirer of Japanese hokku poems. On 
Pound‟s use of the haiku, see Miner 115-28. 
64 
 
jerky rhythms of Henley, until I came to read the French vers-libre, which seemed to 




Further on in the lecture, Hulme returns to the subject of vers libre, now elaborating on what 
he means by it: 
 
The new technique was first definitely stated by Kahn. It consisted in a denial of a 
regular number of syllables as the basis of versification. The length of the line is long 
and short, oscillating with the images used by the poet; it follows the contours of his 
thoughts and is free rather than regular ... it is clothes made to order, rather than ready-
made clothes. This is a very bald statement of it and I am not concerned here so much 
with French poetry as with English. The kind of verse I advocate is not the same as 
vers-libre, I merely use the French as an example of the extraordinary effect that an 
emancipation of verse can have on poetic activity. (52)  
 
Hulme‟s definition of vers-libre here is in its essence a summary of the argument put forward 
in Kahn‟s Préface in Premiers Poèmes, where Kahn argues that vers libre allows the poet to  
 
écrire son rythme propre et individuel au lieu d‟endosser un uniforme taillé d‟avance et 
qui le réduit à n‟être que l‟élève de tel glorieux prédécesseur. (28)  
write his own individual rhythm, rather than follow pre-fabricated restrictions, and thus 
reduce himself to being simply a follower of so-called glorious masters. 
                                                 
63 Hulme‟s mention of the “jerky rhythms” of Henley here may be indicative of an early desire to move away 
from what he described in “Romanticism and Classicism” as the vague and high-pitched rhetoric of 
Romanticism (62-63). As Kirby-Smith argues, Henley‟s experiments with verse were “Most relevant to 
twentieth-century free verse,” precisely because for Henley, Kirby-Smith writes, “free verse was a way of 
stripping off the Tennysonian-Swinburnian rhetoric that prevented poetry from coming to terms to the hard facts 




Although Hulme‟s reliance on Kahn suggests that he endorses Kahn‟s vers libre, Hulme 
states that he does not think of French vers libre as the principal form of modern poetry. 
Tempting as it may be to conclude that he is here contradicting himself, Hulme is simply 
making the point, which is also the point Storer makes in his “Essay,” that what makes vers 
libre a primarily modern form of poetry is that it does not follow any prescribed rules. This is 
the only definition of vers libre that can be got out of “A Lecture” and it is, in fact, the only 
satisfactory definition that, as scholars have shown, can be given to the terms “vers libre” and 
“free verse” as they are used in English poetry. Hough thus writes that “free verse” as 
adopted by English poets in the early twentieth century is more correctly understood as vers 
libéré, not vers libre, as, whereas vers libre refers to verse that is “born free,” vers libéré 
denotes verse that “has been liberated from some pre-existing chains” (87). Kirby-Smith 
makes a similar point to Hough, suggesting that the only common characteristic of “free 
verse” poems in English is that “they escape or deviate from traditional meters” and that they 
thus “run counter to expectations of various sorts” (43, 47). 
 
That Hulme is favourable to a verse form that is not prescriptive but that only abandons 
strict conventions is made evident from his poetry, which is an example of what Malof calls 
“fragmented free verse,” or, in Kirby-Smith‟s terms, “vers-libristic” form, “a loosening up of 
poetic structure into lines of irregular length” but which retains, as Kirby-Smith explains, “a 
certain regularity of syllabification and use of rhyming endings” (44). Consider, for example, 
“The Embankment”: 
 
Once, in finesse of fiddles found I ecstasy, 
In a flash of gold heels on the hard pavement. 
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Now see I 
That warmth‟s the very stuff of poesy 
Oh, God, make small 
The old star-eaten blanket of the sky, 
That I may fold it round me and in comfort lie. 
 
A rhyming structure persists – “ecstasy” with “poesy”; “I” with “sky” and “lie.” In “Above 
the Dock,” the iambic pentameter ensures that the rhythmic structure is much more fluid: 
 
Above the quiet dock in midnight, 
Tangled in the tall mast‟s corded height,  
Hangs the moon. What seemed so far away 
Is but a child‟s balloon, forgotten after play. 
 
Consider also his unpublished poem “A Sunset,” with the primary metrical stress marked on 
its original manuscript:  
 
I love not the Sunset 
That spréad like a scarlet sóre 
O”er hálf a sick sky, 
Or flaunts a tráiled red globe 
Along the fretted edge of the city‟s roofs 
Abóut the time of hómeward going crows 
Calling aloúd for all to gape 







“Autumn” is also unrhymed, but it is written in a much freer form:  
 
A touch of cold in the Autumn night –  
I walked abroad 
And saw the ruddy moon 
Like a red-faced farmer. 
I did not stop to speak, but nodded, 
And round about were the wistful stars 
With white faces like town children. 
 
Here, the conventions of rhyme and metre are rejected completely, the modern poet left free 
to express himself. Instead of trying to achieve a “perfect” representation, in “Autumn” 
Hulme simply presents a series of impressions. He does not speak, but nods; in the 
terminology of “A Lecture,” he possesses a “tentative and half-shy manner of looking at 
things” (53-54). 
 
Like Flint and Storer, therefore, Hulme argues in “A Lecture” for a verse form that allows 
the poet to express himself, without imposing on him strict rules regarding metre, rhythm or 
rhyme. French vers libre certainly adhered to this requirement, yet, as Storer noted, so did 
English free verse. It was in this sense only that Hulme saw in French vers libre a form that 
could emancipate modern English poetry. As understood by Hulme, Flint and Storer, the 
modern poet should adopt not a form that rejects metre, rhythm, and rhyme altogether, but a 
form that allows the poet to freely express himself, without having to conscribe to any formal 
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restrictions. This explains why Hulme uses rhythm and rhyme in his poems. Ultimately, what 
concerns him the most in “A Lecture,” however, is not so much the specific verse form that 
modern poetry will take, but that it is “visual.” What Hulme means by “visual” is examined 
in the next and final part of this chapter.  
 
4. The “new visual art” 
Having argued that the “modern spirit” would find its expression in poetry as free verse, 
Hulme moves on in “A Lecture” to explain in more detail how modern poetry differs in its 
aims and its methodology from poetry that obeys to strict metric, rhythmic and rhyme 
patterns: 
 
Say the poet is moved by a certain landscape, he selects from that certain images which 
put into juxtaposition in separate lines serve to suggest and to evoke the state he feels ... 
Two visual images form what one may call a visual chord. They unite to suggest an 
image which is different to both.  
Starting then from this standpoint of extreme modernism, what are the principal 
features of verse at the present time? It is this: that it is read and not chanted ... We have 
thus two distinct arts ... The older art was originally a religious incantation; it was made 
to express oracles and maxims in an impressive manner, and rhyme and metre were 
used as aids to the memory. But why, for this new poetry, should we keep a mechanism 
which is only suited to the old? The effect of rhythm ... is to produce a kind of hypnotic 
state, during which suggestions of grief or ecstasy are easily and powerfully effective ... 
This is for the art of chanting, but the procedure of the new visual art is just the 
contrary. It depends for its effect not on a kind of half sleep produced, but on arresting 




Later on in the lecture, Hulme returns to elaborate on the difference between the modern and 
old art:  
 
This new verse resembles sculpture rather than music; it appeals to the eye rather than 
to the ear. It has to mould images, a kind of spiritual clay, into definite shapes. The 
material ... is images and not sound. It builds up a plastic image which it hands over to 
the reader, whereas the old art endeavoured to influence him physically by the hypnotic 
effect of rhythm. (56) 
 
On the one hand, Hulme draws a distinction between “read” and “chanted” verse or poetry. 
Hulme‟s definition of modern poetry as poetry that is read and that “appeals to the eye” has 
received little critical attention. The few critics who have discussed it, argue that in 
emphasising that modern poetry is for the eye, not the ear, Hulme advocates typographic 
experimentation, or, at the very least, must be anticipating the experimentations with 
typography of e. e. cummings, Apollinaire and the Dadaists (Carr 179; Kirby-Smith 46-47). 
Here, I argue that a different interpretation of Hulme‟s distinction is possible, according to 
which Hulme‟s definition of modern poetry as visual is intended to distance his conception of 
modern poetry from the popular chanted verse of the time. On the other hand, Hulme 
describes how modern poetry consists of distinct images arranged in juxtaposition and also 
how modern poetry aims at creating “a plastic image.” In order to understand these two 
claims, it is useful to return to the ideas of Bergson and Ribot.  
 
Hulme‟s description of the “older art” of chanting in “A Lecture” fits perfectly the profile 
of the chanted verse popularised by Yeats and Florence Farr in the early 1900s. In his 
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excellent study of Yeats and chanted verse, Schuchard explains how Yeats turned to chanting 
in an attempt to revive Irish literature. “Seeing himself as the inheritor of the Irish bardic and 
ballad traditions,” Schuchard writes, Yeats “set out to reconcile in his work the ancient Gaelic 
tradition with the younger Anglo-Irish tradition,” a synthesis he achieved in works such as 
“Love Song. From the Gaelic” and the Ballads of “Moll Magee,” “Father O‟Hart,” “Old 
Foxhunter” and “Father Gilligan.” Yeats‟ turn to the ballad form, according to Schuchard, 
links him to “the distant bardic order in England through Blake and those Romantic poets 
who had not relinquished the power of the voice to the printed page,” as well as to Gray, 
Macpherson, Percy, Coleridge, Wordsworth and Tennyson, all of whom idolised the bards 
(The Last Minstrels 5-6). The quest to revive the bardic arts led Yeats to collaborate with 
Florence Farr, one of the most exciting recital actresses at the time. The pair first met in 
1891; impressed with Farr‟s acting and delivery of verse, Yeats invited Farr to join him in 
developing together a new art of chanting. When in 1901, on Yeats‟ encouragement, Arnold 
Dolmetsch presented Farr with a kind of lyre called a “psaltery,” Farr and Yeats finally found 
the art of chanting or “cantilating” they wanted. As Schuchard explains, “cantilating” soon 
captured the imaginations of many poets in the early twentieth century, including the 
members of the “Poet‟s Club,” who invited Farr to perform at the Club‟s premises on St. 
James street some point in 1908 (256). An idea of the kind of art Farr and Yeats were 
promoting can be found in Farr‟s “The Music of Speech,” a self-promotional pamphlet 
published in 1909, in which Farr argues that poetry must strive to become like music. “It is 
only by listening very carefully to the little tunes contained in every word,” Farr maintains in 
this pamphlet, “that one comes to divine something of the real meaning of the tradition of 
magic words” (19). As she goes on to explain, in order for chanted verse to be effective, “The 
audience should not be hurried and wearied by violent transition, but should absorb each 
phrase, and feel that each phrase was building up a great cumulative effect” (20). This was an 
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idea Farr shared with Yeats, who in 1904 described musical rhythm as “the glimmer, the 
fragrance, the spirit of all intense literature” and as that which “separates good writing from 
bad” and who, like Farr declared that “this new art ... will have to train its hearers” 
(“Speaking to the Psaltery” 25-26).  
 
It is easy to see why Hulme would have wanted to distinguish his brand of modern poetry 
from the chanted poetry of Yeats and Farr. Farr‟s and Yeats‟ discussion of recited verse was 
certainly not the “plain talk” that Hulme demands in “A Lecture” (cf. 49). Speaking of 
chanting as poetry that makes words sound magical, Farr in particular belongs to those critics 
derided in the lecture for describing poetry as a “higher kind of reality” (49). Even though 
there is no mention of Farr‟s name in Hulme‟s writings, Hulme refers to Yeats twice in 
“Notes.” On the first occasion, he associates Yeats with the “popular idea of poet as in 
communion with the infinite,” an idea which, as this entry states, can also be found in 
Tennyson (cf. 37).
64
 In the second instance, Hulme writes that “W. B. Yeats attempts to 
ennoble his craft by strenuously believing in supernatural world, race-memory, magic and 
saying that symbols can recall these,” concluding that “This [is] an attempt to bring in an 
infinity again” (43). Given Hulme‟s opposition in “A Lecture” to critics who “make 
mysterious passes and mumble of the infinite and the human heart” (49), he would certainly 
have opposed the chanted verse of Yeats‟ and Farr. More importantly, Farr‟s slow, rhythmic 
“cantilating” is at odds with the modern poetry of Hulme that “depends for its effect not on a 
kind of half sleep produced, but on arresting the attention, so much so that the succession of 
visual images should exhaust one” (54). In other words, read and chanted verse are based on 
two diametrically opposite methods of composition. Whereas the “old” art of chanted verse 
                                                 
64 In the fragment in “Notes,” Hulme mentions specifically the “account of Yeats walking in the woods” (cf. 
37). This seems to be an allusion to Yeats‟ description in his book In the Seven Woods, published in 1903, of his 
creative process. Yeats writes how “walking about among the Seven Woods,” the poems included in the 
collection “came to [him] in a dream” (qtd. in Jeffares 73). 
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creates “suggestions of grief or ecstasy [that] are easily and powerfully effective” through the 
use of rhythm, modern poetry, as Hulme explains in the passage cited above, presents images 
in juxtaposition, a process that aims to “arrest” the attention of the reader. Moreover, while 
chanting tries to “influence by the hypnotic effect of rhythm,” modern poetry, as Hulme 
describes it later on in the lecture, “builds up a plastic image which it hands over to the 
reader” (56). 
 
The method of presentation of different images in distinct lines that Hulme prescribes for 
modern poetry can be understood through Bergson‟s key suggestion in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics that many diverse images can lead us “to the precise point where there is certain 
intuition to be seized” (28). In Chapter 1, I demonstrated how the idea behind this suggestion 
is that images are better equipped to guide us to duration because, unlike concepts, images 
are non-rational; as Bergson puts it in An Introduction to Metaphysics, images “keep us in the 
concrete” (27). In Chapter 1, I argued that this idea clarifies Hulme‟s distinction in “Notes” 
between “prose” and “poetry.” Here, it is another aspect of Bergson‟s suggestion that is the 
most relevant, namely Bergson‟s claim that it is only through the convergence of distinct 
images that intuition can be seized. Bergson writes in An Introduction to Metaphysics: 
 
By choosing images as dissimilar as possible, we shall prevent any one of them from 
usurping the place of the intuition it is needed to call up, since it would then be driven 
away at once by its rivals. By providing that, in spite of their differences of aspect, they 
all require from the mind the same degree of attention, and in some sort the same 
degree of tension, we shall gradually accustom consciousness to a particular and 
clearly-defined disposition – that precisely which it must adopt in order to appear to 




The reason why it is important that images are distinct, Bergson explains, is because different 
images succeed in triggering our attention towards intuition without directing us to a specific 
point. An important requirement of intuition for Bergson is that it requires an effort on the 
part of the individual. He thus goes on to say: 
 
But, then, consciousness must at least consent to make the effort. For it will have been 
shown nothing: It will simply have been placed in the attitude it must take up in order 
to make the desired effort, and so come by itself to intuition.    
 
The idea here is that, precisely because intuition requires effort from our consciousness, it 
cannot be given to us, but only be suggested to us.  
 
Read through Bergson‟s idea, the juxtaposition of images in modern poetry that Hulme 
proposes is designed to facilitate the process of intuition. The modern poet presents a series 
of brief and distinct images or metaphors designed to lead the reader to an intuitive moment. 
This logic is enacted in Hulme‟s poetry, where metaphors are presented successively, without 
Hulme privileging one image over another and where, as suggested by Hulme in “A Lecture,” 
the reader is encouraged to make out of them as he wants and to unify them into a new image 
(54). In “Above the Dock,” for example, the image of the hanging moon is followed by that 
of a balloon held by a child; the two images carry equal weight and unify into an image of the 
moon floating as if a balloon held by the child. Likewise, “A Sunset” begins with the image 
of the sunset “spréad like a scarlet sore,” the poem then moving rapidly through the images of 
the “hálf a sick sky,” a “tráiled red globe,” “the city‟s roofs,” and the “hómeward going 
crows.” Finally, in “Autumn” Hulme associates the “ruddy moon” with a “red-faced farmer” 
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and “wistful stars” with the “white faces” of “town children,” the mind of the reader shifting 
suddenly from one image to the next. In the terminology of An Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Hulme invites the reader to make the effort required by intuition; he must suspend any 
“particular and clearly-defined disposition” he may have.   
 
A similar idea is expressed in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” where Hulme explains that the 
poet must always aim to invent original metaphors – “because language will not carry over 
the exact thing you want to say,” he writes, “you are compelled simply in order to be accurate 
to invent original ways of stating things” (200) – only to then stress that the presentation of 
metaphors and epithets alone does not suffice. As he argues, what matters most in poetry is  
 
not the accidental fact that imagery conveys over an actually felt visual sensation, but 
the actual character of that communication, the fact that it hands you over the sensation 
as directly as possible, attempts to get it bodily with all the qualities it possessed for 
you when you experiences it. The feeling conveyed over to one is almost a kind of 
instinctive feeling. (201) 
 
The “instinctive feeling” that Hulme describes here is intended to prepare us for intuition, 
ultimately aiming at achieving “actual contact with reality” (203). This point receives more 
careful examination in the next chapter. Here, it suffices to note how in explaining in 
“Bergson‟s Theory of Art” that the presentation of images in poetry is not enough, but that 
these images must serve to generate communication between the poet and the reader, Hulme 
acknowledges that rhythm and metre had a role to play in poetry. Making the point that 




Among all the varied qualities of good verse, and in the complex kind of motion which 
it can produce, there is one quality it must possess, which can be easily separated from 
the other qualities and which constitutes this distinctively aesthetic emotion for which 
we are searching. 
[...] 
To get at what it is definitely, I only consider it in as far as it bears on the choice of 
epithets and images. The same quality is exhibited in the other parts of verse, in the 
rhythm and metre, for example, but it so happens that it is most easily isolated in the 
case of epithets. (198) 
 
This is an important qualifier, for it explains why Hulme does not abandon in his own poetry 
such conventions as rhythm or rhyme. 
 
Hulme also writes in “A Lecture” that, in contrast to chanted verse, modern poetry 
“appeals to the eye rather than to the ear” and that, moreover, “It has to mould images, a kind 
of spiritual clay, into definite shapes” (56). The requirement that Hulme postulates here for 
modern poetry can be understood through Ribot‟s theory of imagination in Essay on the 
Creative Imagination. According to Ribot, there are two main types of reasoning involved in 
the processing of “abstract” and “general” ideas: reasoning from particular to particular, and 
reasoning by analogy. Both are needed to pass from the known to the unknown; the 
difference is that, whereas in the first case the mental progress is of the simplest form, as the 
mind simply passes from the immediately given to that suggested by experiential association, 
reasoning by analogy is of a far higher order, as it presupposes mental construction. Focusing 
on analogical reasoning, Ribot shows that, as a spectrum ranging from valueless likeness to 
cognitive resemblance, analogical reasoning leads to different kinds of creative imagination. 
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In cases in which analogies are valueless, the operation involved is “diffluent imagination.” 
As Ribot explains, this process consists of “vaguely-outlined, indistinct images ... evoked and 
joined according to the least rigorous modes of association” (195). When analogies approach 
cognition, however, they give rise to what Ribot terms “plastic imagination.” This “plastic 
imagination,” Ribot explains, “has for its special characters clearness and precision of form,” 
adding that its “material [sic] are clear images, approaching perception, giving the impression 
of reality” (184). 
 
In various entries in “Notes,” Hulme writes that “poetry” (or direct language) must be 
made up of “analogies,” in a way that invites comparison with Ribot‟s definition of plastic 
imagination as the process of “reasoning by analogies.” In one fragment in “Notes,” for 
example, Hulme states that “the poet is forced to use new analogies, and especially to 
construct a plaster model of a thing to express his emotion at the sight of the vision he sees, 
his wonder and ecstasy” (24; cf. 22, 25, 26, 30, 31, 42). Elsewhere, in a fragment entitled 
“Example of Plastic Imagination,” Hulme asserts: 
 
The two tarts walking along Piccadilly on tiptoe, going home, with hat on back of head. 
Worry until could find the exact model analogy that will reproduce the extraordinary 
effect they produce.  
Could be done at once by an artist in a blur. (28) 
 
In Ribot‟s terms, the logic in both these fragments is that through cognitive analogies, it 
becomes possible for the poet to present accurately that which he has in his mind – to give an 
impression of reality. The idea that the success of a poem depends on the ability of the poet to 
use “exact” analogies features also in “Romanticism and Classicism,” where a similar 
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example to the entry in “Notes” – of someone “walking behind a woman in the street ... the 
skirt rebounds from her heels” (70-71) – is used to explain the creative process involved in 
“classic” poetry. To represent the emotion produced by the movement of the woman, Hulme 
maintains in “Romanticism and Classicism,” it is necessary that the poet has in his mind an 
“actually realised visual object.” More importantly, Hulme goes on to argue, the analogy used 
by the poet must be “every bit necessary for accurate description ... sincere in the accurate 
sense” (71). The same idea can be found in “A Lecture.” For in explaining in “A Lecture” 
that unlike chanted verse, modern poetry “mould[s] images … into definite shapes” and 
“builds up a plastic image which it hands over to the reader” (56), Hulme is essentially 
stating the case he later makes in “Romanticism and Classicism”: that the poet must aim to 
capture the feeling he wants to express through clear and accurate analogies.  
 
In Essay on Creative Imagination, Ribot locates the process of diffluent imagination in the 
“art of the „symbolists‟,” by which Ribot, as he explains, means art that “despises the clear 
and exact representation of the outer world [and] replaces it by a sort of music that aspires to 
express the fleeting inwardness of the human soul” (202). In contrast, “plastic imagination,” 
Ribot argues, is involved in those arts which present images in a precise and detailed way, for 
example the literature of Hugo, in whose works, Ribot asserts, we find “a stream of glittering 
images” (188). Quoting Mabilleau and Gautier with approval, both of whom write on Hugo, 
Ribot claims that Hugo “wants to see the words”; Because for Hugo “a book is made to be 
read, not to be spoken aloud,” Ribot continues, “Hugo never spoke his verses but wrote them 
out ... as if he needed to fixate the image ... to find the appropriate word” (189; emphasis in 
original).
65
 As well as explaining Hulme‟s emphasis on the use of accurate analogies, 
                                                 
65 Ribot is here quoting Mabilleau who was, in turn, quoting Gautier. Cf. Mabilleau 122 and Gautier‟s idea that 
“Un livre est fait pour être lu, et non parlé à haute voix [a book is to be read, not to be spoken out loudly]” (qtd. 
in Thibaudet 207). In his study of Hugo, Mabilleau discussed Hugo‟s poetic experiments in free verse, claiming 
that Hugo belonged in the tradition of the “„coloriste‟ ... poètes moderns” (cf. 122). 
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therefore, Ribot‟s theory of creative imagination provides a different way of understanding 
Hulme‟s distinction between chanted and visual art. For, despite Hulme‟s dismissal of Hugo 
as a “Romantic” later on in “Romanticism and Classicism,” the modern poet in “A Lecture” 
resembles Hugo in Ribot‟s analysis: they both aim at creating visual, not aural, analogies 
because, as explained above, they hold visual images to be the only means of approaching 
perception.   
 
In claiming that, unlike chanted verse, modern poetry should present images in 
juxtaposition and that it should build up a plastic image, Hulme was in many ways returning 
to the account of language he presented in “Notes.” On the one hand, the juxtaposition of 
distinct images that Hulme prescribes as the method of modern poetry ensures that poetry has 
a direct effect on the reader. It does this by “arresting the attention” of the reader through a 
process that leads to intuition. This “directness” is what separates modern poetry from 
chanted verse and indirect conventional language. On the other hand, the process of finding 
accurate analogies to represent the feeling or idea that the poet has in his mind, which Hulme 
postulates in “A Lecture” as an essential quality of modern verse, guarantees that modern 
poetry has greater contact with reality than chanted verse. Understood through Ribot‟s theory 
of creative imagination, analogies used in modern poetry approach perception in a way that 
the “verbal quibbles” of chanted verse, as Hulme describes the rhythmic language of chanted 
verse in “A Lecture,” cannot (54). Thus understood, the overarching aim of “visual” poetry is 
to return the reader to the point of originary sensation.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Hulme belonged to a generation of poets who were dissatisfied with existing conceptions 
of poetry. This explains why his first concern in “A Lecture” is to explain how the modern 
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spirit differs from the spirit of the nineteenth century. The latest developments in philosophy 
and in painting demonstrated, Hulme argues, that the moderns conceived of the world in a 
significantly different way than their predecessors. Drawing on Kahn‟s theory that verse 
forms are gradually worn out and that they must constantly be renewed, Hulme uses the ideas 
of Kahn to argue for the benefits of introducing a new verse form. Although as Flint, Storer 
and Pound, Hulme suggests that regular metre, rhythm and rhyme were no longer adequate 
for poetry, he was more interested in defining a method of composition for modern poetry. In 
this process, Hulme recasts the “anti-intellectualist” account of language he put forward in 
the notebooks into a theory for a “new visual art.” That his argument in “A Lecture” can be 
understood through ideas expressed in “Notes,” as well as in “Romanticism and Classicism” 



















Writings on Bergson: Hulme’s Interpretation of Bergson’s Metaphysics 
 
 
1. Introduction  
In July 1909, Hulme published in the New Age an article entitled “The New Philosophy.” 
A review of William James‟ A Pluralistic Universe, this short essay is largely devoted to the 
philosophy of Bergson. Hulme credits Bergson with offering the most satisfactory 
repudiation of the “old intellectualist philosophy”; complaining that Bergson‟s philosophy 
has received little attention in England, he announces that “The twenty years required for an 
idea to cross the Channel are fulfilled, and now we shall hear of nothing but Bergson” (85).
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In the next two and half years, Hulme wrote extensively on Bergson, discussing Bergson‟s 
philosophy in essays, letters and lectures and also translating Bergson‟s 1903 essay 
Introduction à la métaphysique. According to the common critical interpretation, on 
encountering Bergson in 1909 Hulme immediately embraced the theories of the French 
metaphysician, finding in Bergson “a philosophical way out of the nightmare of nineteenth-
century materialism and mechanism” (Csengeri, ed. xi). He soon became disenchanted with 
Bergson‟s metaphysics, however, realising that his political views were at odds with the 
theories of Bergson.
67
 Admittedly, such trajectory of intellectual development is supported by 
claims Hulme makes in his writings. He repeatedly praises Bergson, for example, for 
enabling him to free himself from mechanism, which he describes, echoing Huxley‟s mantra, 
                                                 
66 James acknowledges Bergson‟s impact on his work in A Pluralistic Universe 208, 214, 225 and 265, where he 
also discusses Bergson‟s “anti-intellectualism” to some length. Hulme‟s claim in “The New Philosophy” that 
James devotes “one half of the book” to Bergson (85), however, is an exaggeration. In reality, James considers 
Bergson‟s theories in two of the eight chapters included in A Pluralistic Universe. 
67 See Csengeri, “The Intellectual Development of T. E. Hulme” 7 and “The Chronology of T. E. Hulme‟s 
Speculations” 109. This view is also held by other critics. See, for example, Roberts, T. E. Hulme 139-40, 
Levenson 82, Ferrall 17-18, and Matz 117. 
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as “a nightmare which has long troubled my mind” (127; cf. 146, 151).
68
 Hulme also argues 
that Bergson provided him with a solid account of metaphysics, as well as a satisfactory 
definition of poetry and of art in general (cf. 86, 101, 111, 191-93). Moreover, in “Balfour, 
Bergson, and Politics,” he recognises the validity of Lasserre‟s and Maurras‟ criticism of 
Bergson‟s metaphysics on political grounds (cf. 165). Finally, in “A Notebook” in 1915, he 
makes it clear that Bergson‟s failure to accept an “absolute chasm” between biology and 
moral values is “ridiculous”; as he puts it, “Biology is not theology, nor can God be defined 
in terms of „life‟ or „progress‟” (425).  
 
There are, however, two significant flaws with this assessment of Hulme as Bergsonian in 
1909 and anti-Bergsonian from 1912 onwards. On the one hand, it fails to discriminate 
between the moments in his work when Hulme explains, endorses, freely interprets or 
criticises Bergson‟s philosophy. While in “The Philosophy of Intensive Manifold” he aims to 
give an overview of Bergson‟s metaphysics, in other writings he makes it clear that he is 
giving “simply a personal confession” of how Bergson‟s philosophy has altered his own 
views (126; cf. 147).
69
 Furthermore, as S. Schwartz and Jesse Matz have separately pointed 
out, given that Hulme often “misreads” Bergson, we should be careful not to identify him too 
closely with Bergson.
70
 On the other hand, such interpretation does not explain why ideas that 
can be described as “Bergsonian” feature so prominently in his post-1911 writings, most 
obviously in “Romanticism and Classicism.”
71
 While Roberts, Csengeri and Carr understand 
the presence of “Bergsonian” ideas in Hulme‟s later work as a case of “natural” overlapping, 
                                                 
68 Huxley described physical determinism as a “great truth” that “weighs like a nightmare … upon many of the 
best minds of these days” (qtd. in Ayres 115-16). 
69 As Ferguson points out, the lecture was “aimed at introducing Bergson to a lay public in clear and simple 
terms” (96).  
70 S. Schwartz, The Matrix of Modernism 52; Matz 117. 
71 Elements in Bergson‟s works feature also in Hulme‟s essays on politics, his art criticism and his war writings. 
The part played by Bergson in Hulme‟s politics, art criticism and ethics is discussed in more detail in chapters 4, 
5 and 6 respectively. 
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an alternative explanation is possible.
72
 Hulme was critical of some aspects of Bergson‟s 
philosophy from early on in his career, valuing Bergson‟s method of intuition and the 
empirical nature of his philosophy more than he valued Bergson‟s conclusions. Such reading 
of Hulme explains the presence of Bergson in “Romanticism and Classicism” and shows that 
the way Hulme is using Bergson in this lecture is consistent with his overall interpretation of 
Bergson‟ philosophy. 
 
As I already discussed in the previous chapters, certain ideas in Bergson‟s philosophy 
provide a useful framework from within which to understand some of Hulme‟s statements, 
such as the fragments in “Cinders” and “Notes” that refer to Hulme‟s views on the nature of 
reality and of language, and his definition of “modern” poetry as “direct” in “A Lecture” (cf. 
54). Here, the aim is to explain in detail how Hulme interpreted Bergson‟s philosophy. I 
begin by setting Hulme‟s discussion of Bergson in the intellectual context of the early 
twentieth century. The fact that Bergson‟s philosophy was welcomed as a new and exciting 
way at looking at the world in the early 1900s offers one possible explanation as to why he 
appealed to Hulme so much. More specifically, in Bergson Hulme found a positive theory for 
understanding reality through intuition. He was hesitant, however, about endorsing some of 
Bergson‟s conclusions, remaining more enthusiastic about the method of intuition and 
Bergson‟s theory of duration than he was about Bergson‟s discussion of free-will or his 
philosophy of life. In the final section, I argue that Hulme found in Bergson first and 
foremost the possibility for a theory of art. Examining Hulme‟s appropriation of Bergson‟s 
philosophy sheds light on the discussion of “classic” poetry in “Romanticism and 
Classicism.” 
 
                                                 
72 Roberts 138; Csengeri, ed. xi; Carr, “T. E. Hulme and the „Spiritual Dread of Space‟” 101. 
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2. Bergson’s crossing of the Channel 
In the France of 1907, the year when Creative Evolution was published, Bergson was 
“arguably the most celebrated thinker” (Antliff 3). Part of the reason for his appeal was that 
Bergson‟s philosophy conformed to the “spirit” of the time. As Grogin shows, Bergson‟s rise 
to fame sprung from the general disillusionment of French intellectuals with what Grogin 
describes as the “reigning positivist orthodoxy inherited from the Second Empire” (2). In 
Bergson‟s philosophy, these intellectuals felt they had the most serious and credible critique 
of positivism in years. Precisely because the feeling of dissatisfaction with positivism was so 
undetermined, Bergson appealed to a wide spectrum of people with often little or nothing in 
common. Thus “Bergsonians” included occultists who did not think that positivism could 
answer the fundamental questions regarding human nature, moralists who maintained that 
France was suffering from a “moral void” that scientism was unable to fill, psychologists 
wanting to address areas of the human psyche that rationalism left unexplained, and religious 
thinkers who opposed the scientific explanation of religion (Grogin 4-12). Bergson also 
appealed to what Léon Blum described as the “prochain generation litteraire,” the young 
French aesthetes who found that Bergson shared their anxieties; like these artists, Bergson 
was concerned with “the effort of the individual to free himself from logical constraints and 
natural necessities” (qtd. in Grogin 37).
73
 Finally, Bergson‟s philosophy was utilised by 
political intellectuals on both Left and Right. Syndicalists such as Sorel, Lagardelle, Berth, 
Severac, and Oliver, and Conservatives including Maire, Clouard, Pujo, Massis and de Tarde 




                                                 
73 For a useful discussion of Bergson‟s appeal to French artists, specifically Cubists, Rhythmists and Futurists, 
see Antliff 30-34, 39-66 and 67-105. On Bergson‟s influence on French poets, see Guerlac, Literary Polemics 
159. 
74 On the ways in which Bergson‟s philosophy lends itself to both the Left and Right, see Grogin 86-90 and 
Schwartz, “Bergson and the Politics of Vitalism” 278. Antliff goes as far as to suggest that in the inter-war 
years, the prevalent “romantic fascism” in Germany links Bergson to Nazism (14-15).  
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The “new philosophy,” as Hulme described Bergson‟s philosophy in his review of James 
in July 1909, had gradually made its way from across the Channel to England.
75
 Between 
1909 and 1911 alone, no less than two hundred articles in journals, newspapers and books on 
or about Bergson appeared.
76
 Wildon Carr, A. D. Lindsay, Bernard Bosanquet and A. J. 
Balfour all began to promulgate Bergson‟s metaphysics and to lay it out in simple terms; A. 
N. Whitehead declared himself in agreement with Bergson‟s premise that the limitations of 
mechanistic science were burdening the development of philosophical investigation (Grogin 
83); and the Cambridge philosopher John Ellis McTaggart embraced Bergson‟s distinction 
between time as durational succession and durée in his 1908 article “The Unreality of 
Time.”
77
 Bergson‟s philosophy was also warmly received in the arts and literature. John 
Middleton Murry reported in 1911 that Bergson‟s philosophy is “a living artistic force” (9), 
while as various critics have shown, Flint, Eliot, Pound, Lewis and the artists associated with 




Various reasons are given as to why Bergson appealed to Hulme‟s generation of artists 
and poets, including that he provided authors and artists with an alternative to the prevalent 
Naturalistic forms of art, which are usually associated with positivism, and that his theory of 
duration accommodates modern artists‟ reinterpretation of the concept of “time” (Grogin 6). 
What makes artists and poets turn to Bergson above everything else, however, is the way in 
which Bergson‟s work is of direct relevance to art. Although he never formulated an aesthetic 
theory per se, Bergson gives art philosophical significance by comparing intuition to the 
                                                 
75 As Grogin notes, the term “philosophie nouvelle” was often used by French intellectuals to describe 
Bergson‟s philosophy (cf. 90). 
76 The New Age alone published sixty three articles and letters on Bergson between the period 1909 and 1914. 
Bergson‟s philosophy was debated extensively in journals as diverse as The English Review, The Monist, 
Science, The Philosophical Review and The Hibbert Journal. For a useful account of the reception of Bergson‟s 
philosophy in Britain, see Gillies 33.  
77 See W. Carr, “Bergson‟s Theory of Instinct” and Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change; Lindsay, The 
Philosophy of Bergson; Bosanquet, “Prediction of Human Conduct”; Balfour, “Creative Evolution and 
Philosophic Doubt.” On the impact of Bergson on British philosophy, see Copleston 212-15 and Lowe 267-96. 
78 See, for example, Gillies 46-50, Meyer 15-16, Jain 53, and H. Carr, Verse Revolutionaries 193-194, 388, 429. 
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process of artistic creation, using art as a paradigm for illustrating the concepts of duration 
and intuition, and also by substantiating his arguments using examples from aesthetic 
experience.
79
 Moreover, Bergson avoids using philosophical jargon, finding that, especially 
in his shorter and more accessible essays, literary metaphors are better suited for 
accommodating his “intuitive” metaphysic – in fact, Bergson‟s poetic style won him the 1927 
Nobel for literature. While for some his “poetic effort,” as Russell referred to Bergson‟s style 
and method, was cause for criticism – the analytic philosopher famously compared Bergson 
to Shakespeare and Shelley, ultimately dismissing him as a “cosmic” poet – it is easy to 
imagine how the young poets and writers of Hulme‟s generation, most of whom were 
untrained in philosophy, would find Bergson‟s “poetic effort” refreshing and relevant.
80
 
Hulme certainly did. In his article on Gaultier, he describes Bergson as a philosopher who 
treats philosophy “not as science but as an art” (99), presumably a reference to the way 
Bergson invokes the model of artistic perception to describe how metaphysics should 
combine analysis with intuition (e.g. Laughter 150). Rather than “humbly groping after the 
truth,” philosophy in Bergson‟s view, Hulme writes, is the “means of expressing certain 
attitudes to the cosmos ... simply an elaborate means for the expression of quite personal and 
human emotions” (100-01). Bergson‟s anti-intellectualism, he goes on, has restored “bold 
speculation,” “light-heartedness” and “idiosyncrasy” in philosophy (100). Hulme also praises 
Bergson‟s writing style. In “The New Philosophy,” he thus singles out as one of Bergson‟s 
                                                 
79 See, for example, Time and Free Will 7-8, 14, 134; Creative Evolution 45, 176; “Life and Consciousness” 12-
13; An Introduction to Metaphysics 32-24; and “The Life and Work of Ravaisson” 231. The closest Bergson 
comes to working out a theory of art is in Laughter, where he briefly discusses the object and aim of art, 
maintaining that the purpose of art is to “come into direct contact with sense and consciousness” and to thus 
“enter into immediate communion with things and with ourselves” (150). For discussions of Bergson‟s use of 
art in his work, see Lacey 188-96, Pilkington 14, and Lorand 400. 
80 See Russell, “Philosophy of Bergson” 33 and History of Western Philosophy 722. Perhaps Russell‟s rejection 
of Bergson‟s “poetic” style is ironic, given that Russell also won a Nobel for literature. Both Le Roy and James 
praise Bergson‟s writing style. Le Roy finds his writing as “truly ... magic” (56), while James admits to being 
fascinated with Bergson‟s “art de bien dire” (A Pluralistic Universe 227). According to Gunter, Bergson‟s 
theories were being received at the time as “naïve, if fascinating poetry” (15). In “The New Philosophy,” Hulme 
agrees with James that Bergson is not one of those “dusty-minded philosophers” (85). In this sense it is 




greatest contributions to modern philosophy the “extraordinary clearness” in which Bergson 
attacks “intellectualism” (86), a claim he repeats elsewhere in his writings (cf. 89, 99, 126, 
148). What “struck” him the most in Bergson, he argues in “A Personal Impression of 
Bergson” from November 1911, was Bergson‟s “visual” style. He describes Bergson 
lecturing in the following way: 
 
I was struck ... by the extraordinary difference between the manner of his delivery and 
that of the Germans. I could describe it best by saying it was emphatically not fluent. It 
was not „determined‟. His eyes seemed always to be half-closed, and he gave you all 
the time the impression of a man describing with great difficulty the shape of 
something which he just saw. (167) 
 
Exactly like the “modern” poet in “A Lecture” whose job is “to mould images ... into definite 
shapes” (56), Hulme presents Bergson in “A Personal Impression of Bergson” as someone 
who avoids using “ready-made phrases,” focusing instead on “vision” (167). Moreover, 
Hulme‟s description of Bergson in the passage above recalls the poet and artist in 
“Romanticism and Classicism” who tries “to get the exact curve of ... an object or an idea in 
the mind” (69; cf. 199). Such analogy between philosopher and poet is in fact explicitly 
suggested by Hulme in the article on Haldane from August 1911, where he likens the “visual” 
philosopher to “a poet delighted with the physical metaphors before him that press directly 
and actually to be employed as symbols of thought” (96).  
 
Bergson‟s popularity in Britain reached its apex in the spring and autumn of 1911, when 
the French philosopher toured the country giving lectures, attracting not only the 
intelligentsia but also many “Five o‟clock Bergsonians,” as Péguy had described the French 
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members of the “high society” who attended Bergson‟s Paris lectures (qtd. in Grogin 123). 
As in France, the lecture halls in Oxford, Birmingham and London surpassed capacity levels, 
and the lectures were regarded as both intellectual exchanges and cosmic events. Given that 
Bergson‟s London lectures were advertised in all the major newspapers and received 
extensively coverage in the Times, Isaiah Berlin‟s impression at the time that “there has been 
nothing like this in England since the lectures of Thomas Carlyle” was both perceptive and 
accurate (qtd. in Gunter, “Bergson” 179).
81
 As we will see further below, Hulme received 
Bergson‟s sudden popularity and his appeal to the haute bourgeoisie with extreme unease, the 
audience at the University College of London lectures causing him “a most profound fit of 
depression” (154). For now, however, we need only note that despite being among the 
earliest advocates of Bergson‟s philosophy in Britain, in 1909 Hulme was not alone in seeing 




3. A philosophy against “artificial gymnastics” 
The introspective method and the “poetic effort” of Bergson‟s writings described above 
should be understood as part of the French philosopher‟s conscious attack on a long history 
of what Bergson describes in An Introduction to Metaphysics as “metaphysical dogmatism,” 
meaning the view of philosophy which privileges reason at the expense of “intuition” (cf. 24, 
42). Hulme criticised philosophies that imposed “unity” and “truth” on experiential “flux” 
through a process of “artificial gymnastics” in “Cinders” (13; cf. 9-12, 17, 22). Facets of this 
idea, as I suggested in chapter 2, can be seen to feature in both “A Lecture” and in 
                                                 
81 See the Times 18 May 1911 4a; 4 Oct. 1911 3d; 21 Oct. 1911 4d; 23 Oct. 19114d; 28 Oct. 1911 11c; and 30 
Oct. 1911 10b. For detailed accounts of the lectures‟ popularity and Bergson‟s reception in London more 
generally, see Antliff 4 and Gillies 29-30. Russell echoes Berlin‟s sentiments when he complains in October 
1911 that Bergson‟s lectures “are reported in the daily newspapers – all England has gone mad about him for 
some reason” (qtd. in Monk 238). 
82 As demonstrated in Gunter‟s Bibliography of writings on Bergson, Hulme was one of the first, if not the first, 
critic in England to have discussed Bergson publicly, his articles predating the works of W. Carr, Lindsay and 
Bosanquet on Bergson. See Gunter, Henri Bergson: A Bibliography 120, 136-37, 230-31, 275. 
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“Romanticism and Classicism.” In the former, Hulme draws a distinction between “ancient” 
philosophers such as Plato who despite acknowledging the “fluidity of the world” try to order 
this “flux” by creating “a static fixity,” and the moderns who “no longer believe in absolute 
truth [and] frankly acknowledge the relative” (52-53). A similar philosophical view comes 
under attack in “Romanticism and Classicism,” but is now part of a politically-charged 
argument against romanticism, which Hulme associates with the belief in human perfection 
(62, 66). In the New Age articles, Hulme renews his attack on “artificial” systems on reality 
and advances a view of reality as experiential “flux” similar to the one suggested in 
“Cinders” and the lectures on poetry. As in “Cinders,” he berates the emphasis placed by 
“science,” “rationalism” and “idealism” on logic and geometry, arguing for an alternative 
approach to philosophical problems (cf. 87, 90-91, 94-95, 106, 110-13). The difference is 
that, unlike in “Cinders” where Hulme remains enigmatic as to which philosophies exactly he 
thinks of as “artificial,” in his New Age articles on Bergson he is explicit about the 
philosophies he criticises and the reasons why he thinks of these philosophies as 
unsatisfactory. In doing so, Hulme interprets Bergson‟s attack on “intellectualism” as the 
philosopher‟s greatest contribution to modern thought; and, despite recognising that Bergson 
was only one among many thinkers who reacted against the use of science and mathematics 
as bases for philosophical investigation – Burke, Coleridge, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and 
James, he concedes, had all been crusading against positivism broadly understood long before 
Bergson – he insists that only Bergson had rejected “intellectualism” in a “clear” and 




                                                 
83 For a useful discussion of the movement against “militant scientism” in the nineteenth century, see Schwartz, 
Matrix of Modernism 24-27. 
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Beginning with his review of Gaultier, Hulme criticises the view of philosophy as science, 
lamenting the fact that philosophy adopted the method used by science and thus losing its 
independence. As he explains:  
 
[Philosophy] began to regard itself as science, to consider itself a systematic structure, 
solidly built up, which should give us certain unquestionable results ... Philosophy, 
tempted by science, fell and became respectable. It sold its freedom for a quite 
imaginary power of giving sure results. It was a solemn structure, in face of which 
light-heartedness was out of place ... One felt uncomfortable in it. Nothing could be 
done by sudden insight and images ... Here was no place for the artist to impertinently 
express an attitude before the cosmos, but rather for the humble professor to work 
honestly in a corner.  
To a certain extent this movement was correct. Logic, psychology, etc., look like, and 
as a matter of fact are sciences ... But the danger was when they began  to absorb 
philosophy itself, when it began to consider itself as merely a scientia scientium. (100) 
 
As he goes on to say in the article on Gaultier, this old conception of philosophy “prisoned 
[sic] us, restrained our vagaries” (101). He returns to this idea in the report of the April 1911 
International Congress of Philosophy in Bologna, now rejecting “scientism,” meaning the 
view that, as he explains, “Somewhere at a great distance, Truth is hidden ... always waiting 
to be discovered” (105). In a second report he wrote of the Bologna Congress, Hulme dates 
the view that philosophy should be “pursuing the same method as that of science, that of 
intellectual analysis, and having the same ideal, that of a complete science of existence,” back 
to the “Greeks,” gladly reporting that, as testified by Bergson‟s address to the conference, 
modern philosophy was “beginning to form a more fluent and a less rigid and systematic 
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conception of truth” (110).
84
 Philosophy after Bergson, Hulme thus announces in this second 
report, will see it as its aim as that of investigating “the field of the unknown”; as he puts it 
otherwise, its “future lies in a recognition of the fact that it must pursue a different method 
entirely to that of science. It must give up the attempt to give a complete intellectual 
representation of the cosmos” (111). 
 
In the New Age articles Hulme also attacks “rationalism,” which he defines in the review 
on Gaultier as “the abuse of the power of translating the flux of immediate experience into a 
conceptual order” (86), as well as “intellectualism,” defined in his review of Bax as the 
attempt to “resolve” reality into “logical concepts” (90). The conceptualisation of reality in an 
ordered system is likened in this article on Gaultier to a “geometrical diagram” or “a chess-
board” in which the “movement is from one square to another”; returning to the central 
metaphor of the notebooks, Hulme describes the flux of immediate reality as “a kind of 
chaotic cinder heap,” in where the movement is always “indefinite,” and therefore freer than 
in the “chess-board” of rationalism (86). In his review of Bax, Hulme argues that 
intellectualism “takes a bad analogy, logic and the geometric sciences, which are in essence 
identical, and asserts that the flux of phenomena which apparently contradicts this is not real, 
and can really be resolved into logical concepts” (90). Like with rationalism, the problem 
with intellectualism in Hulme‟s view is that it interprets reality without actually taking into 
account the experiential “flux” that is the real essence of reality.  
 
Another philosophical view that comes under attack in the New Age articles is Haldane‟s 
neo-Hegelian “idealism,” a view I briefly discussed in Chapter 1. For the purposes of this 
                                                 
84 The paper Bergson delivered at the Bologna Congress is entitled “Philosophical Intuition.” In it, Bergson 
announces that “metaphysics at present is tending to become more simplified, to draw closer to life,” with 
Bergson arguing that it is wrong to associate philosophy with science, as “Such a conception ... would be unfair 
to science. But ... much more unfair to philosophy” (107, 123). 
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chapter, it is crucial to briefly examine Haldane‟s Pathway to Reality in more detail. Haldane 
argues in Pathway to Reality that “Experience [is] an indefinite manifold made definite only 
in so far as it is arranged by reflection under general conceptions” (190). Haldane‟s idea is 
that, although experience is a totality, it is “not a thing to be laid on the dissecting table and 
taken to pieces.” Rather, for Haldane experience “is the ultimate reality behind which you 
cannot get” (88). To differentiate between “knower” and “object known,” Haldane maintains 
that philosophers must begin from the unified whole of experience. This is what he means 
when he writes in his Preface to Hegel‟s Science of Logic that “Behind knowledge we cannot 
go. There is no standard of truth save in its own process” (14). Haldane‟s brand of Idealism, 
as Vincent demonstrates, draws on a specific reading of Hegel‟s logical doctrines. Like 
Bosanquet and other neo-Hegelian Idealists, Haldane believes that when we speak about 
conscious experience, we speak essentially about judgment.
85
 Judgment, in other words, is 
our consciousness, and because all experience is “qualified” by judgment, our entire world 
becomes a series of interconnected judgments. As Vincent explains, for Hegel logic plays a 
central part in this process as it deals with our consciousness through judgments, leading us 
ultimately to an understanding of human experience. Haldane interprets Hegel‟s logical 
doctrines differently, arguing in Pathway to Reality that Hegel understands “human 
experience as the source of his quest after what is ultimately real” (284). Thus, according to 
Haldane, there can be no leap from judgment to reality; because reality is only the epiphany 
of consciousnesses, philosophy becomes the “self-comprehension of mind” (148).  
 
In his review of Pathway to Reality, Hulme argues that for Haldane “Reality is an 
intellectual system, and the flux only has reality in so far as it fits into this system” (93). He 
explains:  
                                                 
85 See Pathway to Reality, where Haldane defines reality as “the logical system of my judgment” 295-96. A 




Like all idealists since Berkeley, he uses the formula „esse is percipi‟ [to be is to 
perceive], as an acid wherewith to break up the apparent solidity of the objective world 
to a fluid form more suitable for digestion in a spiritual system. Once having reduced it 
to a flabby condition of this kind, he is in a better position to prove his second step, that 
it is moulded entirely by the laws of the intellect ... Reality must consist in the common 
system, the objective world ... The next step consists in proving that this common 
system, this objective world, is entirely a construction of the intellect ... Reality consists 
in an objective system ... The nature of the world is thus rational, „Esse is intelligi [to be 
is to be understood].‟ (94) 
 
Haldane, Hulme contends here, invokes an external logic – “the laws of the intellect” – in 
order to explain reality. In other words, Haldane gives too much authority to the intellect, 
thus ignoring reality as reality is experienced. Although recognising like Haldane that “the 
flux is reduced to a practical order for personal life by the intellect, and made habitable,” 
Hulme cannot accept that the “intellect” is “the only reality.” To illustrate what he means, he 
gives this example:  
 
When unhappy proximity forces me to survey Edwardian architecture I am quite aware 
that what gives fixity to the extraordinary chaos of varied marble is the hidden steel 
girder, but I cannot console myself, as Mr. Haldane does, by saying that the steel alone 
is real and that the marble is a passing dream. (94-95) 
 
Likewise, while Hulme is prepared to accept that the human mind “is compelled to „think‟ the 
world according to a system of concepts,” he does not agree with “Mr. Haldane and the 
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Hegelians [who] attribute some transcendental value to the word „think‟”; on the contrary, 
Hulme maintains that “Thinking might be, and probably is a method of distorting Reality” 
(95). 
 
As it turns out, Hulme‟s fundamental objection to Haldane is that Haldane is what he 
describes as a “counter” or “derivative” philosopher: he “can manipulate the counters, 
without ever having been in actual contact with the reality of which he speaks” (95). Haldane 
uses abstractions to explain the physical things which cannot be experienced by the intellect. 
In doing so, Hulme restates Bergson‟s suggestion in An Introduction to Metaphysics that 
metaphysics must consist in “a passage from reality to concepts and no longer from concepts 
to reality” (45). Because Haldane assumes that “Thought creates things rather than things 
thought” (94), for Hulme he is a philosopher who lacks “original „visual‟ act” (97). What he 
means by this is that Haldane lacks the ability for intuition, which is what, according to 
Hulme and Bergson, gives impetus to all philosophical ideas. As he explains:  
 
Once having received the impulse from the act of intuition, the philosopher has to 
continue in the other plane of abstraction. But he must not go too far in this medium or 
he loses foot and must return to the primary act of intuition. Like Antaeus, he must 
touch the earth for renewed strength...  
The legitimate function of logic only comes in the elaboration of the original „visual‟ 
act ... Never moving on the physical plane where philosophy arises, but always in the 
abstract plane where it is finished and polished, Mr. Haldane has his reward in a 




Haldane‟s Idealism, therefore, just like “science,” “rationalism” and “intellectualism,” is 
deemed by Hulme as unable to explain reality: all these systems disregard the experiential 
“flux.” At the same time, by invoking external systems – science, mathematics or logic – all 
these philosophical views explain reality by alluding to abstract ideas that are not part of the 
experiential world.  
 
For Hulme, the only satisfactory alternative is Bergson‟s philosophy. Bergson does not 
impose a “conceptual order” on reality through “intellectual analysis,” nor does he approach 
philosophical questions relating to the nature of reality from an a priori “plane of 
abstraction.” On the contrary, Bergson approaches reality through the “visual” act of intuition 
(97). In doing so, Bergson restores what is for Hulme the only philosophical method that can 
shed light into the workings of reality. In a letter he sent to the New Age in June 1911, Hulme 
thus describes intuition as an “element which exists in nature, but which was banished in the 
eighteenth century because men were determined on being clear at any cost” (“Bergsonism in 
Paris” 190); in the article on Bax, Hulme claims that only intuition allows us to “grasp the 
nature of reality” (91; cf. 85). The choice for Hulme is therefore simple: as he puts it in the 
review of Bax, we could either “resign ourselves to the nature of the cosmos,” or follow 
Bergson into the “turbulent river of reality” (91). Furthermore, unlike philosophies that 
exercise “artificial gymnastics,” Bergson presents a precise and empirically verifiable 
analysis of reality (91).
86
 “There is nothing infinite or ineffable” about Bergson‟s conception 
of the “fundamental self,” Hulme writes in “The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds”; rather, 
Bergson‟s free creating durational subject must be understood as “a perfectly finite thing,” 
adding that “What Bergson means by an intuition is a perfectly normal and frequent 
phenomenon” (178). Like the “classic” poet in “Romanticism and Classicism,” Hulme 
                                                 
86 Both Rae and Ansell Pearson have pointed out at the way Bergson‟s metaphysics puts a great emphasis on 
empirical facts. See Rae, Practical Muse 56 and Ansell Pearson ix. 
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presents Bergson in the article on Haldane as someone who remains grounded in reality. 
Bergson does not speculate from a “plane of abstraction,” but constructs his philosophy in an 
“act of intuition ... a perception of a physical analogy.” Unlike Haldane, Bergson does not go 
“too far” in the medium of abstraction; it is in this sense that Bergson resembles the “classic” 
poet in “Romanticism and Classicism”: “He may jump, but he always returns back; he never 
flies away into the circumambient gas” (62). As we will see further on in this chapter, 
Hulme‟s interpretation of Bergson as a philosopher who provides a way of understanding the 
experiential “flux” in an intuitive but also empirical manner explains why Bergson features 
so prominently in “Romanticism and Classicism”; it also explains why Hulme can associate 
Bergson with the “classicist” view which is “perfectly human and never exaggerated” (66). I 
return to this idea later on in this chapter. Before we consider Hulme‟s appropriation of 
Bergson in “Romanticism and Classicism,” however, it is necessary to first understand how 
exactly Hulme thinks that Bergson‟s philosophy can lead into the “turbulent river of reality” 
(91). 
 
4. The “real importance” of Bergson 
In “The New Philosophy,” Hulme distinguishes between Bergson‟s “destructive criticism 
of intellectualism” and the “positive constructive part” of Bergson‟s philosophy, by which he 
means the French philosopher‟s method of intuition. According to Hulme, what makes 
intuition “positive” is that it represents the “fullness of content that no conceptual description 
can equal” (87). Hulme kept returning in his writings throughout the next two and a half 
years to this idea, stating repeatedly that “intuition” enables understanding of reality (cf. 91, 
96, 111, 171-72, 179). In Hulme‟s view, intuition provides access to the deeper structures of 
reality, where, as he writes in “The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds,” there is a “complex 
thing” that is “absolutely unseizable [sic] by the intellect” and which can be called “for the 
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sake of convenience ... an intensive manifold” (173-74; cf. 120, 72). In Bergson‟s “method” 
and in the “category he works with, that of intensive manifolds,” Hulme argues in “Bax on 
Bergson,” lies the “the real importance of Bergson” (119).
87
 In order to understand what 
Hulme has in mind when he praises Bergson‟s “method” and “category,” and to investigate 
his claim that Bergson provides an accurate picture of reality, it is necessary to turn briefly to 
Bergson‟s own project. A basic knowledge of Bergson‟s project ultimately helps assess 
Hulme‟s interpretation of Bergson, allowing us also to see which aspects of Bergson‟s 
thought appealed to him the most, and which he was less enthusiastic about.  
 
The foundational premise of Bergson‟s philosophy is the idea that all philosophical 
investigation based on rational analysis is misleading and therefore inadequate. This 
supposition leads Bergson, in a move that defines his entire metaphysic, to distinguish 
between “intellect” and “intuition.” Put simply, for Bergson there are two forms of 
knowledge: one reached at by analysis or through the “intellect” and another which is the 
result of “intuition,” achieved when we “carefully look into ourselves” (Time and Free Will 
130; cf. Introduction 47). The intellect is a well-tuned instrumental mechanism, working in 
order to organise reality in a practical, convenient and efficient manner. The problem is that 
in doing so, the intellect suppresses “our inner and individual existence” (Time and Free Will 
129-30). According to this logic, our mental, social and linguistic mechanisms are all geared 
towards practical considerations, thus preventing us from experiencing reality as it truly is: in 
its rawest state. As Bergson explains in his essay “The Soul and the Body,” our brains 
process only those experiences that are relevant to our daily lives, censoring all but the 
“practically useful,” with language arranging rather than expressing our thoughts and with 
                                                 
87 Hulme is not consistent in his distinction between intuition as method and “intensive manifolds” as category. 
In “Mr. Balfour, Bergson and Politics,” for example, he refers the “theory of intensive manifolds” as Bergson‟s 
“method” (160). In the prospectus for his lectures on Bergson in 1911, he similarly refers to the “conception of 
an intensive manifold” as Bergson‟s “new method” (qtd. in Ferguson 96). 
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our “outer … social life” as a result dictating our feelings, thought and actions (qtd. in 
Schwartz, Matrix of Modernism 28). He makes a similar point in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, now arguing that the “intellect” is not interested in finding a pre-existing 
reality, but only “to draw profit – in short, to satisfy an interest” (38-39). Despite stressing 
that all of our activities are determined by the “intellect,” Bergson holds that it is still possible 
to recover true reality or “immediate experience,” by practising “intuition.” Everyone has 
moments in their lives, he suggests, where our practical orientation is suspended. In these 
moments, we become aware of deeper psychic states, as occurs, for example, in dreaming. 
Because it is especially difficult to attain these moments in real life, Bergson reasons that we 
must depend upon the artist or the philosopher to guide us there, the artist and the philosopher 
being more accustomed to intuition than the rest of us. Thus the “bold novelist” in Time and 
Free Will is “tearing aside the cleverly woven curtain of our conventional ego,” and by 
revealing to us the “fundamental absurdity” of logic, he brings us back “into our own 
presence” (134). In a similar way, the philosopher, as explained in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, moves us from conceptual abstractions back to immediate experience, his job 
being “to promote a certain effort, which in most men is usually fettered by habits of mind 
more useful to life” (27).  
 
Through “intuition,” Bergson hopes that we can access “duration” or “real time,” as 
opposed to time generally conceived as a set of discrete moments. Because Bergson‟s 
philosophy, as it has been pointed out, is predominantly a “philosophy of time” (Lacey 26; 
Mullarkey 5), to appreciate his argument it is necessary to understand the distinction he 
draws between the inner experience of durée and the space outside that surrounds us. As 
Bergson argues in his first book, Time and Free Will, as inherited from Kant, the prevalent 
conception of time in the late nineteenth century wrongly conceives of time in terms of space. 
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Kantian time is thus described by Bergson as a “homogeneous medium in which our 
conscious states are ranged alongside one another as in space, so as to form a discrete 
multiplicity” (90). This “spurious concept” of time that regards “time as an unbounded 
medium, different from space but homogeneous like the latter,” Bergson asserts, is “nothing 
but the ghost of space haunting the reflective consciousness” (98-99). What concerns 
Bergson the most in Time and Free Will is that this “Kantian” conception of time eliminates 
the possibility of “real change.” For, by understanding time as quantitative, homogeneous and 
static like space, Kant, in Bergson‟s view, removes the potential for creation, thus leading us 
to determinism. In repudiating the “spatialisation” of time, Bergson hopes to show that we are 
free creating individuals – it is in this sense that the question of free will is linked to the 
question of time. Intuition in Time and Free Will intends to enable us to access “real 
duration” and thus rediscover our ability for creation. By what Bergson refers to as “a 
vigorous effort of analysis” (129) that involves paying close attention to our experience, it 
becomes obvious that our psychic states are continuously changing, that an object already 
perceived will appear different the second time it is seen, and that objects are constantly 
altering in our consciousness (129-30, 199-200).  
 
It is obvious from his writings that Hulme endorses Bergson‟s method of intuition, 
repeating after Bergson that the “method” of pure philosophy should be a process whereby 
“Our intelligence ... can install itself in the flux of reality by means of that intellectual 
sympathy that one calls intuition” (87; cf. Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics 6). As 
Hulme argues in the article on Bax, because the “intellect” cannot represent the “flux” of 
reality – for “the logical is like a serpent engaged in continually swallowing the endless meal 
of the flux, a task in which it can never succeed” – the nature of reality is only accessible 
through intuition; as he states, “by intuition one can identify oneself with the flux” (91). 
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Similarly, in his report of the Congress in Bologna for Nature, he praises Bergson for 
demonstrating that there are “two different, and indeed inverse, ways of acquiring a 
knowledge of reality,” making it clear that “intuition,” not the “intellect,” is the method best 
suited for modern philosophy (111-12). 
 
Hulme also recognises that Bergson‟s notion of intuition is significant insofar as it allows 
access to the immediate reality of duration, or what Hulme refers to as the “intensive 
manifold.” As far as I can tell, the phrase “intensive manifold” does not appear anywhere in 
Bergson‟s work, in the original texts or in translations of his work. The rationale behind 
Hulme‟s choice of term seems to come from Bergson‟s discussion early in Time and Free 
Will of different kinds of “magnitudes” or “intensities,” one which is described by Bergson as 
“intensive” and the other as “extensive” (3). As Bergson argues in the opening pages of Time 
and Free Will, the human mind normally defines the “intensity of a sensation” either “by the 
number and magnitude of the objective, and therefore measurable, causes which have given 
rise to it,” or by reducing sensations “to extensive differences between the changes taking 
place between them” (4, 6). For Bergson, both are wrong: sensations cannot be ordered or 
counted and to treat them like they can be is to treat them quantitatively and not qualitatively. 
As he sums it up towards the end of the book, “the intensity of a simple state ... is not 
quantity but is a qualitative sign” (224). Bergson elaborates on this idea throughout Time and 
Free Will, ultimately being led to the conclusion that there are “two very different kinds [of] 
multiplicity” (85; cf. 85-87, 121, 128-29). On the one hand, there is a multiplicity of material 
objects “to which the conception of number is immediately applicable”; on the other, psychic 
states constitute a complex and indissoluble whole and, therefore, “the multiplicity of states 
of consciousness ... cannot be regarded as numerical” (87). Understanding psychic states 
quantitatively, Bergson asserts, requires “the help of some symbolical representation, in 
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which a necessary element is space” (87; emphasis in original). Bergson thus defines “pure 
duration” as an “intensive magnitude” in the sense that, like sensations, pure duration cannot 
be counted or ordered: for it is an “interpenetration of conscious states” (108).  
 
In “The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds,” Hulme explains that by “intensive manifold” 
he means “an absolute interpenetration ... which ... cannot be said to have parts because the 
parts run into each other, forming a continuous whole, and whose parts cannot even be 
conceived as existing separately.”
88
 This “thing,” he continues, “could not … be called a 
quantitative multiplicity, but a qualitative one” (174). To explain what he means, he uses the 
following example:  
 
If you melt salt in water, after a time salt would be found in every particle of the water, 
and you might think then that here you had interpenetration. But no: your mind cannot 
support an idea of that kind. It sets to work and imagines that the molecules of salt fit in 
between the molecules of water. It so gets rid of the idea interpenetration and reduces 
everything to an extensive manifold ... But if you suppose that there do exist in the 
world some instances of real interpenetration, then the intellect, working by analysis, 




In other words, it is difficult, Hulme claims, to see the “intensive manifold,” because our 
intellect is programmed to reduce everything to a quantitative multiplicity – to what he calls 
an “extensive manifold,” meaning that “which can be resolved into separate elements or 
                                                 
88 Cf. Bergson‟s description of “pure duration as the “interconnexion and organisation of elements, each one of 
which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought” in Time 
and Free Will 101. 
89 Bergson uses a similar example – of sugar melting in water – in Creative Evolution  to make a slightly 
different point: that when we take the non-living in the context of the world as a whole, containing life, 
interacting with consciousness, and enduring, the non-living can be seen to also endure (9, 339). 
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atoms” (172). The only way to grasp the “intensive manifolds” is therefore through intuition, 
precisely because intuition focuses not on extensity, but on intensity (173-74). This is what 
Hulme means when he states in “Romanticism and Classicism,” returning to the subject of 
intuition, that “To deal with the intensive you must use intuition” (72). 
 
In claiming that the “real importance” of Bergson is intuition and his theory of “intensive 
manifolds,” Hulme makes explicit the features of Bergson‟s philosophy which he finds most 
appealing. For Hulme, the lesson from Bergson is that it is possible through intuition to get to 
where philosophies of “artificial gymnastics” cannot. As discussed in chapter 1, this concern 
– of how to understand or interpret the “cinders” of reality – runs throughout the notebooks. 
A similar theme features also in “A Lecture,” where Hulme inaugurates direct 
communication with reality as the primary aim of modern poetry (53-54). Indeed, as will 
become obvious by the end of my thesis, the idea that there is a deeper structure of reality 
that cannot be accessed through rational means but only through intuition, underwrites the 
entire of Hulme‟s work. For all his approval of Bergson‟s intuition and the “theory of 
intensive manifolds,” however, Hulme, as I will now show, was not so enthusiastic about 
many other aspects of Bergson‟s metaphysic. 
 
5. Bergson’s “conclusions” and the rising popularity of Bergson 
In a revealing passage in “Mr. Balfour, Bergson and Politics” from November 1911, 
Hulme explains that Bergson‟s philosophy is best divided into “three perfectly distinct parts”: 
 
There is first the new „method‟, the theory of intensive manifolds; there is secondly the 
result of the application of this method to the nightmare of universal mechanism, which 
constitutes the theory of duration; and finally there is what I might call his 
102 
 
„conclusions‟, his cosmology, his views on the soul, and the rest of it. Now in my 
opinion the first of these is by far the most important, and it is in these that his 
originality lie. But the conclusions are the part of Bergson which, while they are the 
easiest to explain and criticise, are also the most attractive to the ordinary man. (160) 
 
Hulme makes a similar claim in “Bax on Bergson,” an earlier article from August 1911, 
distinguishing in this essay between the “real importance” of Bergson and “the conclusion to 
which the application of his method leads him, that of the dualism of soul and body,” a 
conclusion which, Hulme adds, “is precisely the conclusion which most people seek” (119-
20). Both in “Mr. Balfour, Bergson and Politics” and in “Bax on Bergson,” Hulme argues 
that Bergson‟s theory of “intensive manifolds” can be understood separately from Bergson‟s 
“theory of duration.” Thus, even though, as I have explained above, what Hulme refers to as 
Bergson‟s theory of “intensive manifolds” is, in essence, identical to Bergson‟s theory of 
duration, he treats them as quite distinct. In doing so, Hulme is not contradicting himself; 
rather, he expresses his disagreement with how Bergson applies his theory of “intensive 
manifolds” in his work, reaching several different conclusions. Moreover, in both articles 
Hulme dismisses popular interpretations of Bergson. The two points to note here are that in 
criticising the parts of Bergson that are attractive to the “ordinary man,” Hulme discredits 
Bergson‟s “conclusions” – what he describes in “Mr. Balfour, Bergson, and Politics” as “his 
cosmology, his views on the soul, and the rest of it”; at the same time, he registers his 
dissatisfaction with the rising popularity of Bergson in the London of 1911. 
 
Hulme is right in stating that Bergson “applies” duration in different ways and to different 
ends. A brief overview of Bergson‟s books will confirm this view. As I mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, in Time and Free Will Bergson‟s emphasis is on asserting individual freedom. 
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Our real experience of the world, not the one that we have been programmed to think of, 
Bergson argues, transcends the material world and is, therefore, free to develop over time. 
Bergson‟s argument is primarily directed against associationism, a philosophical doctrine 
with a long and complex history, but which Bergson understands in its broadest definition, 
meaning the view that regards an idea or a state of mind as disappearing after it has been 
replaced by another idea or state of mind. To illustrate his argument, Bergson gives the 
example of someone standing up to open a window but for some reason forgetting why he 
stood up before he actually opens it. For the associationist, Bergson maintains, the person 
standing up had two ideas – that of standing up and that of opening the window – and that 
one disappeared, leaving him only with the idea of standing up (160). Specifically, Bergson 
objects to associationism‟s “mechanical” interpretation of complex ideas, according to which 
the mind registers external things, and to what this view implies: “scientific determinism” or 
the view that humans do not have free will. Dismissing associationism as a description of 
only our superficial consciousness – in our practical lives, Bergson writes, “we „are acted‟ 
rather than act ourselves” (231) – he is keen to show that in our deeper consciousness – in 
“real duration” – we can restore our freedom and “recover possession of oneself” (232). At 
the same time, as Schwartz has pointed out, Bergson‟s argument in Time and Free Will is 
also an attempt to overcome the idea that human action is determined by natural causality. 
Bergson does this, Schwartz explains, by showing that, because in “real duration” there is no 
mechanistic causality, there is freedom (The Matrix of Modernism 14). 
 
Seven years later, in Matter and Memory, Bergson deployed the theory of duration he had 
formulated in Time and Free Will in order to prove, as he puts it in the Introduction, “the 
reality of matter and the reality of spirit, and ... to lessen greatly, if not to overcome the 
theoretical difficulties which have always beset [this] dualism” (vii). In Matter and Memory 
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Bergson thus challenges the traditional philosophical formulation of the mind/body dualism, 
rejecting both Idealist and Realist accounts of it. The Idealist view, he argues, postulates that 
the world is in our heads or exists as a representation of ideas we have in our heads – this is 
what Kant, in Bergson‟s view, means when he writes that the world is a phenomenon and that 
all we can know of the external world is an image we give to it that is determined by the 
structure of our minds. Realists, by contrast, understand perception as a function of our 
brains; perception for Realists responds to the external world and thus representations in our 
mind can be explained by physical causes. For Bergson, both idealism and realism are wrong; 
they are based on “external perception,” which, he explains, always results in the binary 
opposition of representation and matter (17). In an attempt to offer a different account of the 
mind/body dualism, Bergson proposes an elaborate theory of “pure perception,” where 
“subject and object coincide” (195), and moves on to restate the problem of perception in 
terms of images rather than representations. He is thus able to show that the supposed 
“dualism” between consciousness and matter, or body and soul, is in fact a monism; in 
Matter and Memory matter and spirit co-exist through memory in the heterogeneity of 
duration (292). It is in this sense that Bergson states that memory is “the point of contact 
between consciousness and matter” and that, moreover, “in phenomena of memory ... we 
believe that we can grasp spirit in its most tangible form” (81). 
  
Finally, in Creative Evolution in 1907, Bergson applied his theory of duration to the field 
of evolutionary theory. The problem with understanding evolution through scientific 
investigation, Bergson maintains in Creative Evolution, is that it completely disregards 
change. As Bergson understands it, the scientific account of evolution leads to mechanism 
and finalism, two doctrines which he had been keen on refuting since Time and Free Will; 
more importantly, the scientific account of evolution implies denial of duration (9, 19-20). In 
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mechanism, the parts are pre-given and re-arranged by external “laws” as, for example, in 
Laplace; in finalism, it is the goals that are pre-given and determined, therefore denying the 
unpredictability of duration. Ultimately, both mechanism and finalism are for Bergson 
restricted by the “intellect”: they are regulated by “mathematical laws,” with one interested 
only in efficient causality and the other in the “realization of a plan” (45). If we avoid the 
“mechanistic instinct of mind” (17), Bergson argues, then we can come to see that living 
beings, like the universe as a whole, are durational; thus for Bergson “The living organism is 
a thing that endures” (15). Moreover, we can come to see organic evolution as resembling the 
evolution of consciousness: “the past presses against the present and causes the upspringing 
[sic] of a new form of consciousness, incommensurable with its antecedents” (27). Biological 
evolution, therefore, becomes in Bergson‟s book a form of creation – duration, as he 
explains, “means invention, creation of forms, continual elaboration of the absolutely new” 
(11). At the same time, intuition is elevated to “mind itself,” “life itself,” and the “unity of the 
spiritual life” (268). The object of intuition becomes life as a whole; “the whole of humanity, 
in space and in time” becomes “one galloping beside and before and behind each of us ... able 
to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death” 
(271). 
 
Hulme discusses Bergson‟s treatment of the question of free will, Bergson‟s views on the 
relation between soul and the body, and Bergson‟s theory of evolution in “The Philosophy of 
Intensive Manifolds.” He begins by reconstructing Bergson‟s argument concerning free will, 
following closely Bergson‟s argument in Time and Free Will. Hulme explains how Bergson 
allows for freedom by distinguishing between the “superficial” and the “fundamental” or 
“deeper” self, moving on to show how Bergson refutes determinism through a specific 
conception of change and time parallel to his distinction between two kinds of selves. The 
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intellect, he explains, deals with change by asserting that “all bodies can be analysed out into 
separable elements”; consequently, it reduces change “to a mere change in position of the 
particles” and, thus, “explains change by denying its existence” (178-79). He ends his 
discussion by stating that it is important to understand Bergson‟s account of the mind as a 
“free creative activity” because it is the “first application” of Bergson‟s “method” (182), 
adding that Bergson leaves many questions unanswered in Time and Free Will; for even 
though in Time and Free Will Bergson goes some way to refuting mechanism, Hulme argues, 
he still needs to prove that such free mind really does exist. As he puts it:  
 
the retort is still open that the whole thing is subjective. It may be a kind of self 
delusion...  
You have still got to prove that this state of flux – this feeling of a free activity which 
you feel in a certain tension – is not merely a subjective state of mind, but does give 
you real information about a reality which exists outside you. (182) 
 
In a sense, Hulme‟s remark here is a rhetorical ploy. This is suggested by the fact that Hulme 
goes on to show that the answers to the questions Bergson left unanswered in Time and Free 
Will are provided in Bergson‟s Matter and Memory. However, he does not return to the 
subject of Bergson‟s treatment of free will in “The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds” or, 
indeed, in any of his other writings on Bergson. The question of free will is therefore left 
hanging and, even though we cannot possibly know whether Hulme agreed or disagreed with 
Bergson‟s views on individual freedom, it appears that he was not especially concerned with 
Bergson‟s treatment of “free will.” This would explain why he does not identify it as a central 
aspect of Bergson‟s thought anywhere in his lecture. In any case, we know that in “The 
Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds,” Hulme interprets Bergson in Time and Free Will as 
107 
 
making the point that “free acts are exceptional” and of “rare occurrence,” occurring when 
“at moments of tension and crisis ... we choose in defiance of what is generally called a 
motive” (179). Although this guarantees freedom, it also shows that acts of freedom are only 
rare. Such view is consistent with Hulme‟s “classicism” and the position he advances in 
“Romanticism and Classicism”: that “freedom in man is much exaggerated” (64). This is 
what allows him to argue in “Romanticism and Classicism” for a recognition of human 
limitations while, at the same time, claim that “That we are free on certain rare occasions, 
both my religion and the views I get from metaphysics convince me” (64).   
 
Hulme goes on in “The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds” to discuss Bergson‟s treatment 
of the question of the relation between mind or soul and the body in Matter and Memory, 
employing in his discussion a series of metaphors taken directly out of Bergson‟s book (183; 
cf. Matter and Memory 165-66, 233-37, 292-300). He does not, however, elaborate on 
Bergson‟s distinction between spirit and matter, nor does he explain how Bergson thinks that 
this dualism can be overcome. Instead Hulme emphasises that Bergson‟s treatment of the 
distinction between mind and matter goes back to the “idea of the intensives”: 
 
Where are these past memories stored? The answer to that is that the whole of your past 
life is in the present. This inner stream which composes your inner self bears in it not 
the whole of your past in the form of completed pictures, but bears it in the form of 
potentiality. In this stream the elements are ... interpenetrated. All that happens in an act 
of recognition is that the interpenetrated parts get separated out (184). 
 
In doing so, he evades what is perhaps the most important part of Bergson‟s argument in 
Matter and Memory, namely Bergson‟s conclusion, given in the fourth and final chapter of 
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Matter and Memory: that “between brute matter and the mind ... there are all ... the degrees of 
freedom” (296). Bergson‟s “views on the soul,” as Hulme argues in “Mr. Balfour, Bergson, 
and Politics” may be attractive for many, but are certainly not the most important (160). 
Rather than Bergson‟s treatment on the soul, Hulme chooses to highlight how the “novelty” 
of Bergson‟s thesis in Matter and Memory lies in the fact that Bergson deals with the 
question of mind/body dualism “not as a mere matter of speculation, but on a basis provided 
by an examination of a body of empirical observations” (182). 
 
Much more time is devoted in “The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds” on Bergson‟s 
account of the process of evolution in Creative Evolution, described by Hulme as the “most 
familiar part” of Bergson‟s philosophy. Hulme writes that for Bergson evolution is “produced 
by a kind of impulse which is something akin to the creative activity we find in our own 
mind,” explaining that in Bergson‟s view, this impulse “is not material at all ... it is of the 
same nature as the kind of activity we find in ourselves, and which, being an intensive 
manifold, could not be understood by the intellect” (184). He proceeds to reinstate Bergson‟s 
criticism of mechanism and finalism, defining mechanism as the view that “the whole of the 
change has been produced solely as the result of the forces exerted upon the atoms” and 
describing finalism as the view that understands “life ... to be following a plan all laid down 
beforehand ... working towards some final end which is generally taken to be man” (185). 
Bergson, Hulme argues, demonstrates convincingly that both mechanism and finalism are 
problematic in that they fail to account for different lines of evolution. Repeating Bergson‟s 
argument in Creative Evolution, Hulme explains that mechanism and finalism fail to explain 
how it is that in two separate lines of evolution, that which includes vertebrates and that 
which ends in molluscs, it is possible to have the production of an eye composing of the same 




evolution is a separating out of elements which interpenetrated in the original impulse. 
If then you get the same organs developed on divergent lines of evolution, you have on 
Bergson‟s theory nothing to be surprised at, for they both develop it from their common 
origin... (185-86; cf. Creative Evolution 98) 
 
Another example from Bergson that Hulme uses in the lecture is Bergson‟s metaphor of the 
hand moving through iron filings, which Bergson employs in Creative Evolution to explain 
the process through which nature evolves.
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 Like a hand that moves “through iron filings that 
are compressed and offer resistance to it,” Hulme writes, so “impulse” moves through matter 
creating life (187; cf. Creative Evolution 94-95). In contrast to mechanism and finalism, both 
of which interpret evolution in terms of material necessity, “The characteristic of the 
impulse,” Hulme explains, is “a free creative activity”; thus, the process of evolution as 
Bergson understands is “a gradual insertion of more and more freedom into matter.” Hulme 
makes it clear, however, that this “gradual insertion of freedom into matter,” as he describes 
the process of evolution, should not be understood as a “plan laid down beforehand.” Rather, 
in this process “chance” plays a crucial part; more importantly, this process is not 
teleological, nor is it geared towards the perfection of man (187). What Hulme means by this 
is that evolution in Bergson‟s view is unpredictable and it may thus result in different 
directions (188-89). Finally, he concludes that Creative Evolution “does not add anything 
new to Bergson‟s thought”; for “If one has understood the difference between intensive and 
extensive manifolds, you have grasped the whole of that” (190). As it turns out, therefore, the 
value of Creative Evolution for Hulme is that in it Bergson manages to “plant all his ideas 
                                                 
90 In “Bax on Bergson,” Hulme complains that “Every critic explained Bergson in precisely the same phrases 
and the same metaphors, which were at the same time Bergson‟s own,” describing such strategy as “ludicrous” 
(116). In a way, in “The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds” Hulme was guilty of following a similar strategy as 
the critics he berates in “Bax on Bergson.” 
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solidly down on the earth and show them at work before you in a concrete form, in physical 
shape” (190). There are two things to note here. First, the fact that Hulme again singles out 
Bergson‟s theory of “intensive manifolds” as the most important part in Bergson‟s thought 
suggests that it is Bergson‟s theory of duration, not his philosophy of life, that Hulme finds 
the most significant. Secondly, as in his discussion of Matter and Memory, in presenting 
Bergson‟s argument in Creative Evolution, Hulme is keen on emphasising that Bergson‟s 
theory of evolution has as its basis “empirical proof” (185). It is Bergson‟s attention to 
empirical facts that ensures for Hulme that Bergson‟s theory of evolution possesses “stability 
and ballast” (190). 
 
Thus, for Hulme the essence of Bergson‟s metaphysics is to be found in Bergson‟s method 
rather than in Bergson‟s “conclusions.” According to the interpretation of Bergson Hulme 
postulates in “The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds,” what is important in Time and Free 
Will is not Bergson‟s theory of the free creative mind, but the way Bergson reaches this 
theory – through intuition (182). Likewise, in his discussions of Matter and Memory and 
Creative Evolution, Hulme argues that Bergson‟s theory of “intensive manifolds,” by which 
he means Bergson‟s notion that there is a reality which the intellect cannot grasp, is far more 
important than either the distinction between matter and spirit or the philosophy of life of 
Creative Evolution (184, 190). In other writings, he is much more polemical than he is in 
“The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds” about Bergson‟s “conclusions,” dismissing them as 
popular misinterpretations of Bergson‟s philosophy. As he puts it in “Mr. Balfour, Bergson 
and Politics,” “the whole reason why his conclusions are worth discussing at all is that they 
have been arrived at by this new method” (161). He expresses a similar view in “Bax on 




while the real importance of Bergson lies in pure philosophy, lies in his method, lies in 
the category he works with ... yet the conclusion to which the application of his method 
leads him, that of the dualism of soul and body, is precisely the conclusion which most 
people seek. It is nice for the timid to be assured on thoroughly respectable authority 
that there is a chance of immortality and that they have free will. (119-20) 
 
Hulme‟s point in “Bax on Bergson” is that those who ignore Bergson‟s method of intuition 
and his theory of “intensive manifolds,” focusing instead on Bergson‟s “conclusions,” 
misinterpret the French philosopher‟s thought. Bax, Lindsay, Balfour, the women who 
flooded Bergson‟s lectures in 1911, and critics such as Simmons who, as Hulme protests in a 
letter sent to the New Age shortly after Bergson‟s lecture tour in London, gained their 
understanding of Bergson‟s philosophy from “reports of popular lectures in the „Times‟” 
(“Bergsonism” 46), all come under attack.  
 
Hulme first expresses his disapproval of “popular” interpretations of Bergson in “Bax on 
Bergson” in August 1911. Bax published a review of Lindsay‟s The Philosophy of Bergson in 
the New Age the previous month, in which he accuses Bergson of being merely the latest 
“fashion in philosophy,” complaining that “it is difficult to find an adequate explanation in 
the intrinsic merit of his work” for Bergson‟s growing reputation (280-81). Hulme retorts in 
“Bax on Bergson” that Bax belongs to a generation of philosophers who have their “mental 
make-up so definitely crystallised around Kant and other philosophers, that they have not ... 
in the least grasped what it is exactly new that Bergson has brought into philosophy,” adding 
that philosophers like Bax fail to appreciate Bergson‟s method of intuition, “the thing which 
is at the centre of everything that he says” (117; cf. 160). Hulme‟s more serious objection to 
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Bax, however, is that Bax fails to differentiate between the “real” and the “fashionable” 
Bergson: 
 
It seems always to be the case that there are two definite stages in the reputation of a 
philosopher ... There is first a stage in which he is known to the few people who really 
care for and who are really able to understand subjects about which he writes ... This 
was the case with Bergson from about 1890 up to six months after „Evolution 
Créatrice‟ was written. Then suddenly, for no apparent reason, it seems a man‟s 
reputation spreads all over Europe. Articles appear in newspapers ... the propagandists 
of the different sects utilise him for their own purposes ... he penetrates to the drawing-
rooms, he is welcomed and read by the ladies who have ambitions salon-wise; and, 
finally, chatter makes his name stink in the nostrils of everyone who cares seriously for 
philosophy. (119) 
 
One could be forgiven here for thinking that Hulme‟s unease at Bergson‟s fame is elitist – 
some would suggest that it is even misogynistic.
91
 However, as Gillies, Guerlac and Quirk 
have all demonstrated, looking at the years from 1907 onwards, when Creative Evolution was 
published, a valid and credible distinction can be drawn between those who were 
“Bergsonian” and those who found “Bergsonism” interesting. While “Bergsonians” were 
“genuine students of the philosophy,” Gillies argues, “Bergsonism” consisted of “various 
corruptions of Bergson‟s ideas” (26).
92
 Seen in this context, Hulme‟s comments about the 
“ladies who have ambitions salon-wise” in the passage above, as well as his claim about the 
audience of “women, most of them with their heads lifted up in the kind of „Eager Heart‟ 
attitude” (154) at the UCL lectures in “Bergson Lecturing,” gain a different, if not entirely 
                                                 
91 See Garver 142-43; H. Carr, “T. E. Hulme and the „Spiritual Dread of Space‟” 108-10 and Verse 
Revolutionaries 392; and Ardis 47. 
92 See also Guerlac, Thinking in Time 10 and Quirk 54. 
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innocent, meaning; at the very least, it invites rethinking of Garver‟s claim that Hulme 
rejected Bergson‟s philosophy for its “overly close association with women” (143). My point 
here is that Hulme‟s gender politics should not obstruct us from the fact that in expressing 
dismay at the presence of middle-class audiences, including women, at Bergson‟s lectures, 
Hulme is questioning the way Bergson‟s philosophy was being utilised by people who care or 
know little about philosophy. This is not to say that Hulme does not read Bergson‟s thought 
with a heavy interpretative bias – for he certainly did – or that he was trained in philosophy – 
for he was not. While Bergson‟s philosophy cannot be understood if one ignores Bergson‟s 
method of intuition and his theory of duration, they only feature in Bergson‟s oeuvre as part 
of a broader discussion about the existence of free will, the unity of matter and spirit, and a 
philosophy of life as creative; disregarding all these ideas or dismissing them as 
“conclusions” seems unfair. As is clear from his exposition of Bergson‟s work in “The 
Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds,” Hulme had a very good grasp of Bergson‟s work. That 
he emphasised some aspects of Bergson‟s work over others, shows that he did so deliberately. 
Acknowledging that Hulme was not so enthusiastic about certain of Bergson‟s arguments is 
important here, for it complicates the common critical view that in the years between 1909 
and 1912 Hulme was a disciple of Bergson who merely repeated Bergson‟s ideas with 
approval.  
 
6. “Bergson’s Theory of Art” 
It is impossible to understand Hulme‟s interpretation of Bergson without also examining 
“Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” Hulme‟s lecture on Bergson and art from around 1911-12. This is 
because in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” Hulme explains with more clarity than anywhere else 
in his writings the reasons why he finds Bergson an important philosopher. He argues that as 
well as offering a comprehensive theory of reality, the French thinker provides the basis for a 
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“theory of art.” Hulme does not mean that Bergson has created a theory of art; as he clarifies, 
claiming that Bergson has a theory of art “would be absurd” (191). Rather, the importance of 
Bergson for Hulme is that “by the acute analysis of certain mental processes he has enabled 
us to state more definitely and with less distortion the qualities which we feel in art” (191). 
As it turns out, in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” Hulme uses Bergson‟s ideas to restate – and 
modify – claims he makes about poetry in “A Lecture.” In view of the fact that many of the 
ideas in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” feature also in “Romanticism and Classicism,” 
“Bergson‟s Theory of Art” links Hulme‟s description of modern poetry with the “classicism” 
of “Romanticism and Classicism.” This is important because it complicates the critical 
position that by late 1911 Hulme abandoned Bergson; it also explains why Bergson features 
so prominently in “Romanticism and Classicism.” 
 
As we will remember from the previous chapter, in “A Lecture” Hulme defines the “new 
visual art” as a means of “expression and communication” of that which the poet conceives in 
his mind; it is in this sense that the success of “impressionist” poetry is measured by the 
extent to which it achieves “the maximum of individual and personal expression” (53) and 
also judged by whether or not it “arrests” the reader‟s attention (54). According to the 
argument presented in “A Lecture,” the modern poet recaptures the original “vision” that is 
obstructed by the conventional language of “prose”: as Hulme puts it, the poet “must 
continually be creating new images, and his sincerity may be measured by the number of his 
images” (55). Hulme also maintains in this lecture that the poet must not make explicit any 
image or metaphor to the reader, but, rather, prompt the reader to combine distinct images in 
original and novel ways – thus the images in modern poetry “unite to suggest an image which 
is different to both” (54). Ultimately, this juxtaposition of images which Hulme prescribes for 
modern poetry serves to direct the reader‟s attention to a moment of intuition, and thus aims 
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to achieve communication between poet and reader, defined in “A Lecture” as the 
fundamental aim of modern poetry (54-55). In “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” Hulme makes 
similar claims to the ones he postulates in “A Lecture,” now linking them explicitly to 
Bergson‟s philosophy. He maintains, for example, that Bergson shows how it is impossible to 
predict the end result of a work of art – “For to predict would be to produce it before it was 
produced” – adding that Bergson also shows that artists should “accept” the “unforeseeable,” 
because “art lives on creation and implies a belief in the spontaneity of nature” (191; cf. 
Bergson, Creative Evolution 30, 45). Moreover, he describes the “process of artistic creation” 
as “a process of discovery and disentanglement,” repeating after Bergson that the job of the 
artist should be to present a “certain vision of things,” which the “recipients” in turn 
“recognise ... as true” (194; cf. Bergson, Laughter 153-54). As Bergson in Laughter, Hulme 
explains that art should be “an individual way of looking at things”; it should be the activity 
of an individual who “was able to break through the conventional ways of looking at things ... 
to pick out one element which is really in all of us, but which before he had disentangled it, 
we were unable to perceive” (194-195; cf. Laughter 152). Finally, as in his early lecture, 
Hulme argues in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” that linguistic metaphors “soon run their course 
and die” (195). Returning to the distinction he cast in “Notes” and in “A Lecture” between 
“poetry” and “prose,” Hulme emphasises in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” that the poet must 
“avoid this defect of language” (202; cf. 24-25, 55). Owing to the particular nature of 
language, the poet must “continually to be searching out new metaphors ... because the visual 
effect of a metaphor so soon dies”; as such, he must not “rest satisfied” until he “got hold” of 
a metaphor, “which did pull up the reader and make him visualise the thing” (195). As in “A 
Lecture,” therefore, Hulme argues in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art that the aim of poetry should 




The significant difference between the two lectures is that in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” 
Hulme can explain in more detail how exactly a poet can recover the “vision” behind words 
by drawing on Bergson‟s ideas. Bergson‟s notion that our mind is always oriented towards 
action, and is thus only able to see the practical side of things, is used by Hulme as evidence 
that “in ordinary perception, both of external objects and of our internal states, we never 
perceive things as they are, but only certain conventional types” (193). For Hulme, Bergson‟s 
distinction between the intellect, which sees only the practical side of things, and intuition, 
which grasps the “immediate reality,” is important because it “enables one to give a more 
coherent account of ... what previously had only been assumed.” What the poet needs, Hulme 
repeats after Bergson, is “pure perception” or intuition; like Bergson, he thus argues that “the 
function of the artist is to pierce through ... the veil placed between us and reality by the 
limitations of our perception engendered by action” (193), also adding that the poet must 
place “himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy and breaking down by an effort 
of intuition that space puts between him and his model” (192).
93
 Through intuition, moreover, 
the poet can “dive” into the deeper structures of reality, where the “intellect” cannot go. In 
this way, Hulme‟s “Bergsonian” poet captures that which he wants to express in its original 
intensity; recognising that language is prohibitive, he can “force the mechanism of expression 
out of the way in which it tends to go and into the way he wants” by “a certain tension of 
mind” (200; cf. Bergson, Laughter 154). This is also the unifying idea in “A Lecture,” where 
Hulme makes it the aim of the modern poet to express in us that which conventional language 
cannot describe (cf. 56).  
 
While in “A Lecture” the demand Hulme postulates on the poet is only to arrest the 
attention of the reader, in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” there is an added emphasis on accuracy 
                                                 
93 Cf. Bergson, Laughter 151-52; Creative Evolution 176; and An Introduction to Metaphysics 21-23. 
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and precision as requirements for poetry. Hulme likens the poet in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” 
to an architect who uses “architect‟s curves” to draw the line he has in his mind in the most 
accurate way possible. The architect-poet does not give in to “conventional means of 
expression,” but, rather, expresses “This vision he had of the individuality of the curve” 
(199). Thus art for Hulme is a “desire for accuracy.” As he writes: 
 
The motive power behind any art is a certain freshness of experience which breeds 
dissatisfaction with the conventional ways of expression because they leave out the 
individual quality of this freshness. You are driven to new means of expression because 
you persist in an endeavour to get it out exactly as you felt it.  
You could define art, then as a passionate desire for accuracy. (200-01)  
 
According to S. Schwartz, Hulme‟s emphasis on accuracy in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” is 
proof of the fact that Hulme is using Bergson in an “un-Bergsonian manner.” “While Bergson 
wishes to restore the subjective flux of experience,” Schwartz argues, “Hulme wants to 
present an objective element that all of us can apprehend”; in Schwartz‟s view, this 
demonstrates that “Hulme is turning ... from the subjective to the objective side of 
experience” (The Matrix of Modernism 54). Levenson shares a similar view, finding Hulme‟s 
call for accuracy as evidence that he was moving away from the “subjectivist” aesthetic of 
Bergson towards objectivism (87, 99-100). In detecting a clear rupture in Hulme‟s thought, 
both Schwartz and Levenson fail to see that, rather than moving from one position to another, 
in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” Hulme is promulgating a specific interpretation of Bergson, 
based on the aspects in Bergson‟s philosophy which he found the most appealing: intuition; 
Bergson‟s notion of an immediate reality existing, not accessible through intellectual means; 
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and the way in which Bergson, in Hulme‟s view, grounds his metaphysical theories on 
empirical observations.  
 
Schwartz is right in noting that Hulme is not interested in restoring the “flux” of 
experience; for, Hulme‟s poet differs significantly from Bergson‟s philosopher who aims, as 
Bergson explains in “The Soul and the Body,” to recover the flow of duration (56-57). Yet, 
there is nothing “un-Bergsonian” about Hulme insisting in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” on the 
poet presenting the object or idea he has in his mind in an “accurate” way. This claim follows 
from two different ideas expressed by Bergson. The first occurs in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics. Here, Bergson argues that analysis can only understand an object through 
conventional measurement because the “intellect” is blind to the internal character of that 
object, with Bergson adding that intuition is an “intellectual sympathy by which one places 
oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it” (6; emphasis in 
original). Hulme‟s insistence that the object presented in poetry is precise and unique 
approximates Bergson‟s description of the process of intuition in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics. Hulme‟s call for accuracy and precision in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” is also 
consistent with Bergson‟s brief discussion of art in Laughter, a passage that is missing from 
Schwartz‟s analysis. Bergson argues in Laughter that the poet‟s aim is to “make us see 
something of what they have seen” (156), defining poetry as a “direct vision of reality” (157). 
Moreover, Bergson explains in Laughter that art “always aims at what is individual,” by 
which, as he explains, he means that the artist should aim to “fix” that which “he has seen at a 
certain spot, on a certain day, at a certain hour” (161). This is important for Bergson because 
only by presenting precise objects can the poet bring us “face to face with reality itself” 
(157). Thus, although Hulme is not interested in recovering the flow of duration, which, for 
Bergson, can be recovered only through “the rhythmical arrangement of words ... animated 
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with a life of their own” (156), it is misleading to claim that Hulme is using Bergson in an 
“un-Bergsonian” way. Rather, as when discussing Bergson‟s metaphysics, Hulme offers in 
“Bergson‟s Theory of Art” a specific reading of Bergson that privileges his method at the 
expense of Bergson‟s “conclusions.”  
 
The metaphor of the architect trying to present the object or idea that he has in his mind in 
the most precise way possible features also in “Romanticism and Classicism,” in which, as in 
“Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” Hulme declares the “great aim” of poetry to be “accurate, precise 
and definite description” (68). The way Hulme uses this claim in “Romanticism and 
Classicism” is significantly different; as we will see in the next chapter, the distinction 
between accurate description and vague rhetoric carries a distinctly political valence. Yet, the 
confluence of aesthetics and politics in “Romanticism and Classicism” should not distract us 
from the fact that Hulme‟s description of “classic” poetry is consistent with his discussion of 
poetry in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” and thus with his general interpretation of Bergson. As I 
already discussed in this chapter, in “The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds” Hulme notes 
the way in which Bergson‟s metaphysics is grounded on empirical evidence (182, 185). This 
is significant because it is Bergson‟s attention to empirical facts that explains the presence of 
Bergson in “Romanticism and Classicism.” In his philosophy as Hulme understands it, 
Bergson explains the process of poetic creation without postulating that there is anything 
mysterious or magical in the composition of poetry, a conception of poetry which Hulme has 
been trying to discredit since the time of “A Lecture” and which now, in “Romanticism and 
Classicism,” he associates with the romantic view of poetry. To use the terms of Hulme‟s 
“Romanticism and Classicism,” while Bergson‟s emphasis on inspiration and spontaneity is 
shared by key romantic aesthetes such as Coleridge, Bergson‟s attention to empirical facts 
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makes him a “classic,” insofar as we understand “classic” to mean someone who “never flies 
away into the circumambient gas” (62). 
 
As in “A Lecture” and in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” in “Romanticism and Classicism” 
Hulme follows Bergson in describing the poet as diving into the “flux” of reality and 
reproducing that which the poet sees in his mind. The “classic” poet, Hulme argues in 
“Romanticism and Classicism,” has a “rare” ability to “see things as they really are, and apart 
from the conventional ways in which you have been trained to see them”; moreover, through 
a “concentrated state of mind,” Hulme‟s “classic” poet is able to get at the “actual expression 
of what one sees” (69). The process involved in the act of creation, Hulme states in this 
lecture, “is ... worked out in Bergson,” who shows that: 
 
the characteristic of the intellect is that it can only represent complexities of the 
mechanical kind. It can only make diagrams, and diagrams are essentially things whose 
parts are separate one from another. The intellect always analyses – when there is a 
synthesis it is baffled. (72) 
 
The “central feature of his whole philosophy,” Hulme goes on to argue in “Romanticism and 
Classicism,” is that, “To deal with the intensive you must use intuition,” as “the intellect can 
only deal with extensive multiplicity” (72). What determines the success of a poem for 
Hulme is not the “scale or kind of emotion produced,” nor the subject, but whether it has any 
real “zest” in it. By “zest” Hulme means that the poet must have “an actually realised visual 
object before him in which he delighted”; the poet should subsequently present this object in 
the most sincere way possible. Hulme thus writes that “If it is sincere in the accurate sense, 
when the whole of the analogy is necessary to get out the exact curve of the feeling or the 
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thing you want to express – there you seem to me to have the highest verse” (71). This 
process recalls both the poet in “A Lecture,” who selects “certain images ... to evoke the state 
he feels” (54), and the artist in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” who describes the “individuality” 
of that which he sees in his mind by breaking through “stock” perception (199). Hulme 
recognises in “Romanticism and Classicism” that this “positive quality” of verse “is the same 
as you get in the more romantic people.” He thus acknowledges that the “sincerity” 
demanded of the “classic” poet is akin to what Coleridge terms the “vital or organic,” words 
which Hulme sees as “a convenient metaphor for a complexity ... in which the parts cannot be 
said to be elements as each one is modified by the other presence, and each one to a certain 
extent is the whole.” In many ways, then, the mind of the “classic” poet resembles Ruskin‟s 
“imaginative mind,” which  
 
seizes and combines at the same instant all the important ideas of its poem or picture, 
and while it works with one of them, it is at the same instant working with and 
modifying all in their relation to it and never losing sight of their bearings on each other 
– as the motion of snake‟s body goes through all parts at once and its volition acts at the 
same instant in coils which go contrary ways. (72) 
 
As Howarth has noticed, the metaphor of the mind moving like a snake‟s body and 
synthesising the poem‟s form and meaning is taken almost in verbatim out of Ruskin‟s 
Modern Painters; more intriguingly, it echoes Coleridge‟s description in Lectures on 
Literature of Shakespeare‟s genius “writhing in every direction, but still progressive” (qtd. in 
Howarth 37). Far from accidentally, Hulme is consciously paralleling in “Romanticism and 
Classicism” the synthesising power of intuition with Ruskin‟s and Coleridge‟s theory of 
Imagination. That he would do so, should not surprise us: as many critics have pointed out, 
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there are intimate connections between Bergson and Coleridge. Wellek and Muirhead, for 
example, demonstrated some time ago how Coleridge was one of the most influential 
proponents of vitalism, while Chiari and Haeger have separately argued that Bergson‟s theory 
of duration is in many ways a continuation of ideas first laid out by the romantics and 
Coleridge in particular.
94
 The similarities between duration and Imagination become obvious 
when we compare Bergson‟s discussion of duration with Coleridge‟s famous formulation of 
Secondary Imagination in Biographia Literaria. Coleridge defines Imagination in Biographia 
Literaria as a power that “dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate ... struggles to 
idealize and to unify” and is thus “essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are 
essentially fixed and dead” (1: 304; emphasis in original). As a continuous creative 
projection, Coleridge‟s Imagination anticipates Bergson‟s description of the durational élan 
vital in Creative Evolution, defined by Bergson as a “current passing from germ to germ 
through the medium of a developed organism ... as if the organism itself were only an 
excrescence, a bud caused to sprout by the former germ endeavoring to continue itself in a 
new germ” (27; emphasis in original). More crucially, the creative movement of the romantic 
Imaginative mind parallels the diving-into-flux of the Bergsonian artist, his breaking through 
the static recognition of the world (which for Coleridge is the characteristic activity of 
Fancy), and the making of that which the artist sees or feels available to the world.  
 
While Bergson‟s duration postulates an Imaginative mind creating an ever-unpredictable 
unity, however, his metaphysic is fundamentally different to that of Coleridge. Coleridge‟s 
distinction between Imagination and Fancy is primarily an attack on the mechanistic 
materialism of eighteenth-century philosophy through a re-appropriation of German Idealism 
                                                 
94 See Wellek 101; Muirhead 127-28; Chiari 25; and Haeger 98-99. Wellek argues that Coleridge‟s notion of the 
productive Imagination should be seen as an attempt to bridge the gap between form and matter, while 
Muirhead demonstrates how Coleridge postulates a “view of Nature as a progressive system of embodied and 
individualizing activities” and shows how Coleridge‟s philosophy of nature is based on the principle of 
interconnection of elements (127-28). 
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(Haeger 98). As Rae demonstrates, Bergson‟s account of intuition breaks away from German 
Idealism, specifically the theories of Schelling, the philosopher on whom Coleridge relies the 
most in Biographia Literaria. This is because, Rae argues, Bergson‟s artist does not 
transcend the particulars to the real of universal Ideas, thus offering the basis for a theory of 
poetry that is “organic” but that, crucially, is not mystical or idealist (Practical Muse 57).
95
 In 
acknowledging in “Romanticism and Classicism” that both Ruskin and Coleridge postulate 
an essentially similar aesthetic to Bergson, but at the same time objecting to the metaphysic 
of Ruskin and Coleridge (67, 72), Hulme is deliberately seeking to re-appropriate the 
romantic notion of “organic” creation and to recast it with a distinctly different metaphysic. 
Turning to “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” helps explain this point. Hulme writes in “Bergson‟s 
Theory of Art”:  
 
To describe the nature of the activity you get in art, the philosopher must always create 
some kind of special vocabulary. He has to make use of certain metaphysical 
conceptions in order to state the thing satisfactorily. The great advantage of Bergson‟s 
theory is that it states the thing most nakedly, with the least amount of metaphysical 
baggage. (194) 
 
He goes on to explain that intuition for Bergson is simply a rare ability for “natural 
detachment,” that those who are capable of using intuition do so “only by accident, and in 
one sense only” (196), that an artist is simply a “person who is able to turn aside from action 
and to observe things as they are in a disinterested way” (197), and that the process through 
which art is created, intuition, is nothing more than a “human activity” (204; cf. Bergson, 
                                                 
95 Cf. Bergson, “The Stating of Problems” 34. Rae acknowledges that, by the time of Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion, Bergson embraces mysticism and that a turn to mysticism is already evident in Creative 
Evolution. Yet, Rae rightly points out that in Creative Evolution Bergson uses élan vital mostly as a model for 
the inner self rather than as something continuous with it. See Practical Muse 246n57. 
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Laughter 154). It is this interpretation of Bergson as an intuitive philosopher who pays 
attention to empirical facts that explains why Hulme has no hesitations about using Bergson 
in “Romanticism and Classicism” to describe “classic” poetry. This is not to say that Hulme‟s 
interpretation of Bergson is accurate; rather, it is to note that Hulme‟s use of Bergson in 




A close examination of Hulme‟s writings on Bergson reveals the answers to the following 
questions: What was the specific attraction Bergson held for Hulme? To what ends did he use 
Bergson‟s metaphysics? And, to what extent did Hulme deviate from the theories of 
Bergson? Like many other young aesthetes in the early twentieth century, Hulme was 
attracted to Bergson‟s “poetic effort” and his intuitive method. More importantly, Hulme 
found in Bergson a positive theory for understanding reality as that which cannot be grasped 
by conventional language or “artificial gymnastics,” but that can only be reached by intuition. 
While he valued Bergson‟s method of intuition and the French philosopher‟s idea that an 
immediate reality exists beyond language, Hulme was critical of Bergson‟s “conclusions.” 
Hulme‟s “selective” reading of Bergson is nowhere more evident than in “Bergson‟s Theory 
of Art,” where he draws on Bergson‟s theories to explain how the poet, by turning the objects 
in his mind into accurate and precise “visions,” can enable us to come closer to reality. 
Understanding the way Hulme interpreted Bergson‟s philosophy helps explain the reason 
why in “Romanticism and Classicism” he uses Bergson‟s aesthetic theory as the basis for 
“classic” poetry. Ultimately, the great lesson of Bergson for Hulme is that a deeper reality 
exists that can only be grasped through anti-intellectual means. This idea also underwrites 









During the time when he was publicly defending Bergson‟s philosophy, Hulme also wrote 
a number of essays in which he advocated a “classical” attitude in politics. By “classical” 
attitude, Hulme means the view of humans as imperfect or “limited”; in politics, the 
“classical” attitude asserts that nothing positive can ever come out of disorder and that, as 
Hulme puts it in “A Tory Philosophy,” “The best results can only be got out of man as the 
result of a certain discipline which introduces order into this internal anarchy” (235). Critics 
have always been quick to detect a contradiction in Hulme‟s contemporaneous defence of 
Bergson and the ideas he promulgated in these political essays: how could he possibly 
reconcile the individual freedom guaranteed by Bergson‟s ever-creating, ever-unfolding élan 
with his advocacy of discipline and order in politics? The conventional explanation is that a 
breach occurred between Hulme and Bergson at around 1912, with Hulme endorsing the anti-
democratic politics of Maurras and Lasserre, two thinkers who opposed Bergson‟s 
philosophy on political grounds.
96
 Even those critics who like Schwartz maintain that 
Hulme‟s political beliefs are not incompatible with his admiration of Bergson‟s metaphysics, 
argue that his politics is authoritarian; according to Schwartz, Hulme‟s “reactionary 
ideology” is entirely consistent with a “vitalism of the Right” (“Henri Bergson and the 
Politics of Vitalism” 296).
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96 See Roberts 139-40; Levenson 37-47 and 80-102; Ferrall 17-18: Robinson 109-111; Ardis 7; R. Potter 67; and 
L. B. Williams 25. 




In this chapter, I offer a different interpretation of Hulme‟s “classicist” politics. What 
critics often neglect is the significance of the context in which Hulme makes his political 
claims. As I show in the first part of this chapter, Hulme did not turn to politics because he 
“ran out of things to say ... about philosophy and art” (L. B. Williams 69), nor was he in his 
essays “harking back to the „Chesterbelloc‟ debate that raged through the pages of The New 
Age for much of the winter of 1907-8” (Ferguson 99). Rather, taking a genuine interest in the 
events which unfolded after the 1910 General Election in England, he participated in a very 
topical debate concerning the future of the Conservative Party. All five of Hulme‟s essays on 
politics were published in the Commentator, a Conservative weekly that appeared in the wake 
of the Conservatives‟ electoral defeat and of the constitutional crisis that ensued.
98
 In these 
articles, Hulme is responding to the Commentator‟s call for the formulation of a plausible and 
effective conversion strategy; he proposes ways in which Conservative rhetoric could be 
reformed and in doing so, Hulme draws on ideas expressed in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art.” 
Moreover, his discussion of a reconversion strategy can be understood from the perspective 
of Sorel‟s method of “diremption”, which constitutes an appropriation of Bergson‟s anti-
intellectualist philosophy. Seen in the context of the debate in the pages of the Commentator, 
it becomes obvious that Bergson features prominently in Hulme‟s political analysis. At the 
same time, even though to his own admission Hulme was inspired by Maurras‟ and 
Lasserre‟s campaign against Socialists in France, in his political essays he does not embrace 
                                                 
98 Martin, first, suggested that Hulme‟s connection with the Commentator has to be studied, writing in 1962 that 
Hulme‟s articles in the Commentator must be examined by “those who wish to complete their knowledge of 
Hulme‟s works” (“T. E. Hulme: A Bibliographical Note” 307). Martin did not, however, investigate Hulme‟s 
connection with the Commentator further, instead opting to concentrate on Hulme‟s relationship with the New 
Age circle. See New Age under Orage 213. Robinson regrets the fact that Hulme‟s and Storer‟s connection with 
the Commentator has gone “totally unnoticed” (107), yet, like Martin, he reads Hulme‟s political essays through 
the writings of the New Age “reactionaries,” specifically Kennedy and Ludovici (95-118). Most recently, L. B. 
Williams has acknowledged that writers from both the New Age and the Commentator “suggested to Hulme that 
an aristocratic alternative to democracy was possible and that it had existed and prospered in a pre-modern age,” 




the proto-fascist programme of the Action Française, nor are his ideas consistent with the 
radical Right. Both Levenson‟s claim that “Hulme embraced the programme of reaction 
almost as soon as he discovered it” (83) and Robinson‟s assessment that he campaigned for 
“the maintenance of a rigidly stratified, hierarchical society” (91) must, thus, be substantially 
revised. Ultimately, acknowledging the context in which Hulme developed his “classical” 
politics clarifies the “classicism” of “Romanticism and Classicism” by emphasising the great 
extent to which Hulme‟s description of poetry as “classic” is politically-charged. 
 
2. The Conservative Party “crisis” and the Commentator 
Hulme writes repeatedly in his essays on politics about the need of Conservatism for an 
effective conversion strategy. In “A Note on the Art of Political Conversion” and “The Art of 
Political Conversion,” as well as in “Theory and Practice,” he argues that, because political 
conversion is a largely emotional process, the Conservative Party must try and appeal to the 
electorate‟s instincts rather than address them as rational beings, suggesting ways in which 
Conservative propaganda could be made more effective (cf. 209-212, 215, 227-28). Hulme‟s 
case study of the propaganda strategy of the Conservative Party has gone largely unnoticed 
by critics. As far as I know, it has only captured the attention of his most recent biographer, 
who claims that Hulme found it “remarkable” that in 1911 “so many middle-class people 
were attracted to radical views in general” (Ferguson 99). Hulme‟s discussion of the need of 
the Conservative Party to present its beliefs in a more convincing manner, however, is only 
fully understood when set in the context of the debate that took place in the Commentator, to 
which Hulme‟s articles were in fact a direct contribution. 
 
At the turn of the century, the Conservative Party in Britain was facing a significant 
leadership crisis. Arthur Balfour, who succeeded Salisbury as leader in July 1902, was 
128 
 
finding himself unable to steer the Party through the many challenges posed by the changing 
social and economic conditions, being forced to make unpopular decisions (Green 2). The 
Party crisis reached its climax following the Conservative Party‟s losses to at the 1906 
General Election that paved the way for the Liberals‟ ascent to power. By 1910, the Liberals 
had established themselves as the most potent political force in the country; according to 
Ramsden, the Conservative Party was now “out of control” and “dangerously split” (197, 
201-02).
99
 The Conservatives‟ discontent was aggravated in 1910, when the Liberal Prime 
Minister Asquith began pushing for reforms aiming at limiting the power of the Lords (Ensor 
424-25). Amidst this turmoil of political change, the Party‟s disintegration was being 
discussed extensively in the Conservative press. A reading of mainstream “Tory” newspapers 
demonstrates that the success of the Liberals in winning the electorate and the rise of the 
Labour party was interpreted as directly related to the lack of strong leadership and, 
specifically, to the inability of the Party‟s leaders to devise a coherent political and 
ideological strategy. Thus the Spectator argued that under Balfour the Conservative Party 
was lacking a “certain hardness of temperament,” the Morning Post dismissed Balfour‟s 
“policy of vacillating shilly-shally,” and the National Review waged a “Balfour Must Go” 
campaign.
100
 It was in response to the political events of early 1910 that in May a group of 
Conservatives launched the Commentator.
101
 This weekly newspaper‟s primary task, as its 
opening editorial proclaimed, was “the advocacy and propagation of Conservative 
                                                 
99 See also Dangerfield 70; Green 267; and Searle 81-82. 
100 Qtd. in Ramsden 199, 201, 211. On the Conservatives‟ fear of Socialism, see Green 137. For an analysis of 
the “crisis of Conservatism” and of the dissatisfaction among the members of the Party with the leadership, see 
Searle 79-81. 
101 I have not been able to determine the newspaper‟s founder or its editorial committee. A “Notice” to the 
readers in November 1910 states that “The Commentator is published … at the personal expense of one 
independent Conservative, who is not only sacrificing money, but a great deal of valuable time, for the purpose 
of making a supreme effort to extricate this country from the slough of despond into which it has sunk” (2 Nov. 
1910: 553). Despite a clear sense of purpose shared by the editors, the Commentator is rather multivocal. Its 
contributors include prominent Tories, such as Lionel Valdar, Louis J. MacQuillant and Sydney Knox, the 
fantasy short-story writer and occultist George Raffalovich, the poet and critic Alfred Berlyn, and the poet, 
author of children‟s stories, Margaret Sackville, who was to become a prominent pacifist activist during the First 
World War.  
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principles”; at a time when the traditional structures of power were coming under assault by 
the Liberal and Labour opposition, the Commentator promised “exhaustive enumeration and 
criticism” of “the many … causes operating detrimentally to the interests of the nation” (“The 
Question” 1). Like other Tory newspapers, the Commentator put forth a forceful critique of 
the party‟s leadership, stating repeatedly that the existing leaders had betrayed the Party‟s 
base and bemoaning the fact that, as one contributor put it, “we have the official party in one 
direction and the rank and file of the party pulling in another, and in this manner the 
Conservative instincts of the English nation as a political factor are wasted” (“Plain Talk to 
Conservatives” 51).
102
 In the first issue it was thus announced the Commentator was 
dissatisfied with how “The Conservative leaders have completely forgotten that they were 
sent to Parliament to represent Conservative principles,” a demand the paper continued to 
make right up to its final issue, which reminded Conservative voters that the Party could only 
be rescued by “a bold and unswerving advocacy of true Conservative principles” (“The 
Question” 1; 11 June 1913: n.p.). 
 
Historians have noted how the Constitutional crisis of 1910 and the anxieties that it caused 
amongst the Conservatives splintered the Party faithful into different factions, with many 
taking a partisan approach against the Party. There were those who, in the name of “National 
Efficiency,” pioneered a national government of “first-rate men,” the primary aim of which 
would be to preserve the Empire. There was also the “Reveille” movement led by die-hard 
Tories such as Willoughby de Broke, and associated with nationalist, xenophobic and racist 
views as expressed by Arnold White (Searle 82-86; Sykes 661-67). The Commentator 
certainly shared these separatist groups‟ conviction that the party leadership had alienated the 
electorship, demanding from the Party, like the “Reveille” group and the champions of 
                                                 
102 This is a recurring theme in the Commentator. Cf. 20 May 1910: 1, 52; 14 Sep. 1910: 387; 28 Sept. 1910: 
441; and 19 Oct. 1910: 523. 
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“National Efficiency,” a more uncompromising approach to the Liberals‟ attempts at 
changing the status-quo.
103
 Yet, for all its polemics and despite its critical stance against the 
Party‟s leadership, the Commentator rarely deviated from the official party line; there is also 
no sign of xenophobic or racist ideas in it. In its three-year-run of life, it consistently backed 
the Conservatives in the Commons and Lords over such issues as Tariff Reform and Irish 
Home Rule and repeatedly praised the Party‟s policies. Characteristically, the Commentator 
made it clear that “In spite of all we have said against the action of the official Conservative 
party, we can assure you that the only way to rid yourselves of Radical tyranny is to support 
Conservative candidates at the next election” (“Plain Talk to Working Men” 6). What 
distinguishes the Commentator from the mainstream Conservative newspapers of the time is 
the emphasis it put on the need of the Party to provide its supporters and the general public 
with a cohesive ideology and to devise an effective propaganda strategy. According to the 
Commentator Conservatives, the party should present the electorate with a “clear and defined 
policy” ideology because, as it was announced in the first issue:  
 
To go before them with a hundred and one suggestions for breaking up the last 
stronghold this country possesses for the protection of the freedom of its people, and for 
the maintenance of its prosperity as a commercial nation, is simply to court defeat. 
Without such a defined policy, it is impossible to enthuse the electorate, and especially 
when it is perfectly obvious that the leaders are irretrievably mixing themselves up with 
the politics of the other side. (“The Question” 2) 
 
By “other side,” the Commentator contributors mean the Liberals or, as they refer to them 
interchangeably, the “socialists,” two terms that, as Searle shows, were often conflated in the 
                                                 
103 Cf. Commentator 8 Feb. 1911: 203; 19 Jul.1911: 140; and 5 Apr. 1911: 327. 
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Edwardian times (81). The Commentator attributed the success of the Liberals to their 
“methods of training.” As stated in an unsigned article from December 1910, if the 
Conservative Party was to be successful at the elections, the Conservatives needed to match 
the propaganda techniques of the “socialists”: 
 
Any political speaker will tell you that the requirements of public, and especially 
outdoor, speaking have undergone considerable changes. Rhetoric appeals to human 
emotion and instincts fall exceedingly flat, or else create uproar. To keep an audience 
silent and listening, it is necessary to provide it with facts, or to answer those put 
forward by opponents. Even figures are becoming interesting to the modern crowd … If 
we are to be put in the abject position of being taught by Socialists, it would seem that 
the first lesson we should learn is their methods of training their adherents in the way of 
exposing the vulnerable points in an opponent‟s arguments. (“Political Organisation” 
86)  
 
Thus, in its three years of circulation, the Commentator continuously sought to address what 
it perceived was the Conservative Party‟s major weakness, namely its lack of efficient 
propaganda strategy. 
 
More than any other contributor, it was Storer, Hulme‟s friend from the time of the “Poet‟s 
Club,” who undertook the task of giving the party “a Conservative ideal and an expressed 
philosophy” (“The Conservative Ideal” 139). Storer began writing for the Commentator at 
around the same time as Hulme, his first article appearing only a month before Hulme‟s “A 
Note on the Art of Political Conversion” was printed. The arguments Storer puts forward in 
the Commentator are almost identical to Hulme‟s. Like Hulme, Storer argues that the 
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Liberals‟ electoral success could be explained by the fact that they appealed to people‟s 
emotions more “directly” and that it is necessary for the Conservatives to come up with a 
fully worked-out ideology. Moreover, in the same way as Hulme, Storer associates the 
Liberal position with romanticism and the views of the Conservative Party with classicism, 
rejecting Progress and defining Classicism as the belief in human limitations. As such, it 
seems appropriate to consider their articles as part of the same project. 
 
3. “Anti-intellectualism” as theory of propaganda  
In his first article for the Commentator, Storer writes: 
 
People are not Conservatives or Socialists by the operation of rational processes, but 
from conviction, which is an instinctive silent thing. Arguments and reasons are merely 
means for advancing towards or preserving an end. Though it may seem at first glance 
a point of little importance that the English intellectuals are mainly, if not entirely, on 
the side opposed to Conservatism, consideration will show that though theirs is a very 
small class, it exercises an influence altogether out of proportion to its size. (“The 
Conservative Ideal” 139) 
 
Storer‟s idea here is that the formation of political ideology is an instinctual or non-rational 
process and that the Conservatives must do more to appeal to the basic emotions of the 
electorate. Specifically, Storer argues that a major reason for the mass appeal of Liberalism is 
the work done by Liberal intellectuals towards popularising Liberal beliefs. Thus, if the 
Conservatives are to be effective in gaining back members of the electorate, Storer goes on to 
claim in “The Conservative Ideal,” they must “destroy” the Socialists‟ “illusion of being in 
the fashion” (139). “What was wanted,” Storer proposes in an article in May 1911, is “a 
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weapon with which to strike the revolutionary evil at its head and centre of activity. This 
work,” he continues in this essay, “writers can do, and it is as important in its way as the day-
to-day tactics of the practical politicians” (“A Basis for Nationalism” 426). Like Storer, 
Hulme maintains in “A Note on the Art of Political Conversion” in February-March 1911 that 
“Conversion is always emotional and non-rational” (209), arguing, like Storer, that the 
intellectuals play an important part in the formulation of political beliefs. Hulme‟s analysis is 
identical to Storer‟s: 
 
We may be under the delusion that we are deciding a question from purely rational 
motives, but we never are...  
Now this does seem to me to be a point of practical importance if it helps us to convert 
this class. For though the type may not be numerous, it does have, in the end, a big 
influence in politics. Not very obviously or directly, for in no country do the 
intellectuals appear to lead less than in ours; but ultimately and by devious ways their 
views soak down and colour the whole mass. (209)  
 
Both Storer and Hulme, therefore, were agreed on the significance for the Conservative Party 
to reconvert the young intellectuals who had joined the Fabians. The first step in doing so 
was to recognise the non-rational nature of the psychological process involved in ideological 
formation.  
 
At the time Storer and Hulme were writing for the Commentator, the view that ideological 
conviction is a non-rational process was a fairly widespread idea, popularised by various 
crowd psychologists. Sherry shows that crowd psychology was being used by Liberal 
politicians for propaganda purposes, while McLelland demonstrates how it was also utilised 
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by those suspicious of liberalism as evidence against “liberal” belief in “reason as a universal 
legislator” (627).
104
 One of the most famous expositions of this view of ideology as a non-
rational process was given by Gustave Le Bon in The Crowd, a text which Hulme cites in “A 
Note on the Art of Political Conversion” in support of the claim he makes in this essay that 
“conversion is anything but intellectual” (208). In The Crowd, Le Bon argues that “crowds 
are not ... influenced by reasoning, and can only comprehend rough-and-ready associations of 
ideas,” so that “The orators who know how to make an impression upon them always appeal 
... to their sentiments and never to their reason” (112). Le Bon attributes this phenomenon to 
the nature of “man” who, he writes, “possesses the ... facility with which he allows himself to 
be impressed by words and images” (13) and whose “Reason and arguments are incapable of 
combating certain words and formulas” (100). Ultimately, Le Bon‟s study of crowd 
psychology aims to show how words such as “democracy,” “socialism,” “equality” and 
“liberty,” described by Le Bon as “vague,” often become “natural forces”: words that “evoke 
grandiose and vague images in men‟s minds” (101, cf. 21). Another study mentioned by 
Hulme in “A Note on the Art of Political Conversion” is Graham Wallas‟ Human Nature in 
Politics. Building on Le Bon‟s work, Wallas argues in Human Nature in Politics that it is a 
mistake to exaggerate the “intellectuality of mankind,” as political allegiance frequently 
depends on impulses and instincts (21; cf. 69). In the same manner as Le Bon before him, 
Wallas asserts that it is part of human nature to seek something “vague” to believe in. 
According to Wallas, this human tendency to believe the “vague” is what explains 
Socialism‟s great popular appeal: “The need of something which one may love and for which 
one may work has created for thousands of working men a personified „Socialism,‟ a winged 
goddess with stern eyes and drawn sword to be the hope of the world” (93). 
 
                                                 
104 See McClelland 661-81 and Sherry, Great War and the Language of Modernism 25. 
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In many ways, in his essays Hulme employs the observations of Le Bon and Wallas as 
evidence of the fact that Conservative propaganda must change. In “A Note on the Art of 
Political Conversion,” for example, he argues like Le Bon that “catch-words,” words such as 
“natural” and “free,” end up acquiring the status of “mental categories” through a process in 
which politicians and other rhetoricians “deliberately reiterate a short phrase … until it gets 
into the mind of the victim, by a process of suggestion definitely not intellectual” (211, 208-
09; cf. The Crowd 127). In “The Art of Political Conversion,” published in the Commentator 
in April 1911, Hulme warns his fellow Conservatives that to win back votes from the 
Liberals, they have to appeal to the electorate‟s “instincts,” for, as he puts it, “it is absolutely 
no use trying to convert them by means of hard facts” (214). Thus William Samuel Lilly‟s 
Conservative treatise Idola Fori, Hulme argues in this article, may be “perfectly sound … it 
contains the exact truth, and … it exactly represents my own position,” but it fails to appeal 
to the people because it has “no propaganda qualities ... It is sense, but it is not „catching‟” 
(215). Following Le Bon and Wallas, therefore, Hulme stresses in both essays on “Political 
Conversion” the need of using “catch-words” that evoke mental images as a method of 
political persuasion (cf. The Crowd 100; Human Nature in Politics 40-41). 
 
Although Hulme credits in “A Note on the Art of Political Conversion” the view of 
political conversion as an instinctive process to Le Bon and Wallas, the idea that instinct 
plays a vital function in humans‟ decision-making can also be found in Bergson‟s philosophy, 
specifically Bergson‟s suggestion in “The Soul and the Body” discussed in the previous 
chapter, according to which the intellect censors our experiences except the “practically 
useful” (qtd. in S. Schwartz, The Matrix of Modernism 28). Bergson is mentioned only once 
in Hulme‟s Commentator articles, but the significance of this solitary reference should not be 
underestimated. In “A Note on the Art of Political Conversion,” Hulme refers to Bergson as a 
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philosopher who, like Le Roy, Croce, Eucken and Simmel, understand “the intellect ... 
merely as a subtle and useful servant of the will, and of man‟s generally irrational vital 
instincts” (208). While Bergson does not discuss political conversion anywhere in his work, 
the implications of his critique of intellectualism on the formation of ideologies were noted 
by Georges Sorel, whose Reflections on Violence Hulme translated for publication in 1914. In 
Reflections on Violence, Sorel argues that “we do nothing great without the help of warmly-
coloured and clearly-defined images, which absorb the whole of our attention” (164-65). By 
utilising the power of language, Sorel maintains, it is possible to create “a body of images 
capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments,” adding in a footnote that “This is the 
„global knowledge‟ of Bergson‟s philosophy” (137).
105
 As I discussed in the previous 
chapter, in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” Hulme argues that Bergson‟s philosophy provides a 
basis for a theory of art, the “motive” of which “is a certain freshness of experience which 
breeds dissatisfaction with the conventional ways of expression because they leave out the 
individual quality of this freshness” (200). Moreover, in “A Lecture” Hulme emphasises the 
importance that words acting as images have on the recipient, a claim which, as analysed in 
Chapter 2, can be read through Bergson‟s suggestion in An Introduction to Metaphysics that 
images are more effective than conceptual language. The task with which Hulme charges the 
Conservative propagandist in his essays on politics parallels both the steps taken by the artist 
in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” and by the modern poet in “A Lecture”; more importantly, his 
analysis of the process of conversion echoes Sorel‟s appropriation of Bergson‟s metaphysics. 
A brief examination of Hulme‟s proposals for the renewal of the Conservative dialect 
confirms this point.  
 
                                                 
105 Sorel makes a similar point in La Décomposition du Marxisme 252. In Reflections on Violence, Sorel also 
acknowledges the influence of Le Bon on his thought, describing Le Bon as “one of the most original physicists 
of our time” (152). For an enlightening discussion of Bergson‟s influence on Sorel, see Stanley, Introduction to 
From Georges Sorel 47-54. 
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In “The Art of Political Conversion,” Hulme maintains that words gradually lose their 
meaning and effect, arguing that it is compulsory to continuously enrich language with new 
and fresh metaphors. The significant difference between this essay and his discussions in “A 
Lecture” and “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” is that the emphasis now is not on poetry but on the 
language used by Conservatives: 
 
I am firmly convinced that just at the present time Conservative thought has come to an 
important crisis. The old set of catch-words in which its philosophy embodied itself are 
now absolutely worked out. They now appeal only to the older generation, to the new 
they appear to be mere date nothings...  
The Socialist is mistaken in thinking that Banbury is saying nothing, that there is 
nothing behind the phrases, „rights of property‟, „for king and country‟. On the 
contrary, there is, and it is exactly what I or any other young Conservative holds. But I 
should never dream of expressing myself by those phrases...  
The phrases feel dead in exactly the same way as clichés in bad poetry do. It is only by 
a certain unexpectedness of phrasing that a certain feeling of conviction is carried over, 
and you feel that the man was actually describing something at first hand ... The point 
is, that any metaphor or image in time becomes conventionalised, and so ceases to 
convey any real concrete meaning. (215-16) 
 
For the same reasons that he disapproves of Lilly‟s Idola Fori, Hulme rejects in “The Art of 
Political Conversion” the language used by Conservative spokespeople, such as Sir Frederick 
Banbury, the ardent anti-statist and champion of the old order: it is dated and thus fails to 
appeal to the young intellectuals.
106
 What is significant is that in doing so, Hulme advocates 
                                                 
106 On Banbury‟s brand of Conservatism, see Cooper 30 and Reid 149-69. 
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the use of “fresh” and “unexpected” images in Conservative rhetoric, thus essentially 
restating the demand he makes in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” for “Creation of imagery to 
force language to convey over this freshness of impression” in a different context (201; 
emphasis in original). He makes a similar point in “Theory and Practice,” where he argues 
that Conservatives should communicate their ideas in a “direct instinctive way,” explaining 
what he means by “direct instinctive way” by turning to Keats, as in “Bergson‟s Theory of 
Art.” Drawing attention to Leigh Hunt‟s anecdotal account of the effect that Spenser‟s poem 
“Faery Queene” had on the young Keats, Hulme states:  
 
When he came to the phrase about „sea shouldering whales‟, Keats jumped in a state of 
wild enthusiasm about the epithet „sea shouldering‟. Why? ... Simply for this reason, 
that the choice of an epithet like this at once communicated in a kind of direct 
instinctive way to Keats the feeling that Spenser was not merely decorating his story 
with the conventional adornments in the way of animals that the age approved of … but 
that he had in his mind a distinct visual sensation, a real personal vision of the thing he 
was describing, and this resulted in the choice of the unusual epithet in order to convey 
this feeling over directly. (227-28)  
 
Redeploying his analysis of language in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art” (cf. 201), Hulme argues 
in his essays on politics for a reform of Conservative Party propaganda, proposing a change 
in the vocabulary used by Conservatives. In “The Art of Political Conversion,” he states that 
this was one of the lessons to be learnt from France, where Maurras and his circle had been 
successful in the 1890s in “restating an old dialect,” and therefore in giving the “French 
Conservative party” “fresh expression” (217). The result of this “restating” of Conservative 
“dialect,” Hulme maintains in “A Note on the Art of Political Conversion,” is that “L‟Action 
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Française has made it rather bête démodée to be a Socialist ... They serve their victim with 
the right kind of sauce” (210). Storer thought so too: “Papers like L‟Action Française, writers 
like Pierre Lassère [sic], and Charles Mauras [sic],” he had written weeks earlier, “have 
succeeded in gathering around them a group of young men who laugh at the old-fashioned 
dreams of Socialism with the quiet understanding of its power that can best be found in men 
who were themselves once among its supporters” (“The Conservative Ideal” 139). That was 
exactly what the Conservatives in Britain had to do. As well as pursuing a much more 
effective propaganda strategy, however, the reason the Action Française were so successful 
in mitigating their theories in Hulme‟s view, was because, as he puts it in “Balfour, Bergson 
and Politics,” Lasserre and Maurras “show … vivid interest in the theoretical basis of their 
position and … make an endeavour to find a thought-out consistent political philosophy” 
(164). Reforming the Conservative rhetoric, therefore, was not enough; what was needed if 
the Conservatives were to be successful in converting members of the electorate was a 
coherent, fully worked-out political philosophy. 
 
4. “Diremption” 
Hulme puts emphasis on the need of developing a coherent Conservative ideology in “The 
Art of Political Conversion,” where he suggests that an “ideal” would help the Conservative 
Party lure back the “young intellectual ... from the arms of the Fabian Society.” As he puts it: 
 
How was he to be converted? ... the peculiar type of motive which will move these 
people ... must be something rather abstract, something in the nature of a Utopia or an 
ideal. It is, then, quite ridiculous to attempt to meet them on a different plane entirely ... 
To be effective you have to meet one vague ideal by another vague ideal...  
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The problem is to find something which shall come under this category on the 
Conservative side. (214) 
 
The logic here is that a Conservative “ideal” would not only make it easier to recruit young 
intellectuals, but that it is equally important for the Conservatives to expose Socialism as a 
sham ideological position. Thus turning once again to developments in France, Hulme cites 
the “speech by Jaurès, which ... will become historic, as marking a turning-point in political 
tendencies” as an example of a strategy the Tories in Britain should follow. The reason why 
this socialist thinker‟s lecture was relevant here, Hulme purports, is because Jaurès 
recognised how an attack on “the dogmas on which the appeal of Socialism to the intellectual 
is based, the stock of ideas which they had never argued about,” is much more effective than 
“any mere attack on details,” making “the ground ... moving under their feet” (217-18). 
 
Hulme‟s suggested strategy in “The Art of Political Conversion” hides an obvious 
problem: if the formation of ideologies involves an unconscious process over which we have 
no control and all beliefs are instinctive, then how can Hulme claim to be able to uncover a 
false belief? In other words, what is it that enables him to determine which beliefs are false 
and which are not? Hulme acknowledges this problem in “A Note on the Art of Political 
Conversion,” where he states that “No one can escape from the law of mental nature ... We 
may be under the delusion that we are deciding a question from purely rational motives, but 
we never are” (209). He does not address it directly, however, and nor does Storer. Yet, 
despite his admission that he cannot have a detached point of view, Hulme does suggest that 
it is possible through careful examination to uncover the “theory” on which any view is 
based, describing in “A Note on the Art of Political Conversion” his own “change of mind on 
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the subject of Colonial Preference” (210). This is an important point, for it reveals a great 
deal about what Hulme takes to be a good method of reconversion: 
 
once I had got the theory out fairly and squarely before me, had seen its origin and 
history, its influence over me had gone. It was powerful because I really didn‟t know 
that it existed ... the histories I had been brought up on, while never stating this view as 
a theory, had yet so stated all events in our Colonial history as to convey it by 
suggestion. Always the English were shown as succeeding as by some vague natural 
genius for colonisation or something of that kind ... The people who did make definite 
plans, like the French ... and later the Germans, were always represented as failing...  
It took me years to get rid of the effects of this. For when an idea is put into your head 
in this indirect way, you are never conscious of its existence. It just silently colours all 
your views. (212) 
 
Hulme‟s point here is that it is only when one sees the “theory” behind a specific view or 
belief that its influence disappears.
107
 This possibility is granted by Le Bon and Wallas. 
According to Le Bon, a “general belief being little else than a fiction ... can only survive on 
the condition that it be not subjected to examination” (149-50). For Wallas, likewise, it is 
possible to discover “facts in the world around us” that are not based on “affection and 
instinct” through a process of “deliberate observation and analysis” (98). Neither the theory 
of Le Bon, nor Wallas‟ suggestion, are, however, viewed by Hulme as satisfactory. As he 
puts it in “A Note on the Art of Political Conversion,” “no one has given any connected 
theory of ... the conversion of the „intellectual‟, of the leisured middle-class wobbler” (209). 
                                                 
107 Hulme is enigmatic about the moment of his “conversion.” In “Art of Political Conversion” from April 1911, 
he refers to “the days when I was a Socialist,” claiming that he was “already converted” to Conservatism (214), 
while in “Bergson Lecturing” he describes himself as a “Tory by disposition” (155). In the notes and letters 
Hulme left behind, there is nothing that suggests such moment of conversion. As Ferguson argues, when Hulme 
is alluding to his own experiences, it is often for rhetorical reasons (102-03). 
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A more interesting theory of conversion than those of Le Bon and Wallas, and one with 
which Hulme seems to be in agreement, can be found in Sorel, who devised a method for 
simultaneously uncovering “illusions” and creating new ones. Unlike Le Bon and especially 
Wallas, who in Hulme‟s view “somehow leaves you with a suspicion in your mind that he 
does still think that the „intellectual‟ is in the position which Mill, in the age of naive belief in 
reason, imagined him to be” (209), Sorel approaches the question of ideological conversion 
from Bergson‟s “anti-intellectualist” perspective. 
 
In “Unity and Multiplicity,” Sorel argues that “language deceives us constantly as to the 
true nature of the relationships which exist between things,” thus arguing in this essay that 
“Before commencing a systematic critique of a system, there would often be a very real 
advantage in finding out the origin of the images which are frequently encountered in it” 
(253). Sorel explains the aim of this method in his Introduction to Reflections on Violence, an 
essay entitled “Letter to Daniel Halévy,” in which he writes of his hope of exposing what he 
terms the “myths” assisting ideological “utopias,” specifically the “myths” which are 
“founded on the legends of the Revolution” and which preserve “all their value as long as 
these legends remained unshaken” (31). Sorel elaborates on this myth-exposing method in 
“Materials for a Theory of the Proletariat,” now writing that: 
 
In order to study the most important phenomena of history, social philosophy is obliged 
to proceed to a „diremption,‟ to examine certain parts without taking into account all 
their connections with the whole; to determine in some way the nature of their activity 
by isolating them. When it has attained the most perfect knowledge in this way, social 




What Sorel calls “diremption” takes into account both the rational aspects of reality which are 
deducible through close observation, and the “irrational” aspects which are equally, if not 
more, important.
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 As Sorel goes on to argue in “Materials for a Theory of the Proletariat,” 
“Rather than representing things, this method produces symbols in which phenomena 
participate, sometimes in a rather obvious way, sometimes in a distant and complex way, 
impossible to define” (228). Once the less “obvious” phenomena are uncovered through 
“diremption”, Sorel maintains in “Materials for a Theory of the Proletariat,” they can then be 
analysed by reason: for “Reason should be prepared to use fully our constructive faculties 
which, after we have practiced „diremption,‟ can give us a symbolic knowledge of what 
history creates by means beyond our intelligence” (228). In this sense, “diremption,” as Sorel 
himself acknowledges, constitutes an elaboration of Bergson‟s method of intuition, according 
to which we can access the true nature of the world only through non-intellectual means. In 
“Letter to Daniel Halévy,” Sorel thus states that the great lesson from Bergson is that “The 
mind of man is so constituted that it cannot remain content with the mere observation of 
facts, but wishes to understand the inner reason of things” (24-25). This is the logic behind 
the argument in Reflections on Violence: the modern syndicalist movement must learn from 
the example of the French socialists in the nineteenth century who deliberately perpetrated 
“myths” based on the French Revolution, for, only with the creation of a “myth” can an 
ideology be truly effective (71, 135-37). The idea is that, after the political philosopher 
exercises “diremption,” he creates a “myth” which ensures that people always have 
something to strive after. In order to avoid falling into invalid reasoning – that is, claim that 
myths are all-powerful and also asserting that they could also be easily exposed – Sorel 
distinguishes in Reflections on Violence between “myths” and “utopias.” The difference is 
that, unlike “myths,” “utopias” can be overruled. Sorel thus describes “utopias” as “an 
                                                 
108 For an enlightening discussion of Sorel‟s method of diremption, see Gasiorek 154-55. Gasiorek argues that, 




intellectual product” and “the work of theorists,” as opposed to “myths” which are 
“expressions of a determination to act” (28). The ideas at the basis of “utopias” are not down 
to material or historical reasons, as are “myths,” but can be traced to purely literary conflicts; 
as Sorel argues in Illusions of Progress, believing otherwise “is an ideological and highly 
superficial explanation” (9). A “myth,” by contrast, is irrefutable; as Sorel argues in “Letter 
to Daniel Halévy,” a “myth” is “identical with the convictions of a group, being the 
expression of these convictions in the language of movement” and is thus “unanalysable into 
parts which could be placed on the plane of historical descriptions” (29). Ultimately, through 
“diremption,” Sorel is able to refute the “utopia” of democracy and, most crucially for him, 
put forward a theory for the creation of “the myth of the general strike” intended to ensure 
workers‟ radical and unswerving struggle (Reflections on Violence 135-37; cf. “Letter to 
Daniel Halévy” 24-31). 
 
In the Preface to his translation of Reflections on Violence, Hulme singles out as Sorel‟s 
most important contributions to political philosophy Sorel‟s account of how any ideology 
“naturally includes a system of sentiments” (247nb), as well as Sorel‟s suggestion that 
ideologies end up assuming the status of “pseudo-categories” (248; emphasis in original). 
Hulme explains that Sorel shows that ideologies “depend on certain fundamental attitudes of 
the mind, on unexpressed major premises,” adding that “The explanation of how these major 
premises get into the position of pseudo-categories goes a long way towards removing a man 
from their influence” (248; emphasis in original). Specifically, in the Preface Hulme is 
concerned with how Sorel analyses in Reflections on Violence the position of “liberal 
Socialists” (248). According to Sorel, Hulme argues, there are “two distinct elements” in “a 
movement like Socialism ... the working-class movement ... and the system of ideas which 
goes with it.” The socialist movement consists of the workers‟ movement and the democratic 
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ideology is associated with socialism: “If we call one (I) and the other (W), (I+W) will be the 
whole movement” (246). The problem with the “democrat,” Hulme writes in the Preface, is 
that “When ... the denial of the connection between I and W forces the separate existence of 
(I) on his notice, he at once thinks of it, not as one possible ideology amongst others, but as 
an inevitable way of thinking” (247-48; emphasis in original). The lesson from Sorel for 
Hulme, therefore, is that “It is this notion of the necessary, the inevitable character of the 
democratic system of ideas, which is here the stumbling-block ... The ideas which underlie it 
appear to him to have the necessary character of categories” (248; emphasis in original). 
Translated into a theory of propaganda, Sorel shows that “All effective propaganda depends 
... on getting ... ideas away from their position „behind the eye‟ and putting them facing one 
as objects which we can then consciously accept or reject” (248). 
 
As we will now see, both Hulme and Storer use in their articles for the Commentator a 
method similar to Sorel‟s “diremption”. To use Sorel‟s terminology, in their attempt to 
reconvert the young Fabian intellectuals, Hulme and Storer penetrate into the “inner reason” 
of Liberalism; they expose the Liberal position as “utopia,” dismissing Liberal ideology as a 
“pseudo-category.” This is an important point, for insofar as Sorel‟s “diremption” is based on 
Bergson‟s intuitionist metaphysic, Hulme‟s and Storer‟s strategy of reconversion is revealed 
to be guided by Bergson‟s “anti-intellectualist” thesis.  
  
5. The creation of a Conservative ideology 
The main ideological force behind Liberalism, Storer and Hulme argue in the 
Commentator, is Progress, by which they mean the belief that humans have an inherent 
ability to expand their consciousness, grow their awareness and endlessly achieve better 
conditions of life. Storer, first, writes in his January 1911 essay for the Commentator that “So 
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completely does the conception of the word progress as meaning improvement seem to have 
imposed itself upon writers generally that it is almost a rarity to find it treated as meaning no 
more than change or motion,” complaining that “Progress is, in fact, a word that thrills them” 
(“The Romantic Conception of History” 170). A similar argument is put forward by Hulme. 
In “On Progress and Democracy” in August 1911, Hulme states that the “middle-class 
intellectual” is driven by “a belief in inevitable „Progress‟, the belief that,” he explains, “the 
forces of things are themselves making for good, and that so good will come even if things 
are left to themselves” (222). Hulme reiterates this view in “Theory and Practice” in 
November, now claiming that Progress is what allows the Fabians to demand the delegation 
of political power down to the “lower” classes, the idea being that, given sufficient education, 
everyone can progress and develop their consciousness (230). In tracing the belief in Progress 
behind Liberal reforms in “Theory and Practice,” Hulme is making an acute historical 
observation. Collini, Burrow and Freeden have all demonstrated how Liberals had been 
basing their proposals for social reform on an account of Progress since the late nineteenth 
century.
109
 Aware that the Liberals were using Progress to legitimise their social policies, 
both Hulme and Storer try in their articles to uncover the origins of Progress, ultimately 
refuting it by counteracting the Liberals‟ argument through appealing to history and science. 
In doing so, they took the first step towards creating a plausible and coherent set of beliefs for 
the Conservative Party. 
 
Storer and Hulme argue that Progress can be traced back to what Storer describes as the 
“orgy of Romanticism” that spread through Europe since about the nineteenth century (“The 
Romantic Conception of History” 170).
110
 According to Storer,  
 
                                                 
109 Collini 159-62; Burrow 29, 255; Freeden 48. 
110 Storer makes similar claims in “From Democratic Liberalism to Positive Conservatism” 68; “The 
Conservative Ideal” 139; and “The Stage Conservative and the Real One” 155. 
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Progress ... is the result of a Romantic Conception of History, the conception which is 
pleased to consider that the Middle Ages were barbarious, and that we can show some 
kind of advance in civilisation since the days of the Hellenic culture. It is the 
conception which believes that man is going to alter from inwards outwards, which 
imagines, with a credulity that really is sublime ... that something will be brought into 
the world that was not already there. (“The Romantic Conception of History” 170) 
 
In this article, Storer dates “Progress” back to the time of the “great Romantics – Rousseau, 
Chateaubriand, Hugo, Gautier, Michelet, Sand, De Musset, Dickens, Marx, Lassalle, Morris, 
Wagner, and where he writes of politics ... Shaw” (170). In “A Tory Philosophy,” Hulme 
maintains that “Progress” goes back to “Turgot and Condorcet, through Saint Simon, down to 
its present use by the Socialists” (239). Like Storer, however, Hulme purports that it is 
Rousseau in particular who has transformed “Progress” into a specific political ideology. As 
he writes in the Preface to Sorel‟s Reflections on Violence,  
 
All Romanticism springs from Rousseau, and the key to it can be found even in the first 
sentence of the Social Contract – „Man is born free, and he finds himself everywhere in 
chains.‟ In other words, man is by nature something wonderful, of unlimited powers, 
and if hitherto he has not appeared so, it is because of external obstacles and fetters, 
which it should be the main business of social politics to remove. (249) 
 
Rousseau‟s “optimistic and romantic view” of humans as essentially good, Hulme goes on, 
“leads naturally to the characteristic democratic doctrine of inevitable Progress” (251; 
emphasis in original. Cf. 212, 222-24, 230). The exact same idea features also in 
“Romanticism and Classicism,” where Hulme argues that the romantics “had been taught by 
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Rousseau that man was by nature good, that it was only bad laws and customs that had 
suppressed him,” also claiming that “This is what made them think that something positive 
could come out of disorder.” “Here is the root of romanticism,” Hulme concludes in 
“Romanticism and Classicism”: that “if you can so rearrange society by the destruction of 
oppressive order then these possibilities will have a chance and you will get Progress” (70). 
 
Identifying the teleological belief in Progress as the fundamental presupposition of 
Socialism, both Hulme and Storer refute it. A common Liberal argument in support of 
Progress was that evidence of uninterrupted social Progress could be found in history. As 
Collini demonstrates, this was a line of argument adopted by a long line of Liberal thinkers, 
including Spencer and Hobhouse (186). In “On Progress and Democracy,” Hulme offers a 
different interpretation of history to Spencer and Hobhouse, arguing that there is nothing in 
history that proves that civilisations continuously progress or that, indeed, they progress in 
the right direction. He therefore dismisses the Socialist belief in progress as an illusion. For, 
what history teaches us, Hulme argues, is that civilisations recur and are constant, which is 
why, for example, the “little Tuscan Republics” resemble the modern states (223). According 
to Hulme, evidence for this can be found in Flinders Petrie‟s study, which, as Hulme 
interprets it, shows that “civilisation is not constantly increasing, but a recurrent phenomena 
[sic]” (224). Petrie‟s observation thus demonstrates for Hulme that “arts pass from archaic 
simplicity through the perfection of the best period to the final decay.” More significantly, 
Petrie‟s study has implications for politics: 
 
What is the application of this to politics? Obviously, it sweeps right away that naïve 
belief in inevitable progress which enables the intellectual to welcome with enthusiasm 
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the sweeping away of all the checks on an uncontrolled democracy, a phenomena [sic] 
which otherwise his reason would compel him to detest. (224) 
 
Storer makes a similar point in “The Romantic Conception of History,” stating that “In 
literature and art, there is nothing that cannot be paralleled in antiquity.” Thus, for example, 
“Our Post-Impressionists,” Storer writes, “are no newer than the art of ancient Greece and 
Egypt and Assyria” (170). In another article in May 1911, Storer argues that this shows that 
“ideas can no more be destroyed than they can be created”; it also proves that “It is a piece of 
pure romanticism to believe that they can. What can happen to them is that they can be 
discredited, obscured, temporarily forgotten – and rescued” (“A Basis for Nationalism” 426). 
 
According to Hulme and Storer, evidence that discredits “Progress” can also be found in 
science, specifically the theory of evolution of the Dutch geneticist Hugo de Vries. Historians 
of ideas have noted how liberal thinkers had been using evolutionary biology as proof of the 
“fact” of Progress since the time of Spencer and Mill (Collini 161; Burrow 196). Spencer, for 
example, uses the laws of evolution in The Man Versus the State to argue against the 
interference of the state in the life of individuals, the free actions of whom Spencer describes 
as “the vital principle of social progress” (181; cf. Studies in Sociology 434). Counteracting 
Spencer‟s argument, Storer argues that De Vries‟ mutation theory proves that “The changes 
in species are effected, not by infinitely subtle alterations, but by leaps, and once a species is 
fixed, it remains fixed” (“The Romantic Conception of History” 171). Hulme echoes Storer‟s 
argument in “Theory and Practice,” “A Tory Philosophy,” as well as in “Romanticism and 
Classicism.” Thus in “Romanticism and Classicism” he credits De Vries for showing that 
“each news species comes into existence, not gradually by the accumulation of small steps, 
but suddenly in a jump, a kind of sport, and that once in existence it remains absolutely 
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fixed” (61), explaining in “Theory and Practice” that the implication of De Vries‟ theory for 
politics is that “It is ... no good planning out any state society whose successful working 
would depend on the assumption that the percentage of intelligent and disinterested people 
can be indefinitely increased” (230; cf. 242-43). 
 
As well as refuting Liberal ideology by challenging its most fundamental premise, Hulme 
and Storer are intend on giving the Conservative Party a positive and coherent ideology. It is 
to this effect that they introduce in their discussion in the Commentator a distinction between 
“romantic” and “classic” politics, linking romanticism to the Liberal position and associating 
classicism with Conservatism. Even though Hulme is widely regarded by critics as the first to 
have refuted political “romanticism” by opposing it with “classicism” in Britain, it is in fact 
Storer who first used the terms of the opposition in a political sense.
111
 On 25 January 1911, 
Storer thus announces in the Commentator that “a classical reaction against a century of 
Romanticism gone mad in art, letters and politics is beginning to arise” (“The Romantic 
Conception of History” 170). Describing Socialism as “a typical piece of Romanticism in its 
conception of the whole State, as subordinated to the proletariat part of the State” (170), 
Storer goes on to define “classicism” in another article in February as the “moment for 
enthusiasms over things as they are rather than [the] worship and homage to the goddess of 
things as they never can be” (“On Revolution and Revolutionaries” 202), adding that “the 
enthusiasms of educated people must be transferred from the revolutionary to the 
conservative side, from the Romantic to the Classic” (202). Soon afterwards, Hulme began to 
employ this distinction himself. In “Anti-Romanticism and Original Sin,” a lecture delivered 
to the Heretics Society in Cambridge, probably in March 1911, and which, according to some 
                                                 
111 See Martin, New Age under Orage 221 and Schuchard, “Eliot and Hulme in 1916” 1085. J. M. Kennedy 
drew similar parallels between romanticism and Liberalism and classicism and Conservatism to Storer, but, as 
far as I know, Kennedy‟s first recorded use of “romanticism” and “classicism” in a political sense is in an article 
in the New Age published some eight months after Storer‟s article appeared in the Commentator. Cf. Kennedy, 
“Tory Philosophy” 342. 
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critics, must be understood as the basis of “Romanticism and Classicism” (Ferguson 112; 
Howarth 32), Hulme argues that the common idea behind the Liberal position and 
romanticism is their shared belief in Progress. More crucially, Hulme sets “romanticism” 
against “classicism.” Ogden, who was present at Hulme‟s lecture in Cambridge, wrote this 
report in the Cambridge Magazine: 
 
Mr T. E. Hulme ... emphasised the importance of certain words – words of power – in 
the formation of prejudices and ideals, and the general clouding of our judgment ... It 
never occurred to the Classicists to have any illusions about Progress ... Let no-one 
think he denied Progress in the sense of change. Obviously there is change; but what he 
did most certainly deny was the particular kind of Progress which was responsible for 
the particular kind of emotion characteristic of the professed Romantics of the „New 
Heaven and a New Earth‟ sort. (“Original Sin – and Mr T. E. Hulme” 201) 
 
The belief in “The New Heaven and the New Earth,” which was mocked in the Commentator 
in 1910 (cf. 10 June 1910: 50), is cast by Hulme in his lecture at Cambridge as the defining 
difference between the “Classicists” and those who believe in “Progress.” Unlike the Liberals 
who are seduced by the emotional rhetoric of progress-talk, the “Classicists,” Hulme 
maintains, recognise human limitations; and while they accept Progress as an evolutionary 
fact, “Classicists” do not postulate it as inevitable, or necessarily a good thing. 
 
In “A Tory Philosophy,” published in the Commentator in April 1911, Hulme associates 
“classicism” with Conservatism in an even more explicit way that in “Anti-Romanticism and 
Original Sin.” He asserts that “behind the opposed attitudes” of Conservatism and Socialism 
“lie two contrasted sets of prejudices and sentiments, two different points of view as to the 
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nature of man, which I am calling the romantic and the classical” (234). The “romantic” 
position, Hulme writes in “A Tory Philosophy,” corresponds to the view that “man is rather 
something wonderful, and that so far he has been prevented from exhibiting any wonderful 
qualities by ... restrictions of order and discipline” (235). In contrast, the “classical” point of 
view postulates that “Man is by his very nature essentially limited ... incapable of attaining 
any kind of perfection” (234). What is significant here is that Hulme makes clear that in using 
“classicism” as a keyword, he is only trying to consolidate all the beliefs associated with 
Conservatism. In introducing the opposition, he thus argues in “A Tory Philosophy,” his 
intention is “simply ... to show the connection between the sets of adjectives one uses to 
describe the difference when it becomes more concrete.” The difference Hulme has in mind 
is that between Conservatism and the Liberal or socialist position, which he now argues is 
best represented by the antinomies “Constancy and Progress,” “Order, Authority and 
Liberty,” “Equality and Hierarchy,” and “Nationalism and Universalism.” These “contrasts,” 
he maintains, “can be shown to follow logically from the fundamental difference of attitude I 
started with,” by which he means the opposition between “romanticism” and “classicism” 
(239-40). Seen in the light of the demand he makes in his essays on political conversion for 
the Conservative Party to develop a “thought-out attitude,” “A Tory Philosophy” becomes the 
place where Hulme has finally presented the coherent philosophical attitude for Conservatism 
which he wanted.  
 
By describing Conservatism as Classicism, Storer and Hulme are able to present the 
policies of the Conservative Party as diametrically opposite to the Liberal-Romantic position, 
and thus answer the Commentator‟s calls for a “decided distinction” between Conservatives 
and Liberals and for a “clear and defined” ideology (“The Question” 2). What separates the 
Liberals from the Conservatives specifically, according to the Romantic/Classical distinction, 
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is their different understanding of human nature. Unlike the “theoretical Radical,” Storer 
writes in “The Stage Conservative and the Real One,”  
 
The real Conservative ... remembers that a similar condition of things has happened 
before, that in any organised society constant fluxes are inevitable, that the success of 
some naturally means the non-success of others … the genuine Conservative ... not 
only makes the best of things as they are, but accepts with joy the limitations of man. 
(155) 
 
Hulme also argues that their view regarding human nature is what sets apart the Liberals from 
the Conservatives. In “On Progress and Democracy,” he thus states: 
 
The Conservative does not believe in progress, of this kind at any rate. He believes that 
man is constant, and that the number and types of the possible forms of society are also 
constant…  
The Radical ... is the exact opposite of this. A good state of society, I take him to 
believe, cannot depend on what he would be pleased to call the artificial aid of 
restraints. It lies in the nature of things in themselves, and is a natural growth. There is 
a mysterious thing called Progress which is making for good. (222) 
 
In contrast to Liberals, Conservatives, in Hulme‟s view, acknowledge that human nature is 
constant, recognising that humans‟ potential is limited.  
 
For Hulme, nothing represents more accurately and more concisely the “classic” or 
Conservative attitude towards the world than the dogma of Original Sin. Much has been 
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written about Hulme‟s use of the doctrine of Original Sin, with some critics speculating that 
Hulme was using it in its religious sense, and others simply expressing their bafflement at the 
occurrence of this idea in his writings.
112
 Yet in this context, it is clear that Hulme uses it in a 
political sense, to encapsulate the “pessimism” of the “classical” worldview which refuses to 
see humans as perfect creatures, a worldview he associates with Conservatism. Hulme‟s first 
known use of the term is in Ogden‟s report of the “Heretics” lecture. Based on Ogden‟s 
report, Hulme seems to have cited “Original Sin” in defence of the idea of human 
“constancy” and against ideas held by “Progressives from Rousseau to H.G. Wells.” The crux 
of the lecture‟s argument, according to Ogden, is that with all the rhetoric about “progress,” 
“it is easy to delude oneself into denying the truths of the doctrine of Original Sin amidst the 
mess of hypocritical Utopias, which ignore the principle of the constancy of Man” (“Original 
Sin – and Mr T. E. Hulme” 201). Hulme mentions “original sin” again in “A Tory 
Philosophy,” now explicitly casting it as the defining characteristic of the modern 
Conservative. For the Conservative, he argues in “A Tory Philosophy,” “Man is by his very 
nature essentially limited and incapable of nothing extraordinary”; moreover, “He is 
incapable of attaining any kind of perfection, because, either by nature, as the result of 
original sin, or the result of evolution, he encloses within him certain antinomies” (234). 
 
By reducing the Liberal position to the “romantic” belief in Progress and also equating 
Conservatism with “classicism,” Storer and Hulme have devised a complete Conservative 
reconversion strategy. On the one hand, the Liberal position is exposed as a “typical piece of 
romanticism,” as Storer describes it in “The Romantic Conception of History” (170). There is 
nothing inherently good – or true – in Liberalism; it is simply a bi-product of a more general 
current of thought, based on an inaccurate interpretation of history and science. On the other 
                                                 
112 See Roberts, T. E. Hulme 134; Kishler 96-106; Brooker 62; L. B. Williams 94; and Levenson 84. 
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hand, by showing how the Conservative position corresponds to a diametrically opposite 
worldview – “classicism” – Storer and Hulme give the Conservative party what the 
Commentator argued it needed most: a solid and coherent system of beliefs. As Hulme puts it 
in “A Tory Philosophy,” the value of the term “classicism” is that “supposing it is true, it 
does join up together in some kind of logical sequence all the epithets that one naturally uses 
in expressing a certain attitude, such as „order‟, „discipline‟, „tradition‟, and the rest of it” 
(235). In more ways than one, then, Storer‟s and Hulme‟s distinction between Romanticism 
and Classicism emerged as part of a topical discussion in 1911 concerning the future 
direction of the Conservative party in England. That the opposition was originally employed 
as part of a call for a plausible conversion strategy for the Conservative party in England is 
important in two regards. First, it complicates the view that Hulme was “flirting” with the 
politics of the French radical Right. As I will now show, despite borrowing many ideas from 
the “classicists” Lasserre and Maurras, Hulme‟s politics is much closer to mainstream 
Conservatism than to the Action Française or to other proponents of the “radical Right.” 
Secondly, Storer‟s and Hulme‟s distinction in the Commentator clarifies Hulme‟s argument 
in “Romanticism and Classicism,” paying attention to the fact that, as Hulme emphasises 
himself in the lecture, “classic” is primarily a political term. I consider the thesis of 
“Romanticism and Classicism” in the final section of this chapter. 
  
6. Two kinds of classicism: the Commentator and the Action Française 
While Hulme‟s and Storer‟s understanding of romanticism and classicism as two opposing 
political philosophies was fairly original in the Britain of 1911-12, in France, Maurras and 
Lasserre, the two most prominent members of the Action Française group, had been 
campaigning for “classicism” in politics since the turn of the century. In L‟Enquête sur la 
monarchie (1900) and L‟Avenir de l‟intelligence (1905), Maurras rallies against 
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“romanticism,” an all-encompassing and deliberately vague term which Maurras associates 
with everything that he thinks of as disorderly – in arts, philosophy, religion and politics.
113
 
Maurras specifically vilifies Rousseau, whom he sees as the chief defender of the foreign 
romantic (and republican) ideas of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. In his usual xenophobic 
fashion, he derides Rousseau as a “Genevan vagabond” and a “homeless individual,” blaming 
Rousseau for making romanticism a force in politics (qtd. in Curtis 84).
114
 According to 
Maurras, romanticism gives a “theology of the individual,” which he sees as a threat to social 
and political order (qtd. in Sutton 22). He also argues that the “romantic” democratic idea of 
majority rule is “ridiculous in its origin, incompetent in practice, and pernicious in its effects” 
(qtd. in Gwynn 23), and that “government by the majority,” as he puts it in La Démocratie 
religieuse, is “irréalisable” (82). As a remedy for the advent of foreign romantic democracy, 
Maurras champions values that he describes as “classical”: in politics, a monarch to replace 
the individualism that has ruled France since 1789 and “protective and necessary 
inequalities” (qtd. in Tannenbaum 67); in art and literature, pre-Revolution “classicism” to 
combat away the “barbarian” influences and signal the return to the art and literature of 
medieval Provencal France. Like Maurras, Lasserre also criticises Romanticism. In Le 
romantisme français (1907), Lasserre berates the eudemonism (“eudémonisme lâche”), 
individualism (“psychique de l‟individu”) and the sentimentalism (“chimerisme sentimental”) 
of romanticism (311), tracing all these characteristics, like Maurras, to Rousseau. 
Romanticism, according to Lasserre, disregards the fact that humans can only prosper in 
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prophetism, the God of the Jews, Bergson “the Scottish Jew,” as well as Protestants, the “franc-maçons” and all 
“métèques,” a neologism Maurras devised to refer to all those who were not French. On Maurras‟ xenophobia, 
see Curtis 61 and Nolte 139. There is no evidence that either Storer or Hulme embraced Maurras‟ xenophobia. 
Hulme, in particular, reacts angrily to comments made disputing Bergson‟s “Frenchness.” Thus, when Gustav 
Hübener, a German reader of the New Age, endorsed Anatole France‟s rejection of Bergson on the grounds that 
he was not truly French, Hulme retorted that “All this racial gossip about philosophers is a little tedious” 
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ordered political environments (17-18), arguing that Rousseau is naive in choosing to believe 
in an ideal world where individuals are free to organise themselves (340; 71-74). Ultimately, 
Lasserre argues, Rousseau‟s romantic politics is based on a false belief in Progress (537), 
with Lasserre contending that Rousseau‟s views follow from the rejection of “le dogme du 
péché original [doctrine of original sin]” (325; cf. 16, 263-364) and proposing in place of this 
romantic interpretation of politics an “esprit classique” (475). 
 
As already mentioned, both Storer and Hulme express in the Commentator their 
admiration for the success Maurras and Lasserre had in France in “restating an old dialect,” 
as Hulme describes the propaganda methods of the Action Française in “The Art of Political 
Conversion” (217; cf. Storer, “The Conservative Ideal” 139). While in Storer‟s articles in the 
Commentator there is only this one solitary reference to Maurras and Lasserre, Hulme praises 
the Action Française on various occasions in his writings, admitting in “Romanticism and 
Classicism” that he “was very much in sympathy” with the anti-Romanticism of Lasserre and 
Maurras (60; cf. 164, 210, 217, 234, 251). A quick glance at Hulme‟s and Storer‟s articles in 
the Commentator shows that there are obvious similarities between Maurras‟ and Lasserre‟s 
classicism and Hulme‟s and Storer‟s version. Like Maurras and Lasserre, for example, Hulme 
and Storer side against the individualism of socialism, while, as their opposition to the Lords 
Reform Bill demonstrates, they are in agreement with Maurras‟ conviction that hereditary 
privileges are necessary for the function of the state.
115
 More importantly, both Hulme and 
Storer argue, like Maurras and Lasserre, that the democratic demand for majority rule is 
based on a false belief in Progress.
116
 While the majority of critics interpret Hulme‟s politics 
as heavily influenced by the “classicist” values of these French thinkers, however, on close 
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inspection it becomes clear that there are significant differences between the “classicist” 
programme of Maurras and Lasserre and the “classicism” advocated by Hulme and Storer in 
the Commentator.
117
 Partly, this is because Hulme‟s and Storer‟s version of Conservatism 
cannot possibly include the Franco-centric classicism of the Action Française or its anti-
Protestantism.
118
 Yet, Hulme and Storer hold fundamentally different ideas to Maurras and 
Lasserre about how “classicism” should be applied in politics. The classicism which Hulme 
and Storer propose is not metaphysical in the sense that it is for Maurras, nor is it apocalyptic, 
like it is for Lasserre. To explain how the classicism of the Action Française can be said to be 
“metaphysical” and “apocalyptic,” it is necessary to turn to Maurras‟ description of France as 
a “goddess,” and Lasserre‟s discussion of the doctrine of Original Sin.  
 
Unlike Hulme and Storer, Maurras is not satisfied with the hierarchical distribution of 
powers guaranteed by a strong House of Lords or similar. Rather, Maurras‟ aim, as he 
expresses it in Romantisme et révolution, is for a unification of reason and emotion under 
“Déesse France”:  
 
For those who think naturalistically but who wish to bring order into their thinking, a 
Goddess France presents none of the difficulties inherent in other formulas. It satisfies 
reason, for, since it represents the fatherland, it resides, as Sophocles would say, in the 
great laws of the world. Yet this god who is so rational is by no means abstract. One 
sees and touches France. It has a body, it has a soul: its history, its arts, its charming 
natural beauties, the magnanimous society of its heroes. But since the goddess may 
                                                 
117 See, for example, Levenson 85-87; Robinson 107-08; and Carr, “T. E. Hulme and the „Spiritual Dread of 
Space‟” 101. 
118 Despite declaring himself an atheist, Maurras supported Catholicism on the grounds that “All our favourite 
ideas – order, tradition, discipline, hierarchy, authority, continuity, unity, work, family, corporatism, 
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Arnal 20; emphasis in original). On Maurras‟ anti-Protestantism, see Arnal 20-23 and Nolte 138-39. 
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perish, she appeals to our devotion; and since her superhuman life may nevertheless be 
extended infinitely, she shares in the eternal majesty … Among such diverse spirits, 
only one good could exist: the cult of the fatherland. (qtd. in Nolte 103-04) 
 
While it is easy to imagine how Hulme would object to Maurras‟ rhetoric here, a more 
significant difference between his and Maurras‟ brand of classicism emerges, however, which 
has to do with the metaphysic implied in Maurras‟ nationalism. As Nolte explains, Maurras‟ 
nationalism can be described as “metaphysical” in that it “established itself in a vacuum 
which was once filled with metaphysical convictions regarding the absolute”; according to 
Maurras‟ definition of France as “goddess,” Nolte argues, “the patrie becomes the final 
absolute, thus simultaneously satisfying the age-old need for worship and the modern desire 
for security and demonstrability” (103). Sutton makes a similar point to Nolte, stating that 
despite Maurras‟ vocal opposition to the teleology of Comte‟s “natural laws,” the 
“fatherland” becomes in Maurras‟ nationalist classicism the absolute end towards which all 
French people must gear (85-86). This is also true of Lasserre‟s version of Classicism. 
Robinson correctly points out that Lasserre‟s appropriation of Nietzsche‟s “paralysis of the 
will” in Le Romantisme français transforms Lasserre‟s anti-romanticism into an advocacy of 
a model of a Hegelian government, whereby the subjects‟ common will is embodied in the 




In Storer‟s and Hulme‟s classicism there is no place for the “metaphysical” State 
advocated by Maurras and Lasserre. Thus, even though Storer emphasises the important role 
that the King and the aristocracy have to play in preserving the Empire, he opposes the 
“dream of a highly centralised state” for fear that, as he explains, it might result in a 
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160 
 
“morbidly self-conscious state” (“The „All-British Shopping Week‟ and Other Matters” 
327).
120
 In doing so, Storer reiterates the common right-wing position which treats the 
organised welfare state with suspicion, yet, he also argues for what he describes as a “realist” 
interpretation of politics: “Foregoing absolute values, either an absolutely right or an 
absolutely wrong, to that we adhere” (327). Hulme also insists that the state should not 
assume an “absolute” status, maintaining in “On Progress and Democracy” that the state 
should always be “independent of the people governed,” which is why he insists on a strong 
House of Lords (220). In “On Progress and Democracy” Hulme rejects what he calls 
“unrestrained” democracy (220-22) in favour of a democracy with restraining or controlling 
powers. In his view, discipline and order are necessary in political organisation; as he puts it, 
“There must be a hierarchy, a subordination of the parts, just as there must be in any other 
organisation” (220). Discipline and order, however, as Hulme goes on to argue in “On 
Progress and Democracy,” would only ensure, not hinder, the harmonious cooperation 
between the various parts of the state: for, “History shows us that it is only by the action of 
certain checks that a democratic State can continue to exist in a healthy condition” (220). 
Hulme‟s version of controlled or restrained democracy is built on the model of the United 
States‟ Constitution, which distributes powers between two Chambers, and which Hulme 
describes as a “prominent example” of a Constitution that “regulates” democracy by 
imposing restraints on it, as “its Senate,” Hulme notes, “is the strongest Second Chamber in 
existence” (221). The invocation of the United States Constitution in “On Progress and 
Democracy” is significant in understanding how Hulme‟s politics differs from that of 
Maurras and Lasserre. As various historians have pointed out, the American Constitution is 
“conservative” in the sense that it is based on the supposition that humans are imperfect.
121
 In 
one of the Federalist Papers, James Madison thus argues that any government must be “a 
                                                 
120 Storer expresses Imperialistic sentiments in “The Romantic Conception of History” 171, “Our Saviours” 140, 
and “The Evil of Democracy” 307. 
121 See Gray 33; Allen and Cloonan 55; and Muller, ed. 146. 
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reflection on human nature,” adding that, owing to human nature, “external controls” and 
“auxiliary precautions” are necessary. Ultimately, the aim of the American Constitution is to 
minimise the agency of different powers of government. “Were this principle rigorously 
adhered to,” Madison concludes Federalist Paper 51, “it would require that all the 
appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be 
drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no 
communication whatever with one another” (319-20). According to Hulme, the American 
model works because it ensures a “centre of authority ... to a certain extent independent of the 
people governed” (220). This separation of powers cancels the possibility of populist 
decisions, while also guaranteeing that, as Hulme states in “On Progress and Democracy,” 
“The wielders of authority must have a tenure which, while it may depend partially, must not 
depend entirely upon their popularity with the governed” (221). In stark contrast to the 
“metaphysical” State envisaged by Maurras and Lasserre, Hulme does not demand a return to 
a pre-Romantic (meaning pre-French Revolution) state in politics, but rather advocates the 
preservation of institutions, specifically the powerful House of Lords, and thus the 
continuation of constitutional monarchy.  
 
In this sense, Hulme‟s politics is also not apocalyptic. That is, Hulme does not desire a 
new (or renewed) classicism. Because humans are limited creatures, any hope for victory of 
humanity over external and internal limitations, something which Hulme sees as the 
fundamental supposition of the Liberal belief in Progress, must be an illusion. As already 
suggested, the idea that humans are imperfect is what lies behind Hulme‟s use of the doctrine 
of Original Sin. This Augustinian notion is also evoked by Lasserre, and according to 
Robinson it is through the writings of Lasserre that we can understand best how Hulme uses 
Original Sin in his politics (110). There is a distinct difference between Lasserre‟s and 
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Hulme‟s use of the doctrine however, which Robinson fails to recognise. Lasserre discusses 
Original Sin in Le romantisme française, where it is used as part of his attack on the French 
Revolution. Citing Michelet‟s account of the Revolution as primarily a reaction against the 
dogma of “original sin,” Lasserre argues that it is time to restore the belief in Original Sin 
and, in so doing, restore “les institutions religieuses, politiques et sociales de l‟Europe [the 
religious, political and social European institutions]” (325). In investing in the doctrine of 
Original Sin his hopes for political renewal, Lasserre is using Original Sin in a similar way to 
Sorel. Sorel‟s discussion of Original Sin in Illusions of Progress and in “Letter to Daniel 
Halévy” is instructive here, for it shows how Lasserre (and Sorel) differ from Hulme in their 
respective uses of Original Sin. Like Hulme and Lasserre, Sorel casts Original Sin as the 
antithesis of the “optimistic” belief in Progress. From the Renaissance through to the Jesuits, 
the “industrial civilization” and the modern bourgeoisie, Sorel argues in Illusions of Progress, 
runs an “optimism” that is characteristic of the “aristocratic” belief that “permits the 
enjoyment of the good things today in good conscience without worrying about tomorrow‟s 
difficulties” (21; cf. 101). He makes a similar point in “Letter to Daniel Halévy,” here 
explaining that the “people of the West” do not discuss Original Sin because they are 
preoccupied with the sense of “optimism” which they inherited from the ancient Greeks and 
which “probably arose in the rich and commercial urban populations who were able to regard 
the world as a gigantic shop full of excellent things that could satisfy their greed” (12). 
Unlike Hulme, however, who invokes Original Sin in support of his argument about human 
limitations, Sorel argues in Illusions of Progress that the “heroic” qualities currently 
suppressed by democratic “optimism” can guarantee progress (48). In contrast to both Sorel 
and Lasserre, Hulme uses Original Sin not as part of a revolutionary programme, but, on the 
contrary, against it: for Original Sin is in Hulme‟s view the reason why we should all accept 
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the limiting and restricting parliamentary institutions and hierarchical organisation of the 
state.  
 
Although Blanton rightly notes that the doctrine of Original Sin as expounded by Marx, 
Proudhon and Maurras is revolutionary (199), Hulme is using Original Sin in his essays in a 
radically different way. The doctrine of Original Sin has been used by many conservative 
thinkers in England throughout the years, who have alluded to the truth of Original Sin in 
defence of their beliefs, namely, the idea that humans are imperfect – at a biological, 
emotional and cognitive level – and that progress is neither inevitable nor necessarily a good 
thing. As Muller writes:  
 
Conservatives typically contend that human moral imperfection leads men to act badly 
when they act upon their uncontrolled impulses, and that they require the restraints and 
constraints imposed by institutions as a limit upon subjective impulse. Conservatives 
thus are skeptical of attempts at „liberation‟: they maintain that liberals over-value 
freedom and autonomy, and that liberals fail to consider the social conditions that make 




This view of human nature and politics, Muller observes, is, in turn grounded in the doctrine 
of “original sin,” which, even though a religious doctrine, is most of the times argued on 
entirely secular grounds (10). For Quinton, too, the doctrine is central in the work of all the 
influential British Conservatives, even if some, such as, for example, Hooker, Hyde, Johnson, 
Burke and Coleridge, use it in a more “religious” way than others – Saville, Halifax, St. John 
and Hume (10, 14). As the contemporary political philosopher John Gray argues, the doctrine 
                                                 
122 A similar point is made by Scruton, who states that whereas “The liberal seeks to emancipate the individual 
from authority, the conservative seeks to protect authority from individual rebellion” (Introduction to 
Conservative Texts 9). 
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of Original Sin has been used by generations of conservative thinkers, who understood 
politics “as a way of coping with the fact of human imperfection.” For Gray, this is what 
guarantees this brand of conservatism its moderation: for, conservatism becomes aggressive 
only when it embraces the “pursuit of Utopia,” a characteristic which Gray finds at the heart 
of neo-conservatism (32). This is not to say that Hulme is not “aggressive” in his defence of 
the preservation of the powers of the House of Lords – his declared sympathy, however 
tentative, with the Action Française suggests otherwise. The point, rather, is that Hulme‟s use 
of Original Sin, and its implications for politics, differ significantly from the way the doctrine 
is utilised by Lasserre. 
 
The difference between Hulme‟s Conservatism and Lasserre‟s Classicism is also made 
clear by Hulme‟s reluctance to agree with Lasserre over Bergson‟s theories. While the 
majority of critics maintain that Hulme‟s meeting with Lasserre marks a turning point in his 
thought, signalling the beginning of his “authoritarian” phase, a close examination of 
Hulme‟s report of the meeting with Lasserre in “Mr. Balfour, Bergson and Politics” reveals 
that Hulme disagrees in a very important way with Lasserre‟s interpretation of Bergson. In 
April 1911, on his way back from Bologna, Hulme travelled to Paris where he met Lasserre 
(Ferguson 88). Reporting his conversation with Lasserre in the New Age in November in “Mr. 
Balfour, Bergson and Politics,” he uses the occasion to also give a concise account of the 
Action Française‟s main ideas. As he explains, the “intellectual discipline” behind the 
ideology of the Action Française is that “laws can be drawn by induction from the 
experiences of history or by deduction from the elementary knowledge that any man may 
have of human nature and the exigencies of life in society.” Against Progress and the idea 
that “man is good,” the Action Française, Lasserre told Hulme, supported the thesis that 
“there are such things as necessary laws governing societies, and more particularly that these 
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laws can be discovered from past history.” One way in which the “progressives” tried to 
justify their beliefs in Lasserre‟s view was by employing Bergsonian phraseology to refute 
the idea that “there are such things as necessary laws governing societies, and more 
particularly that these laws can be discovered from past history” (164). According to Hulme‟s 
report, Lasserre explained:  
 
If we ask why, we are told that Bergson has now proved that Time is real – that is, that 
the present moment is a unique moment and can be paralleled by nothing in the past … 
If we point that history does or does not show us any prosperous, strong and conquering 
nation, which was at the same time a democracy, they retort, history would not be 
history if it were not change itself and perpetual novelty … To our judgments on 
politics in the name of reason interpreting experience, the Bergsonians oppose to us 
what they call „Life‟ – life which is always creating and always incalculable. (165; 
emphasis in original) 
 
“M. Lasserre,” Hulme concludes his report, “endeavoured to prove to me that Bergsonism 
was nothing but the last disguise of romanticism” (165).
123
 Hulme, who began writing for the 
Commentator eight months earlier, acknowledges in “Mr. Balfour, Bergson and Politics” that 
“If I thought this was true, I should be compelled to change my views considerably.” Despite 
bemoaning the fact that “phrases like „le continu‟, „élan vital‟, and „la durée réelle‟” were 
being employed by the Liberals indiscriminately, however, Hulme is extremely uneasy with 
the view that “Bergson ... stands for Democracy” (165, 163). Rather than endorsing 
Lasserre‟s idea that Bergson allowed a theory of democracy, he argues that “I can find a 
compromise for myself … by saying that I think time is real for the individual, but not for the 
                                                 
123 On Maurras‟ and Lasserre‟s rejection of Bergson, see Curtis 61 and E. Kennedy 80-87. 
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race.” While Bergson proves that it is possible through intuition to be free-creating 
individuals, Hulme seems to be saying here, it does not follow that an entire nation could 
possess free will.  
 
Hulme does not elaborate on this statement. Had he done so, he could explain that such 
possibility is allowed for by Bergson‟s discrimination between the few – artists and 
philosophers – who can access their fundamental selves through intuition, and the many – 
those who cannot break through the practical necessities of the “intellect” on their own (cf. 
Time and Free Will 134; An Introduction to Metaphysics 27-29). Like Bergson, that is, we 
can take Hulme as arguing that the real truth of things is more accessible to some than to 
others; translated into politics, “truth” is not available to the masses, but requires a few select 
individuals to guide us there. Of course, if Hulme is indeed using Bergson‟s theory of 
duration as proof of the fact that human potential for freedom is limited, that would be 
turning Bergson‟s theory of duration – which aims ultimately to create a positive philosophy 
of time – on its head. However unorthodox it may sound, though, such a view is entirely 
consistent with Hulme‟s interpretation of Bergson‟s philosophy. As I discussed in Chapter 3, 
Hulme was far more interested in Bergson‟s method of intuition and in the French 
philosopher‟s theory of “intensive manifolds,” according to which intuition provides a way 
into the “flux” of experience, than he was about Bergson‟s “conclusions,” including the 
“cosmology” of Creative Evolution which Lasserre attacked (160). In this sense, it is perhaps 
significant that nowhere in the Commentator is Bergson attacked for harbouring anti-
conservative ideas. On the contrary, both Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution are 
reviewed favourably, with Bergson praised for his decision “to study life as it is, and to 
substitute, in place of the false, prejudiced systems of his predecessors … a complete 
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revolution of philosophy” (“Review of Creative Evolution” 126).
124
 In any case, Hulme 
would not be the first to use Bergson‟s theory of duration against Liberal belief in Progress. 
As Mead argues, mixing “free will” with a desire for order is one of the traits of the early 
twentieth-century “vitalist” Right (253). Yet, Hulme‟s insistence that there is no “real time” 
for the “race” sets him apart from the radical Right position of Maurras, whose political 
programme may have shared much more with Bergson‟s metaphysics than he would be 
willing to admit. As S. Schwartz has demonstrated, in the early twentieth century, vitalism 
appealed to both ends of the political spectrum, with those on the Left and Right alike seeing 
in the notion of an unfolding élan vital the promise for spiritual transfiguration (“Bergson and 
the Politics of Vitalism” 278-79). In denying real time to the “race,” Hulme rejects the 
possibility of spiritual renewal, thus distancing himself from the anarcho-syndicalists of the 
New Age group, who, as Mead shows, interpreted vitalism as evidence of a dynamic change 
leading progressively to a “New Age” (251). Moreover, Hulme takes also a different stance 
from Maurras, who campaigns for the creation of a common national identity under a 
“natural, ordered and enlightened élan” (Curtis 250). Even though Hulme‟s argument in “Mr. 
Balfour, Bergson, and Politics” remains undeveloped, it is tempting to think that he employs 
Bergson in defence of his own brand of Conservatism, by carrying out a “pessimistic” 
reading of Bergson‟s theory of duration. 
 
7. “Conservative” Poetry 
As well as discrediting the common critical view that in his political essays Hulme makes 
similar demands to the Action Française, acknowledging the context in which Hulme‟s 
notion of “classicism” originates illuminates his argument in “Romanticism and Classicism” 
a great deal. Ever since Murray Krieger‟s “The Ambiguous Anti-Romanticism of T. E. 
                                                 
124 Cf. “Review of Matter and Memory” 239. The anonymous reviewer of Matter and Memory writes that “With 
extraordinary clearness and precision, the author gradually strips his problem of all unnecessary attributes until 
he is enabled to place it before his readers” (239). 
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Hulme” (1953), critics have been focusing on the way that, despite bemoaning romanticism, 
Hulme‟s conception of poetry in “Romanticism and Classicism” is in its essence romantic.
125
 
Specifically, critics trace the “ambiguity” of this lecture‟s anti-romanticism in the way in 
which Hulme‟s call for “sincerity,” meaning the unity of the poet with his emotions, is the 
defining characteristic of the very theory of poetry he rejects, Coleridge‟s theory of the 
Imagination (69). What these critics fail to recognise, is that in “Romanticism and 
Classicism” Hulme is using the terms “romantic” and “classic” predominantly in a political 
sense. Both his refusal to apologise in the lecture “for dragging in politics,” and his insistence 
that his use of the term “romanticism” is justified in as far as it is understood as the view 
“associated with certain political views,” suggest that the terms have a political valence (60). 
This complicates the “ambiguity” of Hulme‟s literary anti-Romanticism a good deal, 
allowing for the view that in “Romanticism and Classicism” Hulme is rejecting not 
romanticism‟s creative method, but the ideology on which, in his view, it is based, and which 
also underwrites “utopian” politics. This, in turn, supports my argument in the previous 
chapter, according to which Hulme agrees with the basic tenets of Coleridge‟s theory of the 
Imagination, disagreeing only with its “idealist” metaphysic. While this leaves Hulme open to 
the charge of eclecticism, understanding “Romanticism and Classicism” as the place where 
Hulme applies his “classicist” politics onto poetics goes a long way to explaining the 
lecture‟s “ambiguous” anti-romanticism.  
 
The argument in “Romanticism and Classicism” follows closely Hulme‟s and Storer‟s 
defence of Conservatism in the Commentator. The premise is that political ideologies fall into 
one of two contrasting worldviews or “attitudes”: romanticism and classicism (62). As in the 
Commentator articles, in Hulme‟s lecture romanticism is defined as the worldview associated 
                                                 
125 See Krieger 300-14; Bayley 49-58; Kermode, Romantic Image 141-163; A. Jones, The Life and Opinions of 
T. E. Hulme 46; Primeau 1104-22; Harmer 175-77; and Howarth 34-44. 
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with Progress and with the belief in human perfection. It is a view, Hulme argues, that is 
premised on Rousseau‟s idea “that man was by nature good, that it was only bad laws and 
customs that had suppressed him” and the concomitant belief shared by Rousseau‟s followers 
that “something positive could come out of disorder” (61). Classicism is its opposite. 
According to the “classical” view, “Man is an extraordinarily fixed and limited animal whose 
nature is absolutely constant”; moreover, “It is only by tradition that anything decent can be 
got out of him” (61). Explaining that he uses the terms as “political catchwords” (60), Hulme 
moves on in “Romanticism and Classicism” to “shirk the difficulty of saying exactly what I 
mean by romantic and classical in verse” (62). Romanticism has been the dominant ideology 
behind art for a century, he claims, and, as a result, it has come to be regarded as both the 
norm and the standard for poetry. The idea is the same as in his articles on political 
conversion: we do not make rational, independent decisions, but we are rather a product of a 
specific ideology suggested to us in an unconscious way (cf. 217-28). As in the Commentator 
articles, therefore, Hulme states in the lecture that “no one, in a matter of judgment of beauty, 
can take a detached standpoint,” adding that “The amount of freedom in man is much 
exaggerated” (64). In a similar way to the Commentator articles, however, where, as I 
suggested earlier, Hulme is able to unravel the reasons behind Liberal beliefs through 
exercising a kind of “diremption,” in “Romanticism and Classicism” he detects a unified 
Romantic ideology behind the poetry of the nineteenth century, made evident from 
nineteenth-century poetry‟s subject, language and tone: 
 
The romantic, because he thinks man infinite, must always be talking about the infinite; 
and as there is always the bitter contrast between what you think you ought to be able to 





[I]n romantic verse you move at a certain pitch of rhetoric which you know ... to be a 
little high-falutin [sic]. (63) 
 
The essence of [Romantic] poetry ... is that is must lead ... to a beyond of some kind. 
(66) 
 
In contrast, what Hulme defines as “classical” verse proceeds from the exact opposite 
principles: “classical” poetry is not interested in evoking grand themes and epic subjects but 
only in the “earthly”; it does not use “vague” words; and it avoids sounding idealistic. Thus 
the “classical” poet “remembers always that he is mixed up with earth ... he never flies into 
the circumambient gas” (62); he never moves above “a certain pitch of rhetoric ... The kind of 
thing you get in Hugo or Swinburne” (63); and he also refuses to be sloppy and sentimental, 
keeping his poetry “always perfectly human and never exaggerated” (66). 
 
As I discussed briefly in Chapter 2, many of the demands Hulme makes in “Romanticism 
and Classicism” anticipate ideas he expressed in “A Lecture.” Like the modern poet of “A 
Lecture,” for example, the classic poet in “Romanticism and Classicism” rejects idealised 
rhetoric and ridicules the belief that poetry is a “beyond of some kind” (66; cf. 52). 
Moreover, just like Hulme‟s modern poetry does not deal with “big things” and “epic 
subjects” (53), the classic poetry described in this late lecture aims to present the “earthly.” 
Most importantly, the method followed by the “classical” poet is in essence the same as that 
of his “modern” counterpart, both using intuition to break through conventional language, 
thus achieving “direct communication” with the reader (55, 70). Unlike in “A Lecture,” 
however, where the primary aim is that “some vague mood shall be communicated” (53), the 
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emphasis in “Romanticism and Classicism” is on “accurate, precise and definite description” 
(68). “Accuracy” and “precision” are, of course, the very qualities demanded by Hulme in 
“Bergson‟s Theory of Art.” In fact, the “classical” poet is identical with the artist described in 
“Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” who struggles with language in order to represent the “individual 
curve” which he sees in his mind, and whose “original sincerity” becomes the standard by 
which his success is measured (cf. 199-200; 68-69). The significant difference is that in 
“Romanticism and Classicism” Hulme‟s “Bergsonian” poet is metamorphosed into the 
Conservative citizen of the Commentator articles: he is “always faithful to the conception of a 
limit” and “remembers ... the limits inside which you know man to be fastened” (63). This 
transformation is the reason why the lecture appears to contain incongruous aesthetic 
demands. In “Romanticism and Classicism,” Hulme rejects what he sees as nineteenth-
century poetry‟s inclination to talk about the “infinite,” interpreting it as the result of a 
specific romantic ideology based on “Progress” and human perfection. Re-valorising 
Coleridge‟s distinction between Secondary Imagination and Fancy, Hulme declares the 
“weapon” of classic poetry to be Fancy, not Imagination (59). In doing so, he applies a 
political meaning to these terms. In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge allows that, while the 
Imaginative poet reflects the divine creator, the poet who uses Fancy is merely choosing the 
most appropriate literary devices in order to illuminate his experiences. In opposing 
romanticism as “spilt religion” (62), Hulme decries Imagination, instead privileging Fancy, 
which, as Coleridge describes it in Biographia Literaria, deals with the “fixities and the 
definites [sic]” (1: 305). As noted in Chapter 3, the method Hulme proposes for classic poetry 
adheres to Coleridge‟s definition of Imagination: like Coleridge‟s Imaginative poet, the 
classic poet aims for what Hulme describes as “vital or organic” perception (72). In the 
previous chapter, I explained how Bergson‟s metaphysics, insofar as it is based on empirical 
evidence, allows Hulme to uphold romantic notions of creation while, at the same time, 
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offering a method for poetry that is, in his view, more “definite” than Coleridge‟s 
Imagination. That this “ambiguity” in his argument should not be read as a contradiction is 
also made clear by the fact that Hulme‟s position in the lecture is not significantly different to 
that of Coleridge himself. Indeed, no other poet resembles the “classical” poet of 
“Romanticism and Classicism,” at once “Bergsonian” and Conservative, more than 
Coleridge. While in Biographia Literaria he asserts the freedom of the individual for 
unhindered creation – “the infinite I AM” (1: 304) – in The Friend Coleridge advocates 
politics as the art of the possible. He thus opposes any political theory that is rooted in the 
speculative and the general, and for this reason he rejects the abstract principles of Rousseau 
and the Rights of Man (165). Moreover, endorsing the view that human nature is limited, 
Coleridge argues in The Friend contra Rousseau for a theory of government that does not 
exaggerate human capacity for reason and, thus, for freedom (185-87).
126
 By 1830, Coleridge 
was of the opinion that metaphysics has no place in politics and that the priority for all 
Englishmen should be to conserve the institutions that have, as he puts it in On the 
Constitution of the Church and State, “formed themselves out of our proper needs and 
interests” (23). In this way, as Calleo notes, Coleridge is able to stand his ground against the 
utopian politics of Rousseau, Paine and Cartwright; but because Coleridge believed in 
individual free will, Calleo adds, he was also able to refute the despotism of the Physiocrats 
and the coercive politics of Hobbes, which exaggerates the maliciousness of humans in the 
same way that Rousseau emphasises their capacity for freedom (64-71). Far from a slip, 
therefore, Hulme‟s tacit approval of Coleridge in “Romanticism and Classicism” might be a 




                                                 
126 On Coleridge‟s conservative politics, see Coleman 107-31 and Magnuson 51-70. 
127 Hulme would not be unique in interpreting Coleridge to his own purposes. As Marilyn Butler shows, 
Coleridge‟s political thought has long been utilised by intellectuals of all political convictions (92).  
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A similar connection between Conservative politics and “classicism” in literature is drawn 
by Storer in the Introduction to his 1912 edition of William Cowper‟s poems. It is unfortunate 
that this essay has been neglected by critics, for it is a great example of how aesthetics and 
politics converged in the early twentieth century.
128
 As such, Storer‟s essay helps us 
understand Hulme‟s argument in “Romanticism and Classicism,” which, I suggest, colludes 
Conservatism with aesthetic “classicism.” Tracing “literary romanticism” to “the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Social Contract” (xvi), Storer defines romantic art in this 
introductory essay as art that “always prefers the extraordinary to the ordinary, the less 
natural to the natural,” complaining that Romantic poetry “would rather deal with the infinite 
than with the finite,” and arguing that by choosing to ignore the “finite” nature of man, 
Romanticism creates “poetry of disorder and tumult” (vii, xx). In contrast, “classicism,” 
Storer argues, “does not think to make a better world than its creator” (xv). A paradigmatic 
“classic” poet for Storer is Cowper, who, Storer reminds his readers, “Whig though he called 
himself ... had no love for revolutionaries” (xvi). Storer‟s use of Cowper as a model for the 
modern “classic” poet is significant. According to Coleridge, Cowper is “the best of modern 
poets” and the first to reconcile “the heart with the head” (Biographia Literaria 1: 6), an 
assessment repeated by later critics including Davie and Newey, both of whom find among 
Cowper‟s poetic achievements his combination of introspective remarks with realistic 
presentation.
129
 In his Introduction, Storer identifies similar traits in Cowper as these critics. 
Unlike Shelley or Keats, he argues, Cowper avoids the “passion” and “ecstasy,” the 
“exaggerations and grandeurs” and the “tenderness and sentiment” of the Romantics, instead 
choosing to describe “the obvious thing, the average thing, the ordinary thing,” as he is “not 
taken in by the attitudes of sublimity [sic], the impertinent assumptions of divinity with 
                                                 
128 As far as I know, the only critic who acknowledges Storer‟s 1912 Introductory essay is Carr, who notes in 
Verse Revolutionaries that Storer‟s “comments … predate the savage criticism that Pound himself, rather later, 
came to make” (380), without, however, Carr pursuing this observation further. 
129 See Davie 53-60 and Newey x-xi, 2-3. 
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which romantic art abounds” (xviii, xii, xv, xx). For Storer, therefore, Cowper has all the 
conservative traits described by Hulme in “Romanticism and Classicism.” Moreover, like the 
classic poet in “Romanticism and Classicism,” Cowper, in Storer‟s view, “manages to 
interrupt our staticism [sic] or state of non-vision by some commonplace, some minutia, 
some trifle by which he charms us through forcing us to admit its importance” (xii-xiii). 
Charting a process that recalls the artist in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” Storer presents 
Cowper as moving inside an object and capturing its internal landscape. Through his “touches 
of poetic accuracy, the sureness of his observation, and the directness with which he conveys 
the impression to our minds,” Storer explains, Cowper is able to present us with an accurate 
description of an object without any of the “distortion which makes and also mars so much 
romantic art” (xviii). Thus, in Hulme‟s “Romanticism and Classicism” and Storer‟s 
Introductory essay on Cowper, the demand for undecorated language and the emphasis on 
accurate, precise and definite presentation of objects or ideas in the poet‟s mind gain a 
distinctly political valence.  
 
8. Conclusion  
By returning attention to the debate that took place in the pages of the Commentator in the 
second decade of the twentieth century, and by focusing specifically on Hulme‟s and Storer‟s 
contributions, we are able to understand Hulme‟s “classicist” politics in an informed way. 
The important part that Bergson plays in Hulme‟s formulation of a Conservative propaganda 
strategy discredits the common critical position that Hulme abandoned Bergson as he came 
closer to Maurras and Lasserre. As I have shown, in his essays on politics Hulme is drawing 
on the theories of the Action Française in order to develop a plausible reconversion strategy, 
but it is inaccurate to ascertain that his politics is similar to the politics of Maurras or 
Lasserre. Although he advocates a hierarchical form of government, Hulme‟s conviction that 
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human nature is limited does not allow him to make “utopian” demands which, according to 
Gray, is what leads to Conservatism in its most aggressive form. Rather, his belief in Original 
Sin leads him to become a proponent of the American constitution. Finally, acknowledging 
the context in which Hulme‟s famous distinction between Romanticism and Classicism 
originates, illuminates his theory of poetry a great deal, and highlights the extent to which in 




























Following a year‟s absence from journalism, in December 1913 Hulme published a review 
in the New Age of Jacob Epstein‟s exhibition at the Twenty-One Gallery in London. The 
article on Epstein was the first of eight essays on contemporary art that Hulme wrote for the 
New Age, his last piece of art criticism appearing in July 1914. During this time, he also 
delivered “Modern Art and its Philosophy,” a lecture in which he elaborates on the 
characteristics of “geometrical” art, while his biographer gives evidence of an unfinished 
book on Epstein that Hulme began writing in late 1916 (Ferguson 247). Hulme had expressed 
an interest in the visual arts on a number of occasions earlier in his career. In “A Lecture,” he 
refers to Whistler‟s recording of momentary impressions in his Impressionist paintings as an 
example of a distinctly modern method of art (53); in “Romanticism and Classicism,” he 
credits Raphael, Titian, Turner and Constable with introducing original and innovative forms 
in painting (64); and, finally, in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” Hulme refers to the art of 
Constable and Giotto, Binyon‟s “little book on Chinese art” and Berenson‟s study of the 





 Now, however, rather than drawing on the visual arts to sustain points he was making 
about poetry or Bergson‟s metaphysics, he was focusing his attention exclusively on the 
visual arts, directing all his energy to discussing the latest developments in the fields of 
painting and sculpture. From his position as a leading art critic for the New Age, in his essays 
on art Hulme launched one of the most combative defences of the artistic experiments of 
Epstein. Moreover, proselytising for “geometrical” art, Hulme became, according to 




The years immediately before the outbreak of the Great War were an exciting time for art 
in London. Critics and art historians have described in detail how during this time “Old” and 
“New” conceptions of art collided, with great repercussions for both visual and literary 
modernism (Scholes 34-35; Martin, New Age under Orage 134-37). Such was the force and 
pace of this collision, that Hulme‟s emergence as an art critic can in many ways be explained 
as the natural reaction of an intellectual to the events circumscribing the period. The years 
1910-14 were also a time of friction among the various artistic coteries in London. As critics 
have stressed, in praising the art of Epstein, Lewis, Bomberg and their circle, Hulme is taking 
sides in the war that broke between the artistic factions of Roger Fry and Lewis.
132
 At the 
                                                 
130 For a useful discussion of how Hulme‟s early references to art instruct his art criticism, see Beasley, “„A 
Definite Meaning‟: The Art Criticism of T. E. Hulme” 62-65. In “Bergson‟s Theory of Art,” Hulme claims that 
the aim of all art is “direct communication,” citing in support of his argument Berenson‟s “book on the 
Florentine painters,” specifically, “The part ... where he explains the superiority of Giotto to Duccio” (203). 
Csengeri (ed., 466n3), Robinson (249n32) and Beasley (“„A Definite Meaning‟: The Art Criticism of T. E. 
Hulme” 71n4) take this as a reference to Bernard Berenson‟s Florentine Painters of the Renaissance (1896), 
with Beasley rightly pointing out that in Florentine Painters of the Renaissance Berenson does not compare 
Giotto to Duccio, but to Cimabue, and concluding that “Hulme misremembers.” It is much more likely, 
however, that Hulme has another text by Berenson in mind. In vol. 2 of The Italian Painters of the Renaissance 
(1894-1907), an expanded version of Florentine Painters of the Renaissance, Berenson compares Giotto with 
Duccio (57), arguing that the essential element in Renaissance art is a “particular life-communicating quality” 
(33). 
131 Qtd. in A. Jones, The Life and Opinions of T. E. Hulme 116. Cork goes as far as suggesting that artists such 
as Lewis and Epstein were putting Hulme‟s theories “into practice” (187). In Blasting and Bombardiering, 
Lewis claims that Hulme‟s art criticism greatly influenced Epstein‟s art (107). 
132 See Cork 55, 92, 130, 146-50; Tillyard 233; and Beasley “„A Definite Meaning‟: The Art Criticism of T. E. 
Hulme” 62. See also Fry‟s letter to Duncan Grant, probably from January 1914, in which Fry writes that “The 
Lewis group have got hold of the New Age critic” (378). 
178 
 
same time, though, Hulme‟s discussion of art exceeds purely artistic concerns. Drawing on 
the anti-materialist art theories of Alois Riegl and Wilhelm Worringer, Hulme argues that art 
is always the expression of a particular worldview that also infiltrates politics, science and 
religion. While the old “vital” art is the expression of Renaissance humanism, the modern 
“geometrical” art, he maintains, signals a move towards anti-humanism and thus heralds the 
end of the Renaissance doctrine of Progress and the belief in human perfection. For 
Levenson, Hulme‟s praise of “geometrical” or abstract art marks yet another turning point in 
his thought, with Hulme seen as abandoning what Levenson describes as the “subjectivist 
poetic” of “A Lecture,” which, inspired by Bergson‟s metaphysics, puts emphasis on the poet 
expressing his individual view of the world, in favour of “anti-subjectivism” or “objectivism” 
(80-84, 100). According to Levenson, this turn to “objectivism” shows that by 1913-14 
Hulme substituted the aesthetic and political classicism advocated in “Romanticism and 
Classicism” with a more authoritarian, more radical anti-humanism (98-99). A. Jones, 
Robinson and Donahue all concur with Levenson, arguing that in his art criticism Hulme 




This chapter examines Hulme‟s art criticism in an effort to delineate the ways in which 
claims he makes in his essays on art relate to other ideas in his work. I begin by discussing 
the developments in art in early twentieth century. A survey of the contemporaneous art 
criticism reveals the proximity of Hulme‟s defence of abstract art to demands made by the 
Post-Impressionist critics, a connection which complicates the view that he himself 
promoted, according to which he had nothing in common with Fry or Bell.
134
 Moreover, the 
                                                 
133 A. Jones, “T. E. Hulme, Wilhelm Worringer, and the Urge to Abstraction” 1-7; Robinson 119-20, 127-28; 
Donahue, ed. 17. 
134 The proximity of Hulme‟s ideas to the criticism of Fry and Bell has been recognised by Beasley, who shows 
how Hulme “struggled to move beyond the critical framework so influentially coined by Fry and Bell” (“„A 
Definite Meaning‟: The Art Criticism of T. E. Hulme” 67). For Hulme‟s attacks on Post-Impressionist criticism, 
see 263-64, 294 and 282. 
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fact that he participated in the general reaction of critics against Renaissance forms of art 
demonstrates that in rejecting the “Renaissance” he was as much protesting against its 
Humanist ideology as he was expressing the broader dissatisfaction of his generation against 
Renaissance representationalism. Finally, this focus also shows that Hulme agrees with the 
Post-Impressionists (whose debt to Bergson has been demonstrated by various critics) that the 
artist should, above all, aim at a personal and original expression; this goes some way to 
disproving Levenson‟s claim that Hulme‟s aesthetic was thoroughly “anti-subjectivist.”
135
 I 
then proceed to discuss Hulme‟s claim that the new geometrical art heralds the endpoint of 
the Renaissance “general attitude.” Contra Levenson, I argue that Hulme‟s anti-humanism is 
in essence the same as the anti-romantic worldview advocated in the Commentator articles 
and in “Romanticism and Classicism,” and that, therefore, Levenson‟s view that Hulme 
dismissed classicism as a “half-measure” and “insufficiently radical” is inaccurate (98-99). In 
the final part, I argue that Hulme‟s anti-humanism is not as “reactionary” as Levenson and 
Robinson insist. Both his defence of abstract art on the grounds that it enables the artist to 
achieve his personal expression, and his suspicion of extreme abstraction, demonstrate that, 
despite relying extensively on Worringer‟s theories, Hulme‟s theory of art is significantly 
different to that espoused by the German art historian. More crucially, Hulme‟s insistence 
that the artist always expresses his personality through archaic forms means that his 
conception of art eschews the severe ideological implications invested by Worringer in his 
model of abstract art. 
 
2. Against the Renaissance: experimentation with “primitive” forms 
In the early years of the twentieth century, visual artists were steadily abandoning 
representationalism in favour of abstract or “primitive” forms. Reacting to what Charles 
                                                 
135 On Post-Impressionism‟s debt to Bergson‟s philosophy, see Gillies 57, Goldman 3-7, and Randall 38. 
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Altieri has named the “logic of the window” (395), meaning the reproduction in art of 
equivalences in nature, modernist painters and sculptors turned to non-representational Asian 
and African art. The turn to “primitivism” that started years earlier with Gauguin and 
Cézanne reached new heights in the beginning of the century in the works of artists such as 
Modigliani, Picasso and Brancusi, whose works were a source of inspiration for the Paris-
based Epstein, Lewis and Gaudier.
136
 From 1910 onwards, painters and sculptors including 
Ginner, Gore, Lewis, Gill, Nevinson, Bomberg and Epstein, all began to experiment with 
archaic forms. Despite their different approaches to art and their later personal spats, what 
these artists had in common, as both Bullen and Beasley have shown, was that, joined 
together in opposition to Impressionism and Naturalism, they were seeking new mediums of 
expression.
137
 Though not an artist himself, Hulme placed himself at the centre of this artistic 
reorientation towards abstract art. His famous Tuesday evening soirees at Frith Street were 
attended by artists from all the different coteries and featured extensive conversations about 
the latest developments in art. As Nevinson, Davies and Fletcher later remembered, Hulme 
provided a theoretical basis for the new movement of abstract art, while also playing an 





When the formal experimentation of this new art was rejected by some as mere imitation, 
Hulme quickly took to defending the moderns‟ use of “primitive” forms, specifically the art 
of Epstein.
139
 In his earliest known piece on art, an unpublished essay entitled “Jacob Epstein 
                                                 
136 See Cork 11, 176-77; Friedman 148-50; and Beasley, Ezra Pound and the Visual Culture of Modernism 176. 
Epstein discusses the influence of primitive art on his work in Let There Be Sculpture 35-39, 165 and The 
Sculptor Speaks 104-07. See also Bassani‟s and McLeod‟s fascinating discussion of Epstein‟s collection of 
primitive art and of what his collection of primitive art says about Epstein‟s own work (16-18). 
137 Bullen, ed. 32-34; Beasley, “„A Definite Meaning‟: The Art Criticism of T. E. Hulme” 59-61. 
138 See Beasley, “„A Definite Meaning‟: The Art Criticism of T. E. Hulme” 58. 
139 Hulme refers specifically to the criticisms of “C.B.” in the Athenaeum on 6 Dec. 1913 and the article by 
“E.M.” in Illustrated London News for 13 Dec. 1913 (255). For the press‟ reaction to Epstein‟s exhibition, see 
Cork 185. For critics‟ reaction to the new “primitive” art, see Martin, New Age under Orage 131-32; Cork 15-
181 
 
at the 21 Gallery,” Hulme praises the artist‟s experimentation with “archaic elements” 
(8135.351). Epstein‟s turn to African and Polynesian work and his use of “the simplifications 
of those arts in the past,” Hulme argues in this unpublished essay, constitutes a break from 
“naturalistic arts, like the Renaissance and classical art.” As he goes on to claim, it is this 
break that has enabled Epstein to achieve the much more interesting “expression” that is only 
made possible through the use of “primitive” forms. Hulme has in mind specifically a 
drawing by Epstein that was on show alongside Epstein‟s Flenite carvings at the Twenty One 
Gallery.
140
 The drawing, Hulme maintains, achieves an “atmosphere” that is effective, 
because wholly anti-Impressionistic: “There is nothing vague about this atmosphere,” he 
writes; “it is as rigid and definite as the figure itself.” Hulme concludes that, if used in the 
right way, the “monumental art of the past” can be used to a “thoroughly modern” effect, thus 
liberating the modern artist from the restrictions of Renaissance art (8135.351-53). In “Mr. 
Epstein and the Critics,” largely a revision of this unpublished essay, he again claims that the 
“use of formulae taken from another civilisation” has a liberating effect on modern artists. 
Epstein‟s Flenite sculptures, Hulme asserts, are not imitations of “Easter Island Carvings” 
indicative of a “lack of individuality in the artist”; rather, they represent “a constant and 
permanent alphabet,” used by the artist to achieve the “natural expression of the feeling” he 
wanted (256-57). More crucially, Epstein‟s work in Hulme‟s view is a refutation of the 
“modern feeling” of the Renaissance, and thus a step towards a different kind of art. A similar 
point is raised in his second essay on art, a review of the Grafton Group show at the Alpine 
Club, published in January 1914, in which Hulme praises the works of Roberts, Gaudier and 
Epstein. These artists, he writes in “Modern Art I: The Grafton Group,” and Epstein in 
                                                                                                                                                        
18; Bullen, ed. 13-21; Beasley, Ezra Pound and the Visual Culture of Modernism 64-67; and Gruetzner Robins 
15-16. 
140 Different titles for this drawing are given by Beasley and Scholes. While Beasley suggests that the drawing 
Hulme is describing in the unpublished essay on Epstein is “Creation,” Scholes refers to it as “Generation.” See 
Beasley, “„A Definite Meaning‟: The Art Criticism of T. E. Hulme” 66 and Scholes 50. Such drawing is not 
listed in Silber‟s catalogue The Sculpture of Epstein. 
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particular, have achieved “a new direction” and “an intenser perception of things” by re-
employing archaic formulae and in this way, they have managed to break away from the 
“dregs of the Renaissance” (265-66). 
 
Hulme‟s suggestion that in 1913-14 modern art was moving away from “Renaissance” art 
must be seen as part of a broader aesthetic shift occurring in early twentieth-century art in 
Britain. Like Hulme, other critics were rallying against what they saw as “Renaissance” arts 
at this time, a broad term used to describe representational or “naturalistic” arts, such as 
Impressionism. Even though, as I explain further below, Hulme‟s campaign against the 
Renaissance was driven by ideological reasons, it was also in line with the contemporaneous 
attempts of Victor Reynolds, Roger Fry and Clive Bell to develop a new aesthetic for 
modernity and to break from what they interpreted as the “Renaissance” conception of art. 
Turning to these critics‟ defence of experimentation with “primitive” forms helps us see how 
in praising the art of Epstein, Hulme was aligning himself with Reynolds and the Post-
Impressionist critics; this, in turns, complicates the common critical view that Hulme‟s 
rejection of the Renaissance was motivated by purely ideological reasons. 
 
Reynolds‟s contribution to the turn away from representational art in early twentieth 
century has been regretably overlooked by critics. However, as Scholes has recently pointed 
out, Reynolds was among the first in Britain to present a programme for “radical 
Modernism,” calling on artists to experiment with archaic forms (36). Reynolds‟ defence of 
anti-representationalism was part of the debate that started in the New Age in April 1910, the 
venue which hosted Hulme‟s art criticism. When Huntly Carter, the resident art critic of the 
journal, recommended an art supplement to discuss “all that concerns the welfare and 
prospects of art” (1), Reynolds declared representationalism, which he described as “the 
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fundamental principle of impressionism,” “deader” than the Pharaohs. “Nothing is more 
hopeless than a moribund tradition,” Reynolds wrote, “while on the other hand the oldest, 
most „primitive‟ sources ... have ever been the seeding ground and the hope of future 
progress.” He thus went on to rebuke critics‟ sneers at Picasso‟s work in what, as Scholes 
notes, is the first full-length appreciation of Picasso in English.
141
 In Picasso, Reynolds 
argues, “one sees an almost isolated instance of the power to react against the current 
tradition.” More specifically, Picasso‟s achievement for Reynolds lay in the way in which in 
his decorations “all element of representation is thrown overboard, and an attempt [is] made 
to express emotion of form by the use of an extremely large and simple curve” (7-8). 
 
As well as Reynolds‟ defence of Picasso, Hulme‟s praise of modern artists‟ 
experimentation with “primitive” or archaic forms echoes Storer‟s derision in the New Age in 
late 1910 of the artists who “imagine that the object of a picture is to represent accurately, or 
at least plausibly, some material object ... As if there could be any artistic merit in the mere 
multiplication of inadequate representations of material objects” (“Post-Savages” 215).
142
 
Here, Storer is responding to the controversy caused by Roger Fry‟s first Post-Impressionist 
exhibition which opened in November, by endorsing the Post-Impressionists‟ argument that 
the future of art lies away from representationalism. “Manet and the Post-Impressionists,” as 
this exhibition was called, was a significant step taken towards the development of abstract 
art in Britain, introducing to the London public the works of artists who refuted, according to 
the exhibition catalogue, the “dogma” of the “close imitation of nature” (MacCarthy, “The 
Post-Impressionists” 96). The Post-Impressionists, MacCarthy writes in his Introduction to 
the show, rediscovered the “fundamental laws of abstract form” that naturalistic art had 
                                                 
141 See Scholes 37. 
142 Storer repeatedly praises Gauguin in his articles in the Commentator, while he also expresses his fascination 
with Picasso‟s experimentation with primitive forms. See “The Renaissance of the Nineties” 108 and “Art 




entirely neglected and thus show the way to “a return to primitive, even ... barbaric art” (“The 
Post-Impressionists” 98). 
 
Similar ideas were expressed by Fry. In “The Grafton Gallery” in November 1910, Fry 
rejects the “photographic vision,” “the tempered realism” and the “science” of 
Impressionism, interpreting Impressionism as the culmination of the Renaissance aesthetic 
(121). Modern artists in Britain, Fry argues in this essay, should embrace the aesthetic of the 
Post-Impressionist masters – Manet, Cézanne, Gauguin, Van Gogh, Seurat, Matisse and 
Derain – whose work, as Fry puts it, constitutes “the latest, and ... the most successful, 
attempt to go behind the too elaborate pictorial apparatus which the Renaissance established 
in painting” (121). Praising specifically Cézanne and Gauguin for re-introducing “primitive” 
forms in art, Fry thus urges the modern artist to “throw away all the science with which the 
Renaissance and the succeeding centuries have endowed mankind” (121). As he explains:  
 
Why should he wilfully return to primitive or, as it is derisively called, barbaric art? 
The answer is that it is neither wilful nor wanton but simply necessary, if art is to be 
rescued from the hopeless encumbrance of its own accumulations of science; if art is to 
regain its power to express emotional ideas, and not to become an appeal to curiosity 
and wonder at the artist‟s perilous skill. (121) 
 
That is, if modern artists want to retrieve the essence of art, according to Fry, they have to 
incorporate “primitive” forms in their works; as he writes, “we must begin at the beginning, 




The Post-Impressionists‟ emphasis on the use of “primitive” forms by modern artists 
formed a central part of the argument presented by Clive Bell, Fry‟s long-term collaborator, 
in Art. Published in March 1914, in Art Bell argues for “a return to first principles” (43-44). 
According to Bell‟s scheme of art history, the development of art constitutes a downhill 
movement from the “heights” of primitive art to the “flats” of the Renaissance. Thus Bell 
traces the “long ... imperceptible fall” of art from Sumerian sculpture, pre-dynastic Egyptian 
and archaic Greek art, the “Wei and T‟ang masterpieces,” “early Japanese works,” the 
“primitive Byzantine art of the sixth century” and “the mysterious and majestic art that 
flourished in Central and South America,” to the “Classical Renaissance” of Giotto and 
Leonardo and the way it has survived in the works of Pater and Symonds (23; 123-29).
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This reversal of the traditional hierarchy aims at refuting what Bell sees as the dominant 
critical standards in early twentieth-century art, specifically the common understanding of art 
history as the history of representational ability. Like Fry before him, who holds that it is 
wrong to dismiss primitive art as lacking in technique (cf. letter to Burlington Magazine 375), 
stressing that non-naturalistic art “must be judged in themselves and by their own standards” 
(qtd. in L. B. Williams 119), Bell argues in Art that the simple forms of primitive art cannot 
be dismissed as mere proof of primitives‟ inability to produce skilful representations. Rather, 
“primitive” artworks in Bell‟s view are the result of a conscious deliberation, “a passionate 
desire to express their sense of form” and, thus, to provoke through this form their emotion 
(39; cf. 62). Claiming that the primitives lacked skill or ability was therefore simply a “wilful 
distortion” (24). Ultimately, Bell‟s point in Art is that whether it is “from want of skill or 
want of will” that primitive art was created is irrelevant: for what matters most is that the 
“primitives neither create illusions, nor make display of extravagant accomplishment, but 
concentrate their energies on the one thing needful – the creation of form” (25; cf. 8, 154). 
                                                 
143 See also Fry‟s review of Bell‟s Art. Fry agrees with Bell‟s account of art history, arguing that the 
“Renaissance merely prolonged putrefaction” (“A New Theory of Art” 491). 
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The desire to create “significant form,” which Bell famously defines as the fundamental aim 
of all art, explains why “primitive” art is valuable: because “significant form,” as Bell 




While agreeing with Reynolds, Fry and Bell that the return to primitive forms is both 
justified and necessary, Hulme‟s defence of formal experimentation is carried out from a 
markedly different standpoint. Unlike Fry and Bell, Hulme does not define art as 
“significant” or “expressive” form and therefore does not defend experimentation with 
archaic forms on the grounds that it returns attention to form. Instead, his point is that the 
modern artist shares a common “sensibility,” “emotion” or “outlook” with his primitive 
counterpart and that it is this shared view of the world that legitimises the use of old formulae 
by modern artists (cf. 257, 263). This is an argument which, as Hulme himself acknowledges 
in “Modern Art and its Philosophy,” owes a lot to the anti-materialist conception of art 
history of Riegl and Worringer (cf. 268, 271). Given Hulme‟s open acknowledgement of 
Riegl‟s and Worringer‟s influence on his thought, it is pertinent to examine briefly these 
critics‟ theories.  
 
Riegl and Worringer argue in Problems of Style (1893) and Abstraction and Empathy 
(1907) respectively that what determines artistic production at any period is a consciously 
purposeful Kunstwollen or “will to art.”
145
 As conceived by Riegl, first, and then Worringer, 
art is not a casual activity, but an instinctive struggle with external surroundings. “Human 
artistic creativity,” Riegl writes in the Introduction to the 1899 edition of Problems of Style, 
                                                 
144 Bell first uses the term “significant form” in the Introduction to “The English Group,” an essay he wrote for 
the catalogue of the Second Post-Impressionist Exhibition in 1912 (cf. 350). Fry had used similar terms in May 
of the previous year, praising Cézanne for revealing “a new world of significant and expressive form” (“Post 
Impressionism” 178). 
145 Here, I follow Bistock‟s translation of the term “Kunstwollen.” For problems relating to the translation of the 
term into English, see Bistock 253n38. 
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“is a contest with nature” and its ultimate aim is that “of bringing to expression a harmonious 
worldview” (298, 300; emphasis in original). Riegl‟s anti-materialist analysis of art is above 
all an attack of the idea that non-representational art is the work of unskilful people and that 
is therefore inferior to representational art. In a similar way to Fry and Bell after him, Riegl 
dismisses the conventional view of art history as the history of representational ability. In 
contrast to Fry and Bell, however, Riegl‟s emphasis is not so much on the way “primitive” art 
valorises form over content, but on the reasons why the primitive artist uses simplified forms, 
with Riegl arguing that this is because the primitive artist “yearns incessantly for harmony” 
(299). Riegl explains: 
  
[The primitive artist] sees ... harmony constantly disrupted and threatened by things and 
phenomena of nature that exist in a state of perpetual struggle, both with one another 
and with humanity. If nature were really the way it appears in the individual human 
senses, man would never be able to attain harmony. Consequently, man creates a vision 
of nature in his art that frees him from nature‟s perpetual instability; he imagines nature 
to be better than it looks. He seeks to bring order to the apparent chaos, to push aside 
those raw random occurrences to which he is otherwise subject and vulnerable. (299-
300) 
 
The idea is that in the primitive artist‟s hands art becomes a means of achieving harmony and 
order in a world viewed as foreign and chaotic. This explains the geometric nature of 
primitive forms, as through geometry the primitives seek to impose permanence or fixity on 
what they perceive as a hostile environment. Gradually, as humans become able to “master” 
nature, they stop feeling vulnerable and become part of it – hence the emergence of 
“naturalistic” or “anthropomorphic” art. Thus Riegl concludes in Problems of Style that art 
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history is a process of development beginning from an objective or “haptic” conception of 
things towards a subjective or “optic” perspective of things, with Egyptian art and 
Impressionism standing at the opposite sides of this trajectory (10, 71). 
 
Building on Riegl‟s work, in Abstraction and Empathy Worringer presents a history that 
similarly conceives art as primarily a contest with nature. “Primitives” such as “Oriental” 
people, Worringer maintains, experience “the unfathomableness of being that mocks all 
intellectual mastery,” which is why, according to Worringer, they produce art that is 
instinctively abstract. The “pure geometric abstraction” of primitive art, Worringer argues, is 
“free from all external connections with the world” and represents “a felicitation whose 
mysterious transfiguration emanates not from the observer‟s intellect, but from the deepest 
roots of his somato-psychic constitution” (35). Like Riegl, Worringer sees this “urge to 
abstraction” as “the outcome of a great inner unrest”; or, as he puts it otherwise, the “urge to 
abstraction” finds its source in “an immense spiritual dread of space” (46, 15). The 
primitives‟ aim, Worringer argues in line with Riegl, is to create a work of art that, as a 
“closed material individuality,” provides a refuge from the flux and the “relativity” of the 
world (16). By contrast, more “advanced” peoples, who achieve a familiarity with the world 
that primitive people never had, produce “empathetic” or “naturalistic” art. This positive 
feeling, Worringer claims, is usually expressed in art that is three dimensional and 
representational, like Classical and Renaissance art (101-03). In a similar way as Fry and 
Bell, therefore, Worringer criticises the understanding of primitive art as inferior to 
representational art. It is inaccurate, Worringer writes in “Transcendence and Immanence in 
Art,” an essay appended to the 1910 edition of Abstraction and Empathy, to reduce artistic 
evolution “to an easily surveyed undulatory [sic] motion” according to which “that which 
precedes the Classical zeniths in question is regarded as an imperfect endeavour, but 
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important as an indication of the heights to come” (124). For, the history of art, Worringer 
insists, is not the history of representational ability, but rather the history of two antithetical 
artistic volitions: abstraction and empathy. 
 
Hulme acknowledges the influence of Worringer on his art criticism first in “Modern Art 
and its Philosophy,” in which he describes his argument as “practically an abstract of 
Worringer‟s views” (271), and then again in “A Preface Note and Neo-Realism” from 
February 1914, now reiterating that in Worringer he finds “an extraordinary clear statement 
... of a view very like the one I had tried to formulate” (287). In “Modern Art and its 
Philosophy,” Hulme follows Worringer (and, thus, in effect, also Riegl) in postulating a 
strong anti-materialist interpretation of art. He defines art as the “satisfaction of some specific 
mental need, and so ... in looking at a work of art ... it is necessary not only to think of the 
object itself, but of the desire it is intended to satisfy” (272). As Hulme explains, it is 
therefore wrong to claim that the use of geometric forms indicates lack of technical ability. It 
is also wrong, he argues, to hold that the art created by a nation is determined by which 
materials are available to that people: even “If Egypt had been inhabited by people of Greek 
race,” Hulme explains by reiterating Worringer‟s claim, “the fact that the material was 
granite, would not have made them produce anything like Egyptian sculpture” (284; cf. 
Abstraction and Empathy 99). The anti-materialist view of art put forward by Riegl and 
Worringer enables Hulme to claim that the source of art is always, as he puts it in “Modern 
Art and its Philosophy,” a certain “feeling for form” (284; cf. 273). This in turn allows him to 
defend modern geometric art on the basis that the modern artist must be left free to choose 
any form deemed best-suited to accommodate his expression. Thus the adverse critical 
reaction to Epstein‟s use of archaic formulae, Hulme argues in “Mr. Epstein and the Critics,” 
can be explained by the fact that most critics fail to recognise that “form follows the need in 
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each case,” or that the need of an artist for a specific form may be “divided by many 
civilisations” (257). In other words, it is entirely legitimate for a modern artist such as 
Epstein to use archaic formulae, given that the emotion that he wants to express is better 
mediated through primitive forms, and that these emotions are “entirely alien and unnatural to 
the critic” does not prove that Epstein‟s art was inferior to naturalist art (258). A similar point 
is made both in Hulme‟s review of the “Grafton Group,” as well as in “Modern Art: Preface 
Note and Neo-Realism.” In the former, he asserts that Epstein‟s experimentation with archaic 
forms is entirely justified, as it is needed to achieve a “new direction” and a specific 
“intensity”; as Hulme puts it, Epstein‟s art “quite naturally and legitimately finds a foothold 
in these archaic yet permanent formulae” (265-66). In the article on “Neo-Realism,” Hulme 
likewise defends the use of archaic forms, reiterating that the “geometrical character of 
modern art is essential to the expression of the intensity they are aiming at” (287). Finally, in 
his essay on the “London Group” from March 1914, he again claims that Epstein‟s Flenite 
carvings are in “no sense imitative,” but that, rather, the artist takes from African and 
Polynesian works those elements that enable him to evoke “a certain effect” (298). 
 
Despite their different approaches, then, Hulme‟s defence of experimentation with 
primitive forms is consonant with the demands made by Reynolds and the Post-Impressionist 
critics. Like Reynolds, Fry and Bell, Hulme maintains that in the early twentieth-century 
representational art reached its endpoint, proposing a return to archaic forms as a way out of 
what he, like these critics, perceives as stagnation in art. Moreover, like Reynolds, Fry and 
Bell, Hulme holds that the modern artist should use primitive forms in an expressive way. 
Indeed, in its essence, Hulme‟s insistence on modern artists using archaic forms to express 
their emotions was the same as Fry‟s belief that primitive forms, as Fry puts it in “The French 
Group,” affords artists “a pictorial language appropriate to the sensibilities of the modern 
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outlook” (353), but from a different standpoint. In this essay, which Fry wrote for the second 
Post-Impressionist exhibition prospectus, Fry criticises the art which subordinates the “direct 
expression of feeling” to skill, maintaining that, above all, art should be “an attempt to 
express by pictorial and plastic form certain spiritual experiences” (352). Therein lies for Fry 
the success of Cézanne, the French master using archaic forms in an “expressive” way (354). 
In a similar manner to Fry, Hulme hails Cézanne in his review of the “Grafton Group” as an 
example of a modern artist who “seeks expression through forms that are to a certain extent 
archaic” (266), an attitude he also finds in Epstein. As he puts it in the unpublished essay 
“Mr. Epstein at the 21 Gallery,” Epstein‟s art is characterised by “an entirely personal and 
modern method of expression” (8135.352). Hulme discusses the subject of expression 
through archaic forms in more detail in “Mr. Epstein and the Critics,” where he writes that 
“the formula used must be a natural expression of the feeling you are getting at and not a 
mere imitation of an exotic or romantic past” (257), and in his article on the Grafton Group, 
in which he argues that “the persistence of a feeble imitation of archaism ... is an absolutely 
unnecessary survival” (265) and that archaic forms should be viewed as a “medium of 
expression” (266). He returns to it once more in “Modern Art and its Philosophy,” now 
claiming that the aim of the modern artist is to “utilise some already existing methods of 
expression and work from them to the one that expresses his own personal conception more 
accurately and naturally” (280).  
 
In employing the anti-materialist conception of art as theorised by Riegl and Worringer 
Hulme is therefore primarily defending his contemporaries‟ experimentation with archaic 
forms. Artists such as Epstein who turn to “primitivism,” he claims, are not only justified in 
doing so, but by expressing a feeling for form, they are able to reach an “intenser” 
expression, only made possible through primitive forms. Agreeing with the Post-
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Impressionists about the expressive use of archaic forms, Hulme is in effect returning to the 
idea of art he articulated in “Romanticism and Classicism” and in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art.” 
For, insofar as the modern abstract artist aims to achieve an “intenser perception of things 
striving towards expression” (266), he resembles the Bergsonian poet-artist who avoids 
“conventional means of expression” (199; cf. 68-69), as well as the classic poet in 
“Romanticism and Classicism,” who strives to express with “intense zest” a specific personal 
emotion (70; cf. 194). This is significant because, as we will shortly see, the kind of abstract 
art Hulme advocates in his essays on art combines an “inhuman” detachment from nature 
while giving the artist freedom of expression. This distances Hulme‟s theory of abstract art 
from that of Worringer, thereby also separating his politics from the politics with which 
Worringer implicates his theory of art. 
 
3. “Humanism” and “anti-humanism” 
The fact that Hulme carries out his defence of abstract art from the standpoint of Riegl‟s 
and Worringer‟s anti-materialist history of art means that he can make broader claims than 
either Reynolds or the Post-Impressionists ever did. While using the anti-materialism of Riegl 
and Worringer to defend his contemporaries‟ experimentation with primitive forms, Hulme 
also employs Riegl‟s and Worringer‟s analyses to claim that the advent of the new art 
signalled a new cultural attitude, a different Kunstwollen. A similar idea underwrites his 
earlier work. In “A Lecture,” Hulme claims that a new form of art is needed to accommodate 
the modern “spirit” or “character” that had changed dramatically (cf. 50, 52, 56), while in 
“Romanticism and Classicism” he announces that “the romantic tradition has run dry” and 
called for a modern “classical revival” (65, 59). Now, in his essays on art, Hulme argues that 
a new form of art is needed to capture the moderns‟ “general attitude” towards the world 
(269). At the same time, he uses the notion that art represents a specific feeling towards the 
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world to campaign against “Progress” and the belief in human perfection. Drawing on Riegl‟s 
differentiation between “haptic” and “optic” art and Worringer‟s distinction between 
“abstraction” and “empathy,” Hulme defines modern “geometric” art as art that rejects the 
“rational humanistic attitude” and that, as such, represents a completely different, anti-
humanist, attitude (286; cf. 269). The essays on art, therefore, are where Hulme‟s aesthetics 
meets his politics, his defence of “geometrical” art transforming in them into a polemic 
against what he terms in the Commentator articles “romanticism.”  
 
In “Modern Art and its Philosophy,” Hulme explains the process by which modern artists 
turn to primitive forms. In the same way as he argued years earlier that the modern poets, 
experiencing the stagnation of having to write poetry in regular metre, rhythm and rhyme, 
sought new forms of poetry, Hulme is now maintaining that modern artists, seeing 
representational art as unsatisfactory, turned to alternative methods of expression. This 
“feeling of dissatisfaction with, and reaction against, existing art,” he explains, has coincided 
with a much more fundamental change in the way that modern individuals conceive of 
themselves and the world (280). As he put it in “Mr. Epstein and the Critics” the previous 
month, “in the peculiar conditions in which we find ourselves, which are really the breaking 
up of an era it has again become quite possible for people ... to have the attitude expressed by 
these [primitive] formulae” (258). In “Modern Art and its Philosophy,” Hulme thus explains 
that artists‟ turn to “geometric” art should be seen as part of a more general change of 
sensibility taking place in artistic circles that is evident from the way artists and critics alike 
are speaking and thinking of art along formalist lines: 
 
The change of attitude betrays itself by changes in the epithets that a man uses ... to 
express his admiration for the work he admires. Most of us cannot state our position, and 
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we use adjectives which in themselves do not explain what we mean, but which, for a 
group for a certain time, by a kind of tacit convention become the „porters‟ or „bearers‟ 
of the complex new attitude which we all recognise that we have in company, but which 
we cannot describe or analyse. At the present time you get this change shown in the 
value given to certain adjectives. Instead of epithets like graceful, beautiful, etc., you get 
epithets like austere, mechanical, clear cut, and bare, used to express admiration. (278) 
 
The reason why the shifting attitude is particularly evident in art, Hulme argues here, is 
because art, which, as Hulme insists in his lecture, is largely an unconscious process (278-
79), possesses the power of exposing the dominant intellectual and cultural trends that may 
be hidden from us. He thus writes in “Modern Art and its Philosophy” that “So thoroughly 
are we soaked in the spirit of the period we live in, so strong is its influence over us, that we 
can only escape from it in an unexpected way, as it were, a side directional like art” (269-70). 
Or, as he puts it otherwise, again in “Modern Art and its Philosophy,” “one‟s mind is so 
soaked in the thought and language of the period, that one can only perceive the break-up of 
the period in a region like art which is ... a kind of side activity” (276). 
 
That art can break through normative modes of thought and expression is an idea that 
Hulme, as I explained in Chapter 3, found in Bergson. Bergson‟s artist, by using a creative 
method similar to intuition, suspends the practical orientation of the intellect and is therefore 
able to “tear aside” the “curtain” or “veil” of conceptual abstractions, thus revealing 
immediate experience (cf. An Introduction to Metaphysics 27-29). A similar idea also 
features in Riegl and Worringer. For Riegl, an investigation of the art of a certain people 
could reveal a great deal about that people‟s Kunstwollen and, therefore, its corresponding 
general attitude. As Riegl explains in Problems of Style, because “The comforting view of 
195 
 
nature is something man creates in his mind,” it follows that it “affects man‟s relation to 
every object in the world without exception” (300). The same worldview that instigates art is 
therefore evident, Riegl claims, in all corresponding human activities: “not only in religion, 
philosophy, science, but also in government and law” (12).
146
 Worringer also holds that art 
instructs the general outlook of a people. As “a disputation of man with nature,” for 
Worringer art is the “same with religion and metaphysics”; what this means, Worringer 
argues, is that there is always a strong “inter-relationship between the absolute artistic 




What is this change that Hulme detected in the general worldview? The new “geometric 
art,” Hulme states repeatedly, heralds the end of the “humanist” worldview, and is “the 
precursor ... of the break up [sic] of the Renaissance humanistic attitude” (286; cf. 257, 263, 
276). Hulme‟s introduction of the term “anti-humanism” has been interpreted by critics in 
terms of a radicalisation of the already authoritarian position he expresses in “Romanticism 
and Classicism.”
148
 For Levenson in particular, Hulme‟s campaign for “anti-humanism” 
marks a turn in his thought towards objective ethics and an increasingly reactionary politics 
(98-99). Hulme‟s advocacy of anti-humanist ethics in “A Notebook” is discussed at length in 
the next and final chapter, where I challenge the claim that his anti-humanism entails a 
reactionary politics. Here, my focus is “anti-humanism” as it appears in Hulme‟s art criticism. 
On close consideration, Hulme‟s “anti-humanism” is revealed to be entirely consonant with 
the “classicism” pronounced in the Commentator articles and in “Romanticism and 
Classicism.” This becomes obvious once we recognise that by “humanist attitude” Hulme has 
                                                 
146 Riegl makes a similar claim in “Main Characteristics of the Late Roman Kunstwollen” 95. 
147 Cf. Worringer‟s claim in Form in Gothic: “Form changes in will ... cannot be purely arbitrary or fortuitous. 
On the contrary, they must have a consistent relation to those spiritual and mental changes which are clearly 
reflected in the historical development of myths, of religions, of philosophical systems, of world conceptions” 
(12). 
148 See, for example, Spanos, “Modern Literary Criticism and the Spatialization of Time: An Existential 
Critique” 93-94; Robinson 120; and H. Carr, “T. E. Hulme and the „Spiritual Dread of Space‟” 102-04. 
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in mind the worldview based on Progress and the belief in human perfectibility, two ideas 
that Hulme associates with romanticism in the Commentator. Indeed, there is no difference 
between the claims Hulme makes in his political articles and the position he defends in his 
essays on art, except that now, instead of dating Progress and the belief in human perfection 
back to the French Revolution and Rousseau, he argues that this set of beliefs originates in 
the Renaissance. 
 
In “Modern Art and its Philosophy,” “Progress” is thus traced back to Copernicus‟ 
rejection of the doctrine of Original Sin which inaugurated, Hulme argues, the idea of man as 
“the centre of the world” (270). Hulme also maintains in “Modern Art and its Philosophy” 
that this humanistic tradition, spanning from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries onwards 
found “its first stage of decay in Rousseau” (271). He makes the same claim in “Mr. Epstein 
and the Critics,” here postulating that there has been “a certain state of mind which has lasted 
from the Renaissance till now, with very little variation,” and which, “taking at first the form 
of the „humanities‟, it has in its degeneracy taken the form of a belief in „Progress‟ and the 
rest of it” (257). Finally, this idea also features in the Preface to Sorel‟s Reflections on 
Violence, where Hulme states that “Humanism contains the germs of the disease that was 
bound to come to its full evil development in Romanticism” (250). What is defined in the 
Commentator as “romanticism,” therefore, in 1913-14 is viewed as the last phase of a longer 
– and on-going – tradition beginning with the Renaissance. In a similar way to his 
Commentator articles, in his art essays Hulme contrasts this attitude with an antagonistic 
view, which he associates with the “religious attitude.” The “stark uncompromising 
bleakness” of this attitude, he asserts in “Mr. Epstein and the Critics,” is the antithesis of 
Rousseau‟s optimistic outlook and what he describes as the “modern progressive conception 
of life” (257-58). As he puts it otherwise, this time in “Modern Art and its Philosophy,” by 
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contrast to “the flat and insipid optimism of the belief in progress,” the anti-humanist attitude 
is “pessimistic” and “world-rejecting” (277). In the review of the “Grafton Group,” Hulme 
likewise explains that this attitude is a “genuine expression of abhorrence of slop and 
romanticism,” asserting that it is “the exact opposite of romanticism and nostalgie” (265).  
 
To understand the sense in which Hulme uses the terms “humanism” and “anti-humanism” 
in his art criticism, it is useful to turn to Worringer, specifically, Worringer‟s contention that 
Classical, Greco-Roman art constitutes a humanisation or “anthropomorphisation” of the 
external world, while primitive, abstract art is based on a contrasting view of the world. 
According to Worringer, the chief characteristic of Classical art is its naturalism, which, in 
Worringer‟s view, is the result of the close connection the Classical artists feel to their 
environment. As he explains in Abstraction and Empathy, the feeling of familiarity with the 
world achieved by “advanced” peoples, their “unproblematic sense of being at home in the 
world,” leads them to create naturalistic artworks, while in religion it results in “a naive 
anthropomorphic pantheism or polytheism” (45). Unlike abstract art that is “life-denying” (cf. 
4), Classical naturalistic art for Worringer represents “the most intimate union between ego 
and work of art” (23), as the “urge to empathy finds its gratification in the beauty of the 
organic” (4). Worringer elaborates on this idea in “Transcendence and Immanence in Art,” 
describing the Classical condition as a “state of equipoise ... in which man and world were 
fused into one.” As he goes on to explain: 
 
In the field of the history of religions, this state is marked by religions which start from 
the principle of immanence and which, wearing the various colours of polytheism, 
pantheism or monism, regard the divine as being contained in the world and identical 
with it. At bottom ... this conception of divine immanence is nothing other than a total 
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anthropomorphisation of the world. The unity of God and world is only another name 
for the unity of man and world. The parallel in the province of art history is not far to 
seek. The Classical feeling for art has its basis in the same fusion of man and world, the 
same consciousness of unity, which is expressed in humanity‟s attribution of a soul to 
all created things. (128) 
 
This state of immanent self-objectification is what Worringer has in mind when he refers to 
“empathy,” a notion he associates with the theory of Theodor Lipps – it “no longer takes the 
aesthetic as the starting-point of its investigations but proceeds from the behavior of the 
contemplating subject,” he writes in Abstraction and Empathy (4) – and which, as Waite has 
pointed out, has a long history in romantic thought, running from Novalis through to Vernon 
Lee (24). In “Transcendence and Immanence in Art,” Worringer locates this belief in the 
unity of man and God in Rousseau‟s idea of “a lost Paradise of humanity in which all created 
things dwelt together in happy innocence and harmony,” contrasting Rousseau‟s paradise 
with the state of the primitives really: not a “reverent devotion to the world, but fear of it ... 
[a] kind of spiritual agoraphobia in the face of the motley disorder and caprice of the 
phenomenal world” (129).  
 
Worringer‟s distinction between the “Classical” and the “primitive” worldviews 
corresponds to that drawn by Hulme and Storer between romanticism and classicism in the 
Commentator. Just as in Hulme‟s and Storer‟s romanticism, in what Worringer calls the 
“Classical” era humans operate as if in unity with God; to use the terminology of 
“Romanticism and Classicism,” Classical art for Worringer is a form of “spilt religion” (62). 
Moreover, in what Hulme and Storer referred to as “classicism,” a state Worringer associates 
with that in which the primitives find themselves, humans acknowledge the absolute duality 
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between themselves and God, stoically accepting their inherent limitations. Thus in 
Abstraction and Empathy the primitive artist is portrayed as someone who possesses an 
“awareness of the limitations of human knowledge” and who acknowledges “the absolute 
dualism of God and the world” (16). In this sense, Worringer‟s primitive artist in Abstraction 
and Empathy recalls Hulme‟s classic poet in “Romanticism and Classicism,” both 
recognising that human nature is “limited” (70). Worringer‟s primitive artist also resembles 
the Conservative citizen in “On Progress and Democracy” and “A Tory Philosophy” – aware 
of his human fallibility, he realises that he is incapable of achieving perfection (cf. 222, 234-
35) – as well as the “classical” revolutionary described in the Preface to Sorel‟s Reflections 
on Violence, who, unlike Rousseau‟s romantic individual, does not believe in “something 
wonderful, of unlimited powers” (249). It is likely that what accounts for the change in 
Hulme‟s terminology is the distinction Worringer draws between “Classical” Greco-Roman 
art and primitive abstract art. In claiming that Hulme abandoned classicism for anti-
humanism in 1913-14, Levenson mistakes the classic, anti-romantic attitude of his 
Commentator articles for Hulme‟s rejection in his essays on art of the emphasis put by artists 
in the Classical period on anthropomorphism. There is no contradiction in Hulme rejecting 
Classical art in “Modern Art and its Philosophy” and asserting in the review of the “Grafton 
Group” that “By temperament I should adopt the classical attitude myself” (263), because he 
uses the term “classical” in two distinct ways. 
 
4. The politics of anti-humanist art 
Worringer‟s critique of Lipps and the distinction he draws between immanence and 
transcendence go beyond a mere rejection of Rousseau‟s optimistic view of human nature. 
The severe political implications that underwrite Worringer‟s theory of art have been 
discussed by various critics, most famously by Georg Lukács and William V. Spanos. Unlike 
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Lukács, who sees Worringer‟s theory of art, specifically as it was executed in Expressionism, 
as subjectivist and nationalist at its base, and thus deeply reactionary, or Spanos, who 
critiques Worringer‟s anti-humanism from an existentialist position, here, I am more 
interested in the way Worringer‟s developmental scheme of art can be read as a critique of 
modernity and in terms of a propagation of authoritarian politics.
149
 Because accusations of 
anti-humanist authoritarianism are customarily waged against Hulme, with his reliance on 
Worringer cited as evidence of his reactionary politics, it is instructive to briefly examine the 





Worringer‟s suspicion of modernity is evident in both Abstraction and Empathy and in 
Form in Gothic (1911). Both begin with the aim of examining the development of European 
art, but end up depicting Southern, Classical art as a foreign invader that has regrettably 
suppressed (though crucially, as Bushart notes, not completely eradicated) the racial 
disposition of Nordic or Germanic people, who, according to Worringer, have always 
displayed an urge to abstraction.
151
 Indeed, in his discussion of abstract art, Worringer 
appears to lament the loss of the collective consciousness of prior times, which he thinks has 
disappeared with the advent of modernity and the surrender of the modern individual to 
empirical knowledge (Abstraction and Empathy 121). This is an idea that, as Bushart 
                                                 
149 Lukács critiques Expressionism‟s fascination with inorganic forms and irrational formalism, a fascination 
which, Lukács argues, betrays an ideology that is subjectivist and nationalistic at its base and thus deeply 
reactionary, with Lukács implicating Worringer in this critique – for Abstraction and Empathy, he writes, is “a 
book of fundamental importance for expressionist theory” (89). Spanos puts forward an existentialist critique of 
Worringer‟s definition of art. In distinguishing between abstract and empathetic art, Spanos argues, Worringer is 
in effect promoting a specific worldview, as geometric art is “a microcosm of an essentially Gnostic macrocosm 
... a universe in which the temporal world (alive and changing objects) is discontinuous with the world of 
eternity (dead and permanent form) and qualitatively inferior, infected ... by the corrupting (i.e., evil) powers of 
time.” By rejecting (or subduing) the temporal world of human existence, Spanos concludes, Worringer‟s vision 
of the world ignores the human in favour of absolute, i.e. absolutist, values (93). 
150 See, for example, Spanos 94; Levenson 97-98; and Robinson 127. 
151 Cf. Abstraction and Empathy 106 and Form in Gothic 114-16. For a discussion of the severe nationalistic 
and racialist implications of Worringer‟s model, see Bushart 74-75. Bushart demonstrates how within 
Worringer‟s developmental scheme of art, we find writ small the nationalistic and often racist programme of 
“German classicism” that had already been put in place by Lamprecht and Dilthey. 
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demonstrates, recurs throughout Worringer‟s writings. In an article on modern architecture 
from 1911, for instance, Worringer likens the modern individual to a woman surrendering 
herself to “female receptivity,” describing “This feminine surrender” in terms of “the will to 
lose one‟s self” (qtd. in Bushart 73). Earlier, in Lukas Cranach (1908), he diagnoses a change 
in worldview, expressing the hope that “The raging pathos of youthful individualism, 
confident of victory, has shrunk pitifully” and that, moreover, the cultural values of the 
Renaissance will be rejected, giving way to the “great, old styles” and “the desire for great, 
necessary values that elevate beyond all the individual noisemaking” (qtd. in Bushart 73). For 
Worringer, the renunciation of Renaissance sensibility ultimately carries the hope of a 
complete transformation of values. He explains the process by which a return to pre-
Renaissance forms of art will herald a will to self-assertion in “Moderne Idealisten,” an 
article dating from 1907-1908:  
 
We stand today in the middle of a crisis, in which the young generation with its 
unconsumed energies and its restless need for activity breaks through all restraints, as 
they are ankered [sic] in an all too differentiated hyperconsciousness, in an all too 
sensitive receptivity, and, unconcerned about yesterday‟s truth, this young generation 
creates for itself a new truth from its own flesh and blood. It appears that we have 
matured for a second, other naiveté that will restore to us the happiness and unself-
consciousness of an active individual. (qtd. in Bushart 74; emphasis in original) 
 
Read in the light of these remarks, Worringer‟s “urge to abstraction” as theorised in 
Abstraction and Empathy is revealed to be politically-charged. In Worringer‟s own terms, the 
primitive artist seeks “happiness” by “taking the individual thing of the external world out of 
its arbitrariness and ... eternalizing it”; he must “wrest” the object out of its natural context 
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and its “unending flux” and thereby give it an “absolute value” (16-17; cf. 18, 37, 42). By 
depriving himself of individualism and self-consciousness, Worringer‟s primitive artist exists 
in a state of transcendence and collective consciousness. Thus, abstract art becomes in 
Abstraction and Empathy both a model for art and a microcosm for society. This idea, 
according to which the modern individual in the twentieth century is as lost and helpless in 
the world as his counterpart is in the “primitive” world, as Kramer and Jennings separately 
note, became the cue for the Expressionism of the “Brucke” circle and Kandinsky.
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According to Bushart, it also forms the fundamental premise of the nationalist “conservative 
reform” of Benz, Hamann and Barthels which, as Bushart shows, was so “characteristic of 
the climate of the time” (74-75). 
 
Even though in his art criticism Hulme makes similar claims to Worringer, he distances 
his theory from Worringer‟s in several important regards. Having presented a scheme of art 
which adheres to Worringer‟s distinction between abstraction and empathy, in “Modern Art 
and Its Philosophy” Hulme declares that “a new geometrical art is emerging” and that, 
furthermore, “this change from a vital to a geometrical art is the product of and will be 
accompanied by a certain change of sensibility, a certain change of general attitude” (276). 
Unlike Worringer, however, Hulme is careful not to draw a direct link between the condition 
of the modern artist and his primitive counterpart. Thus admitting that “these sweeping 
statements run a good deal ahead of the facts,” he makes it clear that, “Though both the new 
Weltanschauung and the new geometrical art will have certain analogies with corresponding 
periods in the past ... it is not for a moment to be supposed that there is anything more than an 
analogy here.” The difference, as he explains, is that the “pessimism” of the new attitude 
“will not be world-rejecting in the sense in which the Byzantine was” (276-77). Moreover, 
                                                 
152 Kramer, ed. xii; Jennings 89. 
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while, like Worringer, Hulme detects a general “confusion” in modern times, he locates this 
confusion not in politics or in society, but in art: 
 
You get at the present moment in Europe a most extraordinary confusion in art, a 
complete breaking away from tradition. So confusing is it that most people lump it 
altogether as one movement and are unaware that it is in fact composed of a great many 
distinct and even contradictory elements, being a complex movement of part that are 
merely reactionary, parts that are dead, and with one part only containing the possibility 
of development. (277) 
 
Hulme‟s reference to an “extraordinary confusion in art” should not be taken out of context. 
This was a time when the various artistic factions in London, broadly described as “Post-
Impressionists,” were organising themselves in different groups, with Rutter, Hind and Lewis 
all complaining that the term “Post-Impressionism” was too vague. That Hulme is using 
Worringer‟s scheme and his distinction between naturalism and abstraction to defend the art 
of those around him is not only indicative of the larger attempt of artists to define themselves 
as a movement, but also of the way he depoliticises Worringer‟s thesis.
153
 Marinetti‟s 
Futurism, he goes on to argue in “Modern Art and its Philosophy,” falls into the category of 
“naturalism,” while the Post-Impressionism of Fry and the Cubism of Metzinger and Gleizes 
must be seen as only a “preliminary and temporary stage of experimentation” that has 
reached its full force in the art of “Mr Epstein and Mr Lewis” (280-82). 
 
                                                 
153 For a historical account of how various artists were forming themselves into different groups in 1913-14, and 
for an discussion of the friction between Fry‟s and Lewis‟ groups, see Bullen 32-34 and Beasley, “„A Definite 
Meaning‟” 62. Hulme was not alone in finding “Post-Impressionism” a vague term in need of refining. See, for 
example, Rutter, “An Art Causerie” 397 and Foreword to the Post-Impressionist and Futurist Exhibition 
catalogue 461-62; Brooke 403-08; Lewis, “Cubist Room” 8; and Hind 3. 
204 
 
The difference between Hulme and Worringer is made even clearer when we compare the 
art which Hulme advocates in his essays to the abstract art described by Worringer in 
Abstraction and Empathy. As already demonstrated, Hulme is adamant that archaic or 
primitive forms should be used in an expressive and therefore personal way. Unlike the 
abstract artist in Abstraction and Empathy who suppresses individual expression by creating a 
self-objectified work, therefore, Hulme‟s modern artist uses archaic forms to enable personal 
expression. In his article on “The London Group,” Hulme sides against the extreme 
abstraction of artists such as Kandinsky who create art “based simply on the idea that abstract 
form, i.e., form without any representative content, can be an adequate means of expression” 
(295). Although Hulme‟s criticism of Kandinsky can be read as an attempt to show that the 
art of Epstein is superior to all other contemporaneous artistic experiments (Hulme goes on to 
explain why Epstein‟s art is also more interesting than the art of Lewis, Wadsworth, 
Hamilton and Gaudier), his claims that form must have a “representative content” and that it 
must be a “means of expression” cannot be dismissed as propagandising for Epstein‟s art.
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Hulme is even more adamant that art should have a “representative element” in “Modern Art: 
Preface Note and Neo-Realism,” now arguing that “the artist cannot work without contact 
with ... nature” (288, 292). As Thistlewood argues persuasively, Hulme could not have 
endorsed a type of visual art that is based exclusively on abstract forms “offering little 
indication as to the nature of an original intuition, or to that aspect of the outside world from 
which it had derived,” because, despite stressing his preference for anti-humanist art, 
Hulme‟s aesthetic remained in 1913-14 largely Bergsonian (29). Thistlewood‟s claim is 
consonant with the assessment made earlier in this chapter, according to which Hulme‟s 
expressive visual artist shares something with the artist in “Bergson‟s Theory of Art.” By 
                                                 
154 Hulme claims that Lewis‟ work “lacks cohesion and unity” and argues that Wadsworth‟s work is “Equally 
abstract.” Although he finds Hamilton‟s work interesting and Etchell‟s drawings “firm and hard in character,” 
and despite the fact that he praises Nevinson‟s work for being “very solid,” singles out Gaudier-Brzeska‟s 
ability and finds Bomberg‟s “sculptural treatment ... admirable,” he states that “the only really satisfying and 
complete work ... is that of Mr. Epstein” (296-97). 
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contrast to the primitive artist who in Abstraction and Empathy strives to produce a “closed 
material individuality” (21-22), Epstein, seen by Hulme as a paradigmatic abstract artist, uses 
primitive forms in a creative, personal, way: his “design,” Hulme writes in “Modern Art: The 
London Group” is in no sense empty, but gives a most impressive and complete expression ... 
of its subject” (298). 
   
Hulme‟s insistence that artists use primitive forms in an expressive way is what lies at the 
heart of his notorious attack on Anthony M. Ludovici in “Mr. Epstein and the Critics.” 
Fascinated by the polemical tone and the swaggering language in which Hulme responded to 
Ludovici‟s negative assessment of Epstein, critics have paid little attention to the argument 
put forward by Ludovici and the reasons why Hulme is so firmly against it.
155
 “Mr. Epstein 
and the Critics” gains a completely different significance once we recognise the 
fundamentally different notions of art proposed by Hulme and Ludovici. Although certainly 
defending the art of his friend Epstein, in “Mr. Epstein and the Critics” Hulme is also 
articulating an important aesthetic and ideological objection to Ludovici‟s notion of art and, 
by consequence, to Worringer‟s model of abstract art, on which Ludovici built his art theory. 
A Nietzsche scholar and art critic, Ludovici is, as far as I know, the first English critic to have 
taken note of the work of Worringer.
156
 With the notable exception of Robinson‟s discussion 
of Ludovici in Poetry, Painting and Ideas, the connection between Ludovici and Worringer 
has gone largely unnoticed by critics. According to Robinson, Ludovici gives Worringer‟s 
argument in Abstraction and Empathy a “„Nietzschean‟ admixture in the cause of political 
propagandism” (100). Mixing ideas from Worringer with Nietzsche‟s distinction between 
“will to live” and “will to power,” Robinson argues, Ludovici uses Worringer and Nietzsche 
                                                 
155 Critics who discuss Hulme‟s verbal attack on Ludovici include A. Jones, “T. E. Hulme, Wilhelm Worringer, 
and the Urge to Abstraction” 2; Levenson 122; and Garver 131. 
156 Critics who have taken Hulme as the first critic in England to have discussed the work of Worringer include 
Read, Introduction to Worringer‟s Form in Gothic x; Cork 140; Holdeim 343; Kramer, ed. viii; and Kimball 46. 
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to campaign for a stratified and radically anti-democratic society, concluding that, insofar as 
Ludovici uses art to make authoritarian demands, his argument is aligned with Hulme‟s 
“reactionary intransigent” aesthetics and politics (106).
157
 Robinson is right in highlighting 
Ludovici‟s fascistic credentials: in later years, Ludovici openly embraced both the anti-
Semitism and the social and economic programmes of Mussolini and Hitler.
158
 What 
Robinson fails to notice is the proximity of Ludovici‟s argument to that of Worringer and, 
more crucially, the significant difference that exists between Ludovici‟s (and Worringer‟s) 
positions and that of Hulme.  
 
In Nietzsche and Art, published in 1911 and advertised in the New Age in September, 
Ludovici launches a fierce ideological critique of “democratic” art, which he associates with 
the art movements of Realism and Naturalism (vii).
159
 Ludovici detects in post-Reformation 
Europe a general social, political and moral malaise that has also infiltrated the arts (46). He 
thus complains that in modern art “There is neither a direction, a goal, nor a purpose” (15), a 
claim he repeats in his 1912 “Introductory Essay” to the Letters of Van Gogh, where he 
berates the “bankrupt, impoverished, democratized, and futile” work of modern artists 
(xxxiv). As he puts it in this essay, in order for art to be truly “great” it needs “some higher 
purpose and direction, some universal aim and aspiration” (xx). Drawing an explicit 
connection between art and politics, Ludovici suggests in Nietzsche and Art that the “highest” 
kind of art is only possible in rigidly stratified, aristocratic, ordered societies, such as that of 
ancient Egypt, where, according to Ludovici, all the citizens were in awe of a ruling authority 
(v, 116). As it turns out, therefore, the reason Ludovici favours primitive art in Nietzsche and 
                                                 
157 Other critics who claim that Ludovici and Hulme share a common agenda include Scholes 47 and Stone 38. 
158 Ludovici expresses his anti-Semitism in Jews, and the Jews in England, published under the pseudonym 
“Cobbett.” On Ludovici‟s appreciation of Mussolini and Hitler and his racist politics, see Stone 50-61. 
159 Nietzsche and Art collects lectures Ludovici delivered at the University College in London during December 




Art is because he views the works of primitive people as generated by a feeling for order and 
a desire for discipline, a desire which regrettably, in Ludovici‟s view, does not exist in 
twentieth-century Britain. In support of his anti-democratic agenda, Ludovici cites Riegl, 
whose Problems of Style he describes as an “excellent work” (104), as well as Worringer, 
whose importance lies in the way he 
 
points out that there is not only a difference of degree, but actually a marked difference 
of kind, between the intensely realistic drawing of the Madeleine finds and of some 
Australian cave painting and rock sculptures, which are the work of the rudest savages, 
and the rhythmic decoration of other races; and that whereas the former are simply the 
result of a truly imitative instinct which the savage does well to cultivate for his own 
self-preservation – since the ability to imitate also implies sharpened detective senses – 
the latter is the result of a genuine desire for order and simple and organised 
arrangement, and an attempt in a small way to overcome confusion. (107) 
 
Drawing on Worringer and freely appropriating Nietzsche‟s distinction between “will to live” 
and “will to power,” Ludovici argues that, whereas advanced or modern people display a 
“will to live,” the primitives are guided by a “will to power.” Naturalistic and Realistic art 
from Monet to Lavery, he maintains, portrays “the universal paralysis of will that has 
overtaken the Art-world,” a paralysis which Ludovici sees as the result of modernity‟s 
insistence on “personality” and which is thus characterised by “Exaggerated individualism 
and anarchy” (8, 52, 100). Ludovici is specifically opposed to the free formal 
experimentation of his contemporaries, something which he finds symptomatic of the modern 
subjective consciousness and lack of self-control (cf. 99-100; 43, 45-48; 116-17). “[This] 
tremulousness, this plebeian embarrassment, this democratic desire to please, above all, this 
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democratic disinclination to assume a position of authority,” he writes in Nietzsche and Art, 
“are things which contradict the very essence of Art, and these are the things which are found 
in the production of almost every European school to-day” (16-17). By contrast, primitive art 
for Ludovici is characterised by “that order, simplicity and transfiguration which the artist‟s 
mind imparts to the content of his production” (125). In mastering the hostile world, Ludovici 
claims, the primitive artist resembles Nietzsche‟s Ruler-Artist expressing a “will to power” in 
both art and politics: “Stimulated by disorder, which he despises, he is driven to his work; 
spurred by the sight of anarchy, his inspiration is government; fertilized by rudeness and 
ruggedness, his will to power gives birth to culture and refinement” (118). Attracted to 
disorder and confusion, this primitive Nietzschean artist aims to “make Life simpler, more 
orderly and better adjusted” (117); his “will to power and his determination to prevail ... 
involves all kinds of things which are antagonistic to democratic theory ... Command, 
Reverence, Despotism, Obedience, Greatness and Inequality” (99).  
 
As is the case with Worringer, in Ludovici‟s conception art becomes a model for society. 
While Worringer never formulated a specific political programme in the way Ludovici did, 
their art criticism carries similar political implications. Ludovici‟s derision of modern 
individualism shares something, even if only in spirit, with Worringer‟s rejection in Lukas 
Cranach of “individual noisemaking” (qtd. in Bushart 73). Moreover, despite the fact that 
Ludovici appropriates Worringer‟s theories a good deal in order to uphold his aristocratic 
elitism, his suspicion of a foreign “woman-ridden European” modernity in his Introduction to 
Letters of Van Gogh (xxxv), his racially-charged critique of the “Sick” modern culture, his 
insistence that art ought to restore the order that is lacking in modernity (a notion that 
Scholes, writing on Ludovici‟s Ruler-Artist, compares to what Benjamin describes as the 
“fascist aestheticization of politics” (44)), and his desire for a ruler-Artist, all rather 
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unnervingly recall Worringer‟s argument in “Moderne Idealisten.” Specifically, Ludovici‟s 
claims echo Worringer‟s idea in “Moderne Idealisten” that art should aim to reinstate in the 
Germanic people “the happiness and unself-consciousness of an active individual,” and bring 
to mind the essay‟s overarching demand for “self-assertion” in place of “self-surrender” (qtd. 
in Bushart 74). Finally, in a way not too dissimilar to Ludovici‟s appropriation of Nietzsche‟s 
philosophy, Worringer‟s antagonistic model of art history, as Waite and Masheck have 
separately demonstrated, draws on the Nietzschean idea of a chthonic struggle between the 
Apollonian and Dionysian in Birth of Tragedy, a relation which suggests further common 




In the years after the publication of Nietzsche and Art, Ludovici continued to promulgate 
his political and aesthetic ideas in the pages of the New Age, becoming from July 1912 
onwards the journal‟s chief art critic. In his articles for the New Age, Ludovici repeatedly 
berates modern art, launches numerous attacks on the Post-Impressionists and campaigns for 
“ordered” art. A week before Hulme‟s “Mr. Epstein and the Critics” appeared in the New 
Age, Ludovici published an article in the New Age reviewing three exhibitions: Maurice 
Asselin‟s show at the Carfax Gallery; the exhibition by members of the “New English Art 
Club” at the Royal Society of British Artists; and Epstein‟s solo show at the Twenty-One 
Gallery. Reiterating the point he made in Nietzsche and Art years earlier, Ludovici begins his 
review by arguing that all works of art ought to be animated by a sense of “order”: 
 
when the graphic artist is animated by the spirit of no great order or scheme of life, 
graphic art loses its vitality, the subject picture dies, or better still is killed, and painting 
becomes one of two things, either a medium in which new tricks of technique are 
                                                 
160 Waite 25-28; Masheck 48-53. 
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attempted for their own sake, or a means of expressing simply the idiosyncrasies of 
individuals divorced from any great vital arrangement or scheme. (“Art: The Carfax, 
the Suffock Street, and the Twenty-One Galleries” 213) 
 
Turning first to the show on at the Carfax, Ludovici states that he could see this “order” in the 
nature paintings of Maurice Asselin, though not in Asselin‟s nudes because “frankly,” as he 
admits, “I do not like the nude save when it is clothed in the spirit of some ruling order” 
(214). He can also see it in a few works on at the Royal Society of British Artists, specifically 
Augustus John‟s “Cartoon – The Flute of Pan” and Paul Wilson Steer‟s “Sunset.” What 
Asselin‟s, John‟s and Steer‟s works have in common, in Ludovici‟s view, is that they avoid 
formal experimentation: in all these cases, the artist does not try to impose his personal 
expression on the audience but, on the contrary, tenders all authority to outside sources. 
Asselin‟s oil paintings are thus “highly simplified transcripts” of nature, while the “beautiful 
boy” in John‟s “Cartoon” depicts, according to Ludovici, a beautiful and virtuous “brand of 
human being” (214). In any case, Ludovici definitely cannot see this “order” in the work of 
Epstein. One detects in the sculptures exhibited at the Twenty-One Gallery, he argues, “the 
idiosyncrasy or individual angle of the isolated ego.” Epstein‟s art, Ludovici goes on to 
claim, is the art of a “minor and non-value-creating” individual and the result of modern 
individualism; it is of “no interest whatsoever,” he concludes, “save for cranks and people 
who have some reason of their own in abetting or supporting purposeless individualism à 
outrance” (215). 
 
In “Mr. Epstein and the Critics” the following week, Hulme reacts angrily to Ludovici‟s 
article. He calls Ludovici a “charlatan,” a “little Cockney intellect,” “a light weight 
superman” and a “little bantam” (259-60). Mocking his “very comical little book on 
211 
 
Nietzsche,” moreover, he likens Ludovici‟s interpretation of Nietzsche to the reaction of “a 
child of four in a theatre watching a tragedy based on adultery” (259) and dismisses it as 
“stupid and childish” (260).
161
 What frustrates Hulme the most, however, is Ludovici‟s attack 
on Epstein‟s art: apparently lost for words, Hulme fumes that “The most appropriate means 
of dealing with him would be a little personal violence,” adding sarcastically that “the 
unworthy sentiment of pity for the weak, which, in spite of Nietzsche, still moves us, 
prevents us dealing drastically, with this rather light-weight superhuman” (260). Although 
Hulme‟s “bashing” of Ludovici may be, as Garver argues, paradigmatic of the “belligerent” 
swagger that we find in many modernists (131), with Trotter adding that this “bashing” is a 
fundamental component of modernism‟s “polemical armoury” (232), Hulme‟s polemical tone 
should not detract us from the point he makes in this essay. Ludovici‟s conception of art as 
the expression of a “greater” and impersonal “order” is antithetical to the art Hulme is 
advocating in his essays on art in that it suppresses creativity and originality. John‟s “The 
Flute of Pan,” Hulme argues in “Mr. Epstein and the Critics,” “is the result of no personal 
creative idea, but is entirely a derivative conglomeration of already existing pretty ideas” 
(260). As discussed earlier, for Hulme it is important that the modern artist uses primitive 
forms to achieve a feat of new and personal expression. Ludovici‟s dismissal of originality as 
“purposeless,” means that he is advocating imitation. Furthermore, whereas Ludovici insists 
that art should never express the “idiosyncrasies of individuals,” Hulme holds, like the Post-
Impressionists, that artists do not merely reproduce primitive forms, but that they use these 
forms as a mode of personal expression. Thus “The formula used,” he writes in “Mr. Epstein 
                                                 
161 By the time when Hulme wrote “Mr. Epstein and the Critics,” Ludovici had published, as well as Nietzsche 
and Art, two books on Nietzsche: a collection of lectures delivered at the University of London in the winter of 
1908 and published under the title Who is to be Master of the World? (1909), and a short introduction to 
Nietzsche‟s philosophy entitled Nietzsche, his Life and Works (1910), and to which Hulme is more likely 
referring when he describes it as a “comical little book.” Ludovici uses this hundred-page introduction to 
Nietzsche to attack Christianity and Democracy – “the grandmother and the mother of what is called „progress,‟ 
„modernity‟” (34) – and makes a case for “a complete transvaluation of all values” needed in order to “alter man 
and make him more worthy of his past” (73). He concludes that the lesson from Nietzsche is that society can 
only function through “the rearing of a select and aristocratic caste” (81). 
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and the Critics,” “must be a natural expression of the feeling you are getting at and not a mere 
imitation of an exotic or romantic past” (257).  
 
Because Hulme puts such great emphasis on artists using primitive forms in a new, 
personal and expressive way, the art which he advocates is significantly different to the kind 
of art favoured by Ludovici. This, in turn, guarantees that his aesthetic programme has 
different ideological implications to that of Ludovici. While Ludovici‟s campaign for 
“primitive” art is part of a larger project aiming to introduce “order” into what he views as 
the modern individualistic society, the same cannot be said of Hulme. For Hulme is adamant 
that the modern artist should use primitive forms only as a medium for his own personal 
expression, an idea also fostered by the Post-Impressionists, whose art Ludovici views as a 
prime example of what he describes as “democratic” art (“Art: the Pot-Boiler Paramount” 66-
67). In insisting on primitive forms being used as a mode of personal expression, Hulme sets 
himself apart both from Worringer and Ludovici, who, as we have seen, argue for the 
complete suppression of the individual in favour of a higher “ordering” authority in a similar 
manner. Finally, Hulme does not envisage, like Ludovici (or Maurras), a return to a past form 
of art. Thus, whereas Ludovici and Maurras long for a return to the “order” of Egyptian and 
Provencal art respectively, in “Romanticism and Classicism,” citing Maurice Denis‟ claim 
that the Post-Impressionists consider themselves “Classics,” Hulme contends that the 
“classical” attitude is more likely to find its expression as Post-Impressionism rather than as a 
“return to Pope” (65).
162
 A similar claim is also made by Storer, who writes in the 
Commentator that “The first signs of the anti-romantic reaction will come ... from the young 
                                                 
162 Hulme is probably referring here to Denis‟ article entitled “Cézanne” and translated by Fry for The 
Burlington Magazine in 1910, in which Denis argues that Cezanne is a “classic” (63). In December 1910, Fry 
had described Cezanne‟s use of form as “of a supremely classical temperament” (131), while in 1912 he spoke 
of the “Classic spirit” of Post-Impressionism and explained that “I do not mean by Classic, dull, pedantic, 
traditional, reserved, or any of those similar things which the word is often made to imply … I mean that they do 
not rely for their effect upon associated ideas, as I believe Romantic and Realistic artists invariably do” (“The 
French Group” 354-55). 
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men now occupying themselves with the violent and individual methods of Post-
Impressionism” (“Art Notes” 26 Apr. 1911: 375). Both Robinson‟s claim that Hulme and 
Ludovici share a common agenda and Levenson‟s assessment that by defending abstract art 
Hulme is, in effect, promulgating an “anti-democratic” politics, must be considerably revised. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Hulme‟s campaign against the “Renaissance” is best understood in terms of the broader 
shift in the early twentieth century against representational art, which artists and critics such 
as Fry and Bell associated with the Renaissance tradition. Like the Post-Impressionists, in his 
art criticism Hulme argues for a break from existing art forms, advocating experimentation 
with primitive, archaic art forms. In doing so, he returns to the idea he first expresses in “A 
Lecture” and which he further develops in “Romanticism and Classicism,” namely that art 
ought to be in tune with the “spirit” or “general attitude” of its time. Elaborating on this 
notion, he tries to show that there is evidence in the second decade of the twentieth century of 
a new anti-romantic or anti-humanist era. Despite mixing aesthetics and politics in a fashion 
similar to Worringer and Ludovici, however, Hulme‟s conception of art is significantly 
different to both the art advocated by Worringer and by Ludovici. On the one hand, it is a lot 
more compatible with the theory of art promulgated by the Post-Impressionists than it is with 
Worringer‟s brand of German Expressionism or Ludovici‟s “aristocratic” art. On the other 
hand, the fact that, like Fry and Bell, Hulme argues that modern artists‟ experimentation with 
archaic forms is justified only insofar as the artists employ these forms as a vehicle to achieve 
their own mode of personal expression, suggests that the political implications of his version 
of abstract art differ in important ways from those of the art advocated by Worringer and 
Ludovici, who do not allow space for individual expression. In this sense, Hulme‟s turn to 
abstraction cannot be understood merely in terms of a larger shift in his thought in 1913-14 
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towards authoritarianism. Perhaps most importantly, acknowledging the way in which Hulme 
draws on the anti-materialism of Worringer to defend the formal experimentations of his 
contemporaries goes a long way to showing that he does not, as is often assumed, endorse 
Worringer‟s ideas uncritically. Rather, Hulme‟s interpretation of Worringer‟s theories is 
paradigmatic of the way that he also freely appropriates the ideas of Kahn, Bergson and 
Lasserre and Maurras elsewhere in his work. As we will see in the next and final chapter, in 
his war writings Hulme returns to many of the questions he addressed in his essays on art, 
challenging the “romantic” and “humanistic” tradition in arts, ethics and politics and offering 
a far more detailed exposition of anti-humanism. As such, it is impossible to understand 
























On 10 August 1914, less than a week after the Liberal government declared war on the 
Central Powers, Hulme enlisted in the army. During his service, which lasted until his death 
in battle in September 1917, Hulme wrote prolifically. In a number of letters addressed to his 
family from the front and published by Hynes in Further Speculations in 1955 under the title 
“Diary from the Trenches,” he described his experience of trench warfare, while in articles 
published in the New Age and the Cambridge Magazine as “War Notes,” he contributed to 
topical debates relating to the military and political handling of the war campaign, as well as 
discussing the more general question of the moral righteousness of war. In “War Notes,” 
Hulme is firmly in support of the war, repeatedly stating the political and moral case for 
military intervention, berating the “humanism” of those who oppose war on ethical grounds. 
He explains the reasons for his disagreement with the pacifist ethic in more detail in “A 
Notebook,” his last known work, in which he distinguishes between two contrasting 
conceptions of ethical values, arguing that while pacifism rests on an “anthropomorphic” 
ethic, ethical values are in reality objective and, therefore, absolute.  
 
Critics tend to focus on Hulme‟s defence of war and on the ethics he promulgates in “A 





 The problem with this view of Hulme as a militarist who supported 
war on moral principle, is that it ignores the context and the circumstances in which Hulme 
formulated his war-time arguments. A comprehensive reading of his war writings, I show in 
this chapter, discredits the common interpretation of Hulme‟s views on the war as extreme or 
radically reactionary. Beginning with an examination of the letters from the trenches and 
moving on to the anti-pacifism essays and, finally, his argument for objective ethics in “A 
Notebook,” I explore Hulme‟s reaction to fighting in the trenches, the reasons that led him to 
support the war, and the political implications of his conception of ethical values as objective. 
As it becomes clear, Hulme was not a militarist, nor was his politics authoritarian. Moreover, 
contra critics who see the years 1915-17 as marking a distinct phase in Hulme‟s career, in his 
war writings Hulme proffers an ideological renunciation of “humanist” politics and ethics and 
a philosophical critique of intellectualism that are utterly in step with claims he made 
elsewhere in his writings. 
 
2. Trench warfare: desperation and perseverance 
As many critics and historians have shown, the Great War had a tremendous emotional 
impact on those who fought in it.
164
 As is conveyed in his letters from the front, Hulme was 
no exception. At first, he was enthusiastic. Quick to enlist in the army, Murray remembered 
him “bubbling over with delighted anticipation” at the prospect of joining the war effort, 
while Hulme himself admitted to Marsh that he was “excited about the thing” (qtd. in 
Ferguson 183, 217-18). This enthusiasm was shared by many poets and artists close to him, 
including Aldington, Hueffer, Gaudier-Brzeska, Pound and Lewis, but, also, as military 
historians stress, by millions of volunteers who were driven to war by a genuine, however 
                                                 
163 See, for example, Read, Introduction to Speculations x; A. Jones, The Life and Opinions of T. E. Hulme 143; 
Levenson 100; and Susser 360. 






 There is evidence of this “naive” excitement in many of Hulme‟s letters 
from the front. He finds, for example, the feeling of being waved off the dock “thoroughly” 
enjoyable; knowing that he is being seen by “the girls at the windows,” he confesses, makes 
the whole event “very amusing” (313). Once at the front, he writes home that having to sleep 
in stables “sounds dreadful but it‟s really all right” (313). In fact, he describes his first 
experience of war as rather pleasant: the shed that makes the army‟s Rest Camp is “quite 
nice” and the “piles of food” being prepared for the soldiers are “impressive” (314). Eager to 
go to the trenches and to experience, as he tells his father, the “real thing” (qtd. in Ferguson 
188), Hulme volunteered to carry large bundles of wood up the front line because “I wanted 
to see what the trenches were like” (318). That it was taking so long to be finally deployed 
was, he writes on 16 January 1915, “to my annoyance” (320). 
 
As the war went on, though, Hulme‟s initial excitement was severely tempered; 
Ferguson‟s claim that “trench warfare seems neither to have horrified nor greatly surprised 
him” is difficult to believe (211).
166
 Finally making it to the trenches, Hulme immediately 
found himself in “a kind of nightmare, in which you are in the middle of an enormous saucer 
of mud with explosions & shots going off all round the edge” (319). Crawling in the mud, 
marching on “uneven ground in the dark,” “walking across a flat heath or common at night” 
(319) – he had, of course, depicted all these scenes earlier in “Cinders,” where he described 
the world around him as a “primeval chaos” (13) and had made references to a “fringe of 
cinders” (17), a “white moonlit field” (18), “the cinders and the mud” (18), “a great desert 
lifeless” (22), “a floating heroic world,” an “ash-pit of cinders” and “cold walks, of the lines 
that lead nowhere” (17). Yet, even if he had written about cindery landscapes and the 
                                                 
165 On the attitudes towards the war of those in Hulme‟s circle, see Hynes, A War Imagined 5-8; Peppis 98; and 
Moody 260-61. For civilians‟ reaction to the declaration of war, see Winter 29; Stevenson 201-02; and Joll and 
Martel 271. According to Ferguson, Hulme did not expect the war to last more than a few weeks (cf. 183). 
166 A. Jones makes a similar point to Ferguson. See The Life and Opinions of T. E. Hulme 132-33. 
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existential anxiety of facing a universe without any order or structure before, something that, 
as many critics rightly noticed, must have at least made the experience of the desolate 
landscapes of the Western Front look somewhat more familiar, nothing could have prepared 
him for the harsh reality of trench-warfare.
167
 The operation at the Belgian front, he was soon 
to realise, was different to his preconceptions about warfare. “The first thing that looked 
characteristic of war (in the old Boer War scene),” he writes in one letter, “was where we 
were overtaken by a transport wagon taking food, guarded by men on horseback with rifles 
slung across their shoulders” (316-17). Fighting in the trenches must have struck him as a 
completely different “scene.” 
 
The Honourable Artillery Company was stationed in the areas around Kemmel and St 
Eloi. During Hulme‟s brief tenure at the front, lasting from January to April 1915, the 
Company‟s military focus was to take over the German stronghold of Spanbrock Moelen in 
the Petit Bois area (Ferguson 209-11). The task was proving especially difficult, and the 
attempt was marred by successive failures, culminating in the disasters of March and April 
1915. Continuously losing ground to the much more efficient and better-equipped German 
army, the Allies, exposed to continuous shelling and gunfire, were forced to spend lengthy 
periods of time in the trenches or in retreat. The harsh weather conditions – there was frost, 
snow and incessant rain – meant that soldiers were perpetually soaked in the mud. Hulme 
describes the Company‟s Rest Camp as “a large space of clayey earth, no grass ... all pulped 
up into mud” (314). He recalls how on his first day at the frontier, he had to sleep in “a pool 
of black mud ... with continually feet fighting all the night” (315); then, marching towards the 
trenches, “It was pouring with rain,” the roads were “simply fearful with mud” and the men 
were “exposed to shelling” (316-17). Stuck in a “circular reserve trench” near the Company‟s 
                                                 
167 McGuinness xvi-xvii; Ferguson 211-12; H. Carr, “T. E. Hulme and the Spiritual Dread of Space” 105-06. 
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headquarters in Vermizeele, he writes of how he had “to crawl along on my hands & knees, 
through the mud in pitch darkness & every now and then seemed to get stuck altogether,” 
confessing that “I don‟t think I‟ve been so exasperated for years” (320). In the trenches, the 
mud was worse and there was also the unremitting shelling. Unlike the much more 
comfortable German trenches, the Allies‟ trenches were shoddy, smelly and extremely 
unsafe. Lacking both in height and in fencing, they provided little refuge from the rain, the 
enemy fire and the shelling.
168
 Hulme found them “fearfully muddy” (324; cf. 318) and 
“miserable” (325), complaining that they could be more accurately described as “ditch[es] 
with sandbags on top” (325); lying in them, he claims, “felt just like being in your grave” 
(323). The soldiers‟ exposure to German shelling meant that the whole experience was not 
only, as Hulme describes it, “uncomfortable,” but also life-threatening: the shells, he writes, 
“seemed to burst just over your head, you seem to anticipate it killing you in the back, it hits 
just near you and you get hit on the back with clods of earth” (322).  
 
Like so many other soldiers fighting in the trenches, Hulme found it hard to convey his 
experience of fighting at the front in writing; as he tells his family, “It‟s very difficult to 
describe anything to you, to at all make you realise what is actually like” (327; emphasis in 
original). Not that he knew himself what to make of what he was seeing. Digging trenches 
under a “very clear starry night” in January, he notes that everything looked “picturesque”; 
but, then again, “In reality,” he reflects, “there is nothing picturesque about it” (321); instead, 
“It‟s the most miserable existence you can conceive of” (321). On another occasion, German 
shells landing around him, Hulme describes how the landscape was “absolutely peaceful,” the 
nearby town appearing “absolutely white in the sun and immobile as if it would always be 
like that ... out of time and space altogether” (323). This was not to say that it was really a 
                                                 
168 For a description of living conditions in the trenches, see Fussell 42 and Ferguson 209. 
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pleasant experience; at times like these, he admits, “You‟ve got to amuse yourself ... and 
romanticising the situation is a good way as any other” (323). In truth, as he wrote to his 
father in February describing the same event, he felt that he “shall be very pleased indeed 
when the whole thing is over” (qtd. in Ferguson 199). 
 
In March, the attack on the spur of Spanbrock Moelen proved catastrophic. The Allies 
came under “friendly fire” and after suffering heavy casualties the operation had to be 
eventually aborted. Describing the event to his family, Hulme appears particularly moved. He 
remembers soldiers “creeping along the road,” a scene which he finds “extremely depressing” 
(328), and “Enormous red flames, exactly like a poster of war & destruction & then miserable 
looking black figures & probably very tired people crawling out” (329). After the attack, he 
“saw a man come staggering across a field as if he were drunk, holding his head, finally 
falling down just outside our barbed wire entanglement. It turned out to be a Tommy,” he 
states, “who had been blown right out of our trenches by our own artillery” (328-29). 
Eventually, the Company was forced to retreat in the trenches, the soldiers turning their 
attention to the “RB” trenches opposite St Eloi mound (330). But they were again 
unsuccessful, and following a spell in Dickebusch, they finally returned to the trenches on 29 
March, this time to defend the trenches stretching from Viertstraat-Wytschaeete Road to the 
mound of St Eloi. The weather was dreadful, the soldiers were under continuous attack, and 
Hulme was tired, desperate and frustrated. He writes home that on one occasion “We were 
marched onto a chateau all blown to pieces” only to be made to “wait about 2 hours outside”; 
“That‟s how they do things in the army,” he complains, adding that the authorities “never 
seem to think 5 minutes before they do a thing.” When the soldiers returned to the trenches, 
“There were no shelters and it poured continually for several hours”; he was “absolutely tired 
out” (329). The operation lasted until the end of May and resulted in 127 personnel killed or 
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wounded. Hulme was among those shot; wounded from a bullet that hit him on the elbow, in 
April 1915 he was moved back to London for recuperation. 
 
Hulme‟s experiences from the front formed the basis of “Trenches: St. Eloi,” a poem 
published under Pound‟s name, first in Catholic Anthology in November 1915, and then 
again in Umbra five years later.
169
 Given that the poem was most likely composed by Pound, 
it is perhaps unsurprising that it has received so little attention from Hulme critics. Yet, used 
speculatively, a brief analysis of the poem sheds light on Hulme‟s feelings and thoughts 
about the war and, as we will see, reveals a lot about his general attitude towards the war. 
According to Pound, “Trenches: St. Eloi” is an “abbreviation of some of [Hulme‟s] talk made 
when he came home with his first wound in 1915” (Umbra 123). Pound‟s claim is supported 
by the fact that the images depicted in the poem correspond directly to events described in 
Hulme‟s letters:  
 
Over the flat slope of St Eloi 
A wide wall of sandbags. 
Night, 
In the silence desultory men 
Pottering over small fires, cleaning their mess-tins: 
To and fro, from the lines, 
Men walk as on Piccadilly, 
Making paths in the dark, 
Through scattered dead horses, 
                                                 
169 See Catholic Anthology 22 and Umbra 125. A handwritten copy of the poem is found in Hulme‟s papers at 
Hull University Library. As far as I can tell, it is not in Hulme‟s writing and it is much more likely that it was 
copied by Kate Lechmere. See DHU/9. For details concerning the composition of the poem, see Schuchard 
“Eliot and Hulme in 1916” 1092n20 and Eliot‟s Dark Angel, 226n19. See also A. Jones, The Life and Opinions 
of T. E. Hulme 151 and Comentale, “Hulme‟s Feelings” 188. 
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Over a dead Belgian‟s belly. 
 
The Germans have rockets. The English have no  
rockets. 
Behind the line, cannon, hidden, lying back miles. 
Before the line, chaos: 
 
My mind is a corridor. The minds about me are  
corridors. 
Nothing suggests itself. There is nothing to do  
but keep on. 
 
There are references to the “ditch[es] with sandbags on top” (325) that Hulme found so 
uncomfortable to live in while at the front, the peaceful yet nerve-wracking silence at night – 
“Its [sic] fairly quiet up in the trenches,” he writes in one letter, adding that “The only thing 
that makes you feel nervous is when the star shells go off & you stand out revealed quite 
clearly as in daylight” (319), and the soldiers trying to keep warm by lighting a brazier, “i.e. 
an old bucket with holes knocked in it, burning charcoal & coke” (320). The “desultory men” 
in the poem bear a stark resemblance to the soldiers in Hulme‟s battalion, whom he describes 
in the letters as marching in the dark through a field “full of dead things, dead animals here & 
there, dead unburied animals, skeletons of horses destroyed by shell fire” (321; cf. 319, 327, 
329), as well as the “troops” who “going always in the same direction make definite paths” 
(330). Finally, the poem recalls the experience of the sniper in Hulme‟s battalion who 
“discovered one of the paths that we walk over led right over the chest of a dead peasant 




The scene opens at St. Eloi, the place where he was fighting in the trenches between 
March and April 1915. The soft intonation of “flat,” “slope,” “wide” and “wall” creates an 
almost serene atmosphere and the alliteration of “l” in “flat,” “slope,” “Eloi” and “wall” 
achieves a slow, slurring effect. The scene is however quickly interrupted by the advent of 
“Night,” as the poem switches abruptly to a silent and dark place (emphasised by the 
complete absence of vision), where “desultory men” potter and aimlessly clean “their mess-
tins,” and, in an image that is reminiscent both of the crowd floating over London Bridge in 
Eliot‟s The Waste Land and the living dead in Pound‟s Canto VII, “walk as on Piccadilly,” 
cruising over “scattered dead horses.”
170
 In having men “pottering” and walking 
purposelessly “to and fro” in silence, the poem evokes what Hulme describes in the letters as 
the “curious” effect of war: “this continuous shelling and the apprehension of it,” he writes in 
February, “has altered some men. They keep very quiet all day long & hardly say anything” 
(325). In many instances in the letters, Hulme expresses his inability to convey the total 
reality of the experience and the poem‟s presentation of the soldiers working in silence can be 
seen to be playing to this idea that war can only be experienced, but that it can never be 
reproduced in words.
171
 At the same time, by rendering Piccadilly into a dystopic non-place 
and portraying the soldiers walking on a dead land, the poem captures the anomie and 
deracination of war: “there is nothing certain or fixed”; “You never come back to the same 
billets,” Hulme notes in his letters, but, rather, “You have no place that belongs to you. You 
really are as nomadic as an animal” (326).  
 
                                                 
170 See Eliot‟s The Waste Land: “A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many / I had not thought death had 
undone so many” (lines 63-64) and Pound‟s Canto VII: “Life to make mock of motion: / For the husks move, 
before me, move, / The words rattle: shells given out by shells” (lines 106-08). 
171 Both Binding and Leed have described how war, as a form of ritual, is necessarily a nonverbal event. See 
Binding 60 and Leed 74. 
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The opening vignette is succeeded by two brief insertions returning attention to the reality 
of war by presenting the following two incontestable and irreversible facts: “The Germans 
have rockets. The English have no / rockets.” The break at the end of the line both highlights 
the destitution of the English army – they “have no” – and mimics the rocketing suffered by 
the soldiers in the trenches: just as the word “rockets” drops uninterrupted in the poem, 
shelling was, as Hulme describes it, unexpected, seemingly arbitrary, and nothing could be 
done to stop it (cf. 322). The advantage of the German army over the English forces is 
reflected in the structure of the sentence that follows: it is the longest line of the poem and its 
polysyllabic nuance is prolonged through the use of commas helping spell out the fact that 
the Germans had an organised, efficient trench line that stretched for miles. This is in sharp 
contrast to the situation in the English camp that becomes one with the “chaos” of the dead 
man‟s land. The weakness of the English army, the fear of the unknown, the desolate 
landscape that, as Hulme puts it in the letters, makes the experience of walking seem that it is 
always leading “up to an abyss” (326) are all summed up in the word “chaos.”  
 
The colon at the end of “chaos” suggests that a description or explanation will follow and, 
indeed, the poem switches to a first-person voice for an unnamed speaker to exclaim: “My 
mind is a corridor. The minds about me are / corridors.” The break serves to re-enact the 
sense of being lost, the lines forming a visual labyrinth. As the narrow trenches which Hulme 
describes in his letters become “corridors” in the minds of the speaker and those around him 
(cf. 321, 322), any distinction between the topography and its perception by the subject 
disappears. Fussell, Leed, Das and Harvey have all demonstrated the ways in which the 
experience of trench-warfare altered the perception of topography, with soldiers having to 
endure an almost complete lack of vision and restricted movement.
172
 There are many 
                                                 
172 Fussell 76; Leed 77; Das, Touch and Intimacy 73; Harvey 87. 
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references in Hulme‟s letters to instances when the experience of fighting in the trenches 
causes him to have a distorted and claustrophobic picture of the landscape, as well as to 
moments when lack of vision affects his thinking. Crawling on his hands and knees in a 
narrow trench, for example, he was made to “feel shut in,” while in a dug-out that was “just 
deep enough for us to crawl through,” he felt like he was in “a rabbit hole” (320, 329). In 
another letter, he describes the desperation of waiting in the trenches for reserve, spelling out 
the agony of not being able to see at all: “You listen & think you hear voices & feet ... Then it 
turns out that you were mistaken [and] a German shell reveals them to you half-way across 
the field” (325). The absence of vision makes him reflect that “It‟s curious to think of the 
ground between the trenches, a bank which is practically never seen by anyone in the 
daylight” (321; cf. 324). On his first visit to the trenches, one January night, Hulme 
experienced the landscape as a labyrinth, noting in his letters that “You simply must keep up, 
because if you once lost the man in front, you wouldn‟t know what on earth to do, you might 
even walk up to the German lines” (319); and, when he was able to go on a hill to see the 
view, the landscape appeared endless and hostile: “we can see for miles our own & beyond 
the German lines ... then later see, it seems miles away, the white smoke of the shell bursting” 
(320). He was thus led to admit that “the mere fact that in a certain direction there really are 
the German lines, seems to alter the feeling of a landscape,” because, as he explains, “You 
unconsciously orient things in reference to it” (326). This experience of the “inescapability” 
of the landscape is conveyed in the poem through the “Night” prohibiting clear vision; the 
depiction of men “Making paths in the dark,” lacking panoramic view; the condensation of 
the landscape into “chaos”; and the description of the minds of men as “corridors.” By the 
end of the poem, it becomes extremely difficult to separate the physical properties of the 
landscape from the mental attitude of those in it, a situation in which the subject appears 
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robbed of both agency and purpose.
173
 This feeling of inanition is intensified in the following 
line, with the speaker conceding that “Nothing suggests itself / There is nothing to do...” The 
line, however, breaks and the stoic acceptance of the fact that a tragic fate awaits is 
complemented by the determination to “keep on.” The speaker must somehow find a way of 
dealing with the harsh reality of trench warfare and the physical and mental destitute; he must 
find the power, that is, to continue in adversity, in a way not too dissimilar to the 





The reason why a close study of “Trenches: St. Eloi” is pertinent here is because both its 
tone and theme relate Hulme‟s experience of fighting in the trenches, thus discrediting the 
idea that he was not affected by the war; more importantly, the poem‟s message is in line 
with Hulme‟s assessment in “War Notes” that war is a necessary evil requiring sacrifice. This 
idea, as we will see further on in this chapter, is one of the reasons why Hulme supported the 
war. Most of the war poems at the time were written by civilians and it is easy to imagine 
how Hulme, just like any other soldier who experienced the harsh reality of war first hand, 
would have rejected idealistic representations of war by civilian authors and journalists.
175
 
Rejecting what Yeats called in his 1936 Introduction to the Oxford Book of Modern Verse the 
“passive” suffering of so many war poems (xxxv), “Trenches: St. Eloi” avoids evoking the 
heightened emotions we find in Sassoon, Owen, Grenfell, Thomas, Seeger or Blunden, and, 
like Hulme‟s “classical” poet, the narrator in the poem “never flies away into the 
                                                 
173 This point is made by Das, who argues in “War Poetry and the Realm of the Senses” that the volatile life at 
the front denied soldiers both agency and purpose, as their survival depended on factors over which they had no 
control (75). 
174 This willingness to never be discouraged when faced with an impossible task is most famously articulated in 
Eliot‟s “East Coker,” where “each venture / Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate / With shabby 
equipment always deteriorating / In the general mess of imprecision of feeling, / Undisciplined squads of 
emotion” (lines 180-83). According to Josipovici, this passage is “almost ... a manual of Modernism” (77). 
175 In A War Imagined, Hynes demonstrates that the idealistic representation of war at home was at odds with 
the reality of war as experienced by soldiers (119). In a letter to John Quinn, Pound pays tribute to Hulme for 





 Rather, the poem‟s “tempered” tone accommodates the view 
that war requires sacrifice and endurance. Unlike Owen or Sassoon, who reject the vanity of 
war and openly criticise its inhumanity, in “Trenches: St. Eloi” war is presented as a struggle 
which one must simply “keep on.” As Moody and Longenbach have separately observed, the 
poem‟s undertone shares something with the Japanese and Chinese poems that Pound was 
translating at the time for Cathay.
177
 “Song of the Bowmen of Shu,” for example, is told, like 
“Trenches: St. Eloi,” from the perspective of soldiers and depicts the conflicting emotions of 
fighting men as they are forced to acknowledge that “we have no comfort / Our sorrow is 
bitter, but we would not return to our country” (ll. 12-13). In a similar manner, “Leave-
Taking Near Shoku” concludes almost in resignation that “Men‟s fates are already set / There 
is no need of asking diviners” (ll. 10-11), while “South Folk in Cold Country” stoically 
asserts that “Hard fight gets no reward / Loyalty is hard to explain” (ll. 10-11). In this last 
poem, Pound found a “classical and poetic matter-of-factness” and a “sort of rugged 
endurance” (“Webster Ford” 11). This “endurance” can also be seen in Hulme‟s “War 
Notes,” to which I now turn. 
 
3. The argument for war 
The declaration of war against Germany in August 1914 sparked a vociferous and 
ultimately very divisive battle of opinions among the British public (Hynes, A War Imagined 
10). Throughout the duration of the war, politicians, intellectuals, journalists and other social 
commentators of all political affiliations discussed issues relating to the day-to-day political 
and military handling of the war in the press, as well as debating broader questions 
concerning Britain‟s moral stance and its future position in a post-war Europe. Hulme 
                                                 
176 Cf. Sassoon, “Lamentations,” “Does it Matter?”; Owen, “The Dead-Beat,” “Dulce et Decorum Est,” 
“Anthem for Doom Youth”; Grenfell, “Into Battle,”; Thomas, “Rain”; Seeger, “Rendezvous”; Blunden, “Third 
Ypres”. 
177 Moody 257-62; Longenbach 112-16. 
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published his first article on the war question in November 1915, at a time when the terms of 
the debate were already set.
178
 Asquith‟s government had presented the war as an act of self-
defence; in order to preserve the liberty of Britain and of Europe at large, it was necessary, so 
the story went, to put an end to Germany‟s aggressive foreign policy. The government did its 
best to communicate this narrative to the people. Under the directorship of Charles 
Masterman, the Department of Information recruited prominent members of the Edwardian 
regime, urging them to publicly proclaim their support for the war and to remind the people 
that the war was being fought in defence of civilisation against the “barbarous” German 
people.
179
 Despite initial scepticism about the war, the vast majority of the national presses 
finally rallied to the government‟s support (Sherry, The Great War and the Language of 
Modernism 35). The war was opposed by individuals of various convictions, including 
Labour and women activists, Christians and socialists, radical Liberals and Bloomsburyites. 
Although the views of these individuals varied considerably, the two most common pacifist 
lines of argument were that the war departed from the fundamental internationalist values of 
Liberalism, and that war was morally wrong and unnatural.
180
 Many disillusioned Liberals, 
maintaining that there was a common, transnational Liberal ideology shared between the 
Anglo-Saxon peoples, argued that the altercation with Germany hindered the prospects of 
creating the pan-European Liberalism for which they strived.
181
 At the same time, humanist 
pacifists, such as Russell and Bell, made the case that the war was both irrational and 
barbarous. 
 
                                                 
178 For a discussion of the terms of the debate that had being going on since July 1914, see Sherry, The Great 
War and the Language of Modernism 32-36. 
179 Cf., for example, “Britain‟s Destiny and Duty: Declaration by Authors, A Righteous War.” On war 
propaganda, the behaviour of the press, and the intellectuals‟ support of the war, see Hynes, A War Imagined 
26-27, 79; Stevenson 272; Peppis 99; and N. Ferguson 231. 
180 For an overview of the pacifists‟ arguments, see Vellacott 32-36. 
181 See Sherry, “The Great War and Modernist Poetry” 195. 
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In a series of squibs published concurrently in the New Age and the Cambridge Magazine, 
Hulme sided firmly in favour of the war, attacking those who opposed it in his usual 
polemical manner. Hulme‟s vocal support of war has led many critics to read his “War 
Notes” as radically pro-war, with some going as far as finding his argument thoroughly in 
line with the extreme Right.
182
 Several recent critics have qualified this reading considerably, 
yet the consensus remains that Hulme was an enthusiastic militarist.
183
 In this section I revisit 
Hulme‟s argument in favour of the war, demonstrating that Hulme was much less radical in 
his support of the war than often assumed and also showing that, despite claims to the 
contrary, his politics during this time did not shift to the extreme Right. Finally, and perhaps 
more importantly, even though Hulme certainly rejected pacifism on ideological grounds, it is 
inaccurate to claim that he was in principle pro-war. Rather, Hulme presents war as a 
necessary evil, deemed to be the right course of action only insofar as it protected British 
Liberal democratic institutions. 
 
On the eve of the declaration of war, Britain‟s Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, outlined 
the government‟s rationale for joining the war against Germany in a speech to the Parliament. 
The British government, Grey argued, had always been “working for peace not only for this 
country, but to preserve the peace of Europe.” The decision to fight Germany, he added, was 
made in view “of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free from all 
passion as to why peace has not yet been preserved,” thus assuring the House of Commons 
that the decision to go to war was made “without sentiment, and from the point of view of 
British interests.” Grey‟s point was that, unless Britain sought to halt Germany‟s aggressive 
expansionism, the liberty of Britain in particular and of Europe more broadly would be in 
                                                 
182 See, for example, Read, Introduction to Speculations x; A. Jones, The Life and Opinions of T. E. Hulme 143; 
Roberts, T. E. Hulme 139-40; Griffiths 168; and Olsen 98. 
183 Critics who argue that Hulme‟s “War Notes” displays a mind that is assertive yet also tolerant include 
Csengeri, ed. xxv-xxvi; Comentale, Modernism, Cultural Production, and the British Avant-garde 144; L. B. 
Williams 187-88, 193; and Muller 250. 
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danger: “We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody,” Grey asked, “set 
limits to the consequences that may arise out of it?” (qtd. in Butler 307-09). In his first of a 
series of “War Notes,” Hulme puts forward an argument in favour of Britain‟s involvement in 
the war that, in many ways, constitutes only a reiteration of the case for war as put forward by 
Grey and the rest of the Liberal government. The war, Hulme claims, is a necessary measure 
for preserving democracy in Britain and for guaranteeing freedom in Europe at large. The 
British Liberal democratic institutions and the “human ideals” on which the British way of 
life is based, he argues, must be protected from the threat posed by the “bureaucratic” and 
“anti-Liberal” Germany (334). Even for someone who is otherwise extremely critical of 
Liberal democracy, the dilemma is simple:  
 
All we mean by democracy will certainly take a second place in our daily lives if the 
Central Powers have their way. It cannot be otherwise ... For German bureaucracy to 
succeed is to ensure the failure of English democracy, and with it of all the secondary 
variations dependent upon it. (334)  
 
It was these “secondary variations” or, as Hulme also called them, these “realities which will 
affect very strongly the life of the ordinary citizen” (399) in case of a German victory that, he 
maintains, make it imperative for Britain to go to war: for, “the consequences of defeat are 
such as nobody in England can face with his eyes open” (335). In keeping with Grey‟s 
argument, Hulme also asserts that, as well as defending “our liberties” (398), fighting against 
the Central Powers is important for all democratic European countries, as the emergence of 
Germany as a militarist state with expansionist ambitions means that no country would be left 
“unaffected” (385). He thus stresses that German victory would mean “an end of Europe as 
we know it, as a comity of nations” (386) and “would result in a tyranny” (386-87). The war, 
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therefore, is not only vital for the preservation of basic liberties enjoyed by the democratic 
peoples of Europe, but, more importantly for Hulme, it would decide the future political and 
cultural direction of Europe (332). Europe is in a state of “flux,” Hulme argues, that would 
“settle after the war into a physical structure which will probably endure for a century” (385; 
cf. 333, 401-02). As he puts it otherwise, in a metaphor taken directly out of his experiences 
at the front, Europe is “a creation” as “fixed” as the “the trench-lines, between the Allies and 
the enemy” (333; cf. 402). Precisely because the war is a “highly critical intensification” 
(332) of this state of flux, if the European countries want to prevent German hegemony in 
Europe, Hulme concludes, then all European countries have a responsibility to fight 
Germany, for “the liberties of Europe ... can only be preserved by fighting” (349; cf. 383). 
 
That was precisely Hulme‟s objection to pacifists: that they did not recognise the severity 
of the threat posed to both Britain and Europe by Germany. The “pacifist scepticism,” Hulme 
writes in January 1916, springs from two sources: “the fatuous belief that liberty cannot ... be 
permanently endangered, for „Germany herself will inevitably develop towards democracy‟”; 
and the “inability to see that Europe will be really altered in structure by this war” (384; 
emphasis in original). In both cases, he protests that the pacifists get it wrong. In the first 
case, “evolution towards democracy,” he argues, “is not only not inevitable, but it is the most 
precarious, difficult and exigent task political man has ever conceived,” adding that whatever 
the Liberals wish to think, “the mind of Germany is neither Liberal nor even Liberalising, 
that is, disposed to become Liberal” (333). Regarding the pacifists‟ belief that Europe is 
under no immediate threat, the danger of losing the war, Hulme insists, would signal the “end 
of Europe as a new Hellas” and the beginning of “a Europe under German leadership” (384; 
cf. 397). In other words, Hulme accuses the pacifists of political naivety and also of political 
ignorance. To prove his point, he refers pacifists to the writings of Max Scheler and Werner 
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Sombart, two contemporary German political thinkers, whose nationalist views appealed to 
many in Germany.
184
 Drawing attention to the writings of Sombart and Scheler, Hulme thus 
claims that Germany is plotting “a European Empire, a Macedonian military empire, in which 
Germany would play the same part that Prussia plays to-day in Germany itself” (336). 
 
In defending the Liberal government‟s decision to go to war, Hulme is, to a certain extent, 
also offering an apology for the Parliament‟s introduction of emergency measures. On 8 
August 1914, a series of laws aimed at “securing the public safety and the defence of the 
realm,” as stated in the Parliament‟s official announcement, was passed (qtd. in Hynes, A 
War Imagined 79). As Hynes explains, the Defence of the Realm Act or DORA, as it was 
commonly referred to, appeared initially to be only designed to “prevent persons 
communicating with the enemy or obtaining information ... to assist the enemy” and “to 
secure the safety of any means of communication, or of railways, docks or harbours” (A War 
Imagined 79). However, some of the amendments introduced afterwards constituted serious 
violations of basic civil liberties. For example, “His Majesty‟s Government” was granted the 
right to suppress any report or statement “by word of mouth or in writing or in any 
newspaper, periodical ... or other printed publication ... intended or likely” to subvert the 
King‟s authority and to imprison objectors without trial (qtd. in N. Ferguson 219). Hulme 
supported both DORA and compulsory conscription, arguing that “the danger to liberty 
involved in this Act, and in the use of compulsion, is infinitesimal in comparison with the 
loss of liberty that would follow our defeat” (383). In his view, those who opposed DORA 
and conscription were choosing to fight for the principle of liberty over the fact of liberty. For 
Hulme there was, thus, a distinction to be drawn between “principle,” which is of an 
“absolute, infinite character ... not a quantity and, consequently, it cannot be measured,” and 
                                                 
184 On Scheler‟s and Sombart‟s nationalism, see Gerhard 74-80 and 91-93. Hulme is here probably referring to 




“fact.” The difference, as he explains, is that, by contrast to “principles,” “facts can be 
measured and compared,” meaning that the pragmatic realities of Europe in 1915-16 made it 
clear that war was necessary (383).  
 
Despite lending his support to the emergency measures imposed by the Liberal 
government, it would be inaccurate to claim that Hulme supported the suppression of 
individual freedoms or that he collaborated with the government. While we must be careful 
not to diminish the violation of human rights that propaganda and censorship necessitate, it is 
important to remember that, in comparison to other European states, Britain did not make 
excessive use of censorship or propaganda, while, during the time when Hulme was 
expressing his support for DORA, the freedom of expression was largely unchallenged. As 
Stevenson writes in his authoritative History of the First World War, “Although the Defence 
of the Realm Act provided sweeping powers to intervene by decree, in practice the 
government made little use of them, and Britain even more than France „self-mobilized‟ for 
war” (271). More importantly, even though Hulme sides in favour of DORA and conscription 
in “War Notes,” he remains critical of politicians and members of the Cabinet for “not 
making up their minds sooner either definitely for or definitely against Conscription” and for 
misleading the public with their “downright trickery” (344). He also recognises that DORA 
poses a “considerable danger to liberty” (383), warning against the suppression of freedom of 
speech, describing war tribunals as “sham,” “crude and formless” (343; 409, 410) and 
declaring that “If I were a pacifist I should certainly refuse to appear at all” (410). 
Furthermore, he demands that the government guaranteed “that they will repeal the whole of 
the “Defence of the Realm” Acts on the day the war ends” (382). Hulme was also extremely 
sceptical of the Liberal government‟s anti-German propaganda. Despite being wary of 
German foreign policy and what he called the “diabolonianism” of the German state (336), in 
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“War Notes” he dissociates himself with those “crude” people – the “Crude Colonels in club 
armchairs and the editor of the „National Review‟” – who “expressed very crude opinions on 
the German dangers,” stressing that “the contrast between the justness of the Allies‟ cause 
and that of Germany is not so simple as it is painted by the Crude People” (349-50). As he 
makes it clear, “We are not concerned with some eternal principle of the German nature 
which makes them eternally different from us and dangerous to us,” but, rather, as he 
continues to claim, “with quite ordinary people, who, as the result of a certain history and 
under the influence of certain ideas, form part of a mechanism that, directed by certain 
hands, is ... capable of doing permanent injury to the liberties of Europe” (352; emphasis in 
original). In fact, the Germans, Hulme argues, are merely displaying the same “calculation 
and brute force” that the British themselves used in their colonial excursions. The British 
people, he thus complains, “find it difficult to realise the fact, that at the present moment 
others may be thinking of creating a European empire by similar methods.”
185
 Finally, Hulme 
is extremely critical of the military conduct of war. He condemns the slowness with which 
the Allies reacted in Serbia and bemoans their “criminal stupidity” that, in his view, led to a 
“lamentable failure” (342; 372; cf. 337, 356); describes the Allies‟ strategy as “inadequate” 
and “fatuous” (339, 346); berates the general inefficiency of army Generals and Staff 
officers, the “bungling asses who direct our operations” (345, 371); attacks the “prejudice” 
and “the sentimental wish of a section of opinion to beat the Germans … where they are 
strongest” (342); exposes the Allied army as underfunded and lacking in discipline (358); and 
criticises the political and military hierarchy for putting the lives of soldiers at risk, as in the 
disasters of Sulva Bay and the Dardanelles (345-46, 358; 370). 
 
                                                 
185 Hulme added this passage to the Cambridge Magazine version of his article for 2 March 1916. It is reprinted 
in The Collected Writings of T. E. Hulme 475n64. 
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Hulme‟s defence of British democratic institutions and the British “human ideals” (334) 
cannot be dismissed as propaganda. As made clear by his vocal criticism of the government‟s 
handling of the war and his refusal to participate in the anti-German frenzy of the time, unlike 
intellectuals such as Wells, Murray, Powys or Hueffer, Hulme is not interested in offering 
unconditional support to the government, or in regurgitating the Department of Information‟s 
propaganda.
186
 On the contrary, his insistence that his support for the war does not imply that 
he favours authoritarianism politics, but that the war against Germany is necessary for the 
preservation of democracy, suggests that he was in fact keen on preserving the British 
democratic institutions. In attacking the pacifists, therefore, Hulme, as we will now see, was 
keen on arguing that anti-pacifism and democracy are not mutually exclusive. 
 
4. Anti-pacifism and democracy 
Against Bell‟s and Russell‟s claims that support for the war amounts to support for the 
establishment or “an admiration for Prussianism,” Hulme argues in “War Notes” that he is 
neither siding with the forces of “reaction,” nor harbouring German authoritarianism (362).
187
 
On 10 February 1916, he thus declares that “I have no disguised reactionary motives,” adding 
that “I am not in favour of the war, because I think all wars favour reaction” (400). His 
support for the current war, he claims, is based on the hope that it would “hasten the 
disappearance of the rich” and that it would bring about a “new order of society ... different 
from the old” (400, 392; cf. 363). Moreover, while admitting of once being attracted to the 
“„organic‟ theory of the State” and “the theories of this kind to be found in Taine, Barrès, and 
in Maurras,” he makes it clear that he supported such theories only inasmuch as he deemed 
them to be “diametrically opposed,” as he puts it, to utilitarian democracy, claiming that he 
                                                 
186 Cf. Murray 339; Powys 69; and Hueffer‟s When Blood is Their Argument, which was, in fact, commissioned 
by Masterman. For discussion of anti-German propaganda and the role of the intellectuals in disseminating the 
government‟s views, see Hynes, A War Imagined 67 and Stevenson 272. 
187 Cf. Bell, “Peace at Once” 12 and Russell, The Principles of Social Reconstruction 42. In “War Notes,” 
Hulme attacks Bell, Allen and the rest of the no-conscription activists. See 376, 352. 
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has now come to reject this “organic” conception of the State, realising that it is “the 
characteristic German theory of the State” (365). Eager to dissociate democracy from 
pacifism and to show that “There is no essential connection between pacifism and 
democracy” (362; cf. 395, 363-64), Hulme argues that there are two different kinds of 
democracy. On the one hand, there is pacifist democracy, which, in his view, is ineffective 
and corrupt and which, based on a humanist ethic, can “never develop the force which is 
likely to radically transform society” (362-63). On the other hand, there is for Hulme a 
completely different conception of democracy which, as he describes it, “like the democracy 
of the seventeenth century in England, or the Socialism of Proudhon [is] founded on the idea 
of Justice” (363). Even though Hulme does not elaborate on what he means exactly by these 
systems and does not explicitly propose either of them as a substitute for the existing political 
system, it is interesting to investigate possible reasons as to why he might have been drawn to 
these particular political orders. As a brief examination of “the democracy of the seventeenth 
century” and the anarchism-socialism of Proudhon reveals, Hulme is not prescribing a system 
of governance; rather, he is using these political orders to demonstrate how one could support 
the war and be a democrat, in the broadest sense of the word possible. 
 
In invoking seventeenth-century democracy, Hulme counteracts a common interpretation 
of Civil War as a vindication of “liberal” ideas. As Whitworth has noted, at least two articles 
in the Nation, a Liberal pacifist newspaper mentioned by Hulme in “War Notes” (380), 
compared anti-conscription activists and pacifists to Cromwell‟s army at the time Hulme was 
writing (442). Hulme was certainly not the only one at this time to be contesting the Nation‟s 
interpretation of the Civil War. The Conservative politician Hugh Cecil argued in 
Conservatism in 1912 that the Civil War was in reality “a triumph of conservatism,” 
signalling “a general rejection of Puritanism and military tyranny ... in favour of the familiar 
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forms of the ancient constitution” (32). The historian G. P. Gooch, offered a similar 
interpretation of the Civil War, first, in The History of English Democratic Ideas in the 
Seventeenth Century (1898) and, later, in Political Thought in England (1914-1915). Drawing 
from the Clarke Papers, Gooch re-examines in The History of English Democratic Ideas in 
the Seventeenth Century the roles of key figures involved in the Civil War. Among those who 
receive special attention by Gooch are Milton and Ireton. Gooch demonstrates that, despite 
popular belief, “Ireton was not a radical and he did not want to kill the King, [but] only to 
protect England against future despotism” (159). According to Gooch‟s analysis, Ireton 
rejects the notion that there are “Natural Rights” as ultra-individualistic (162) and “in its 
essence anarchic” (205), with Gooch quoting Ireton‟s remark that “Men as men ... are corrupt 
and will be so” (164). “[L]ike all who shared Hobbes‟ view of human nature and therefore of 
the primitive condition of mankind,” Gooch concludes in The History of English Democratic 
Ideas in the Seventeenth Century, “Ireton traces the origin of society uniquely to the necessity 
of securing order” (164), a belief that, as Gooch argues, was also held by Milton, who even 
though believed in “Natural Rights” endorsed Hobbes‟ view of human nature (179-81). 
Gooch is equally categorical about the Civil War‟s conservative credentials in Political 
Thought in England, where he reiterates the view that “the opinions of Ireton were by no 
means revolutionary” (88), welcoming the publication of the Clarke Papers that “has at last 
rendered it possible to reconstruct the evolution of Cromwell‟s philosophy and to recognise 




                                                 
188 The Clarke Papers, which document the notes taken by William Clarke during the Civil War, were made 
available by C. H. Firth in 1891-1901. For Ireton‟s remark on the corrupt nature of humans, see The Clarke 
Papers 2: 176. 
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Gooch‟s analysis of Ireton is significant here because it is from Gooch‟s Political Thought 
in England that Hulme gets his information about Ireton.
189
 Quoting Gooch‟s Political 
Thought in England almost in verbatim, Hulme declares in “War Notes”: 
 
I am opposed to pacifism as a democrat, but I beg leave to point out that democracy is a 
little older than the tabernacles in which these people imbibed it. If I could correct their 
tenets by Ireton‟s belief that „men are born corrupt and will remain so‟, I should prefer 
to call myself a Leveller; for not only did they think „liberty a right inherent in every 
man ... meaning by liberty ... definite participation in whatever political arrangements 
the community finds it desirable to make‟, but they were prepared themselves to fight 
for this right. (362; cf. Gooch, Political Thought in England 90, 86-87) 
 
The attraction of this version of democracy for Hulme is, as he goes on to explain, that it “had 
a certain virility and had not ... fallen into the sentimental decadence of humanitarianism” 
(362). Ireton‟s conception of human nature chimes with Hulme‟s conservative conviction, 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, according to which humans are “limited” creatures. At 
the same time, however, the lesson from the Levellers here is that it is often necessary to fight 
for liberties. Seemingly drawing a parallel between the Levellers in the seventeenth century 
and those who support Britain‟s involvement in the war against Germany, Hulme reminds his 
readers that the Levellers did not take liberty as granted but fought for it. He is thus able to 
turn the Levellers against the pacifists, whom he portrays as not seeing liberty as an 
“achievement,” but, as he puts it, as “an inevitable constituent of the world” (352; emphasis 
in original). That was also, according to Hulme, the great lesson from Milton, who supported 
                                                 
189 Whitworth correctly identifies Gooch as the source of Hulme‟s quotations, but wrongly attributes Hulme‟s 
source as Gooch‟s English Democratic Ideas, a claim also made by Ferguson (240). Hulme, in fact, quotes 
directly from Gooch‟s Political Thought in England (cf. 80, 90, 86-87). Had Whitworth read Political Thought 
in England, he certainly would not have argued that Hulme adapts his quotations from Gooch “considerably” 
and that his quotations are “not completely accurate” (442-43). 
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democracy, but who “had a thoroughly realistic conception of the means by which it could be 
achieved” (362). 
 
Although Hulme is in many ways using the Levellers in “War Notes” strategically, in 
order to show that pacifism does not amount to democracy, as Gasiorek argues, Hulme‟s 
invocation of seventeenth-century politics cannot be dismissed as merely a rhetorical ploy.
190
 
Rather, Hulme‟s invocation of the Levellers‟ sheds light on the kind of politics in which he 
believes. Both Aylmer and Farr have demonstrated how, even though the Levellers were for 
“Government and Against Popular Confusion,” they did not want the complete abolition of 
government because they held it to be a good and necessary system – as Ireton put it, “the 
pravity and corruption of mans [sic] heart is such that there could be no living without it” 
(qtd. in Aylmer 154; cf. Farr 148, 179-81). At the same time, the Levellers valued civil 
liberties above everything else, seeing it as their sole purpose to bring equality and social 
justice to the people. Thus, the Levellers‟ brand of democracy seems to tie together Hulme‟s 
argument in the Commentator articles and in “Romanticism and Classicism,” according to 
which some form of order and discipline is needed for society to function harmoniously, and 
the defence of British democratic institutions and “ideals” in “War Notes” (Cf. 61, 70, 164, 
220, 230, 239-40, 334). Moreover, the Levellers‟ emphasis on duty resonates with Hulme‟s 
idea in “War Notes” that the preservation of liberties requires selfless sacrifice. According to 
Gooch, Ireton‟s Levellers held that liberty was “not merely a freedom from the restraint of 
others, but a conscious and deliberate share in such arrangements as the community finds it 
necessary to make” and that, moreover, “From this the right of the individual springs as a 
corollary the sovereignty of the people, a sovereignty bounded ... by social duty and by 
                                                 
190 According to Gasiorek, Hulme‟s mention of the Levellers is significant as it reveals that, in his later writings, 
Hulme is “moving away from the anti-democratic sentiments … and trying to develop a hybridized theory of 
democracy that combined aspects of anarchism, syndicalism, and classicism all at the same time.” Gasiorek 






 Hulme echoes Gooch‟s description of the Levellers when he argues that, while 
pacifist democracy is “founded on sympathy,” an alternative brand of democracy is possible 
that is “founded on the conception of Justice, leading to the assertion of equality” (362; 
emphasis in original). Because this latter version of democracy places duty at its centre, he 
concludes, the participating citizens must fight to preserve their liberty, just as the Levellers, 
as he puts it in the passage cited above, “were prepared themselves to fight for this right” 
(362). 
 
It is this same insistence on the importance of duty that Hulme finds in Proudhon and 
which, in turn, explains why he links the “Socialism of Proudhon” with seventeenth-century 
democracy, offering both as alternatives to “pacifist” democracy (cf. 362-63). As Gasiorek 
correctly points out, it is extremely difficult to summarise Proudhon‟s political philosophy 
into a consistent account, as Proudhon kept on changing his views over time (158). Yet, there 
is a recurring element in Proudhon‟s work that ties in with Hulme‟s interpretation of Leveller 
democracy and that is thus helpful to consider here. Proudhon holds that no political system 
is worthwhile unless it has Justice as its central component, a notion that in Proudhon‟s work 
includes both individual liberty and economic equality. To understand what Proudhon means 
by “Justice,” it is helpful to consider his critique of the French Revolution. Rejecting the idea 
that societies change organically or immanently from within, Proudhon claims that the 
problem with the French Revolution is that, though it successfully spread liberty and equality 
in politics, it failed to do so in the economic sector and, therefore, failed to deliver Justice, 
which could be achieved only once the working classes were rewarded with the full value of 
their labour (52, 66-67, 113-22).
192
 Despite making Justice the final absolute towards which 
the working classes should strive, however, Proudhon also adds an essential component to it, 
                                                 
191 English Democratic Ideas 204; cf. Political Thought in England 86-87. 
192 Unless otherwise stated, all page references to Proudhon correspond to Stewart Edwards‟ compilation of 
Proudhon‟s writings, Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. 
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without which Justice is not possible: duty. Thus, once Justice is achieved, relationships 
among people would cease to be based on authority, but, instead, they would be based on a 
mutual contract, according to which each party would have a duty to participate in the 
community in a collaborative spirit. In this sense, by invoking Proudhon‟s “Socialism,” 
Hulme is emphasising the important part that duty plays in society and using Proudhon‟s 
political order to argue in an even more poignant way that British citizens, living in a 
democratic country, have a duty to fight Germany to preserve their liberties. 
 
Hulme‟s mention of Proudhon alongside Leveller democracy is also explained by the fact 
that, although making liberty the cornerstone of his theory of society, Proudhon insists, like 
Ireton and Hulme, that individual liberty should not be unrestrained. There are two ways in 
which individual liberty is controlled in Proudhon‟s system. In the first place, Proudhon‟s 
non-dialectical system precludes a synthesis. This means that, rather than leading to a state of 
individual liberty, Proudhonian society is construed around two antagonistic forces or “laws,” 
liberty and authority, that cancel each other out in a kind of a balancing act (102-04; cf. 121, 
140, 194-95). In the second place, as Stewart Edwards notes, Proudhon does not believe in 
human improvement; because human nature is fallible, Proudhon, according to Edwards, 
must concede that humans must always be kept in check (27). Proudhon‟s view of human 
nature is very close to the “pessimistic” worldview Hulme presents in the Commentator 
articles, according to which human nature is limited and fallible and, as such, like the 
political order that Hulme advocates in the Commentator, it is best represented in the 
Christian doctrine of Original Sin. Thus, as well as guaranteeing liberty, the social order that 
Proudhon hopes will replace the reign of capitalism has also to act as a restraining force, 
controlling humans‟ egotistical and evil tendencies. It is in this sense that Edwards argues 
that Proudhon is “closer to conservatives such as de Maistre than to socialist or liberal 
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writers”; for, he calls for control over humans‟ vices and aims not to banish authority, but to 
balance it with liberty (27; cf. Stanley, ed. 9). 
 
Finally, there is another way in which Hulme‟s mention of Proudhon in “War Notes” can 
be understood. While arguing for a conception of democracy based on duty and the 
recognition of human limitations, the French thinker also shows how democracy and anti-
pacifism are not antithetical.
193
 War is an important part of Proudhon‟s political system in 
two respects. On the one hand, Proudhon maintains that militancy helps preserve a society‟s 
liberties from enemies within and from the outside. War, according to Proudhon, has always 
“tempered morals, maintained the balance of power between States, aided progress, 
established the reign of justice and guaranteed liberty” (203; cf. 207). On the other hand, in 
Proudhon‟s political order, fighting or action guarantees Justice and Liberty in society, 
stimulating humans to fight for their ideals. The idea is that Justice can only be achieved 
through action. Action, in Proudhon‟s view, “is the principal condition of life, health and 
strength in an organized being ... [It] enables it to develop and increase its faculties and to 
fulfil its destiny; and “For there to be action,” Proudhon explains, “there must be some 
ground that exists in relation to the acting self,” concluding that “Action ... is a struggle,” and 
that “To act is to fight” (204). Proudhon‟s militant social programme allows Hulme to 
challenge in “War Notes” the argument against the war. Citing Proudhon in one of his jibes 
against Russell, Hulme argues that the problem with those who oppose the war is that they do 
not understand it (cf. 391). Moreover, in a way not too dissimilar to Proudhon, he maintains 
that “certain actions, though good, may involve sacrifice of life; a sacrifice which,” he writes, 
“may be impossible to rationalise, by showing that it furthers life in other ways” (412), 
contending elsewhere that the problem with the pacifists is that they are reluctant to act upon 
                                                 
193 Proudhon often refers to his theory of politics as democratic. Cf. 63-64, 103, 105, 116, 141. As Stanley 
shows, Proudhon does not oppose democracy in principle but, rather, he rejects what may be described as 
“humanist” democracy. See The Sociology of Virtue 205-12. 
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their beliefs (359; emphasis in original. Cf. Proudhon, La guerre et la paix 40). Despite 
evidently drawing on Proudhon in “War Notes,” however, it is difficult to imagine Hulme 
agreeing with Proudhon‟s claims that, for example, “war ... enabled man to assert his majesty 
and valeur” or that “Death is the crown of life” (204; emphasis in original). Rather than 
inaugurating war as the driving force of human progress, it seems more plausible to argue 
that in “War Notes” Hulme appropriates Proudhon‟s theses, using them in support of the 
view that a democratic society that guarantees economic equality and individual liberties and 
that sees it as its duty to fight for its liberties is indeed possible and that, therefore, there is no 
necessary connection between democracy and pacifism.  
 
In understanding how Hulme is using Proudhon in “War Notes,” it is instructive to 
consider Hulme‟s discussion of Sorel in the Preface to Reflections on Language. It is no 
accident that Hulme associates Proudhon with Sorel in “War Notes,” for what attracts him in 
Proudhon is also that which he finds in Sorel (cf. 395, 409). Following Proudhon, Sorel 
blames what he interprets as the failure of modern societies on the “quietism” of the 
dialectical processes involved in political analyses and on the theories of progress, arguing 
for activism achieved through “violence” and a “heroic ethic” as a remedy (Stanley 238-40). 
Furthermore, like Proudhon, Sorel admires the heroic values revealed only in conflict, 
contending that war plays a fundamental part in the success of class struggle, particularly 
“The ardent desire to try one‟s strength in great battles, to submit to the test which gives the 
military calling its claim to superiority, and to conquer glory at the peril of one‟s life” 
(Reflections on Violence 160). More importantly, in line with Proudhon, Sorel offers a 
critique of bourgeois democracy, not on the grounds that capitalist democracy privileges 
individual freedoms but, on the contrary, as Stanley points out, because middle-class 
democracy is based on centralism, force and unity against local liberties, law and plurality 
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(205). In doing so, in “Materials for a Theory of the Proletariat” Sorel adopts Proudhon‟s 
view when he states that “The Revolution consecrated the word „democracy‟ as a lodestar” 
and that it ended up “masking the most horrible tyranny” (249-50; Cf. Proudhon, De la 
justice 2: 116, 120-21). Like Proudhon, therefore, Sorel insists that any theory of society must 
strive after absolute Justice while, at the same time, sustain individual liberties (Stanley 245-
47). 
 
It is “difficult” for liberal democrats, Hulme writes in his Preface to Sorel‟s Reflections on 
Violence,  
 
to understand a revolutionary who is anti-democratic, an absolutist in ethics, rejecting 
all rationalism and relativism, who values the mystical element in religion „which will 
never disappear‟, speaks contemptuously of modernism and progress, and uses a 
concept like honour with no sense of unreality.  
As a rule such sentiments, when the democrat meets with them, are conveniently 
dismissed as springing from a disguised attempt to defend the interests of wealth. But 
this obviously will not fit the case of Sorel. (247; emphasis in original) 
 
As with Proudhon in “War Notes,” here Hulme chooses to portray Sorel as an anti-
reactionary, anti-capitalist, and anti-pacifist democrat, a claim he repeats in “War Notes” 
when he describes Sorel (and Proudhon) as “real as distinct from the dilettante democrat” 
(395). In the Preface, defending Sorel against charges that he is a mystic, a neo-royalist and a 
sentimentalist, Hulme maintains that Sorel‟s contribution to democracy is that he shows how 
“democratic romanticism” has no necessary connection with democratic values. By rejecting 
Rousseau‟s belief in the natural goodness of humans and in Progress, on which the “pacifist, 
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rationalist, and hedonist” version of democracy, according to Hulme, is based, and by 
adopting in its turn a conception of human nature that is, as Hulme describes it, “classical” 
and “pessimistic,” Sorel demonstrates for Hulme how “classicism” is compatible with 
democracy. Even though Sorel‟s opponents argue that his belief in Original Sin is 
“reactionary,” and despite the fact that Sorel‟s opposition to pacifist democracy and his 
reaction against Romanticism explains the “sympathy between Sorel and ... L‟Action 
française,” a link which Hulme notes is “so eagerly fastened on by those anxious to discredit 
him,” Hulme insists that there is nothing reactionary in Sorel‟s politics (249, 251). In contrast 
to other opponents of pacifist democracy, Sorel, Hulme asserts, “expects a return of the 
classical spirit through the struggle of the classes” (251). In other words, rather than 
defending the status quo – aristocracy, oligarchy or monarchy – as is the case with Maurras, 
Sorel desires a revolution of the proletariat. “It is this,” Hulme notes, “which differentiates 
Sorel from other attacks on the democratic ideology. Some of these are merely dilettante, 
having little sense of reality, while others are really vicious, in that they play with the idea of 
inequality” (251). For all those people “who begin to be disillusioned with liberal and pacifist 
democracy, while shrinking from the opposed ideology on account of its reactionary 
associations,” he concludes, “Sorel, a revolutionary in economics, but classical in ethics, may 
prove an emancipator” (252).  
 
Despite the way in which Sorel‟s or Proudhon‟s theories, as both Benjamin and Arendt 
have showed, lend a helping hand to the very authoritarian ideologies they purport to oppose, 
it is clear that Hulme is using them in his war writings in an attempt to dissociate anti-
pacifism from reactionary politics.
194
 Thus throughout “War Notes,” he repeatedly stresses 
that there is nothing reactionary in his support of the war. “[T]his war,” he claims, “has 
                                                 




greatly, to their own surprise, converted many men to democracy,” maintaining that “the right 
theory of society is to be found ... not in the reactionaries” (365). The value of Proudhon and 
Sorel, Hulme writes in the last of his “War Notes,” is that they make it “possible to 
completely dissociate the reactionary spirit, and the rejection of a rationalist humanitarian 
ethic” (413; emphasis in orignal).  
 
5. The ethics of anti-pacifist democracy 
In the February-March instalments of “War Notes,” Hulme turns his attention to 
explaining in more assertive terms the fundamental ethical difference which he argues exists 
between the pacifist and the anti-pacifist positions. His aim is to challenge the ethics of 
Humanism, while, at the same time, providing a philosophical basis to his claim that there is 
no necessary connection between pacifism and democracy. To fully comprehend Hulme‟s 
critique of what he interprets as the ethics of pacifism, it is necessary to examine his very 
public spat with Russell. This is because it is largely in response to Russell‟s political 
philosophy that Hulme develops his notion of “objective” ethics.  
 
In 1915-16, Russell was one of the most vocal opponents of war. Once a prominent 
Fabian, Russell‟s disagreement with the foreign policy of the government eventually led him 
to turn his back on the Liberals and align himself with the Union of Democratic Control. In 
November 1914, he joined Clifford Allen and Fenner Brockway in forming the “No-
Conscription Fellowship,” an organisation that, held together by what Allen called “a belief 
in the sanctity of life,” saw as its solitary aim to stop compulsory conscription (qtd. in 
Vellacott 29). From his position as a member of the UDC and the NCF and as a respectable 
academic philosopher, Russell campaigned tirelessly against the war. Russell‟s objections to 
war included the typical Liberal charge that war violates the fundamental principles of 
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Liberalism; the idea that the confrontation came as a result of pressure exerted on the 
European governments by capitalist warmongers who would be the only ones to benefit from 
it; the notion that war constitutes a complete disregard of human life; and the belief that, as 
Russell puts it in “Philosophy of Pacifism,” war with Germany could have been prevented, as 
it was based on “false and fallacious arguments by which men are induced to believe that war 
is inevitable and even often beneficent” (2).
195
 Perhaps Russell‟s most significant 
contribution to the argument against war, however, was his discussion in early 1916 of “the 
springs of human action” in a series of lectures published as The Principles of Social 
Reconstruction (9).
196
 The crux of the argument in The Principles of Social Reconstruction is 
that reason has little power over humans‟ impulses and desires so that, therefore, even though 
reason helps guide us to any goal we contemplate, unless we want to take notice of the 
calculations of reason, we do not have to. This is the essence of Russell‟s distinction between 
desires and impulses. In the realm of desire, humans can easily make use of reason, as “All 
desire involves an interval of time between the consciousness of a need and the opportunity 
for satisfying it” (11). Impulses, however, resist reason as they impel us to act on them 
without calculation: they are, according to Russell, “erratic and anarchical, not easily fitted 
into a well-regulated system” (14). That is precisely why Russell argues that impulses are 
both important for human life and potentially destructive: having no purpose, impulses 
supply the driving force for our emotional life and ensure creativity; yet, at the same time, 
unless they were directed towards creative and life-enhancing paths though, they could easily 
lead to “destruction and death” (14-15). As Ryan has pointed out, Russell ultimately uses this 
theory of the nature of impulses to discredit war as an irrational, and therefore morally 
wrong, activity (72-74). The reason why so many people support the war, Russell can claim, 
is because, living in a society that does not nurture their impulses, people are bored and 
                                                 
195 See Vellacott 12-13, 55 and 60-72; Monk 367-68; and Ryan 64. 
196 The lectures published as The Principles of Social Reconstruction were delivered by Russell in London 
between 18 Jan. and 7 Mar. 1916. 
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frustrated. As he puts it in “Disintegration and Principles of Growth,” borrowing Wallas‟ 
term, “Many causes contributed to bringing the war; but „balked disposition‟ was certainly 
the chief cause of the enthusiasm with which urban populations everywhere greeted its 
outbreak” (309).
197
 The desire displayed by so many young men to fight in the war is 
explained in The Principles of Social Reconstruction as social malaise: through mischievous 
education and propaganda, the society encourages aggressive and anti-social impulses, rather 
than creative and sociable ones. 
 
In “War Notes,” Hulme accuses Russell and the rest of the prominent pacifists, Allen and 
Bell, of being naive and unable to perceive the imminent danger of German hegemony in 
Europe (387-388, 392-393). Russell and his pacifist friends, Hulme maintains, base their 
beliefs on a sentimentalist view of life (391) and have a false sense of “intellectual 
superiority” (404; emphasis in original).
198
 Focusing specifically on Russell‟s distinction 
between impulse and desire, Hulme protests in February 1916 that it is: 
 
a delightfully simple picture of the true nature of the controversy. On the one hand, the 
bellicose, moved in reality by the „impulses of aggression and resistance to aggression‟, 
fondly imagining, however, that they are acting under the influence of reason, and, on 
                                                 
197 Russell alludes to Wallas‟ term in the opening section of the first lecture on Social Reconstruction, titled 
“Disintegration and the Principle of Growth.” This is the lecture by Russell which Hulme attended (Ferguson 
238). When Russell published his lectures in 1916, he chose not to include Wallas‟ term. Russell draws on 
Wallas‟ ideas in “On Justice in Wartime” 171, 176 and 178 and “The Ethics of War” 63. 
198 In “War Notes,” Hulme blasts what he describes as the “certain general attitude towards life” expressed in 
the “report on a conference on Pacifist Philosophy of Life” (391). This pacifist Conference was organised by the 
League of Peace and Freedom and the report features Russell‟s “The Philosophy of Pacifism,” as well as articles 
by well-known pacifists including Edward G. Smith, Herbert Burrows, Caroline Playne and Edward Grubb. On 
the back cover of the pamphlet, entitled Towards Ultimate Harmony, it is stated that “War is the result of a false 
attitude towards life in the individual and the community,” the League‟s declared purpose being “to further by 
steady propaganda the idea that all movements for the higher and freer development of life are necessary to 
bring about Peace.” A number of critics have noted that Russell‟s early pacifist writings are characterised by a 
religious and romantic tone that it is easy to imagine Hulme would not have approved. See, for example, 
Vellacott 4 and Ryan 52-54. Cf. Russell‟s rhetoric in “The Free Man‟s Worship,” an essay Russell described in 
July 1918 as “merely the expression of the pacifist outlook when it was new to me” (Autobiography 318). 
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the other hand, the wise and tolerant pacifists, seeing things by the light of their 
disinterested intelligence. (393; cf. 405) 
 
In attacking Russell‟s distinction between impulses and desires, Hulme is keen on stressing 
that his defence of the war effort is based on reason and not on impulse. Admitting that “it is 
certainly true that such impulses do play a considerable part,” he thus adds that “my attitude 
as a whole is not determined by such impulses, although it may be reinforced by them” (394; 
cf. 399). The problem with Russell‟s view, Hulme contends, is not that Russell shows 
impulses and desires to play an important role in decisions – because they do – but that 
Russell excludes the possibility that the anti-pacifists can support the war on “other „reasons‟, 
which may also be disinterested, ethical, and not emotional” (395; emphasis in original).  
 
When Russell replied the following week complaining that “North Staffs” 
“misrepresented” his thesis, his grievance was certainly justified. For, rather than arguing that 
only those who support the war are moved by impulse, Russell made it clear in The 
Principles of Social Reconstruction that everyone is moved by impulse. As he reminds 
Hulme in his rejoinder in the Cambridge Magazine, what he really wants is “not the 
weakening of impulse ... but the direction of impulse towards life and growth rather than 
towards death and decay” (“Mr. Russell‟s Reply” 408; cf. The Principles of Social 
Reconstruction 15). Hulme retorted that it was Russell, not him, who misinterpreted his 
opponent. He is only making the rather obvious point, he objects, that “Mr. Russell gives 
many Reasons why wars are evil, and only deals with the Impulses that made men think them 
justifiable.” Russell, Hulme goes on, was guilty of bias, as “He ought ... to have dealt with the 
Reasons on both sides” (405; emphasis in original). Accepting Russell‟s claim that both sides 
are motivated by impulse, an observation with which, as he writes, he “entirely” agrees (405), 
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Hulme thus argues that his problem is with Russell‟s insistence to explain the support for the 
war in terms of impulses, remaining unwilling to allow “than any real Reasons exist on this 
side” (405). 
 
In later years, critics declared Russell the victor, generally concluding that Hulme‟s 
misrepresentation of Russell‟s thesis exposes Hulme‟s philosophical weaknesses and also 
claiming that his choice of Russell as a target is populist, motivated by his inclination towards 
polemical confrontation.
199
 To condemn Hulme‟s criticism of Russell as amateurish or 
populist, however, is to risk missing the point.
200
 Responding to Hulme‟s claim that the 
difference between the pacifists and those who supported the war cannot be explained by 
different impulses, but was due to a difference in ethical valuation (cf. 394, 401), Russell 
maintains in his rejoinder in the Cambridge Magazine that this is only “true on the surface.” 
Quoting from his analysis in The Principles of Social Reconstruction, Russell explains:  
 
ethical differences usually spring from differences of impulse. „Whole philosophies, 
whole systems of ethical valuation, spring up in this way: they are the embodiment of a 
kind of thought which is subservient to impulse, which aims at providing a quasi-
rational ground for the indulgence of impulse.‟ „This difference of opinion will seem to 
be ethical or intellectual, whereas its real basis is a difference of impulse. No genuine 
agreement will be reached, in such a case, so long as the differences of impulse 
persists.‟ (“Mr. Russell‟s Reply” 305) 
                                                 
199 See, for example, Roberts, T. E. Hulme 116; A. Jones, The Life and Opinions of T. E. Hulme 139; Ryan 72; 
and Comentale, Modernism, Cultural Production, and the British Avant-garde 146. According to Garver, 
Hulme‟s attack on Russell is “populist in inspiration,” a claim which Garver does not pursue further (146). In 
later years, Russell claimed that Hulme “was just seizing an issue rather than speaking out on a subject 
especially close to his heart” (qtd. in Ferguson 242).  
200 It is not within the scope of my argument here, but it is significant that we recognise how, despite their 
significant ideological differences, Russell and Hulme share certain similarities, the most striking of which is 
perhaps that, like Hulme, Russell expresses considerable admiration for “heroic” or “tragic” values, singling out 
in “The Philosophy of Pacifism” “the value of courage” as one of the most important human qualities. For a 




In “War Notes,” Hulme explains that he finds Russell‟s reply extremely revealing, as it 
confirms his suspicion that Russell changed from postulating a theory of ethical values as 
objective to now maintaining that ethical values are subjective: “Mr. Russell,” he writes, “has 
completely changed his views on this matter” (408).
201
 Russell‟s suggestion that ethics are 
simply a “quasi-rational ground for the indulgence of impulse,” Hulme argues, leads directly 
to “ethical scepticism” and to “a relativist view of ethics” (407-09); more crucially, it 
undermines Russell‟s reasoning against war: for “all he can say,” Hulme remarks, “is that he 
prefers pacifist instincts” (408).
202
 Russell‟s second reply confirms Hulme‟s suspicion, but 
the philosopher remains unapologetic. Russell writes:  
 
I do certainly mean to maintain that all ethics is subjective, and that ethical agreement 
can only arise through similarity of desires and impulses. It is true that I did not hold 
this view formerly ... Observation of ethical valuations leads me to think that all ethical 
valuations can be so accounted for, and that the claim of universality which men 
associate with their ethical judgments embodies merely the impulse to persecution of 
tyranny. (“North Staffs‟ Praise of War” 386) 
 
Hulme was not sympathetic. Even though he did not send a response to Russell‟s “North 
Staffs‟ Praise of War” to the Cambridge Magazine, he makes it clear in the version published 
                                                 
201 Hulme wrote to Ogden in February 1916 that Russell‟s letter “quite gives him away” (qtd. by Csengeri in 
The Collected Writings of T. E. Hulme 474). It is generally acknowledged that Russell‟s thought underwent a 
dramatic change in 1914 (Vellacott 24). Russell himself attributed his strong reaction to the outbreak of the war 
to a “mystical experience” (qtd. in. Atkin 7). For a discussion of how Russell‟s anti-war activism changed and 
shaped his ethics, see M. Potter 2-14. In “War Notes,” Hulme regrets the fact that in his pacifist writings Russell 
does not display the “great originality” or the “ingenuity” of his earlier work (392). Invoking Lasserre‟s 
description of Condorcet, he asserts that it is a pity that Russell‟s move from mathematics to politics leads him 
to “une sorte d‟éblouissment [a sort of bewilderment]” stemming from a lack of knowledge of “la nature 
humaine” (393). Cf. Lasserre, Le romantisme français 432. 
202 In a way, Hulme here employs Russell‟s argument in “The Elements of Ethics” to refute Russell‟s pacifism. 
See Russell, “The Elements of Ethics” 13, 53. 
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in the New Age on 24 February that he views Russell‟s change of heart as symptomatic of an 
“uncritical acceptance of the liberal ideology that had prevailed since the eighteenth century” 
(408; emphasis in original). In the version he revised for Ogden, Hulme speculates that 
“Perhaps suspecting instinctively that the objective conception of ethics might lead to the 
establishment of values he would call reactionary ... [Russell] dropped the objective 
conception.”
203
 For Hulme, not only does the “objective conception” of ethics not entail anti-
democratic politics, but, on the contrary, it can be used as a basis of an alternative version of 
democracy: anti-pacifist democracy. To understand what Hulme means by “objective 
conception of ethics” in his 24 February instalment of “War Notes,” it is helpful to turn to “A 
Notebook,” where he proposes a theory of ethics based on the philosophical endeavours of 
Husserl, Moore and Russell in the early years of the twentieth century to achieve a “truly 
scientific philosophy” (435). A quick overview of the basic theses of Husserl, Moore and 
Russell will be helpful in understanding Hulme‟s argument in “A Notebook.” 
 
In “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” Husserl makes the case that philosophy should not 
be naturalistic, nor historicist, meaning that philosophy should not reduce phenomena to 
physical states or to particulars. Rather, Husserl argues that philosophy should be an inquiry 
into the invariant features of pure consciousness.
204
 The problem with philosophy, according 
to Husserl, is that it does not live up to its claim of being a “rigorous science,” by which he 
means “the science that satisfies the loftiest theoretical needs and renders possible from an 
ethico-religious point of view a life regulated by pure rational norms” (166). Insofar as “Each 
and every question is … controverted [sic],” and “every position is a matter of individual 
conviction, of the interpretation given by a school, of a „point of view‟,” Husserl maintains, 
philosophy cannot claim to be a beacon of humanity (167). That was precisely the aim of 
                                                 
203 Hulme‟s revisions to the New Age article are reproduced by Csengeri in her edition of The Collected Writings 
of T. E. Hulme 475n68; emphasis in original. 
204 Cf. Husserl‟s Abstract to Logical Investigations, vol. 1 and Logical Investigations 1: 181. 
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Husserl‟s brand of phenomenology: to create a philosophy that “will by means of critical 
reflection and by ever more profound methodological investigation constitute itself as 
rigorous science” (166).  
 
In Britain, Moore and Russell were making similar demands. In “Nature of Judgment,” 
which marks Moore‟s movement from Idealism to Realism, Moore launches an attack on 
“psychologism,” meaning the philosophical view that reduces concepts and principles of 
logic to states of mind or phenomena occurring in the mind, by maintaining that the world is 
composed of ideas consisting of concepts that are irreducible to anything else in the world. 
“The concept,” Moore argues, “is not a mental fact, nor any part of a mental fact” (4). Put 
simply, Moore‟s argument is that we cannot understand our judgment as being dependent on 
the relations of our ideas to reality, as this would involve a vicious circle.
205
 Four years later, 
in Principia Ethica, the work Hulme describes in “A Notebook” as heralding “the only 
philosophical movement of any importance in England” (440), Moore transfers his rejection 
of psychologism onto the field of ethics, now cautioning against committing what he calls the 
“naturalistic fallacy,” by which Moore means the error of “identifying the simple notion 
which we mean by „good‟ with some other notion” (58). Rejecting both evolutionary and 
utilitarian ethics, Moore thus proposes that ethical values are “non-natural,” objective and 
“never analytic” properties (7, 20-21).  
 
Finally, following Moore, Russell also demands that philosophy studies the methods of 
science, arguing in “On Scientific Method in Philosophy” for a more objective, more 
scientific method (8, 57).
206
 “Human ethical notions,” Russell maintains in “On Scientific 
Method in Philosophy,” “are essentially anthropocentric, and involve, when used in 
                                                 
205 For a more detailed discussion on this point, see Hutchinson 40-44. 
206 On the impact that Moore‟s argument against Idealism had on Russell, and on Moore‟s influence on Russell 
in general, see Hylton 152-66. 
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metaphysics, an attempt ... to legislate for the universe on the basis of the present desires of 
men. In this way,” Russell goes on to argue, “they interfere with that receptivity to fact which 
is the essence of the scientific attitude towards the world” (63). As Husserl, therefore, Russell 
argues in “On Scientific Method in Philosophy” for a “scientific philosophy ... which aims 
only at understanding the world and not directly at any other improvement of human life” 
(64). Ultimately, this “scientific philosophy” would not take into account “Special and 
accidental facts,” but would “make only such assertions as would be equally true however the 
actual world were constituted” (65; cf. “The Elements of Ethics” 13). 
 
According to Levenson, Hulme “enthusiastically endorses” the views of Husserl, Moore 
and Russell because they allowed him to “purge the last vestiges of humanism from his 
thought” (92-93). Although Hulme certainly sanctions these philosophers‟ attitude towards 
philosophy, the way in which he uses their ideas is much more complex than what Levenson 
allows. Hulme employs the theories of Husserl, Moore and Russell in two respects, one 
“negative” and the other “positive.” On the one hand, he finds Husserl and Russell as the two 
philosophers who “most clearly insisted on the necessity for an absolute separation between 
Pure Philosophy and Weltanschauung,” Husserl‟s term for subjective, relativistic, philosophy 
(435; emphasis in original; cf. Husserl, “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science 191).
207
 Citing 
from Husserl‟s essay on Rigorous Science and Russell‟s “On Scientific Method in 
Philosophy,” Hulme uses Husserl and Russell to show that there is a distinction between 
Weltanschauung and “pure philosophy.” He then moves on to argue that, even though the two 
                                                 
207 Here, I do not mean to suggest that Hulme uses the term “Weltanschauung” exclusively in the sense given to 
it by Husserl. As Kamerbeek has shown, Hulme‟s definition of Weltanschauung in “War Notes” as an 
“expression of an attitude towards the world” (428), “a particular view of the relation of man to existence” and 
an “interpretation of life” that was “by no means connected to a philosophy” (433), may also be understood 
through Dilthey. See Kamerbeek 194-202. Even though it is not my intention here to extrapolate on 
Kamerbeek‟s argument, it is possible that Hulme is drawing on both Husserl and Dilthey. Despite the fact that 
Husserl‟s “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” is a rebuke of Dilthey‟s position, it is now accepted that Husserl 
and Dilthey are intellectually closer than critics in the past assumed. On Husserl‟s and Dilthey‟s similarities and 
on the genesis of Husserl‟s essay, see P. McCormick 161-164. 
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are closely connected, it is possible to dissociate the former from the latter. This is important 
in Hulme‟s attempt to discredit humanism as a “standpoint” or “a particular view of the 
relation of man to existence” (429, 433). In other words, drawing on Husserl and Moore, 
Hulme aims to dissociate what he sees as the humanist “prejudices” of philosophers from 
pure, “objective” thought (430). The fact that philosophers offer their personal views as facts, 
Hulme maintains, is a “scandal” and the only solution is to “recognise that actual Philosophy 
is not a pure but a mixed subject” (428; emphasis in original). What Hulme means by “mixed 
subject” is that, rather than attesting to impersonal standards, philosophy has become a “pale 
substitute for religion,” concerned with “matters like the nature and destiny of man, his place 
in the universe, etc., all matters which would, as treated, fit very well into a personal 
Weltanschauung” (429). The problem for Hulme, therefore, is that results gathered through 
the “scientific” method are “moulded” “nearer to the heart‟s desire,” and they thus give an 
infelicitous picture of reality. The “final pictures” presented in philosophy of this kind, 
Hulme writes in “A Notebook,” are designed only to satisfy the philosopher who expresses 
them. It is in this sense that Hulme argues that these “results” are made to “conform to the 
same probably unconscious standards or canons of what is satisfying” (429; emphasis in 
original). The possibility for a scientific, impersonal approach offered by Husserl and Russell 
allows Hulme to perform a “critique of satisfaction” (429), aimed to prove that the humanist 
canons are both “demonstrably false” (436) and “unsatisfactory” (438; emphasis in original). 
In the “final pictures” given by philosophers, Hulme thus concludes, there is a “family 
resemblance,” as “They are all satisfied with certain conceptions of the relation of man to the 
world” (429). Harking back to the theme of his essays on art, Hulme traces in “A Notebook” 
this standpoint back to the Renaissance, which he describes as “the most obvious example of 
the emergence of a new weltanschauung” (433), claiming that the most striking 
characteristics of this worldview are “an attitude of acceptance to life” (433), “the putting of 
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the Perfection into man,” “the development of the conception of personality,” and “the 
establishment of the new conception of man as good” (450; cf. 445). The ideas of Husserl, 
Moore and Russell thus become in “A Notebook” the tools with which Hulme invalidates 
humanism, conceived as personal Weltanschauung, not pure philosophy. 
 
On the other hand, in Husserl, Moore and Russell, Hulme finds an “attitude” diametrically 
opposite to what he calls “humanism” (441). This is evident from the way Hulme presents the 
“objective” philosophy advocated by Husserl, Moore and Russell as free from the 
“anthropomorphism” and the “empirical prejudice” of humanist ethics (443). Moore‟s and 
Russell‟s “Neo-realism” proves that logic – propositions and concepts – is “not something 
relative to the human” and, similarly, Hulme goes on, that “ethics can be exhibited as an 
objective science ... purified from anthropomorphism” (443). In this sense, Hulme argues, 
“Neo-realism,” just like Husserl‟s Rigorous Science, constitutes a departure from humanist 
philosophy; as he puts it, “the school of Moore and Husserl break the humanist tradition” 
(452). Most crucially, Husserl, Moore and Russell, according to Hulme, disprove the 
empirical explanation “which reduces all the „higher‟ concepts to combination of more 
elementary ones” (442). For Hulme, this means that it is now “possible to think of certain 
„higher‟ concepts ... as, at the same time, simple, and not necessarily to be analysed into more 
elementary (generally sensual) elements” (443; emphasis in original; cf. 422). This is 
important for Hulme‟s overarching aim in “A Notebook,” which is to sketch out an anti-
pacifist democracy relying not only on the existence of “objective,” non-relativistic values 
but, more importantly, on a “scale,” “order,” or “hierarchy” of values (cf. 409, 452). “In as 
far ... as they free ethical values from the anthropomorphism involved in their dependence on 
human desires and feeling,” Hulme writes in “A Notebook,” “Moore and Russell ... have 
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created the machinery of an anti-humanist reaction which will proceed much further than 
they ever intended” (452).  
 
For Hulme, the problem with Moore, Russell and Husserl is that they did not go far 
enough towards discrediting the “humanist” Weltanschauung that is based on relativistic 
values (419), remaining rapt in what he describes as “uncritical humanism” (436). “A 
complete reaction from the subjectivism and relativism of humanist ethics,” he writes in “A 
Notebook,” “should contain two elements: (1) the establishment of the objective character of 
ethical values, (2) ... an order or hierarchy among such values, which it also regards as 
absolute and objective” (451-52). This remark helps us understand Hulme‟s objection to 
Husserl, Moore and Russell: while they succeed in defeating relativism and in proving that 
ethical values are objective or unanalysable, they do not establish a hierarchy of ethical 
values. Hulme is not clear in “A Notebook” why he thinks such “hierarchy” of objective 
values is so important, but seen in the context of his defence of the war, a hierarchy of ethical 
values allows him to defend his argument in favour of the war in a cohesive way. For, if 
objective or absolute values exist, and if the citizens of Britain had an absolute moral duty to 
defend their country against Germany, then that would prove contra Russell that the war is 
not fought for impulsive reasons. Describing this hierarchy of ethical values in “A 
Notebook,” Hulme argues that it is based on absolute “gaps” or “chasms” (423) between “(1) 
The inorganic world, of mathematical and physical science, (2) the organic world, dealt with 
by biology, psychology and history, and (3) the world of ethical and religious values” (424). 
It is the failure to understand the division between the organic world and religion and ethics 
that, in Hulme‟s view, underpins ethical relativism, the ethic on which humanism (and thus 
pacifism) is based (cf. 427). It is in this sense that the recognition of the existence of the 




Objective and absolute truths, Hulme explains in “A Notebook,” can be revealed only 
through a “logique du Coeur [a logic of the heart],” a reference to Pascal‟s idea that “Le 
coeur a son ordre [the heart has its own order],” meaning that, unlike the intellect, the heart 
does not analyse the world by principle and demonstration. Hulme‟s turn to Pascal instructs 
his argument in “A Notebook” in two ways. First, Hulme‟s interpretation of Pascal as a 
thinker who recognises the fundamental division between ethical/religious values and the 
inorganic and organic world, provides for Hulme a way to “remove the difficulties of 
comprehension engendered in us by the humanism of our period” (449). As we will 
remember, one of Hulme‟s objections against Russell in “War Notes” is that in his pacifist 
essays Russell fails to distinguish between absolute and relative values. Hulme makes a 
similar claim in “A Notebook” when he accuses the “Liberal pacifists” of “taking relative 
things for absolute” and, thus, for precluding the possibility of a “real absolute,” something 
which, according to Hulme, leads to “sceptical rationalism” (419). Through a “logique du 
coeur,” Pascal, as Hulme explains in “War Notes,” allows that certain values or “feelings” are 
“absolute, not relative to human life, and in certain respects a priori,” while, moreover, 
Pascal‟s “logique” makes it possible to “range the ethical values in a certain order or 
hierarchy” (414). In other words, Pascal is not a scepticist, nor is he a relativist. 
 
There is a second way in which we can understand Hulme‟s turn to Pascal and that is as 
betraying Hulme‟s enduring debt to Bergson. In “A Notebook,” Hulme criticises Bergson‟s 
philosophy for failing to recognise the chasm between organic and ethical/religious values 
and thus falling “easily in line with humanism” (426). Yet, Pascal‟s “logic of the heart” is in 
its essence the same as Bergson‟s method of “intuition” that is designed to privilege the 
prowess of instinct over the efficiency of the intellect. It is precisely for this reason that 
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Bergson acknowledges Pascal in “La Philosophie” as a source of inspiration for his 
intuitionist metaphysics (cf. 21).
208
 Like for Bergson, for Pascal reason alone cannot guide us 
to truth but, rather, “instinct” is needed; as Pascal puts it in fragment 282 of Pensées, “We 
know truth, not only by the reason, but also by the heart, and it is in this last way that we 
know first principles; and reason, which has no part in it, tries in vain to impugn them.” In 
using Pascal‟s anti-intellectualist method to explain the process of arriving to objective truths, 
Hulme is, in fact, following Bergson‟s appropriation of Pascal‟s metaphysics. In “War 
Notes,” he describes what he sees as two contrasting systems of ethics: on one side, that of 
“rationalist humanitarians,” whose ethic, as he explains, dictates that “the fundamental values 
are Life and Personality”; on the other, there is the “more heroic or tragic system of ethical 
values,” wherein values are “objective and absolute.” This second ethical order, Hulme 
contends, “may be called irrational, if we give the word rational the narrow meaning given it 
by the first ethic, i.e., those values are rational which can be reasonably based on life” (411; 
emphasis in original). As he makes it clear in “A Notebook,” however, where he returns to 
the subject of the “unconsciousness” through which the “religious attitude” arrives at 
“judgments of value,” there is nothing sentimental or mystical involved in this process: 
 
I want to emphasise as clearly as I can, that I attach very little value indeed to the 
sentiments attaching to the religious attitude. I hold, quite coldly and intellectually as it 
were, that the ... categories which ultimately make up the religious attitude, are the true 
categories and the right way of thinking. (455; emphasis in original) 
                                                 
208 On Bergson‟s interpretation of Pascal, see Chevalier 118, 111 and 122-124 and Eastwood 37-47. The 
intimate connection between the thought of Bergson and that of Pascal is recognised by Scheler, who, like 
Hulme, uses both Bergson‟s intuition and Pascal‟s “ordre du coeur” in order to argue that pure emotional acts 
cannot be based simply on rational understandings. In fact, Hulme‟s choice of the word “logique” instead of 
“ordre” suggests that a possible source for his use of Pascal in “A Notebook” is Scheler, who as Owens shows, 
discusses in his work the “a priori „ordre du Coeur‟ or „logique du Coeur‟ as Blaise Pascal succinctly phrases it” 
(qtd. in Owens 60). The anti-intellectualist methods of Pascal and Bergson are jointly acknowledged as a source 




Not only does Hulme‟s interpretation of Pascal echo his interpretation of Bergson discussed 
in chapter 3, but it is also identical with Bergson‟s reading of Pascal. Like Hulme, Bergson is 
keen on making it clear that there is nothing mystic, non-rational, or even anti-rational in 
arriving at truths by intuition. As he argues in “La Philosophie,” intuition can only be called 
“sentimental” if the word is understood in the sense given to it by Pascal, “including in it all 
knowledge that is immediate and intuitive” (qtd. in Chevalier 118).
209
 Although Hulme 
criticises Bergson‟s vitalist philosophy, therefore, his turn to Pascal shows that he still holds 
intuition to be the only satisfactory method of philosophy.  
 
Where does this leave his argument in “A Notebook”? By arguing that ethical values are 
objective and explaining that they can only be reached through an intuitive method, Hulme 
can argue against the pacifists that the moral righteousness of war is necessitated by a higher 
ethical order, which, even though it cannot be rationalised, it cannot be dismissed as 
impulsive. At the same time, by distinguishing between objective and relativistic values, 
Hulme is able to reject Russell‟s argument against the war as sceptical rationalism. Most 
importantly, the distinction between the “religious” and the humanist attitudes allows Hulme 
to demonstrate how anti-pacifism and democracy are not mutually exclusive. For, even 
though the “religious attitude” leads to a political order that includes order and discipline, this 
“order,” as Hulme explains in “A Notebook,” “is ... not merely negative, but creative and 
liberating” (444). The “religious attitude,” he insists, “is a possible one for the „emancipated‟ 
and „reasonable‟ man at this moment,” because it does not constitute the creation of “new 
medievalism,” but preserves the “honesty in science and a certain conception of freedom of 
thought and action” developed in the humanist period (444, 449). 
                                                 





A comprehensive reading of Hulme‟s war writings discredits the two most common 
interpretations of his late work. Hulme was neither a militarist, nor did he endorse the pro-
war views of the extreme Right. The letters he wrote at the front reveal a side of his thought 
that has remained neglected by critics and which complicates the claim that he was an 
enthusiastic supporter of the war. These letters are revealing because his attitude towards 
trench warfare is in line with the argument he presents in “War Notes” in favour of the war: 
the First World War, according to Hulme, was an unfortunate but necessary resort, a step 
towards securing the conservation of British institutions. Likewise, setting “A Notebook” in 
the context of his “War Notes,” illuminates his anti-humanism a good deal, for it allows us to 
see his thesis of a hierarchy of objective values as an attempt to provide firm philosophical 
backing to his defence of the war. Finally, that Hulme argues for an intuitive method of 
understanding ethical principles in “A Notebook” suggests that he continued to value 
Bergson‟s intuition, thus confirming my argument in Chapter 3, according to which, despite 
finding intuition as the most plausible philosophical method, Hulme rejected Bergson‟s 













“Fire away”: Re-interpreting Hulme’s work 
 
 
There is a letter in the Hulme Archives at Keele University that, tucked away between 
Hulme‟s manuscript notes, greets the visiting scholar. Dated May 1937, it is addressed to 
Hulme‟s first biographer, Michael Roberts, and is signed by Ezra Pound. Presumably 
responding to Roberts‟ request for information about Hulme‟s life, Pound, in his usual 
rampant manner, questions Roberts‟ desire to write a book on Hulme. Pound‟s point is that if 
Roberts wants to reiterate other critics‟ interpretations of Hulme in order to “harmonize” 
Hulme‟s thought with existing criticism, then he should abandon his project, cautioning 
Roberts not to “use retrospect to blanket and damp down the active thought ... of the time.” 
But if he thinks that he can approach Hulme‟s work in a way that both takes into account the 
literary activity of the time in which Hulme was writing and is relevant for future scholarship 
– if, as he puts it, he feels that “Hulme has anything CONstructive [sic] for tomorrow” – then, 
Pound goes on to say, Roberts should “Fire away.”
210
 Pound‟s advice to Roberts seems like a 
good point on which to end my examination of Hulme, precisely because it is as true today as 
it was in 1937. As an Epilogue to my re-examination of Hulme‟s work, I want to briefly 
explain how my study addresses both of Pound‟s concerns. 
 
At the outset of this thesis, I sought to re-examine the work of Hulme by returning 
attention to the context in which he was writing. The investigation of the intellectual context 
in the early twentieth century allows us to understand the reasons why Hulme, for example, 
                                                 
210 HUL 36. 
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describes modern poetry as “Impressionist” and the modern spirit in poetry as “relative” in 
“A Lecture,” why he was attracted to Bergson, and the sense in which he uses the terms 
“romanticism” and “classicism.” Moreover, a survey of the artistic developments in the 
Britain of 1910-14 clarifies Hulme‟s defence of abstract art a great deal, while recognising 
that his defence of Britain‟s involvement in the war was in line with the Liberal government‟s 
moral justification for the war goes some way to dispelling the claim that he was a militarist. 
This emphasis on the context in which Hulme was writing helped to challenge four common 
interpretations of Hulme‟s work: that his arguments are incoherent; that his thought 
underwent dramatic transformations; that he endorsed other thinkers‟ ideas uncritically; and 
that he promulgated authoritarian politics.  
 
In Chapter 1, we saw how, when examined through ideas in the works of Nietzsche, 
Bergson and Ribot, three thinkers whose ideas were being popularised in the Britain of the 
early twentieth century, the rudimentary notes in “Cinders” and “Notes on Language and 
Style” give a coherent “anti-intellectualist” philosophical view of reality and an account of 
the nature of language that adheres to Nietzsche‟s, Bergson‟s and Ribot‟s mistrust of 
conceptual language. In Chapter 2, “A Lecture on Modern Poetry” was revealed to present a 
lucid argument for the introduction of a new verse form in English poetry in 1908 that is in 
line with the contemporaneous demands on poetry made by Flint, Storer and Pound. Chapter 
4 explained how Hulme‟s thesis in “Romanticism and Classicism” becomes considerably less 
ambiguous once we recognise that Hulme‟s distinction between romanticism and classicism 
originates in the debate held in the Commentator about the future of the Conservative Party. 
Finally, Chapter 5 made clear that, understood in the context of the general shift taking place 
in early twentieth-century art away from representationalism, Hulme‟s twin demands for 
abstract art which is also a mode of personal expression turn out to be much less incongruous 
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than critics in the past have assumed. The critical view of Hulme‟s work as incoherent must 
accordingly be revised. 
 
The critical position that divides Hulme‟s work into distinct periods or phases has also 
been exposed as inaccurate. Chapters 2 and 5 chart the way in which the artist who uses 
primitive forms as a mode of personal and individual expression in Hulme‟s essays on art 
resembles the modern poet in “A Lecture,” described as seeking “the maximum of individual 
and personal expression” (53). Moreover, the distinction which Hulme draws in the 
notebooks between “poetry” and “prose” recurs not only in “A Lecture” and in his writings 
on Bergson, but also, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, in his essays on politics. Finally, the idea 
that any historical period is characterised by a specific worldview or attitude underwrites all 
of Hulme‟s writings, from “A Lecture” and “Romanticism and Classicism” to “Modern Art 
and its Philosophy” and “A Notebook.” 
 
Likewise, even though Hulme drew extensively on the views of Kahn, Guyau, Ribot, 
Maurras, Lasserre, Husserl, Russell and Moore, and despite the fact that he helped popularise 
the ideas of Bergson, Sorel and Worringer, it is simplistic to propose that he endorsed any of 
these thinkers‟ theories uncritically. Chapter 2 documents how the ideas of Kahn and Guyau 
are freely appropriated by Hulme in “A Lecture” and employed as part of a discussion on the 
future of modern verse in Britain. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, Hulme was critical of many 
aspects of Bergson‟s philosophy, remaining hesitant about embracing what he described as 
Bergson‟s “conclusions.” In a similar way, as explained in Chapters 4 and 5, Hulme 
distanced himself from the political opinions of Maurras, Lasserre and Sorel, as well as 
Worringer. In “A Notebook,” as argued in Chapter 6, Hulme uses the ideas of Russell, Moore 
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and Husserl to discredit Russell‟s argument, according to which those who, like Hulme, 
supported the war did so on impulsive, not rational grounds. 
 
Finally, while Hulme may fit the profile of the modernist critic who holds anti-democratic 
beliefs, is repelled by the “femininity” of Liberal Britain, and is enthusiastically pro-war, an 
understanding of the intellectual context in which he developed his political views proves that 
such assessment of his politics is very far from the truth. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, 
Hulme‟s advocacy of discipline and order in politics is best read as a moderate Conservative 
position, Hulme‟s Conservative thought emphasised in the way he defends the classicist 
ideology as a response to the specific debate in the Commentator about the future of the 
Conservative party. In Chapter 5, Hulme‟s anti-humanism is revealed to have different 
political implications to the anti-humanism of Worringer and Ludovici, while Chapter 6 
demonstrates how Hulme was eager to show how by arguing in support of Britain‟s 
involvement in the war, he was not making anti-democratic demands. Thus, although Hulme 
was suspicious of Liberal democracy, and despite the fact that he argued for a rigidly 
“ordered” and “controlled” society, claiming that he embraced authoritarian politics is 
inaccurate.  
 
In showing how Hulme refuses to take the role that critics have mapped for him, my thesis 
is first and foremost a contribution to Hulme studies. By challenging a series of “myths” 
surrounding Hulme‟s work, it paves the way for a reinterpretation of Hulme‟s work. As 
demonstrated in this study, for many years it has been common practice among critics to use 
Hulme as a paradigmatic “modernist” critic whose thought encapsulates the intellectual 
idiosyncrasies of modernism. Yet, as critics including Susan Stanford Friedman and Peter 





 Hulme‟s brand of “modernism” thus adds to the plurality of modernisms 
identified within “modernism,” as well as to the various contestations that exist within these 
modernisms. The crux of my argument has been that it is only by examining Hulme‟s work 
without a predetermined interpretative or anachronistic bias that we can begin to determine 
his position in twentieth-century literary history. In this sense my study is best seen as a 
response to the recent shift within modernist studies to return attention from the “general” to 
the “particular.” As Ann Ardis argues in Modernism and Cultural Conflict (2002), in re-
thinking modernism it is useful to return to the early “territory” on which the various 
modernisms developed. Even though I do not share Ardis‟ idea that it is necessary to 
determine “when” modernism began, I share her anxiety about constantly challenging 
traditional interpretations of “modernism” (4-8). 
 
How is this study “CONstructive for tomorrow”? There are two important ways in which 
my project contributes to modernist studies more widely. On the one hand, while primarily a 
study of Hulme‟s work, my thesis has also been a study of the intellectual context in the early 
twentieth century. Seeing Hulme as someone who debated the arrival of “foreign” ideas into 
the literary and artistic circles of London, the political “crisis” of 1910, the shift from 
representational art to experimentation with “primitive” forms and the advent of the First 
World War not only helps us to re-interpret his work, but it also testifies to the significant 
cultural impact of all these events on the literary criticism and production of this time. On the 
other hand, and much more importantly, as the last Modernist Studies Association 
Conference has reminded us, the study of modernism in the twenty-first century must seek to 
chart new vectors of influence and must inquire into the dynamic relationships between 
different “networks,” meaning different literary movements, as well as different fields of 
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11 in November 2009. A version of this paper has recently been published as “Planetarity: Musing Modernist 
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cultural production. A deeper understanding of Hulme‟s work informs the study of various 
“networks.” I do not have time to elaborate on all the different ways in which Hulme 
“participates” in modernism here, but three areas that merit further investigation can be 
identified. First, in view of the fact that, as demonstrated in this project, Hulme‟s and Storer‟s 
rejection of nineteenth-century rhetoric is politically-charged, what are we to make of 
Imagisme‟s critique of vague symbolisms? Read through Hulme‟s “Romanticism and 
Classicism” and Storer‟s Introduction to his compilation of Cowper‟s poems, Pound‟s 
insistence that the only “adequate symbol” is the “natural object” and his desire to turn to the 
classics Daniel and Cavalcanti in order to find a way out of the “blurry, messy ... 
sentimentalistic” nineteenth century gains a distinctly political valence (“Retrospect” 246, 
261-62). Secondly, both Hulme‟s relationship to Storer and Eliot deserve more attention. 
Storer‟s part in the Imagist network has received little attention, something which is revealed 
to be all the more surprising given the proximity of his ideas to those of Hulme. Regarding 
Hulme‟s relation to Eliot, even though a plethora of critics have already noted how Hulme‟s 
critique of “romantic” verse and politics in “Romanticism and Classicism” and his rejection 
of “humanist” ethics in “A Notebook” inspired the social and political programme of Eliot, a 
connection which Eliot himself acknowledges on various moments in his writings, the 
publication of vol. 2 of The Letters of T. S. Eliot in 2009 has invited us to re-examine 
Hulme‟s influence on Eliot.
212
 These recently published letters document how Eliot thought 
that there is a lot in common between Speculations and The Waste Land (letter to Sydney 
Schiff 30 Dec. 1923: 287). Moreover, Eliot disagreed with the view that Hulme is an “un 
original [sic]” thinker, whose thought is “amorphous,” insisting that Hulme “set down in 
essentials the only alternative directions that I can see to the directions of the nineteenth 
century” (355-56). Finally, this study urges a more detailed investigation of the intimate – 
                                                 
212 See, for example, Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism 149; “To Criticize the Critic” 17; “Mr. P. 
E. More‟s Essays” 136; “The „Pensées‟ of Pascal” 416 n.2; and “Second Thoughts about Humanism” 489-90.  
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and intricate – ways in which academic philosophy was appropriated into literary theory in 
the early years of the twentieth century and of the manner in which early modernist literary 
critics became interested in organised politics. These are all questions which I am hoping to 
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